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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The thesis examines British and French state action, that is to say both the characteristic 
practices of central governments and their underpinning, the working conceptions of public policy-
making in technical, political and administrative circles. Taken together, practices and conceptions make 
up a `referential framework' of public action with distinctive, deep-seated and enduring features in each 
country. 
 
 The British and French referential frameworks are deducted from two empirical, comparative 
case studies of passenger rail transport policy in Britain and France in the years 1965-1993. Use is made 
of published, archival and interview material, comprising both quantitative and qualitative data, relating 
to the British and French experiences in the research and development of high speed rolling stock 
technology (APT and TGV trains) and the planning of new high speed rail infrastructure (Paris-Lyon 
TGV line and Channel Tunnel Rail Link schemes). The case studies thus constitute windows into the 
realities of the British and French policy processes. 
 
 The empirical findings of the case studies point to highly contrasted British and French 
referential frameworks, of which traditional models of state action cannot adequately take account. For 
instance, the dominance of often contradictory political and financial imperatives in the British case 
studies cannot be explained solely in terms of limited government intervention, whilst the prevailing 
technico-economic rationale in the French case studies does not fully accord with received ideas about 
the propensity of the French State to intervene in economic life. 
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 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Everywhere the idea of the state is in crisis. The question for political reformers, as for 
revolutionaries, is no longer how to take state power, but how to administer it.
1
 From Mexico to 
Italy, the United States and China, and since 1989 in the former communist states of the old Soviet 
bloc; closer at home in Great Britain and France, we are witnessing a crisis of confidence in 
existing forms of the state. The 1980s saw an attempt to 'roll back' the state in the UK while in 
France even traditional supporters of a powerful state were visited by doubts about the French 
model and wondered whether it had become obsolete. Since the early 1970s, political scientists of 
all tendencies have strongly criticised (often for totally unrelated reasons) the ways in which 
modern states are organised. The demise of the nation-state has even been proclaimed in some 
quarters, and with it the end of state organisation as we know it, to be superseded by supranational 
organisations, be they political institutions or transnational corporations, or by sub-national 
governance. 
 Yet state machineries live on and continue to require a large proportion of national 
resources for their upkeep; in spite of reforms, at times drastic (as in the UK with the `Next Steps' 
initiative, and in France with the modernisation de l'Etat launched in 1989), continuities are, more 
often than not, more in evidence than radical changes of direction. Even where change is taking 
place, as in France and Britain, the rationales for change may have been antithetical, and/or similar 
instruments used with diverging results.
2
 This begs the question of why the French and British 
states should continue to develop along separate tracks even though they are both facing internal 
criticism, undergoing comparable external strains and working increasingly closely within the 
European Union, to the extent that some commentators have argued that the national systems were 
converging. 
 Existing forms of the state and modes of public action in Britain and France are both the 
butt of internal disapproval and felt to be under threat from the outside. The issue of national 
sovereignty has re-surfaced in recent times, first in Britain, under the premiership of Margaret 
Thatcher, then in France after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. Within the process of European 
integration, issues centred around the institutional dimension and eventual shape of the Community 
regularly threaten to become the main bone of contention between the governments of some 
member states, in particular Britain and France. Such antagonism at the policy-making level can 
partly be traced back to (seemingly) clashing conceptions and uses of public power among French 
                                                 
     
1
 See Robin Murray in `The State after Henry', Marxism Today, special issue on the public sector (May 
1991): p. 22.  H M Enzensberger argues that `The traditional conception of the state is facing a paradigm 
collapse, such as classical physics underwent long ago' (in `Walking without grace', The New 
Statesman/Society, 21/09/1990). 
     
2
 Cf. the growing centralisation of power in the UK throughout the 1980s, taking place while the reverse 
movement was sweeping France, beginning with the Decentralisation Law of 1982. 
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and British political and administrative elites. The European Community / Union has at times 
provided a new setting for age-old Anglo-French rivalry, a situation which can only delay and 
render more difficult the solving of problems within the competence of the EU, the expansion of 
Union activity into new fields, and the development of institutional arrangements. 
 
1. The British and French models of public action 
 It seems pertinent therefore to examine one of the issues that stand in the way of better 
Franco-British mutual understanding, namely conceptions of public action, of the state and its 
functions. Such ideas are important for more than purely academic reasons; as Kenneth Dyson has 
shown, ideas of the state affect the character of institutional arrangements, the attitudes of elites 
and political opposition, and the modes of interest accommodation.
3
 In spite of the inherent 
difficulties of pinning down something as elusive as conceptions of the state in two given countries, 
it seems vital to acquire some understanding of this field for a second reason: the term `state' itself 
is used as a political weapon by members of the ruling elites, both in the domestic and in the 
European public debates. Naturally, such uses of the term are made partly with reference to what 
these elites regard as popular conceptions of the state, which may vary widely from conceptions 
held by elite groups themselves. But even so, there is some degree of correlation between popular 
and elite views, if only at a superficial level. For instance, the 1980s in France resounded with the 
clamour for `less state' (moins d'Etat); Mrs Thatcher's phrase: `roll back the frontiers of the state',
4
 
as used in one of her speeches had an almost evangelical ring to it, while the word `super-state' was 
clearly meant by her as a derogatory one. French opponents to a feared loss of national sovereignty 
have also argued against the `Super-Etat' more recently. 
 The main objective of this thesis is to illuminate some of the similarities and differences 
between the political systems of the two countries, but why this particular pair? As mentioned 
above, there is a history of Anglo-French antagonism and of mutual misconceptions which - as it 
were - are crying out to be dispelled and this in itself is an incentive to research. But beyond this, 
the two countries have become typecast by political scientists as representatives of wider trends, 
France being the main influence over `continental' western Europe since the 1789 Revolution at 
least, and Britain the founder member of the `Anglo-Saxon' world, which includes countries such 
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Whether such typecasting is accurate or 
not is not our concern here but it is surely useful to compare these two particular `models' of public 
action in some depth in one well-defined sector and on an empirical basis. A parallel study of two 
countries is also worthwhile in that it can bring out salient features which may be taken for granted 
                                                 
     
3
 See Kenneth H.F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe (Oxford: Robertson, 1980). 
     
4
 `We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed 
at a European level, with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.' (Text of a 
speech given by the Prime Minister the Rt Hon. Margaret Thatcher MP on Europe, in Bruges, Belgium on 
Tuesday 20 September 1988.)  
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when looking at one country in isolation. Needless to say, there is no universal yardstick by which 
state action may be appraised and an iterative process of mutual comparison has to be followed. 
Too often, comparative studies focus on one country, which is then compared to caricatures of one 
or several others; this study will studiously seek to maintain a balance, and it is hoped will be even-
handed throughout. 
 Another, related rationale for the choice of countries, is to be found in the fact that both 
countries are members of the same organisation, the European Union. The problems which Britain 
has encountered with membership, both before and since joining, have been analysed at length and 
it is now taken for granted that Britain occupies a peculiar position in the development of the 
Community / Union. It was the French government which vetoed British entry into the Community 
on two occasions, and EC institutions were modelled on French practices in many respects. 
Moreover, the twenty one years which Britain spent outside the Community meant that it did not 
participate in the all-important process of building up a corpus of policy, law and a general 
European `philosophy'. Small wonder then that British officials might feel less at home in the 
Community than their French counterparts. Part of their unease can be ascribed to the assumptions 
that they make about the nature and uses of public power. As Lord Cockfield has pointed out,
5
 the 
original Six set up the EC as a customs union, that is an arrangement which involved `positive' 
action by the member states inasmuch as something which did not exist had to be created. The UK 
on the other hand viewed Europe as a potential free trade area, something which involved the 
removal of existing arrangements (such as import duties) and an increase in the play of private 
forces. It is therefore of some interest to examine the prevailing conceptions and uses of public 
power in two of the key members of the EU, even if of necessity this excludes those found in other 
member states, which are no less significant.
6
 
 
The semantic difficulties of cross-national comparison 
 Interestingly enough, theories of the state have been mainly dealt with by political 
philosophers from the Continent while empirical policy analysis has been the preserve of `Anglo-
Saxon'
7
 thinkers. As Dyson puts it, the concept of the state permeates continental European thought 
                                                 
     
5
 Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics (16/03/1993). Lord Cockfield has been closely 
involved in European matters, in particular as Commissioner in charge of the internal market and as Vice-
President of the Commission. 
     
6
 The different views of public action found in Britain and France partly explain why the two countries 
often find it so difficult to work together, as witnessed by joint projects such as Concorde, the project for a 
tunnel under the Channel (which took the best part of the postwar era to come into existence) etc. One 
might retort that what is a source of difficulty is not Franco-British cooperation but cooperation between 
governments of divergent or opposed political views. I will argue however that state practice tends to cross 
party boundaries. 
     
7
 The French have a habit of grouping the English-speaking world (meaning Britain and America) under 
the general banner of `Anglo-Saxon', as opposed to the Romanised continent. 
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but has little cultural resonance in Britain.
8
 This academic division of labour reflects a linguistic 
divide with important political ramifications. We find semantic issues at several levels: firstly the 
naming of organisations, for instance State / central government; or services publics, which can be 
translated as `public utilities', rather than `public services'. Secondly the nature of the relationship 
between different policy actors; for instance, `regulation' is more properly translated as 
réglementation, whilst régulation is akin to `control'.
9
 I would like to dwell on the first level for a 
moment: whereas in France the term `state' (l'Etat, always spelt with a capital `e') easily rolls off 
the tongue of politicians, civil servants, journalists and public alike, in the UK, any mention of the 
word outside academic circles is unusual. The nearest equivalent in constitutional terms, `the 
Crown', is hardly used, and only in a narrower sense than `state',
10
 while the preferred term, 
`government', has a much wider referential field than its French translation, `gouvernement', which 
only denotes the set of incumbent ministers. For `Whereas individuals die, government continues. 
In English, the word government confuses what is permanent with what is transient. By contrast, in 
most European countries there is a clear distinction between the durable commitments of the state, 
as against the views of the government of the day, consisting of the party and politicians victorious 
at the last election. The state is a permanent body ... In British constitutional usage, the state is 
usually represented by the Crown'.
11
 The authors of the above quotation wished to distinguish 
between two functions, the permanent and the transient, and resorted to `government' for the former 
and `administration' for the latter. I have opted to differentiate between the two countries regarding 
the permanent function by using State for France, central government for Britain. 
 We are faced with a translation problem that in itself reveals a great deal about conceptions 
of public power in the two countries. For instance, as a rule l'Etat is used in a very wide variety of 
contexts, a use which creates the overall impression of a single, unified actor, also a somewhat 
abstract, superior entity. In contrast, `government' suggests recognisable, elected public figures. It is 
used in a majority of contexts, but competes as it were with other terms, such as `the Crown-in-
Parliament', `public power' and `public authority'; the resulting impression is one of a nebula, 
something difficult to define and to name, with no clear identity. The lack of a common usage word 
in English for the permanent business of government denotes institutionalised short-termism. On 
the other hand, much reference to `government' alludes to a great deal more than the government of 
the day. Perhaps this mismatch between theorising about the state and the actual exercise of public 
power is proof of the elusive and ambivalent nature of British conceptions of public power. 
                                                 
     
8
 Dyson (1980). 
     
9
 Claude Martinand, `Quels outils de régulation?', in Bauby et Boual, Pour une citoyenneté européenne: 
quels services publics? (Paris: Editions de l'Atelier/Editions Ouvrières, 1994): p. 136. 
     
10
 Dyson (1980). 
     
11
 Richard Rose and Phillip L. Davies, Inheritance in Public Policy: Change without Choice in Britain 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 9. 
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 The fact that the term `State' will be used throughout to refer to the French State poses no 
particular problem since both academic and practitioners in France use the same term. In Britain, 
there is no such common ground between political science and political practice,  and I have opted 
for `central government' as a shorthand term. In primary material, I have seldom come across the 
term `state'; its uses are very context-specific. Claude Martinand (a French Ministry of Transport 
official) has pointed out that `These semantic difficulties cover different conceptual approaches, 
political and economic cultures, and work in favour of misunderstandings and often sterile 
ideological debates'.
12
 They therefore make international, not to mention supranational, policy work 
more difficult. 
 Although in the final analysis, actual state activities - as opposed to talk about the state - in 
Britain and France are often of a comparable nature, and are exercised in the same sectors (albeit to 
a different extent), both the practice and the justification of public power are often distinctive. This 
is because all action carries subjective meaning, and there are as a result some essential differences 
in (subjective) perception which explain why - as I have shown above - different terms are felt to be 
needed. Differences in perception, and the resulting semantic puzzle, in turn have considerable 
influence on expectations regarding state behaviour, on state behaviour itself and on responses to it. 
The ambition of this study is to highlight the nature of the differences in terms of meanings,
13
 and 
the consequences that flow from them, while drawing attention to the numerous, sometimes 
surprising, similarities. 
 It is taken as read that the state is not to be viewed, in anthropomorphic terms, as a unitary 
actor with something resembling a purposeful will, but rather as a system of power relationships. It 
is however extremely laborious to avoid using anthropocentrist vocabulary in all circumstances; the 
reader is therefore requested to make allowances for occasional lapses. Neither is the state to be 
viewed solely as an arena for action in which numerous factions vie for supremacy. Rather it will 
be portrayed as the repository of public power, both under pressure from society and economic 
actors to use its power in certain ways, and driven to act through an internal (politico-
administrative) momentum, with the ever-present possibility of alliances between sections of the 
state apparatus and sectional interests `outside' it. Inverted commas are required here for it will 
become increasingly clear throughout the thesis that the state cannot be viewed as a well-defined 
entity, even in France where unlike in Britain it actually has a legal personality. To speak of 
`frontiers' of the state in a literal sense is therefore meaningless: state, society and the economy are 
not divided by a clear, unequivocal boundary, all the more so in Britain where a number of terms 
                                                 
     
12
 Martinand (1994): p. 136. 
     
13
 I agree with Dobbin that `the role of meaning has been underemphasized in policy studies' (Frank 
Dobbin, Forging industrial policy: the United States, Britain, and France in the railway age (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1994), p. 26). Too much emphasis is placed either on the mechanics of decision-making, or on the 
power games played out by conflicting interests. 
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compete to label the sphere of state activity.
14
 
 No single overarching theory of the state - be it corporatist, Marxist, pluralist or public 
choice - appears to fit entirely the political realities of either country, both of which on the surface 
share the same characteristics (e.g. mixed economies; social welfare systems; liberal democratic 
ideologies); these theories operate at a level of abstraction which does not account for the rather 
untidy realities of public policy-making. Each of the two countries seems to have evolved its own 
peculiar brand of `state'.
15
 I therefore aim to present a less comprehensive, but more concrete 
picture and to evaluate what happens `on the ground'. The findings will not support or reject any 
one theory of the state, but rather induce some caution towards the applicability of universal 
theories to contexts which are always particular. 
 
2. Methodology 
 The analysis in this study rests on a detailed examination of specific public policies. The 
focus is not however sectoral policy (here, high speed passenger railway services), neither is it the 
policy-making process. Rather it is the framework within which policy-making is set which is to be 
examined: by framework is meant both the conceptual environment and the dense mesh of working 
practices and habits which have to be understood if one wishes to fully comprehend what makes 
British and French political cultures so distinct from one another. 
 To this end, I draw on Muller's definition of a `normative referential framework' (un 
référentiel normatif): every sectoral policy undertaken by the public authorities involves `the 
representation that one has of the sector involved, as well as of its place and role in society.'
16
 Thus 
it is impossible to understand education policy at any given time without referring to the prevalent 
conception of education at that time (a conception which needless to say may change with time). I 
argue that it is impossible to understand the background to any public policy without examining 
what I will call the `referential framework of public action': namely the set of characteristic state 
`practices', together with their underpinning, `conceptions' of public action, of the state's place and 
role in society and the economy. Together, `practices' and `conceptions' form a referential 
framework which although invisible, is nonetheless omnipresent. 
 I do not mean to examine political rhetoric about the state, or the innumerable theoretical 
discussions of the British and French states, but the processes and working assumptions in actual 
policy-making `on the ground'. The ambition of this work is therefore to analyse the `tacit 
dimension' of policy-making, that is the `propositions and opinions shared by a group and so 
                                                 
     
14
 I have borrowed the term `frontiers' from Mrs Thatcher and used it in the title to refer to the perceived 
limits of legitimate public action and state extension into civil society and the economy. 
     
15
 This is what Dobbin calls the `unfortunate disjuncture between theory and empirical findings in 
comparative studies of policy' (1994, p. 1). 
     
16
 Pierre Muller, `Un schéma d'analyse des politiques sectorielles', RFSP, Vol. 35, No 2 (Paris: April 
1985): p. 170. Concept further developed in P Muller and B Jobert, L'Etat en action (Paris: PUF, 1987). 
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obvious to it that they are never fully or systematically articulated'.
17
 
 Why focus on something as elusive as `referential frameworks'? Beyond the mechanics of 
decision-making, there are two levels of analysis which the author felt had not been sufficiently 
explored. Firstly, decisional procedures carry meanings, which need to be unpacked. For instance, 
the duration, format and place of a public inquiry within the decision-making process are far from 
being indiferent matters. Secondly, the substantive content of policy decisions rests on 
unarticulated assumptions, which require careful scrutiny, if we are to make complete sense of 
national public policies. For example, the way in which different transport modes are viewed in 
relation to each other has far-reaching implications for transport policy. The `cultural' dimension of 
policy-making is something we can no longer afford to ignore.
18
 
 Within the frameworks themselves, there is a constant interaction between conceptions and 
practices, a continuous process of redefining one another which is extremely broad and largely 
dependent on the historical legacy. We may indeed speak of a symbiotic relationship in which there 
is no question of `which came first'. I therefore present both in parallel throughout the main 
chapters. 
 In order to define the British and French referential frameworks of public action, I 
undertake a comparison of prevalent practices and conceptions in senior technical, political and 
administrative circles which were involved in two double case studies in the field of high speed 
railway policy. The case studies, which form the bulk of the thesis, are the following: 
(1) British and French experiences in the research and development of high speed rolling stock 
technology, namely APT (Advanced Passenger Train 1965-1985) and TGV (Train à Grande 
Vitesse 1965-1981). Both these new trains represented a new departure for the railways concerned, 
British Rail (BR) in Britain and Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer (SNCF) in France. 
(2) The Channel Tunnel Rail Link between London and the Channel Tunnel (CTRL1 1970-1975; 
CTRL2 1987-1993); the first TGV high speed rail link, between Paris and Lyon (LGV 1966-1983). 
These schemes have been selected because they were the first plans for new main line rail 
infrastructure in the postwar era in Britain and France. 
 In these case studies, the focus of attention is both on public action itself and on 
conceptions of public action in technical, political and administrative circles. The appropriateness 
of policy objectives, the efficiency with which they are pursued, and actual policy outcomes are not 
under scrutiny. This work does not attempt to provide an explanatory framework for two very 
divergent national, sectoral policies, but on the contrary uses empirical evidence gathered for the 
case studies to deduct more general features of the British and French referential frameworks of 
public action. 
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 To speak of state practice and conceptions of public power brings up the question of 
method: how is one to handle a concept of this nature? For this task, two levels of analysis seem 
appropriate, the first one being policy-making (in our field, high speed passenger rail transport); at 
this first level, the focus is on characteristic state practices and on institutions in the narrow sense 
(the `objective' reality). The second level of analysis is elite attitudes towards public power that 
underpin state practice in our sector (the `subjective' reality). The first of the two layers of analysis 
is mainly descriptive and narrative (chronological study of state `behaviour'), while the second is 
more explanatory and interpretative (attitudes accompanying behaviour). The first level may be 
called the organizational dimension of the state, and examines functioning institutions and 
procedures; the second level, the cultural dimension, explores `cultural accounts' of public action.
19
 
These are explanations of social reality by means of the favoured shared opinions of a group; they 
are collective abstractions which purport to describe how the world actually works (whereas 
ideologies deal with how it should work), endow it with meanings which become so entrenched 
that they are taken for granted and become the unspoken assumptions of a given political culture. 
 What makes logics of state action so enduring is the fact that they are subjectively 
associated with national prosperity: `Wherever nations could call their economies successful, they 
linked that success to peculiar characteristics of their political orders.'
20
 In this sense, one may 
speak of national `myths' of state action. Also the `new institutional' approach
21
 argues that national 
policy strategies persist over time because of more objective reasons such as the inherent inertia of 
state organisation, and institutional capacity; that is a given state has the resources to do particular 
things rather than other things which a neighbouring state might do; existing organisational 
resources favour the adoption of new policies that are analogous to existing policies, and obstruct 
policies that are fundamentally different. It is not simply a matter of the amount of available 
resources but of their nature. Thus this study includes a relatively large amount of historical 
material because features of the present British and French transport systems (such as the modal 
split) are to a very large extent the product of administrative, engineering and political decisions 
taken over several decades, and because basic options have often been chosen unconsciously, are 
never evaluated because taken for granted and tend to be reproduced by successive generations of 
decision-makers. 
 
 
Sources 
 The sources to be used for the case studies are manifold and varied so as to increase the 
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value of the findings. They include, in both countries: the national press; government statements, 
reports and policy documents; parliamentary reports and proceedings; ministerial archives; political 
party policy documents; think-tank reports; professional transport literature; speeches, statements, 
articles, autobiographies, etc by politicians, civil servants, and railway officers involved in the case 
studies. Written sources are supplemented by oral evidence gained through a set of semi-structured 
interviews of decision-makers closely involved in the case studies. Respondents were divided up 
into three occupational groups: politicians, senior civil servants, and leading members of the 
railway industry. The technique used was in-depth loosely structured interviewing. There were 
three sets of questions - related to each other but approaching the same issues from different angles 
- for the three segments of the elite. The thesis is based on written and oral evidence which is 
mainly of a qualitative nature. 
 A number of hypotheses had to be formulated as guidelines for the research and the 
interviews. It was presupposed that: 
(1) statutes and formal agreements could not be taken to represent the whole picture, that they 
might even be misleading at times, and that the greatest interest should be accorded to more 
subjective factors such as personalities and traditions. It was equally important to assess the actual 
influence of government officials and of politicians in office over the running of the railway, as 
opposed to their formal controlling powers. 
(2) The objective was to define the dominant attitudinal dispositions in the diverse policy actors. 
The emphasis was therefore on prevailing views; divergent, minority opinions are not dealt with. 
 The study rests to a large extent on information gathered through interviews, an approach 
which is not without its difficulties. But it also makes it possible to gain a view from within that 
cannot otherwise be captured, when evidence connected with recent events is not officially 
available. It was essential to get accounts from all parties involved, not just one actor or one side. 
To this end, the main policy actors were identified in the course of documentary research: either 
they appeared as the authors of reports or members of committees, or they were identified through 
their positions either in the railways or within central administrations. Although it was obviously 
not possible to interview all those involved in the case studies at senior level, the use of 
`comprehensive sampling' meant that I met people from all the divisions involved. 
 By its very nature, such evidence can only shed light on elite, as opposed to popular, 
conceptions of the state. The present work is not a history of popular assumptions about the state. 
`Elite' is to be taken as a working assumption rather than as an illustration of any single elite theory. 
 
Methodological limits 
 The significance of my findings is to some extent circumscribed by a number of 
methodological imperfections, which do not however invalidate it. 
 1) The thesis is to a large extent based on what people were willing to tell me within the 
framework of interviews. The common danger with this type of evidence is that respondents may 
not be in full possession of the facts, or may not all be equally candid; answers may be - 
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consciously or not - biased. This is particularly to be expected in the case of policy failures, which 
may have left bad feelings on all sides. But the biases of one person, or one group, can be 
contrasted with those of others and with facts which are either in the public domain, or well-
established. Cross-checking crucial items with other respondents and with known facts therefore 
constituted a sizeable part of the fieldwork in both countries. Also I was looking for assumptions, 
ideas and feelings rather than dry facts, and biases can tell us something of interest about the 
attitude of the respondent, about self-presentation or about their subjective feelings regarding the 
power relationships they were involved in. The interviews were not designed to constitute a 
quantitative survey, but to help build a qualitative picture. I was not looking for witnesses to truth 
and the best one could hope for was to get close to a realistic picture. 
 2) Although every attempt was made to interview a representative sample of respondents, 
there are bound to be some omissions on the `horizontal' level of decision-making, as the three 
main groups (civil servants, railway managers and board members, and politicians) add up to a 
sizeable number. As far as the vertical level is concerned, many local authorities and grassroots 
organisations have been involved in the policy debate surrounding new rail links but it was beyond 
the ability of a single researcher to include these groups. Furthermore the timespan involved means 
that the evidence gained through interviews can only be incomplete. Even when correlated with 
established facts, it leads to conclusions which at times are tentative. 
 3) Historical and geographical factors have played important roles in the sector under 
scrutiny, hence it is necessary to disentangle them from political factors proper; but in any case, 
one cannot simply reduce national differences to history and geography: natural settings and 
historical legacies can be turned to advantage - or not - through the exercise of public power. 
Moreover, historical and geographical factors actually become absorbed in the political system, 
giving it shape and a distinctive national `flavour'. Conceptions of public action, like any other 
shared conceptions, are to a great extent a product of their time and place. 
 4) There are formal channels of influence which are easily defined but much state control 
is exercised through informal processes, which cannot be documented and must remain as 
unconfirmed hypotheses. 
 5) It will be argued that the conclusions of a sectoral study, however well-researched, 
cannot be generalised and this no doubt is true. The findings have no claim to universal relevance, 
but patterns do emerge: there are typical and atypical sectors. It is in the nature of specialised 
research that it can only illuminate a small area in a vast field and that it only acquires its full 
significance when put side by side with other equally narrow pieces of research in later years, when 
enough pieces of the puzzle have been assembled. I can only hope to arrive at findings which will 
be true of the sector under scrutiny and thus make a small contribution to the long and extremely 
extensive debate about the state. 
 
The `narrative method' 
 The objectives of the present research are ambitious inasmuch as a comparative study 
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inevitably involves handling and presenting large amounts of material and because the material is 
mainly of a qualitative nature, though gained from a sector shot through with extremely concrete 
issues. These objectives therefore required a methodology which would allow the presentation of 
evidence in a gradual yet meaningful fashion, and which would facilitate the `jump' from concrete 
data to qualitative analysis. The method which I have elected to use is the result both of my own 
experimentation and of the work carried out in the field of qualitative research by others, in 
particular Abell's `narrative method', based on the following definition: `Narratives give a portrayal 
of how outcomes are brought about by human actions and interactions.'
22
 
 The case studies in my work are based on Abell's premise that `narratives or accounts can 
legitimately be assembled by, amongst others, the social analyst to account for real occurrences in 
the social world, but as such they should be deemed to be complex entities always open to 
revision.'
23
 Indeed `the totality of a complex narrative will not normally fall within the discursive 
rationality of the actors involved, but local regions will; it is this fact that enables the narrativist to 
begin to piece things together as a structure of intersecting substructures each of which are locally 
meaningful though which may add up to something which entirely escapes the grasp of those 
concerned.'
24
 Herein lies the contribution of the social scientist, who can assemble the multifarious 
dimensions of a given action and thereby arrive at something greater than the sum of its parts. 
 I propose to assemble two sets of two complex public policy narratives as a basis for 
analysis, using the narrative method which in practice involves `copious materials', namely oral 
evidence (interviews) and all manners of documentary evidence. My case studies possess the 
features listed by Abell as characteristic of complex, `rich historically based' case studies: `First, 
they ... involve many actors (units of analysis) the actions of which are parametrically or 
strategically interdependent; second, these actors/units, may be at different levels of aggregation, 
e.g. individuals and collectivities of one sort or another; third, the aggregation may change in the 
course of the narrative, e.g. the creation of an effective collectivity; fourth, there may be complex 
patterns of parallel processing ...; fifth, the time signature of parallel sequences might be on a 
different scale; sixth, the narrative may describe a micro-macro link eventuating in a collective 
outcome.'
25
 
 The narrative method is part of a set of approaches with the 
  ambition to see social phenomena as more or less complex sequences of connected 
events. These events and their connections are theoretically described and it is to 
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`ethno theories' and locally meaningful connections which we often resort to 
enable us to string them together in an intelligible manner (`what theories'). The 
sequences in turn show `how' their end states or outcomes are generated (i.e. they 
portray the inherent kinematics involved) these then acquire the status of the facts 
inviting a generative theory (`why theories'). This is where real theorising begins.
26
 
At the last stage, the purpose of the narrative method is fulfilled, which is to compare analyses of 
narratives `in order to detect whether or not they possess any inherent generalisations when 
suitably abstracted.'
27
 
 In my case studies, I have broadly followed the three stages listed above. The first section 
of each study provides a brief, chronological, factual sketch of what happened. The second and 
third sections provide an account of how it happened. Owing to the complexity of the material, the 
second sections have been divided up into constituent parts which present the actions from several 
slightly different angles, whilst the third sections follow through the kinematics of the action from 
beginning to end. Once the case studies have been presented in this way (`what' and `how') 
separately, comparative analysis proper begins to address the question why. This is achieved 
through delineating strongly connected themes that recur throughout the case studies. 
 The narrative method involves comparing narratives in two ways: semantic and syntactic. 
Semantic comparison revolves around the `situated meanings' of the actions being compared, whilst 
syntactic comparison focuses on `the structure or connectivity of the actions in their respective 
narratives'.
28
 Past public policy research has tended to focus either on decision-making processes, 
or on ideas, but all too often the meaning behind the processes has been ignored. As Heise has 
pointed out, generalisations must include the `serious consideration of semantics ... Formal 
descriptions of narratives must be as disciplined semantically as they are temporarily and 
causally.'
29
 In my study, syntactic comparison will centre on the mechanics of decision-making, 
whilst semantic comparison will focus both on conceptions of public action and on the meaning of 
actual practices. 
 I have therefore divided the comparative parts of the case study chapters into syntactic and 
semantic sections: the former correspond to decision-making processes and the configuration of 
actors; whilst the latter deal with the philosophies of public policy-making which underpin 
decisions. The two levels are indissolubly linked and interact with each other; they are presented in 
parallel in order to gain a thorough understanding of the referential frameworks of public action in 
the two countries. It is within the semantic situations that national rationalities will be most clearly 
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contrasted. 
  Heise also argues that `an action is constructed within a cultural context; the culture of the 
actors defines the reality that constrains actions and makes them connected'; the challenge is that in 
order to develop models that make sense, `we need to work with event descriptions that are 
meaningful in the culture that generated actions'; in other words, though the analysis may (indeed 
should) go beyond `what is known in the indigenous culture', it must be based on descriptions 
which remain true to that culture, using language more or less in the way it would be used by its 
indigenous members; only then can `the analysis of culturally-variable meaning' begin.
30
 I would 
like to briefly address this point: as pointed out earlier, I have chosen to use the word `State' in the 
French case studies and the phrase `central government' - very occasionnally `state' - in the British 
ones. Similarly some French designations simply cannot be translated satisfactorily and it was felt 
to be far more meaningful to keep some words in the native language (e.g. équipement, cabinet). 
Ideally a French practitioner should immediately recognise what is being talked about in the French 
case studies, whilst a British practitioner should feel at home reading the British case studies. The 
real comparative work can only take place in the final part of each chapter and in the concluding 
chapter, using a metalanguage as far as is practicable in order to step back from the particular (case 
studies) and raise issues of general significance. 
 
3. States and railways: a template of public action 
 Why concentrate on a single sector, why elect the railways as that sector, and within it, 
high speed rail passenger transport? State activity in the twentieth century has become increasingly 
multifarious, so much so that one could not possibly hope to encompass all the spheres in which 
the state plays a part in a study of this nature. In order to assess practices of, and attitudes towards, 
public power, it was necessary to use a single policy sector of manageable size, one in which the 
state was fairly active, so that this sector could provide the setting in which state activity and the 
responses to it could be observed. Why, within the transport sector, choose a nationalised industry 
as the context for the case study? Because as has been argued by David Coombes,
31
 it is tantamount 
to studying the process of government, given that the state is directly involved in the running of 
public enterprises. 
 The approach followed was not that of an economist but that of a political scientist. The 
appropriateness, in purely economic terms or otherwise, for the state to run industrial firms is not 
our concern here. We are interested in the meaning of state action, not in its effectiveness. Thus the 
chosen sector, rail passenger transport, is not studied for its own sake. Our concern here is not the 
railways as such (although a fascinating subject in their own right) but the state: why state action 
took the course it did, rather than another, why state power was used, or not used when it could 
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have been, for which purpose and in what manner (e.g. coercive or conciliatory). The objective is 
not to account for differences in the features of the two railway systems, or in outcomes of railway 
policy-making, by means of an explanation centred on the referential frameworks. Although it 
could be argued that state action - or inaction as the case may be - is to a large extent responsible 
for the divergent paths followed by railway development in the two countries, it is by no means the 
sole, or even the main, explanatory factor. The present study examines only one strand of the 
`railway story'. Other strands such as the historical, geographical, managerial, engineering legacies 
may have been just as crucial in determining the outcome of the `railway story' but cannot be dealt 
with here - although passing reference will be made to them inasmuch as they had some connection 
with public action. 
 The policy sector chosen as a setting for the case studies will act as a prism through which 
diverse components of the British and French referential frameworks can be separated and 
examined, in deductive fashion. The contribution this study hopes to make to the debate about the 
state is as follows: to present empirical evidence of public action, so that several main features of 
the British and French referential frameworks may be analysed. 
 It does not follow however that the choice of sector is indifferent. The field of railway 
transport is an ideal one in many ways. Firstly, `The contribution of transport to the gross national 
product is far from insignificant', and the railways actually are a major component of national 
transport systems.
32
 Rail transport infrastructure has played a crucial role in economic life since the 
Industrial Revolution. 
 Secondly, railways were the first major industry to elicit modern industrial strategies on 
the part of nation-states; Dobbin argues that state industrial strategies, at first developed in relation 
to railways, were later applied - on the whole, unchanged - to other sectors of economic life, 
because as a rule `national industrial strategies are reproduced when nations tackle new 
problems.'
33
 What is true of state action in the rail sector therefore stands a greater than average 
chance of being true in a number of other sectors as well. Some of the conclusions will be worth 
applying to other sectors, beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is self-evident that they will 
fall far short of having a universal value. 
 Thirdly, the status of public undertakings such as SNCF and BR raises interesting 
questions. Both are quasi-governmental agencies and may be viewed as an arm of the state in many 
respects. As such, they constitute an interesting facet of the apparatus of public power, even though 
in their dealings with central government agencies they view themselves as separate entities. In 
spite of the fact that the railways are state-owned in both countries, different attitudes regarding 
state control of these public assets have prevailed: as a result, the relationships between the two 
parties are contrasted, a situation which tells us something about the state, as it does indeed tell us 
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much about French and British political cultures in general. 
 Fourthly, the clear differences in services provided in the two countries, as well as in the 
issues that are debated (e.g. privatisation) point to differences in approach in the two countries. 
Some of these differences can be explained in terms of geographical features (the UK having a 
much smaller landmass with long distances only along a North-South axis) or historical 
circumstances (railway development started somewhat later in France). Economic reasons may also 
be invoked; the relative decline of the British economy may have resulted in a reduced availability 
of funds for public corporations. But beyond these factors, there is one overriding reality, which is 
that in both countries, the railway undertakings eventually came to rely on public funds for their 
financing and have laboured under state-imposed constraints as regards other sources (internal and 
external) of financing. In an industry where the availability of capital constitutes a paramount issue, 
such financial dependence provided the state with a prominent role. Furthermore, a high level of 
state involvement both in France and the UK has been justified on the same grounds in at least one 
instance: that of safety. 
 Besides, comparative research in political science may be well established but much 
ground remains to be covered. The French and British railway sectors have either been examined in 
isolation in their respective countries, or have been included in Europe-wide comparative studies of 
a technical nature, which yield extremely valuable data but do not address more qualitative issues. 
 Just as it was felt that the railway sector was very suitable for a study of this type, there are 
some compelling reasons behind the choice of case studies. Firstly, in a study of a comparative 
nature such as this, one has to compare like with like as far as that is ever possible. British Rail and 
SNCF provide good case study material since throughout the twentieth century their status has 
been roughly equivalent; both have been state-owned for a similar length of time: BR wholly since 
1947, while the SNCF was mainly State-owned between 1937, when it was nationalised, and 1983, 
when the French State acquired the 49% of the shares it had not previously owned. Moreover, the 
high speed TGV and APT trains were developed in the same period (from 1965, when the plans 
were first mooted) and entered passenger service for the first time within just over one year of each 
other (TGV on 28 September 1980, APT on 7 December 1981). 
 Secondly, state intervention in the railway sector has been well-established in both 
countries since the nineteenth century, particularly in the fields of safety regulation and national 
defence, but has been more controversial in others, such as financial and commercial policies, upon 
which R&D processes hinge: the case studies are exemplary in this respect. They raise all manner 
of issues about the functions of the modern state and illustrate the way it is organised. 
 Lastly, the case studies are very tangible ones, with a strong, factual basis relatively easy to 
verify, on which analysis of more elusive concepts relating to the referential frameworks of public 
action can be firmly grounded. This point needs stressing: too often, studies of the state have been 
conducted at a very high level of abstraction and have tended to overlook realities on the ground. 
This has been all the more easy as `state' is a term which has so far escaped a precise, authoritative, 
universal definition, and a concept which lends itself to philosophical speculation. On the other 
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hand, public policy-making analysis has yielded extremely valuable information on the actual 
workings of the state apparatus but has often failed to link its detailed findings with more general 
theories of the state. The gap between these two approaches clearly needs to be bridged in order to 
`reintegrate the analysis of policies into a wider conception of the State-society relationship'.
34
 
 Clear differences between British and French policies towards the railways have always 
existed. It would be tempting to ascribe these to party political reasons: thus left-wing governments 
would be expected to favour public transport systems while conservative ones would be less than 
generous towards them. But this does not hold up to closer scrutiny; cross-national differences 
cannot be explained solely in terms of political battles between rival parties, as within each country 
policy decisions have often been remarkably similar regardless of which party was in office. Given 
the relatively favoured condition of French railways, one would have presumed that they had 
flourished under Socialist administrations, but this was not the case until 1981. Conversely, British 
Rail's ambitious and expensive Modernisation Plan was approved by a Conservative Cabinet in 
1955, and the railway's decline was not arrested by eleven years of Labour rule between the early 
1960s and the late 1970s. It follows that state action cannot be viewed simply as the 
implementation of partisan policies: it is also determined by prevailing conceptions and practices of 
public power which, to a large extent, cut across party lines. The extent to which such conceptions 
are national and normative, rather than partisan, is one of the main issues which this thesis 
addresses. 
 An interesting account of the origins of the differences between the two systems is 
proposed by Dobbin in his comparative study of how industrial policy was forged in the early 
railway era. He argues that `Because they were developed to explain policy choices within nations, 
existing approaches to public policy are seldom well suited to explaining broad differences 
between national policy styles.'
35
 So for instance, rather than asking why a new Railway Act was 
passed in Britain in 1968, the type of question one needs to answer is why was the British 
government so anxious to create an arm's length relationship with nationalised industries in general, 
whilst the French government spontaneously institutionalised State control of public enterprises. 
Different logics prevailed in the two countries, but such logics have by and large not been theorised 
by public policy analysts `because the idea that national economies follow different cultural 
patterns is at odds with the modern worldview, in which economics, like physics, is governed by a 
single set of laws under one general theory.'
36
 
 In order to explain different logics, we need to follow the lead offered by ethnographers, 
who `know for certain that the meanings represented by premodern institutions are local fictions' 
and begin to view `the institutionalized meanings found in modern society as products of local, 
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social processes'; ultimately `differences in rationalized meaning systems explain broad cross-
national policy differences, and ... rationality is essentially cultural'; although both Britain and 
France are part of the industrialised, capitalist world, within that world ostensibly ruled by the same 
economic laws, they display different cultural forms of policy-making.
37
 
 Present cultural forms of public policy-making can be traced back to the formative process 
that by the beginning of the nineteenth century had produced distinct British and French political 
cultures. Political stability had been achieved in France through military force and the imposition 
of strong central control. In Britain, it had been achieved `by maximising the autonomy of local 
elites who would further the public good by pursuing their own interests'; thus by 1825, Dobbin 
argues, the French view was that `State sovereignty was the source of political order', and 
accordingly `political philosophies ... made centralization integral to both monarchy and 
democracy'; whilst the British conception was that `Individual sovereignty was the source of 
political order', and the `King-in-Parliament model of government in which every lord reigned over 
his own turf' was exalted by political philosophers `as the instantiation of a minimalist theory of 
government and the foundation of political order and liberty;' these views, once well-established, 
were able to reproduce themselves as new issues arose, not only in their sphere of origin, the 
constitutional realm, but in more mundane sectors as well, and in this instance in industrial matters, 
most particularly railways; both Britain and France `developed cultural constructions of industrial 
rationality that were isomorphic with their constructions of political order.'
38
 
 My own approach bears strong affinities with Dobbin's, inasmuch as I also `aim ... to 
conceptualize the national traditions that shape policy-making', on the premise that `History has 
produced distinct ideas about order and rationality in different nations, and modern industrial 
policies are organized around those ideas.'
39
 The national industrial rationalities permeated not only 
the state apparatus, but also public undertakings: for instance, SNCF was set up as a highly 
centralised, hierarchical organisation, and soon sought to impose homogeneous technical standards 
over the whole network, whilst the nationalised British railways retained their regional autonomy 
and character to a far higher degree, and tolerated the continued existence of technical standards as 
incompatible as the `third rail' on electrified lines of the Southern Region (still in operation to this 
day). In the field of high speed rail development, similar patterns can be found, as the case studies 
will demonstrate. 
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Broad summary 
 The general argument of the thesis is that within the context of the case studies, the British 
referential framework of public action was essentially politico/financial, whereas the French one 
was primarily technico-economic. As a result, the French decision-making apparatus was relatively 
well-equipped with regard to decisions concerning technological innovation and infrastructure 
planning, whilst the British system had difficulty in coping with the inherent demands of projects 
of this type. 
 Chapter II presents the background to the case studies: the relationships between 
sponsoring state agencies and public railway undertakings, and the professional dimensions of 
public action. It shows that the statuses of SNCF and BR were roughly similar, and that indirect 
control of the railways, respectively by the British Treasury and French Ministry of Finance, 
played a crucial role in both countries, but that relations between the railway undertakings and their 
sponsoring departments were conducted on an entirely different basis. The relation State-SNCF 
may be described as a symbiotic one, whereas the relation between BR and British central 
government was characterised by conflict. Chapter III - the first case study - examines the R&D 
processes in the field of high speed rail technology in the two countries; it illustrates the way in 
which engineeering concerns dominated policy in France, whilst scientists had a strong input in 
Britain. Chapter IV - the second case study - deals with planning new rail infrastructure; the 
exercise of state power was dependent on the notions of `general interest' in France and of 
democratic consultation in Britain. 
 The terms of the transport debate that took place around the rail projects examined in the 
case studies differed in at least two respects: the type of problems that were perceived, and the type 
of solutions that were conceived. The case studies illustrate two distinct approaches to policy-
making: procedural and substantivist, both of which raise issues familiar to political scientists. 
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 CHAPTER II 
 UNDERSTANDING RAILWAY POLICY-MAKING 
 IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 A public undertaking is one `over which the public authorities may exercise directly or 
indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation 
therein, or the rules which govern it.'
1
 This chapter analyses the diverse ways in which such 
influence can be brought to bear on the railways and what this tells us about the British and French 
referential frameworks of public action. It is understood that influence can be exercised both 
through the official channels provided by the formal framework within which government-
enterprise relations take place, and through informal transactions which, for self-evident reasons, 
are far more difficult to trace but are nonetheless essential to acknowledge. 
 Three categories of public undertakings may be distinguished:
2
 firstly, `Enterprises directly 
managed by a government department or a similar public authority', whose finances and accounts 
are at least partly integrated with those of the government; secondly, public enterprises `with a 
special legal status, subject to a public authority but possessing also a measure of managerial 
autonomy', which correspond to the `public corporation' in the UK, and to the `EPIC' (Entreprise 
Publique Industrielle et Commerciale) in France. Lastly, some public enterprises are `Companies 
with the same legal status as those in the private sector and enjoying a substantial degree of 
managerial autonomy'; the amount of shares sufficient to ensure control is owned by the state; the 
company is constituted under the national company law. The two organisations observed in this 
thesis, British Rail and SNCF, both belong to the second category, although SNCF only became a 
`public enterprise' in 1983, having until then been a `public company'. 
 This chapter presents the framework in which rail policy was made between 1965-1993 in 
Britain: legal and institutional aspects, financial arrangements that prevailed during the period 
examined, and lastly, the professional dimension of central government - railway relations. I then 
turn to French rail policy-making, following the same approach. Finally, a comparative section 
highlights the main differences and begins to outline the two referential frameworks. 
 
 
1. RELATIONS BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE RAILWAYS IN 
BRITAIN 
                                                 
     
1
 `Commission Directive of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between member 
states and public undertakings', Official Journal of the European Communities (29/07/1980). 
     
2
 Parris et al, Public Enterprises in Western Europe (London: Acton Society Trust, 1987), p. 23. 
  
 
 29 
 The method chosen to develop railways in Britain was `the method of private action, of 
laissez-faire ... government and Parliament ... declined to assume the direction of the railway 
system at its critical formative stage in the authoritarian manner of the Continent.'
3
 But there were 
areas in which public control was exercised, such as prices and safety, so that on the whole, `The 
British railways' freedom from state control was ... not absolute. If the government did not run or 
manage them it supervised their working and, in one field of policy after another, it unobtrusively 
exercised a strong influence over them.'
4
 This influence increased with nationalisation. 
 
 
A. Legal and institutional relationship 
 On nationalisation in 1947, the `British Railways', though under common state ownership 
and under the responsibility of the specially set up British Transport Commission (BTC), were not 
run as a single unit: six regions were created, three of them closely matching the previous private 
companies territories.
5
 Control over the railways was divided: financial responsibility lay with the 
BTC itself, whilst day-to-day running was carried out by the Railway Executive. This arrangement 
proved unsatisfactory and was ended when the British Railways Board (BRB) was set up under the 
Transport Act, 1962, with responsibility both for finance and management. Statutory powers of 
Transport Ministers are listed in the Nationalisation Act, 1947, and in over 70 subsequent statutory 
provisions.
6
 
 
 
 (1) Forms and actors of central government control 
 Four main types of controls are of interest to us: politico-administrative, parliamentary, 
technical and financial. The latter is possibly the most salient, and certainly the most complex and 
the most disputed; as such, it will be examined separately in the second section. 
 
 
 
(a) Politico-administrative control 
 During our case studies, this first type of control was exercised by the Ministry 
                                                 
     
3
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(subsequently Department) of Transport (MoT/DoT).
7
 Several divisions of DoT made up the 
Railways Directorate, responsible for all railway matters and headed by an Under Secretary. 
 British Rail had a form characteristic of public enterprises in Britain, namely that of a 
public corporation. The Chairman of the BR Board (BRB) was appointed by the sponsoring 
minister by statute (who also fixed the salary level, published as a matter for Parliament, with 
prime ministerial approval), and could be dismissed. The minister was also `responsible for the 
hiring of the board' but `Paradoxically, he does not have any power to fire the board, although few 
people are aware of this', a power which was deliberately withheld by Herbert Morrison under the 
original statutes.
8
 The government's powers of appointment and dismissal were the main 
controlling powers in the conception of public enterprise favoured by Morrison in the 1940s, but in 
practice its hands were tied for there was no glut of candidates for this type of appointment and, 
according to one former BRB Chairman, `frequently ... nationalized industries have to be staffed at 
the top by the person the Minister can afford rather than his first choice.'
9
 Ministerial power of 
dismissal was exercised on 26 October 1967 when Barbara Castle `transfered' Stanley Raymond 
once a suitable replacement had been agreed with Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister.
10
 Towards 
the end of Richard Marsh's contract with BR, Harold Wilson demanded his removal from the 
chairmanship.
11
 
 How much of a role did partisan considerations have? `Politics enter into appointments in 
the sense that any government will seek to appoint people who will carry out its policies. But there 
is very little evidence of political favouritism in the party sense.'
12
 For instance, Sir Peter Parker 
(who had once stood as a Labour candidate), appointed by the Labour Government in 1976, was re-
appointed by Mrs Thatcher in 1982. 
  The Minister was able to coerce BR quite lawfully as regards industrial strategy: 
`Ministers are empowered to issue explicit directives if they require the industries to take a course 
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of action they would not otherwise adopt.'
13
 As for day-to-day management, this `must in practice, 
be left to those responsible for managing and running these industries without the intervention of 
Ministers or Parliament.'
14
 But it was difficult to assess the precise degree of actual government 
involvement in the running of BR, as relations between the railways and government were highly 
politicised and concealed behind several thick layers of secrecy.
15
 
 
(b) Parliamentary control 
 Although the central government / railway relationship was mainly conducted through 
MoT/DoT, it also involved parliamentary scrutiny, since 
  Parliament exercises control over public enterprises through legislation ... If an 
enterprise has been established by statute, Parliament has determined its structure, 
defined its duties, and conferred the necessary powers. Once the enterprise has 
been set up in this way, further recourse to Parliament is necessary to change its 
structure, vary its duties, amend its powers, or terminate its existence.
16
 
Direct scrutiny was also carried out by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, set up in 
1956; this was abolished in 1979, with the inception of the new Select Committee system, within 
which BR was overseen by a Transport Committee and the Treasury and Civil Service Committee. 
 Parliament also possessed some degree of `purse power', since `When expenditure is to be 
met out of taxation, Parliament has the right to vote or withhold the money which the government 
needs to implement its policies', something which applied to BR's operating subsidies.
17
 The 1974 
Railways Act set `a statutory limit to the cumulative amount of grant which the Secretary of State 
could pay to BR without seeking parliamentary approval [of] £900m., extendable to a total of 
£1,500m, by Order in Council.'
18
 BR Supplementary Estimates had to be approved by Parliament, a 
second layer of constraints, beyond the more habitual constraints placed by DoT over the Railways 
Board. But on the whole, parliamentary scrutiny was weak and no match for executive-
administrative control. 
 
(c) Technical control 
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 Technical control deals, amongst other things, with safety issues. In the early railway days, 
Parliament played a small role in technical matters,
19
 but technical supervision passed on to the 
central administration, whose powers were weak. The first railway inspecting officers were 
responsible to the Board of Trade, which could make recommendations regarding technical 
systems though it could not automatically impose them. It was not until a grave accident at Armagh 
in 1889 that government intervened forcefully, ending the `old happy-go-lucky days of railway 
working': it `led immediately to the passing of the Regulation of Railways Act, 1889. This made 
both continuous automatic brakes and absolute block-working compulsory on all lines throughout 
the country.'
20
 Similarly with the system of automatic train control pioneered by the Great Western 
company from 1906: `The Great Western steadily spread the installation over the larger part of its 
network, but remained unique for many years among British railways in adopting it, in spite of the 
comments of the railway inspectors that accident after accident on other lines might have been 
prevented by its use'; it was only the Modernisation Plan of 1955 which `allocated £20 million to 
the installation of an automatic warning system ... throughout the country.'
21
 
 The Board of Trade's inspectors were succeeded by Inspecting Officers of the Ministry of 
Transport; the Railways Inspectorate's role was to enforce BR's statutory safety obligations. The 
Officers were generally retired Army officers who had trained in railway operations for military 
purposes but were independent from BR. One of their chief duties was to report on all serious 
railway accidents, in the name of public accountability. Other technical matters were supervised by 
the Railways Directorate but it had no technical expertise as such and did not intervene in detailed 
safety issues on a continuous basis. 
 
 (2) The formal relationship 
(a) Sponsorship 
 The public corporation model enacted in 1945 by the Labour government had been meant 
to shield corporations from political `interference': 
  The Morrisonian concept is traditionally associated with an `arm's length' 
relationship of corporation and government. Government was seen as performing 
comparatively limited interventionist functions in the national interest. It was 
assumed that the board's policies would embody the public interest and that 
conflict with government on the interpretation of national interest would be 
exceptional.
22
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Thus there would be a minimal need for control by central government. Sponsorship, the term used 
to define the relationship between government departments and nationalised industries in general, 
and between DoT and BR in particular,
23
 implied a relationship between equals, a point reinforced 
in the 1978 White Paper, whose language `was largely in terms of agreement, not direction.'
24
 It is 
remarkable that a party committed to public ownership left so much discretion to public 
corporations and viewed ministerial guidance as `interference'. 
 But equal footing and arm's length distance did not necessarily entail harmonious relations. 
According to the National Economic Development Office (NEDO), `The internal structure and 
staffing of sponsor departments and Treasury are not designed for the prime purposes of overseeing 
and developing relevant policy frameworks for massive public enterprises' and `Civil servants and 
Ministers are transferred too frequently to obtain adequate understanding of the nature of the 
industries and their problems'. Overall, the experience was not perceived as positive on the railway 
side either: 
  Suddenly after nationalisation the relationship became more of an arm's length 
one. All railway contacts with the Ministry had to be channelled through the 
British Transport Commission ... And this distancing of the railways from the 
Government, this attitude that, although the railways belong to the State, the State 
has no direct responsibility for them ... has persisted to this day ... the Ministry 
stands back as an observer and critic of the performance of the railways which it 
owns.
25
 
 As a result of this perceived lack of commitment, the relationship between BR and its 
sponsor department was largely of a conflictual nature, a situation which was `in a sense embedded 
in the arm's length philosophy, implicit in the nationalisation statutes and subsequent White Papers, 
which encourages the boards of nationalised industries to be autonomous except to the extent that 
government chooses to constrain them. Many of the participants involved in relationships in the 
UK recognise the need for a different and more cooperative approach.'
26
 By the late 1970s, `The 
industries themselves, far from feeling they were able to get their own way, complained of too 
much ad hoc interference.'
27
 Governments were accused of `manipulating nationalised industries'
28
 
even though powers delegated to individual ministers by statutes were deliberately limited in order 
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to provide for managerial autonomy. The balance between accountability to central government 
and management freedom was found to be elusive. 
 The `long-term deterioration in the relationships of government and nationalised industries' 
deplored by the 1976 NEDO Report was also ascribed to a large extent to `the inherent uncertainty 
about the respective roles and responsibilities of government and boards of nationalised 
industries.'
29
 The NEDO report called for a radical change in relations, but its recommendations 
were not heeded; instead the Labour government produced a White Paper in 1978 (The 
Nationalised Industries) which built on existing controls and further extended the powers of 
Ministers. Previously, the Secretary of State for Transport had only been able `to give directions to 
the Board imposing on them obligations of a general nature';
30
 from then on, `specific' directions 
could also be issued. The new statutory instruments were retained under the following government, 
and `Through these instruments [it] took an altogether tighter grip of the nationalised industry 
sector.'
31
 
 The `arm's length relationship' philosophy itself had deeper roots in a political culture 
which could be defined as the culture of adversarial relations rather than cooperation; relations 
between the Board and the Minister were highly politicised; there was an almost constant struggle 
for power over policy,
32
 a great deal of `game-playing' and `point-scoring'. 
 Adversarial practices were not confined to BR-MoT/DoT relations; `adversary politics' 
also affected the transport policy debate as a whole.
33
 As in many other sectors of political life, 
Finer's definition of adversary politics as `a stand-up fight between two adversaries for the favours 
of the lookers-on' could be applied to railway policy. The `"Adversary politics" process in transport 
policy-making'
34
 prevented a `rational', continuous transport policy from emerging. The competing 
policies of political parties and of political factions within parties were imposed on civil servants 
and on BR: investment programmes were sometimes curtailed once they had got under way,
35
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targets modified, institutional arrangements disrupted.
36
 As a result, long-term planning by the 
railway was well nigh impossible and it found its hands literally tied by the vagaries of public 
policy. The result was often immobilism and inertia. 
 
(b) The British case: the White Paper tradition 
 The publication of Government White Papers and the issuing of directions by the Secretary 
of State was done on an irregular basis; there was no formal temporal framework, with fixed 
deadlines: the Board was merely asked to `act on lines settled from time to time with the approval 
of the Secretary of State' as regards capital expenditure and general policy.
37
 Thus no firm, formal, 
predictable basis was provided.
38
 In 1976, a BRB document commenting on a Government 
Consultation Document asserted the need for `a more positive involvement by the Department of 
the Environment in the Board's Corporate Planning process.'
39
 Since 1979 annual letters to the 
Chairman sent by the Secretary of State are said to have `provided a more formal, secure and public 
framework'
40
 but in practice, dissatisfaction with the ups and downs of government policy has 
continued to run high. 
 Non-financial objectives set by DoT were found to be totally inadequate as policy 
guidelines for transport managers. Chairman Marsh `had long argued that there is nothing wrong 
with a Government requiring a nationalized industry to pursue social, non-commercial objectives, 
but what it must do is to quantify them, rather than to talk in generalities ... Managers can only 
manage against numerate objectives.'
41
 For instance the BRB wanted `vaguely expressed pleas' 
(e.g. `help energy conservation') to be replaced by `quantified objectives'.
42
 
 
(c) Policy coordination and planning 
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 The approach to railway policy-making in Britain tended to be incremental and modal, 
short-term and reactive.
43
 Harold Wilson appointed Barbara Castle in December 1965 in order to 
produce an integrated transport policy (promised in the election manifesto), which was outlined in 
the 1966 White Paper,
44
 but this was a short-lived experiment. Partly this was to do with 
departmental conceptions of planning: for instance on 27 January 1967, Castle met with the 
chairpersons of regional councils to discuss the integration of local transport services: `When we 
were drawing up the press statement afterwards, one of my officials tried to alter the word 
"integrated" transport to "co-ordinated" and I snapped back, "The word is integration and this 
Ministry had better get used to it here and now"'; Castle was told subsequently that `the Department 
were very nervous about this development.'
45
 
 BR was acutely aware of the need for a more pro-active policy; in a 1976 document, the 
BRB asserted that since 1972, it had `consistently pressed for the formulation of a national 
transport policy.'
46
 Having `failed to persuade Government officials to take the initiative' in 1973, 
the BRB produced its own comprehensive strategic study.
47
 In 1976 the Board asked for `a 
transport policy that realistically anticipates the likely changes to come', by means of `a 
professionally-conducted forecast of long-term transport demand' (i.e. fifteen years at least) so as 
not to take `today's market situation as a base'.
48
 An often-heard complaint was that `no 
Government has ever been able to provide a long-term consistent policy which would enable 
Government and the nationalized industries to work together to achieve sensible long-term policies. 
Without consistent policies it is impossible for large industrial organizations to work efficiently.'
49
 
In 1992, the Chairman stated that signals given to the industry change with little predictability (one 
study per year on average was carried out), and that government policy shifts on average every six 
years, whilst the railway need `clarity', `stability' and `long-term horizons'.
50
 
 One BR Chairman called for `a more rational approach to the whole question of the 
distribution of Government expenditure and the introduction of new methods of decision making at 
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the strategic or policy level' which would provide `an antidote to the emotions of lobby politics' and 
stressed the `need for bi-partisan stability in a national policy towards railways'.
51
 It is no accident 
that the 1960s programme of line closures (Beeching Plan) took place under a Conservative 
government and was halted under Labour. Equally, it was under a Labour Prime Minister that the 
integration of transport policy was pursued; Barbara Castle recalled Wilson telling her on 21 
December 1965: `we have got to have an integrated transport policy: I can't hold the Party 
otherwise. And the Party is the key to everything.'
52
 But rail policy was not wholly as partisan as 
the above might imply. The section on finances shows that when it came to actual investment 
policy, there were much fewer partisan differences than one might have expected. 
 By the early 1990s, transport congestion had become a high profile political issue: `The 
country has drifted into this situation because of the lack of proper advance planning by the 
Transport Department, which has no overall national plan for transport provision and is woefully 
inadequate in the modal planning it does attempt.'
53
 Potter argues that `Generally, transport 
planning in Britain today is very ad hoc and is little influenced by integrated systems approaches.'
54
 
 This situation arose partly because of a marked preference for symbols of individual 
choice. In the British referential framework we find a prevalent notion of consumer choice through 
competition between different means of transport. What mattered most was that the consumer 
should be able to exercise his/her choice freely. As a result, public policy openly favouring one 
mode of transport over another was not deemed to be acceptable. The emphasis on competition 
justified a laissez-faire approach by DoT and explains why no integrated transport planning was 
put into practice. In 1976, the BRB asked for the terms of competition to be changed: `The 
competitive framework should be the servant of policy, not its master.'
55
 From the late 1970s, the 
rationale behind the phasing out of support for InterCity services was DoT's belief that InterCity 
competed in a transport `free market' with air, coach and car travel. At a conference in 1983, the 
Under-Secretary for Transport declared: `Our philosophy is that the pattern of transport should be 
decided by customer choice with competition providing the options.'
56
 Market economy principles 
were applied to the transport sphere even more rigourously under Mrs Thatcher than previously. 
 
Conclusion 
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 The Morrisonian public corporation aimed to combine managerial autonomy and public 
accountability, and therefore was reliant upon the government setting clear and comprehensive 
objectives. But in practice the reverse was achieved: as far as policies were concerned, there was a 
comprehensive lack of guidance, owing to vague, general statutes, and no day-to-day autonomy as 
government interference through `backstairs pressure' was a common occurence.
57
 The absence of a 
clear hierarchy between the policy actors led to an almost continuous power struggle. 
 The problems experienced by the railway were not sector-specific but were connected to 
the fact that `public ownership had an unhappy political and economic history in Britain.'
58
 There 
was a structural problem in the British referential framework as regards the role of central 
government towards public industry. The Government was failing to provide a sufficient direct 
policy input. Central government guidance was tentative yet control fairly authoritarian. The 
following section will show that it was exercised as a brake (on spending) rather than as a spur to 
new, targeted investment and the improvement of services. 
 
 
B. Financial relationship 
 A number of officials within the Treasury specialised in public enterprise work, along 
sectoral lines: one Under-Secretary and one Assistant-Secretary were in charge of financial matters 
relating to BR. Furthermore, the White Papers which, in 1961, 1967 and 1978, had sought to 
provide a framework of control over the public sector more focused upon financial matters, had all 
been moulded by the Treasury. The extent of Treasury control over transport policy is difficult to 
ascertain given that much of it was exercised in informal ways, but it is beyond doubt that 
Treasury-imposed constraints were keenly felt by MoT/DoT, who in turn would restrain railway 
industry ambitions. 
 
 
(1) Instruments 
 All railway funding instruments in Britain were part of the Annual Budget until 1976. 
Direct payments to BR were made by the Secretary of State for Transport, who may `determine the 
manner of calculating, and the conditions applicable to, those payments.'
59
 BR received several 
types of grant from the Government: the general grant requirement (which comprised both 
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operating subsidies and deficiency payments); payments for socially necessary lines (`grant aid' 
from 1968), later for the Public Service Obligation (PSO, from 1974), but `The PSO target only 
acts as a cash limit which should not be exceeded. It is not a firm offer of grant. The actual grant to 
be paid still has to be negotiated in the light of current circumstances and thus the department has 
been able to take advantage of new developments to reduce the grant below the original target.'
60
 
There were research grants, which between 1975-1985 averaged £3m a year;
61
 grants for capital 
improvement were made available under the 1968 Transport Act (Section 56) and minor 
investment grants were also made by the Government. Government loans were occasionally made. 
 Large parts of the debts of BR were written off, e.g. by the Transport Act, 1962 (relieving 
BR of the payment of interest on £1,175 million of accumulated debt).
62
 In 1969, another capital 
reconstruction took place, and in 1974, the Railways Act reduced the Railways Board debt liability 
to £250m by cancelling £450m of capital debt.
63
 The writing off of accumulated deficits involved 
fresh legislation from Parliament.
64
 
 
 
(2) Prevailing factors of decision 
 In the treatment of rail passenger transport, a number of critical factors were taken into 
account, some of which were mutually exclusive. The choice between competing factors of 
decision was a political one and was itself guided either by practical considerations or by more 
ideological ones. 
 
 
(a) Macro-economic factors 
 During the immediate postwar period, `it was the role of the railways in the economy as a 
whole that was the criterion for state investment, not the economic performance of the railways 
alone.'
65
 In the early 1970s, the railway system was still considered as `a service to the nation', parts 
of which ought to be subsidised. Conservative governments, most notably Heath's, took macro-
economic factors into account in their treatment of the railway, as a matter of fact if not of rhetoric. 
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But by the late 1970s, government policy had shifted considerably: rail transport was to compete 
with other means of transport, state subsidies provided an unfair advantage to BR and were to be 
phased out in the commercial parts of the network. Finally, the Conservative government led by 
John Major became committed to the privatisation of the railways, thus rejecting the very idea that 
they could constitute an instrument of macro-economic policy. 
 
(b) Social factors 
 The railways of Britain were originally nationalised with the maximisation of social 
welfare in view. This social role meant keeping rural, unprofitable lines open, even though this ran 
against the commercial interests of the railway. By 1960 however, `the British Transport 
Commission had been acidly criticised by the government ... for taking account of social needs 
when its business should have been exclusively with balancing its books'.
66
 The new business 
emphasis led to the Beeching experiment, an attempt to make railways break even by 1970, partly 
through massive secondary line closures. 
 As the social costs of such a policy became clear, and a Labour Government took power, it 
gave way in the late 1960s to an attempt by the Government to provide a `socially useful' network. 
Commercially viable passenger services should be clearly separated from those that were not, the 
`social railway', funded through special grants if BR could show that they met social needs. 
Payments under the new `grant aid' system were made on a service by service basis. The belief that 
central government ought to play a social role through its policy towards the railways was 
reiterated in 1973 during a Joint Policy Review carried out by the Conservative government, which 
concluded that a network of acceptable size would have to be subsidised. 
 Finally, as a result of European Community membership, the Railways Act, 1974, 
generalised payments made for particular lines, which had formally qualified as 'social railway'. 
Now the whole network was covered by a Public Service Obligation (PSO) through the 
incorporation of EC Directive 1191/69 into British law. PSO abolished the individual service-by-
service aid and introduced a global PSO payment.
67
 
 The definition of PSO was fairly vague and it was interpreted loosely by the Government: 
the December 1974 DoT Direction requested the Board to operate a railway passenger system 
which would `provide a public service which is comparable generally with that provided by the 
Board at present'. The lack of specificity of this request has meant that there is `no absolutely fixed 
standard of service for the Board to attain and thus for the Government to fund. Instead the 
flexibility of the Direction has allowed the Government to set tough financial targets.'
68
 
 The vagueness of BR's social obligations was but one manifestation of a general state of 
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affairs in which formally stated commitments and obligations were conspicuously absent. The 
commitment to a social railway was allowed to be diluted,
69
 when financial considerations came to 
the fore. Furthermore, the fulfilment of social objectives was not integrated into the decision-
making mechanism: social goals were implicitly part of BR's brief but were not `rationally' 
evaluated by the sponsoring Department, as the calculation of rates of return excluded non-
financial costs and benefits, in particular social ones. 
 
(c) Financial factors 
 These were prominent from the start: in 1947, BTC `was instructed that its services must 
pay for themselves'.
70
 But the railways plunged into deficit from 1955. The Plowden Report on the 
control of public expenditure (1961, Cmnd. 1432) inaugurated an era when the Treasury re-asserted 
its power, after a period during which public spending had dramatically increased. The 1961 White 
Paper on Financial and Economic Obligations of the Nationalised Industries attempted to place 
financial control on an orderly and calculable basis. But financial controls were found to be 
ineffective. As a result, `formal criteria were introduced in the 1967 White Paper for both pricing 
and investment decisions'
71
, a move which marked the intensification of the commercialisation 
process and was undertaken by a Labour government. Both White Papers, drafted under 
governments of opposite political complexions, stressed that the nationalised industries had to be 
treated as commercial concerns. The 1961 White Paper represented the first attempt to make 
British Rail break even over set periods, after years during which BR had simply been required to 
break even, taking one year with another. The Transport Act, 1962 made it `perfectly clear [that] 
the new Railways Board was to move as fast as possible into solvency, by concentrating its 
attention on the services it could provide with profit.'
72
 
 The Act began a new, commercial era for the railways; it simplified the procedure for 
closing down loss-making lines. Under the first Chairman of the Railways Board, Dr Beeching, a 
two-fold approach was pursued, embodied in two landmark reports: The Reshaping of British 
Railways (1963) sought to define the shape of a viable network whilst The Development of the 
Major Railway Trunk Routes (1965) planned the development of the most remunerative services. 
Railway operations acquired a more commercial edge in the mid-1960s with the improvement of 
service quality and the introduction of the term `Inter-City' in 1966. But commercialism was 
something of a mixed blessing in the eyes of BR managers: all network studies had `terms of 
reference [which] were strictly commercial' and `no wider view' was allowed, which would include 
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social and environmental factors for instance.
73
 
 By 1976, cost-cutting had become the prevailing factor of decision and dictated policy. 
Cash limits were introduced in 1976 by the Labour Government:
74
 the External Finance Limit 
(EFL) comprised (central and local) government subsidies, government loans, and borrowing from 
external sources; the whole was included in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR); 
also the PSO grant was subjected to an annual cash ceiling, set in advance of BR's submission of its 
grant claim.
75
 During the Thatcher premiership, the PSO ceiling was deliberately squeezed. In 
1983, the Secretary of State, Nicholas Ridley, listed among his objectives the reduction of the PSO 
grant.
76
 
 In the 1970s, the fight against inflation overrode most other considerations, so that `The 
financial targets of most of the nationalised industries had to be abandoned'
77
. But in the second 
half of the 1970s, more stringent financial controls, mostly conflicting with corporate long-term 
imperatives, were forced upon BR: the 1974 Railways Act provided for `An extension of 
Government powers to approve the policies and plans of British Railways and to monitor grant 
expenditure';
78
 the Labour Government's 1978 White Paper
79
 reintroduced financial targets. In 
keeping with the attempt to make the railway more commercial, it stated that `The industries will 
let their sponsoring Department have performance indicators ... which will provide regular and 
systematic information as a contribution to discussing their success in controlling costs and 
efficiency.' Under the following Government, BR was requested by the Secretary of State in 
August 1984 to make InterCity services profitable: prior to losing all state support from 1988-89, 
InterCity was asked to achieve a 5% return. But this was not simply a matter of partisan politics; 
the history of this decision could be traced back to the 1977 White Paper, when the (Labour) 
government `saw the Inter-City services as operating commercially',
80
 thus introducing the principle 
that InterCity services should no longer be subsidised. We should therefore not have a purely 
partisan understanding of the importance of financial factors in railway policy. 
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 By the mid-1980s financial control was even more at the forefront than previously. 
Strategic considerations were not taken into account. From 1974 the bedrock of policy-making was 
the precisely defined amount of resources available, prior to any assessment of needs or objectives. 
Although successive British governments did not hesitate to impose financial targets on BR, they 
did not engage in negotiations about the means to reach the targets; this was left to BR 
management discretion. Central government action can thus be defined as `negative' (in the sense 
of `constrictive'), concerned with the minimisation of public expenditure but relatively careless 
about the effects of such a demand. 
 To sum up, macro-economic and social factors were not formalised in the way that 
financial ones were. Social factors were quite prominent from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, but 
financial factors really came to the fore from about 1974 and tended to overshadow any other 
consideration. 
 
(3) Raising revenue 
 BR could raise funds in two ways: through internal income derived mainly from the 
farebox and through external funds, which could only come from or through the Treasury. 
 
Internal revenue 
 A major part of railway revenue was derived from fares. As a result, fare-setting was of 
paramount importance to railway management but they were severely limited in their freedom to 
raise them. It was not until the Transport Act, 1962, that complete pricing freedom was achieved. 
 British governments insisted that fares policy was BR's prerogative but the 1961 White 
Paper required BR to generate revenue which would cover asset depreciation at replacement cost, 
and the Board's fares policy from 1968 followed a recommendation in the Report of the National 
Board for Prices and Incomes: `Mileage Pricing' (in which the price was exactly proportionate to 
the distance travelled) gave way to `Market Pricing', which means that rather than basing fares on a 
`standard-rate-per-mile', BR could charge whatever each segment of the passenger market would 
bear.
81
 As BR's tariffs were no longer nationally based, cross-subsidisation between regions could 
not take place. The principle of equity had been abandoned (an exceptional development in the 
public sector), as customers faced different charges for the same services. 
 Fare rises were substantial, but reduced fare schemes were introduced which mitigated the 
increase. When deciding on its fares structure, BR did not take into consideration social needs and 
fairness, as `British Rail is not part of the Social Services ... [some schemes] fulfill a social need, 
but they are in operation not for that reason but because British Rail sees them as an opportunity to 
attract additional customers, at off peak times, to fill empty seats.'
82
 Thus by 1975, reduced fares 
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accounted for 48.3% of all passenger journeys. Low fares targeted at specific groups, and high 
fares for all other passengers, had taken the place of socially-minded standard fares for everyone. 
 Under the Transport Act, 1968, fares were nominally to be freely determined by BR but 
informal influence was often used by ministers. Under the Conservative Heath government for 
instance, `anti-inflation policies took precedence, which meant keeping prices as low as possible 
rather than adjusting them to whatever was deemed to be the right level of costs.'
83
 By 1976, it was 
`widely recognised that recurring price interventions resulted in unforeseen and damaging 
consequences in the medium term.'
84
 The 1978 White Paper gave public enterprises more flexibility 
in their pricing but BR was still required to set prices at a level which would generate sufficient 
revenue and now had to meet government-imposed financial targets as well; the Board was 
therefore hamstrung as regards the general level, although it had complete freedom regarding 
specific prices. Given the financial impossibility to dramatically increase the number of passengers 
through significantly improved rail services, a high fares (`revenue-maximising') policy appeared to 
be the only option left. 
 Another source of internal revenue was provided by BR subsidiaries, which tended to be 
more profitable than the network itself. By 1979, DoT and BR were jointly examining the 
possibility of introducing private capital into BR subsidiaries. This led to the setting up of BRIL 
(British Rail Investments Ltd) in November 1980, a holding company to which the businesses of 
British Transport Hotels, Sealink UK, BR Hovercraft and some property assets were transferred. 
This policy of private capital involvement was soon turned into full-blown privatisation. 
Throughout the 1980s, most British public enterprises `were pressed to sell off peripheral 
businesses ... and more generally to dispose of land and property assets incidental to the main 
business',
85
 and the BRB had to conform to government wishes. The Transport Act, 1981, 
privatised such BR subsidiaries as Sealink UK Limited, BR Hovercraft, British Transport Hotels 
and non-operational land owned by BR's Property Board. Proceeds of the sale went to the railway, 
but did not provide it with extra funds, over and above what was normally granted by central 
government, as the EFL was reduced by a corresponding amount for the following year. It merely 
reduced the amount of funds required by DoT from the Treasury. Moreover, BR was not allowed to 
decide when sales would take place; as a result, the full value of the property was not always 
realised. 
 
External funding: borrowing restrictions 
 The BRB's borrowing powers were limited by Order of the Secretary of State,
86
 a 
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constraint originating with the Finance Act, 1956, which transferred public corporations' borrowing 
from the capital market to the Exchequer: from then on, such borrowing was included in the overall 
PSBR. Therefore BR had no independent access to financial markets. Although Transport officials 
felt `progressively more and more irritated by it really, and the way the Treasury clung on to this 
was regarded as very detrimental', there was a stubborn refusal at the Treasury to consider any 
changes.
87
 
 A second constraint came in the shape of EFL, also set by the Minister, introduced in 
January 1976 by the Labour government in order to reduce BR's share in the PSBR. The company 
must conform to the EFL even if it was lower than what the Corporate Plan required for a given 
year, as happened between 1985 and 1990, and the limits related to government borrowing policy, 
rather than to BR's investment needs. Public power was exerted at the expense of corporate 
autonomy. 
 Even before the introduction of EFL, meeting all the railways' needs through borrowing 
had been impossible because the Treasury kept such a tight control over loans. Even a Conservative 
Minister had to admit that `The other reason why I became converted to privatizing monopolies 
concerned capital for investment. Treasury control of the borrowings of the nationalised industries 
had led to insufficient investment ... In fact most of the nationalised monopolies were seriously 
underinvested' because `Capital allocations ... are rationed ... in the public sector by arbitrary 
Treasury judgements.'
88
 In effect both the manner and the amount of borrowing were central 
government-controlled. 
 
(4) Investment programmes 
 There has been much talk in Britain of chronic under-investment in the railway. As early as 
1955, railway management felt that the railways were not working at full efficiency chiefly owing 
to `their past inability to attract enough capital investment to keep their physical equipment fully up 
to date'; they proposed a £1,200 million plan of `modernisation and re-equipment', aiming at `a 
transformation of virtually all the forms of services now offered by British Railways'.
89
 The plan 
met with a favourable reception and the `Conservative government promptly undertook to 
guarantee the necessary loan.'
90
 However, the plan was not evaluated in depth by MoT, its 
shortcomings soon became apparent and was the object of a critical inquiry. In 1961, the Transport 
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Minister announced that it was to come to a halt. As a result of this costly misadventure,
91
 
subsequent investments came under much closer scrutiny. 
 
Assessing investment programmes 
 The 1967 White Paper introduced uniform criteria for investment appraisal in nationalised 
industries, the Test Discount Rate (TDR). New investments had to earn a return at least equal to 
TDR. The (Labour) government set this minimum rate at the same level as that required in the 
private sector (4 to 8% depending on the type of project). The 1978 White Paper replaced TDR 
with the required rate of return (RRR). 
 The Board would submit a list of all investment projects above a certain size (e.g. £5m in 
1986) to the Department, on an annual basis. The investment programme would then be considered 
as part of the Government review of nationalised industries and investment allocations be decided 
upon. This procedure gave the Government a large degree of direct control over BR's investment 
policy and the power to cancel sizeable programmes. 
 The methodology used in the assessment of investment needs is a good indicator of central 
government priorities. The criteria used were purely financial ones; this was also true as regards the 
prioritisation of investment programmes: BR had to choose major investments `by ranking them in 
order on the basis of greatest rate of return. Schemes paying for themselves in two years (i.e. 50% 
rate of return) generally precede others down to a minimum rate of 8% [in two years] - a rate which 
applies to all nationalised industries.'
92
 In other words, financial costs were the only criteria 
accepted by the Department; rail projects in the commercial sector (such as InterCity) were not 
assessed in terms of cost-benefit analysis, where non-financial criteria apply (such as social and 
environmental). As a result, improvements to the network such as electrification and new track 
were often `non-starters ... because they cannot meet the internal profitability criteria that is 
demanded of them'.
93
 
 
Financing investment programmes 
 According to the 1986-1987 House of Commons Transport Committee Report, imposition 
of EFL had `often resulted in a reduction in or an embargo on new investment schemes and partly 
explains BR's inability to fulfill its investment plans.'
94
 The depression of 1980 had resulted in BR 
being unable, for the first time in five years, `to keep within the government's contract price for 
running the railway'; the Board was forced by government intransigeance to postpone important 
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investment projects in order to stay within EFL.
95
 In April 1992, BR was forced to drop four key 
schemes from its ongoing five-year spending plan for 1992-1997 because of a shortage of 
investment funds.
96
 
 Because `BR [financed] almost all its capital investment from internally generated funds'
97
 
and immediate financial objectives had the upper hand, investment was done in piecemeal and 
unpredictable fashion. In 1972, the Chairman lamented the fact that `most of the railway 
investment is to keep the system going' rather than to improve it.
98
 In 1976, the Board called for `a 
more stable commitment by the Government to the industry's objectives' and for `more stable 
railway investment programmes'; they strongly recommended `a more evenly-phased, long-term 
commitment of funds for railway investment' which would put an end to the `Massive fluctuations 
in the railways' long-term investment profile'.
99
 Nevertheless the first Thatcher government wanted 
to further reduce BR's dependence on the Treasury's National Loans Fund and the Serpell Report 
on Railway Finances in 1983 was perceived as lacking confidence in the place of investment as a 
way of enhancing transport infrastructure.
100
 But the scarcity of financial support was already 
apparent under previous governments, as was the `stop-go' fashion in which it was approved. The 
1955 Modernisation Programme for instance represented a massive investment commitment, 
following an investment famine. Similarly, a sudden upsurge began in 1991: a sharp increase in 
investment (nearly 60%) was announced by Cecil Parkinson in November 1990 and completely 
overran the Autumn Statement of November 1989. These changes often took place with an 
unchanged parliamentary majority. 
 
Conclusion 
 The `evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with the practice of ministerial control' 
analysed by Abromeit
101
 was equally present within the railway establishment. It was already 
detected by the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries in 1967-1968. Its recommendations, 
like those of the later NEDO Report (1976), which was equally critical, were not implemented, 
because the referential framework could not accommodate a different style of ministerial control. 
Time and time again, railway managers complained of the vagaries of government policy: `Unless 
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we obtain a more rational and consistent policy for the railway, the taxpayer will be faced with 
even higher bills for a declining railway.'
102
 In 1981, the BRB again requested that long term rail 
policy be spelt out and pressed the government to this end.
103
 The same call was still being made 
sixteen years later by the Chairman, who expressed `concern over the continuity of the flow of 
investment' in view of government proposals of the time.
104
 
 One reason for the discontent stemmed from the following contradiction: the railway was 
required to behave like any other commercial concern, yet at the same time was subjected to 
constraints in most aspects of its business that no private firm experienced, and was not allowed to 
develop the means to act commercially.
105
 A workable balance seemed to elude successive British 
governments, both of the Left and Right. 
 Another ground for discontent was government's almost exclusive reliance on financial 
control. From the 1976 Callaghan Government and particularly under the Thatcher governments, 
EFL (or `financial discipline') was dominant because of Treasury determination. But the Treasury's 
pre-eminent role and wish to retain as much control as possible over public spending was nothing 
new: it had become institutionalised in 1956 when the capital expenditure of public corporations 
like British Rail was included in the PSBR. Central government was a `cash dispenser' with a low 
upper limit. Although one BR Chairman liked to describe the PSO arrangement as a `contract' 
between the railway and the government, the trouble was `that this "Contract" is a constraint rather 
than an objective'.
106
 Here we find in a nutshell the definition of the arm's length relationship in its 
financial dimension: the arm held back but did not direct.  
 In the 1980s financial rules were tightened further, at the expense of macro-economic and 
social benefits, but the one-sided imposition of financial constraints had begun long before 1979. In 
this regard, it is particularly significant that market pricing, cash limits and EFL were all introduced 
by Labour governments. Central government approach to railway policy was not crucially 
dependent on which of the political parties was in power and was characterised from 1961 by the 
almost continuous use of short term financial controls. Unsurprisingly, reliance on such blunt 
controls contributed to a conflictual relationship, as did the fact that the various policy actors 
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belonged to a divided policy-making network, to which we now turn. 
 
 
C. The professional dimension: engineers and civil servants 
(1) A divided technical and administrative elite 
 One striking feature of the professional dimension was the dichotomy between generalist 
and specialist civil servants. Senior civil servants as a rule were `generalists'; if technical or 
specialist advice was required, it could be obtained from experts, who occupied a subordinate 
position in the hierarchical structure, even in the technical ministries. Specialists were thought to 
have interests limited to their own field and therefore to lack breadth of vision, whereas the 
generalist was aware of all political, social and administrative implications of a problem. The other 
side of the coin was down-played: namely, that generalist civil servants lacked a strong 
commitment to, and professional interest in, their field because their career was not tied to any 
specific policy sector. They were therefore relatively indifferent towards improvement, unlike say 
civil engineers, who were likely to want to make things work better, build better bridges, etc. They 
were also reluctant on the whole to provide leadership or take initiatives and to undertake 
development functions. The Fulton Report (1968, Cmnd. 3638) criticised the Civil Service for its 
cult of the `amateur' and the `gifted layman'; it called for the promotion of more specialists and the 
recruitment of graduates with relevant specialised qualifications. The Civil Service offered rigid 
career structures, with vertical movement only; the split between policy-making and management, 
that is between administrators and specialists reflected the doctrine that `experts should be on tap 
not on top'. 
 The second feature of the British central administration related to personnel mobility 
between the public and private spheres: `In the UK there is very little movement between public 
enterprises and the civil service'
107
 and hardly any between the Civil Service and the private sector 
(except for retired civil servants). This judgement also applied to BR which had been run either by 
men predominantly with a business/industry background or by `career men' (i.e. who had risen 
through the ranks of their own industry). This was the case with many chairmen of the British 
Railways Board such as: Richard Beeching (1963-1965), Henry Johnson (1967-1971), Peter Parker 
(1976-1983), Robert (Sir Bob) Reid (since 1990). None of them had worked in the Civil Service; 
neither had Richard Marsh, who was briefly a Minister of Transport before chairing the BRB from 
1971 to 1976, and Robert (Basil) Reid (1983-1990), whose entire career had been spent in the 
railways. We have to go back to Stanley Raymond (1965-1967) to find a head of BR who had been 
in the Civil Service (which he had joined in 1930).
108
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 A third key feature was job rotation: specialists tend `to remain for most or all of their 
careers, in ... middle-level jobs within their specialism. Generalist administrators are moved from 
section to section, very often before they develop any specialist expertise'.
109
 One commentator 
argued that administrators were moved from posting to posting too often to become really useful.
110
 
This general characteristic was perhaps less true of the railway sector. Several senior administrators 
interviewed in connection with the case studies had spent the majority of their careers at Transport 
and displayed a great deal of affection towards their sector. 
 In short, the technical and administrative elite was fragmented. I now turn to the engineers 
and civil servants working in the railway sector and argue that they belonged to estranged 
professions. 
 
(2) The Transport officials 
 It was always extremely difficult for the railways divisions in central government to gain a 
thorough knowledge of BR's activities because the railway staff was very small. Although after 
1947 the railway was by far the most important public asset (in terms of size, manpower and 
capital) under the responsibility of the Department, there were comparatively few civil servants 
dealing with BR (the bulk of the staff being in charge of the road programmes). In a reply to a 
parliamentary question in 1986, it was stated that 10,159 DoT civil servants worked on highways, 
licensing and taxation, 2,468 on roads and 76 on railway issues. Such a small number of officials 
could not possibly be expected to be fully conversant with all policy aspects of running a modern 
railway and could sometimes be overwhelmed by a strong case put forward by railway 
management, as happened with the 1955 Modernisation Plan. 
 On the other hand, MoT/DoT dedicated themselves to road-building, thanks to an unusual 
alliance between engineers and administrators within the Department, and the pressure of a group 
of strong commercial lobbies that has become known as the `road lobby', widely acknowledged as 
extremely powerful. The road lobby was traditionally associated with the Right, whereas the 
promotion of public transport was seen as the preserve of the Left. In 1972, the Chairman of the 
BRB stated that: `we find ourselves ... with an under-used railway ... In terms of capital investment 
for renewal, research, development and improvement, the railways' share has not been comparable 
with the millions poured into other forms of transport. New motorways and trunk roads ... between 
them represent a national investment every year more than five times greater than investment in 
BR, and even then most of the railway investment is to keep the system going.'
111
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complaint was that expenditure on railways was easily pinpointed whilst roads benefitted to a far 
larger extent from less visible, indirect subsidies.
112
 The continued existence of a powerful road 
lobby partly reflected the stress laid in Conservative thinking on individual choice and mobility, a 
stress which to a large extent had also infiltrated Labour policies. Ward, Samways and Benton 
argue that even Labour was in thrall to road building and only paid `lip-service to an integrated 
transport policy.'
113
 At the same time, Labour supported the expansion of public transport because 
it found electoral support among the `transport poor', who were dependent upon it. But it could not 
wholly get away from support for the private car. 
  The salient point here was the methodology deployed to assess new transport projects. 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was the rule as regards road schemes, but was not used for rail 
schemes, where financial appraisals were preferred. This, it has been argued, put the railway at a 
disadvantage for financial appraisals only take into account higher revenues and lower costs, but 
ignore safety improvements, time savings, environmental and social benefits, as well as reduced 
accident costs. The levels of investment into the rail and road networks arguably suffered from 
distortion, a claim rejected by DoT but according to a House of Commons Report, `the Department 
should publish the information necessary to prove its claims that no distortion arises from the use 
of different investment appraisal methods for road and rail'.
114
 
 The relative success of road engineers in establishing themselves as a driving force in 
transport policy was an exceptional development in the British system for, as the next section 
demonstrates, engineers on the whole had little input into policy-making. It must be stressed 
however that even though road proposals were more successful than rail projects, the overall 
picture was still one of under-investment in the road system, in comparison with other European 
countries. 
 
(3) The engineering `condition' in Britain 
 British engineers were trained in a variety of institutions, mainly universities and the 
former polytechnics. Their studies lasted for three to four years after the `A' level examinations, 
which made them somewhat shorter than those of French engineers.
115
 The title of `engineer' was 
not protected. 
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 The engineering profession in Britain has always been self-regulated:
116
 `a laissez-faire 
approach has largely operated' in the relationship between state and engineering in Britain, both 
with respect to educational provision and professional regulation, even though it has been 
estimated that about 40% of Chartered Engineers work in the public sector.
117
 The former Lord 
Chancellor claimed that professions (including engineering) should have `independence of 
professional integrity and freedom from political interference ... to nationalise the professions and 
place them under statutory control of the Executive is a threat to the liberties of a free society.'
118
  
 The distinguishing feature of the British engineering profession since the beginning of the 
century has been its low morale; the high status formerly enjoyed by engineers in the nineteenth 
century vanished; dissatisfaction with the status of engineers could already be found in some 
professional journals in 1919 and by the end of the twentieth century there was `a widespread 
belief within the profession that it has low social status.'
119
 In fact there is a considerable literature 
on the fact that `Measured in status terms, British engineering does not, as an occupation, rank very 
highly, even though some individual engineers do'; this phenomenon has often been connected to a 
more general anxiety about the weakness of British manufacturing, and as such has given rise to a 
very large number of official inquiries.
120
 
 The widely accepted explanation was that `Britain has an anti-engineering ethos, 
particularly in the public schools, which has been traced to well before the 1890s.'
121
 Another, 
complementary explanation was that engineering was the poor relative of science. In 1974 the 
Hudson Report noted that pure science was taught in the great universities but technology and 
engineering were consigned to schools of inferior social status.
122
 Perhaps as a result of this, 
educational qualifications required to enter an engineering course were often relatively low: an 
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interdepartmental report in 1977 was concerned with the poor quality of engineering students.
123
 It 
has also been noted that `Britain produced far more science graduates relative to engineers than 
was the case in other industrial countries where engineering courses also attracted more of the most 
able students.'
124
 Science appeals to the seeker after truth and `In a country like Britain ... the 
disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake has been given more prestige than production 
for practical and commercial reasons'; also the British had been `singularly good at natural 
scientific discovery ... compared with other countries'; as a result - and as a means to enhance their 
status - engineers had been tempted to position their discipline as close to science as possible in 
educational establishments and the content of courses was markedly more science-based than in 
other countries.
125
 
 The relationship between science and engineering as perceived in Britain, according to 
Glover and Kelly, rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of engineering. There 
had been a popular and widespread belief for at least one century that engineering was part of 
science, with `a derivative, subordinate status' and that `engineering increasingly consists, as it 
becomes more difficult, of the use of scientific knowledge and the application of scientific 
principles'; but engineering used `technical knowledge of many types concerning markets, money 
and people as well as hardware'; this fact was well understood on the Continent, where engineering 
professions in the British sense scarsely existed; as a result of this misconception, engineering 
degrees `tended until the late 1970s to become increasingly theoretical and academically 
specialized rather than practical, and concerned with research and development rather than 
production and the commercial and financial functions in manufacturing'.
126
 Another instance of 
this confusion was that engineer civil servants were part of the `scientific' branch of the Civil 
Service; and technical ministries employed `Chief Scientists' and `scientific advisers'. 
 The degree of specialisation of engineering courses was higher than in France.
127
 Given the 
marked preference for `generalists' over `specialists' within the Civil Service, it is hardly surprising 
that the status of engineers was harmed by the perception that they were `only' `technical 
specialists, at best a breed of trusted super-technicians, not potential top job holders ... they are less 
likely to be promoted into senior posts than, say accountants or Oxford history graduates turned 
marketing specialists'.
128
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 Lastly, the profession was highly fragmented, with sharp divisions between chartered / 
non-chartered bodies (the latter tending to be incorporated as companies under the Companies 
Act), and within those bodies themselves.
129
 
 As a result of all the above, engineers and engineering concerns have not been influential 
in shaping the policy agenda in Britain. Lord Hinton (himself a distinguished engineer) pointed out 
in 1970 that the number of MPs who were engineers did not reach into double figures and that the 
Civil Service's Administrative Class hardly ever recruited engineering graduates.
130
 Even within a 
public undertaking such as BR there prevailed a culture of `learning on the job' and a certain 
amount of distrust towards graduates and formal qualifications in general. Many senior railway 
people had joined at sixteen on apprenticeships and been promoted internally; at the same time, the 
recruitment of graduates was not easy. As a result there co-existed two `camps' within management, 
even at Board level. 
 
Conclusion 
 Railway engineers and transport officials did not share the same educational backgrounds. 
Administrators lacked technical grounding and engineers had little knowledge of economics or 
management. BR managers were treated by the (generalist) civil service as mere technicians; their 
opinions accordingly tended to be overlooked. Engineers and officials, who had been trained at 
different establishments, lived and worked in isolation from each other. So if we now return to the 
more tangible aspects of the central government - railway relationship, it is not surprising to find 
that the alternation of power between the Labour and Conservative parties, and the strict policy of 
decreasing state support for the railway since 1976 have had a devastating effect on BR because the 
railway establishment was unable to resist the imposition of policies which it disliked. The balance 
of power was tilted in favour of central government. 
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2. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE RAILWAYS IN FRANCE 
 
 When the railways began to be developed in France, it was under the aegis of unregulated 
private companies. But the State, `considering that the search for profit by rail transport companies, 
which through want of strict control might so naturally have become systematic and been an 
obstacle to the achievement of its social or economic goals ... always refrained from allowing 
companies to create lines in total freedom, to choose their alignments ... and to set the most 
profitable fares.'
1
 As early as 1833 (Montrond-Montbrison Charter) the Government decided that 
this new mode of transport was too important to be left entirely to private initiative: the `principle 
of the concession of an inalienable element of the public domain' was established.
2
 And in 1838, 
when the first project for a railway network was the object of a Parliamentary Bill, it was argued by 
Inspector Legrand that `Main railway lines ... are the great reins of government, the State ought to 
be able to retain them in its hands'.
3
 The great debate of the late 1830s over whether the nascent 
railways should be public or private was settled by a compromise. Although dominant thinking 
favoured public rail construction and operation, this was fiscally impossible and it was thought that 
the involvement of private companies would not be detrimental as long as they were strictly 
controlled. Thus numerous forms of control over the railway were established from the outset and 
lasted well into the twentieth century: e.g. the State kept a firm hold through the Ministry of Public 
Works, staffed by State engineers, and through the concept of public service concession (a form of 
franchising), `a process whereby a public person, called conceding authority, puts into the care of 
an individual or of a legal entity called concessionary, the management of a public service under 
the control of the conceding authority, in exchange for revenue which most often consists in the 
charges collected by the concessionary from service users.'
4
 
 
A. Legal and institutional relationship 
 There were numerous calls for nationalising the railways throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth but the condition of public finances still 
made it impossible. Finally, the Radical government nationalised the 5 private railway companies 
and the 2 public ones in 1937. The decision to set up the Société nationale de chemins de fer 
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(SNCF) was taken by decree; the new undertaking was to be a société d'économie mixte, with the 
State as majority shareholder (51%) and the remaining 49% being held by the private companies; 
the franchise ran for 45 years, and in 1983 the assets were returned to the State. 
 
(1) Forms and actors of State control 
 State control during the period covered by our case studies could be carried out in two 
main ways: statutory and contractual. Statutory control involved Acts, decrees, rules, circulars, 
approvals, whilst contractual control relied on covenants and contracts, in particular franchises; a 
favourite instrument of control was the cahier des charges, which brought together statutory and 
contractual elements.
5
 SNCF's duties were inscribed in the cahier des charges drawn up in 1937. 
 
(a) Politico-administrative control 
 Politico-administrative control was mainly exercised by the Ministry of Transport (MdT), 
with SCF (Railways Division, itself part of DTT, Directorate of Land Transport) in charge of all 
SNCF matters. At the general policy level, DTT contributed to the formulation of railway transport 
policy and regulated competition between different transport modes. 
 The legal status of SNCF was determined by government, first in 1937 with 
nationalisation, then in 1983 when the franchise expired and a new status had to be agreed: the 
railways became an Etablissement Public Industriel et Commercial (EPIC, or `industrial and 
commercial' firm), a designation used for public sector undertakings that carry out activities more 
alike those of private firms as regards their object, the source of their revenues and their mode of 
operation.
6
 
 The head of SNCF was bicephalous: President and Director General; whilst the post of 
President was filled from State ranks, the Director General was always recruited from within the 
railway. The President was appointed by a decree taken by the Council of Ministers, on the basis of 
a proposal by the railway board, itself mainly appointed by government decree. The Board 
underwent changes in its composition with the 30 December 1982 Transport Act, but in the period 
covered by the case studies, it was made up of 10 State representatives (including the President and 
Vice-President), 3 representatives of the private shareholders, and 5 staff representatives; the CGT 
trade union was well represented.
7
 
 The President was chosen amongst the State representatives and could in principle be 
dismissed at any time by the government, though in practice there is no precedent. Because the 
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appointments of presidents of public enterprises constituted `the most important prerogative of the 
sponsoring authority, the one that leaves the deepest mark on the great strategic choices of the 
interested enterprises',
8
 they were informed by a two-fold concern: the person chosen must be a 
widely respected `personality', untainted by strong political prejudices, which is why a former 
President such as André Ségalat (1959-1975), described by those who knew him as a man of the 
Left, was a long-standing head of the railways, serving mostly under governments of the Right. 
André Chadeau, appointed in 1981, had served as Prefect and as Directeur de cabinet to right-wing 
Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas; he was re-appointed and served until 1985 under Socialist 
governments. Fourcade, a former right-wing Minister of Transport, acknowledged that political 
motives had not been conspicuous: `The appointment of leaders of public enterprises was directed 
more towards competent men than party political men.'
9
 Appointees must also have the necessary 
contacts within governing circles that would enable them to be effective; Ségalat had held one of 
the highest public offices in France as Secrétaire général du gouvernement from 1946 to 1958; a 
career path shared by former SNCF President Jacques Fournier, who occupied the same function 
between 1982 and 1986; both had served as members of the Conseil d'Etat. 
 All important decisions required the Board's preliminary approval, but Mény's analysis of 
EPICs' boards as `purely and simply a mere extension of the administration, which endows itself 
with managerial instruments similar to those of private enterprises', also applied to SNCF; indeed 
the State kept `a majority of the seats, which allows it to channel pressures, to take advantage of the 
experience of the interested professionals, while benefiting from an automatic majority.'
10
 
 Close links between central administration and SNCF were ensured through the presence 
of State personnel on the Board: e.g. the head of the Land Transport Directorate was automatically 
appointed as Government Commissioner. A very senior official from MdT, he acted as a permanent 
link between management and minister, attending Board meetings, playing a consultative role, and 
informing the Minister of the firm's activities, as well as informing the Board of the Minister's 
opinions. The Commissioner could put items on the agenda, and overturn a majority decision of the 
Board, but this never happened in practice because difficult issues were ironed out prior to Board 
meetings. 
 The Ministry of Finance (hereafter Finance) was well-represented on the Board: the heads 
of the two Finance directorates (Budget and Treasury) were automatically Board members as 
administrators; a State auditor was appointed by the ministers of Industry and Finance. Moreover 
the Chef de la mission de contrôle économique et financier des transports reported directly to the 
Economy and Budget Minister(s), by `formulating a written opinion on all proposals put before the 
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Board relating to the operating budget, the investment budget and the accounts of the fiscal year.'
11
 
This Mission also took part in the control of SNCF's accounting activity on a day-to-day basis; its 
offices were situated within the SNCF compound and it could request any relevant information as it 
saw fit, which made it a rather fearsome agency in the eyes of railway management. 
 
(b) Parliamentary control 
 Two types of procedure - respectively for permanent and temporary control - were 
available to the French Parliament: permanent control was achieved through the work of 
rapporteurs from the Finance commissions in both assemblies, and through budgetary debates, 
during which all standard parliamentary procedures could be used. Reports from the Senate 
Finance Commissions in the 1970s and 1980s were very critical of government and public firm 
policies at times; in this way they played - if nothing else - a useful informative role. Temporary 
control consisted in setting up Commissions of enquiry and control, information missions or 
special commissions dealing with specific legislative proposals. The Commissions of enquiry 
however could only operate for a maximum length of six months, and rules of confidentiality 
meant that the reports they produced were not always published. As in many other policy matters, 
the Fifth Republic's Parliament had little say and wielded little power. 
 
(c) Technical control 
 Technical control of the railways by State engineers has a long history in France. In the era 
of railroad-building, they scrutinised the technical particulars of the (private) companies' plans, in 
order to make sure that the lines would not be poorly built, and because of concern over safety 
issues, took an increasing stake in the drafting of technical specifications.
12
 This practice 
continued, with MdT's Technical Safety Division, who had to approve SNCF plans for technical 
changes. 
 However, railway accidents - when they occurred - did not for a very long time give rise to 
public inquiries as in Britain. An internal railway inquiry was all that was required since the matter 
was viewed as a technical one. When it was first suggested by a Transport official that a railway 
accident should be publicly investigated, SNCF reacted very strongly. 
 
(2) The formal relationship 
(a) Tutelle 
 The British view of the French State - public sector relationship was that `concertation 
tends to be the desired and achieved objective'.
13
 The French term tutelle only loosely corresponded 
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to the term 'sponsorship'. It consisted in `all the administrative services in charge of supervising, 
one way or another, the activities of public firms, which implies functions of information, 
coordination, authorisation, or more rarely, of decision-making.'
14
 The term had a connotation of 
permanent assistance, and of hierarchical control of the State over the public sector (in common 
usage, tutelle means guardianship, e.g. of a child by an adult). One would therefore assume that the 
doctrine behind State intervention that the term encapsulated was that State expertise was superior 
to that found in (public or private) industry. 
 What made tutelle necessary in the eyes of French politico-administrative elites? Three 
justifications were generally given. Firstly, `the State alone is able to truly fulfil the function of 
collective very long-term forecasting.'
15
 Such forecasting was a need that all public firms 
acknowledged. Secondly, continuity for large-scale projects could only be guaranteed by the State. 
Lastly, the State was deemed to represent the `general interest'. Thus State `guardianship' was 
expected although the detailed control which it entailed until the 1970s was disliked by railway 
management. 
 
(b) The contractual model 
 For a long time, the State - SNCF relationship was conducted at close quarters and senior 
railway managers complained of not being able to do anything without prior approval. Even some 
State officials, joining the Transport administration in the early 1960s, were shocked by the amount 
of involvement of Mdt and put forward proposals for reform. Yet at the same time, the undertaking 
was viewed by many decision-makers as `untouchable', or as a `great lady'; as late as 1993, an 
official report stressed the need for SNCF `before anything else to come out of the "splendid 
isolation" that for too long they have embraced".'
16
 Perhaps this indicates that the control 
mechanisms described above were indeed numerous and fastidious, but that when it came to 
matters of strategy, SNCF had the necessary clout to get its proposals approved. 
 The relationship was reformed in 1970, following long and extensive discussions and 
proposals made by SNCF in 1966 found their way into the new relationship.
17
 Within the new 
framework, SNCF was an autonomous undertaking and the practice of concluding a pluri-annual 
contract with the State was introduced. The Reform of SNCF came in the wake of the Nora Report 
on public industries of 1967 and was its first (and most successful) application. SNCF signed its 
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first `Programme contract' on 27 January 1971. The oil shock negated the advantages of detailed 
contracts and they fell into disuse in the mid-70s, before being revived with the La Genière Report 
in 1977, under a different name (La Génière was the head of the Budget Directorate, Finance). 
SNCF signed an `enterprise contract' with the State for 1979-1982, which gave it `greater financial 
autonomy and guaranteed investment levels'.
18
 This contract committed the company to a number 
of management indicators in return. It had taken three years for SNCF and the State to negotiate it. 
 But these contracts were developed solely on the basis of government directives. A further 
step in the formalization process was taken under the Socialist administration, with the introduction 
of `planning contracts', which have a legislative foundation. An interministerial committee staffed 
by the Planning Commission would ensure the compatibility of contracts and national plans. SNCF 
signed its first Contrat de Plan (1985-1989) in April 1985; it included a definition of planned 
levels of investment. 
 Contract procedures emerged on the one hand, in response to the realisation that public 
firms were stifled by State controls that were both too numerous and fragmented, ill-adapted to 
industrial competition, and made solely on an annual basis. On the other hand, contracts were seen 
by the State as a way to curb spending on railways deemed to have reached excessive levels: indeed 
the first one was entitled `Programme contract for the restoration of financial balance'. Contracts 
meant that financial and budgetary relations could be established on a firm pluri-annual basis. They 
were designed as the instrument that would enable the passage from one mode of State intervention 
to another, from a situation in which controlling powers were emphasised, to a situation of 
corporate autonomy in the public sector; the Prime Minister declared that `Planning contracts will 
be a discipline at least as much for the State as for the firm'.
19
 
 In a nutshell, hierarchical relations were to give way to a more collaborative approach, in 
which both partners would agree on a set of objectives and the means to attain them. Paradoxically, 
this move took place shortly before the status of SNCF shifted from semi-public company to 
wholly State-owned enterprise.
20
 
 
(c) Policy coordination and planning 
 The French approach to rail transport policy may be characterised as medium-term, 
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planning, and integrative: it has traditionally involved the extensive use of State powers, at first 
simply through the corps of State engineers, later through the National Planning Commission, 
interministerial committees accountable to the Prime Minister, and national transport consultative 
bodies such as the Conseil supérieur des transports. The first National Plan listed rail transport as a 
priority area. The second Plan (1954-1957), `oriented towards the search for the most economic 
way of operating at the cost of modernising investments chosen for their profitability' led to the 
electrification of main trunk lines and the replacement of steam by diesel engines on secondary 
lines, the general aim being to reduce operating costs.
21
 Among the third Plan's objectives (1957-
1961) were better use of energy resources and productivity increases, which favoured even faster 
electrification of the railway. The fourth Plan (1961-1965) continued the policy of traction 
modernisation, viewed as the major plank of railway transformation. But by the beginning of our 
case studies, the large railway modernising programmes had been completed; the fifth Plan (1966-
1970) launched a drive to modernise rolling-stock, ending 15 years of investment into 
infrastructure. 
 Planning of national transport policy was meant to be done on a cross-modal basis, being 
based on the perceived complementarity of different means of transport, the belief that no one 
mode should be allowed to dominate the others and the conviction that the railway system could 
not be dealt with in isolation from other transport systems.
22
 The preference for coordination over 
competition was well-entrenched: markets could not be left to themselves. The decree first 
instituting transport coordination (19 April 1934) ushered in an era of preferential treatment of the 
railways: `It was the concern to protect the railway companies, later SNCF, which led as early as 
1934 to the formulation of regulation regarding other modes of transport'.
23
 Again with the Act of 5 
July 1949, coordinating rules were set up with the avowed aim of containing the growth of road 
transport, deemed to be damaging to railway development.
24
 Similarly, coach transport was little 
developed in France, owing to State regulation. 
 The Transport Upper Council (Conseil supérieur des transports), an advisory body 
attached to the Ministry of Transport, dealt with general transport policy and with national 
transport coordination. At the local level, the Comité technique départemental des transports was 
consulted on local transport plans which statutorily involved rail and road services. 
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 In practice, coordination foundered against the complexity of the task and calls for better 
coordination of the competing modes continue to be made today. Cross-modal policy remains an 
ideal which is seldom reached, owing to the disparate interests that come into play. All the same, 
the fact that is has been such a resilient concern is of great significance: in the French referential 
framework, consumer satisfaction ranked higher than consumer choice. It was considered that 
choice could only exist if services of equivalent standards were offered to all. Consumer 
satisfaction was to be achieved through the coordination of some means of transport, and 
competition between some others, whichever was the more efficient.
25
 
 
Conclusion 
 The French control machinery was highly fragmented and rather complex. But in fact, not 
all of the available controls were continuously used, and the justifications for their use were 
sufficiently internalised by practitioners both within the Administration and the railway to be 
acceptable. Moreover, controls were only one part of the relationship, the other part being 
concertation over matters of importance to SNCF. There was sufficiently give-and-take on both 
sides for relations to be fairly harmonious and with a generally low political profile. 
 SNCF managerial autonomy became more entrenched through the use of contracts from 
1970, which bound both the State and the railway. The Inland Transport Act (LOTI, 1982) 
attempted to refine the framework of transport policy: it considered the transport system as a 
whole, asserted the notion of a `right to transport' and re-defined the evaluation process. In this Act 
passed by the Socialist Government, as in previous legislation and practices, the aims of 
comprehensiveness, integrated decision-making and long-term planning were clearly stated. 
 
B. FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 State involvement in railway matters had begun at a very early stage in matters of finance. 
It was assumed that the State should not give too much power to private parties in this key sector of 
the economy, but since at the time public funds were not readily available,
26
 a system of de facto 
mixed public / private financing took shape `in a pragmatic fashion, the State financially 
contributing to the construction of the infrastructure of certain lines and granting, at the same time, 
concessions to Companies, all this whilst liberalism was in full swing.'
27
 With nationalisation, even 
closer financial involvement was inevitable. 
 French State aid to industry was concentrated on a few major sectors, transport being the 
second major beneficiary, and SNCF received over 60% of all aid to the transport sector.
28
 The 
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amount of public money allocated to SNCF was criticised as being excessive throughout the 
postwar period: in the 1950s, `A sally by politician Antoine Pinay was a fair reflection of this 
feeling: "SNCF is worshipful of minutes and contemptuous of billions" - and whilst he was 
Transport Minister he told Armand one day: "I grant you the funds you request but do not conclude 
that I believe in the future of the railway. The car will take its place".'
29
 Financial arrangements 
were then fragmented and unclear in the extreme. The outcome of disaffection with rail spending 
was the 1969 Reform, which sought both to decrease spending and clarify financial arrangements; 
the then Transport Minister, Raymond Mondon, declared that `The prime objective of the reform is 
to restrict SNCF services solely to its profitable activities by allowing it to operate freely and on a 
par with its competitors on a veritable transport market, this under the sole constraint of balanced 
financial management.'
30
 
 This drive to curb railway expenditure was not part of a drive to reduce public spending 
per se; rather it was part of re-directing public funds away from the public sector and towards 
private firms, at a time when the private sector was a political priority. By the mid-1970s, although 
complaints about the railway's propensity to `devour' public funds were still being heard, the first 
Contract's objective (breaking even by 1st January 1974) had been abandoned and a balanced 
account was merely presented as `a desirable and sensible aim'.
31
 Growing aid granted to SNCF 
after 1975 revived criticism: in 1979, the Court of Accounts warned that `There is ... a need for 
putting an end to the growth, which tends to become inordinate, of the contributions and 
compensations paid to the railway by the State and the public authorities'.
32
 
 The second part of the preceding section dealt with the Treasury's de facto sponsorship of 
BR. A similar situation obtained in France, where the Ministry of Finance is sometimes known as 
the `super-tutelle'. Finance exercised financial control through a central control structure which 
comprised its two Directorates: `Budget' (with at its head `the most powerful civil servant in 
France, the Director of Budget')
33
 and `Treasury and Prices'; and through the Economic and Social 
Development Fund, FDES (Fonds de développement économique et social, a division of the 
Treasury Directorate) which amongst other things, co-ordinated technical and financial 
supervision.
34
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(1) Instruments 
 The means to aid industry fall into two broad categories: budgetary activities and off-
budget activities such as tax expenditures, loan guarantees, government loans, often used in order 
to circumvent budgetary controls. The latter were largely used in France. 
 Before the 1969 Reform, which marked a turning-point in railway finances, the operating 
account of SNCF received several types of direct grant. The 1937 Covenant (Article 25) provided 
that at the end of every financial year, if expenditure had exceeded receipts, the State would make 
up the operating losses incurred by SNCF for that year, regardless of their origin or amount. The 
Reform of 1969 put an end to this `blank cheque' policy, introducing the payment of an amount 
fixed at the beginning of each year, that could not subsequently be made to match the size of the 
deficit, with a view to gradually attaining the financial break-even point by 1974. The Reform 
acknowledged two long-standing grievances of railway management (namely that they had to bear 
infrastructure costs which other transport operators did not, and had to provide unprofitable 
services even if they did not wish to), which had led to repeated calls for the `equalisation of 
competitive conditions' and the `normalisation of accounts': it instituted the compulsory and exact 
payment of compensation for services imposed by the State which ran contrary to commercial 
interest, and introduced a measure designed to `equalise' competitive conditions between road and 
rail. The claim that motorway operators did not have to pay for a number of costs which the 
railway had to shoulder and that this distorted competition was validated. The Reform aimed at 
putting the railway on a more equal footing with other transport modes so that a genuinely 
competitive transport market could operate. 
 As regards debts, until 1971 they were relatively small because annual deficits were 
covered by the State. From 1972 onwards, SNCF was responsible for balancing its own accounts, 
which was not always achieved. And SNCF seldom benefited from its debts being written off,
35
 
unlike BR, which resulted in interest payments burdening the books of the enterprise. SNCF's 
continuously increasing debt burden has become a pressing issue; in 1993 for instance, the 
undertaking owed over FF150 billion; debt servicing the previous year had cost FF11 billion on its 
own.
36
 
 
(2) Prevailing factors of decision 
 Prior approval by the sponsoring ministry was required for all decisions with financial 
implications for the State Budget. Approval might be based on financial, economic, and/or non-
economic factors. A good overview of the arguments used to justify transport investment was 
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provided by the Planning Commission's Transport Committee in its 1971-1975 report; members of 
the Transport Committee were drawn from the transport policy-making community, and were the 
same figures which we will find again in the TGV/LGV case studies.
37
 
 
(a) Financial factors 
 Since SNCF accounted for nearly fifty per cent of the total public sector deficit, it is hardly 
surprising that financial matters should have come to the fore, from the 1960s onwards, and that 
State funding of the public sector should have been the subject of an official report, the Nora 
Report (1967). This report was a watershed in the history of the French railways, as SNCF was the 
first public enterprise to undergo reform, whose aim was to make the enterprise `1) one like any 
other transport enterprise; 2) an enterprise that works well, that is at the lowest cost.'
38
 
 The setting of commercial and financial objectives is a State prerogative which was used 
increasingly after the Reform, but objectives were generally not imposed on SNCF; rather contracts 
were introduced as a means to establish clear, agreed guidelines and objectives, and were the 
outcome of lengthy negotiations between the Board, MdT and Finance. The new obligation to 
break even (from 1971) had for counterpart the granting of corporate autonomy in the 1974 
Addendum (Art. 18). The contrat d'entreprise signed in 1979 also aimed at improving the 
company's financial situation. In 1984, the break-even point originally planned for 1974 was finally 
reached. SNCF today is still not required to make a profit, but to break even. 
 In the new, more commercial environment, keeping open rural lines which were little used 
was increasingly difficult to justify in financial terms and in the wake of the Nora Report, a 
programme of secondary line closures was launched. The Transport Minister had been empowered 
by the Decree of 14 November 1949 to set up or cancel services, and the Reform enabled the 
railway to take measures justified by its commercial interest, such as closing down unprofitable 
services. The programme, launched in 1970, had to be halted in 1974 however, owing to local 
political pressure.  
 The Planning Commission specified three main functions in the transport sector, beginning 
with the `internal economic' one, which concerned the competitiveness of the undertaking.
39
 In 
order to maximise `internal return rates' (TRI), it was argued that the railway ought to operate on a 
`level-playing field', or in the hallowed phrase that `"equality of treatment" of economic agents in 
the market economy' be enforced by the public authorities.
40
 The whole thrust of transport research 
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and of government policy (and - incidentally - of SNCF demands) was `to create in our country a 
genuine freight and passenger internal transport market  ... in order to place the various modes of 
transport in a situation of healthy competition, it is urgent and imperative to make each of them 
bear a fair share of the costs to the community to which they give rise.'
41
 This meant that working 
conditions in rail, road, etc. ought to be harmonised, for instance as regards the length of the 
working week, where large discrepancies existed.
42
 Overall, the aim was `to eliminate distortions to 
competition'
43
 through State action. 
 
(b) Macro-economic factors 
 The second function of the transport sector, according to the Planning Commission, was 
`economic development' within the framework of aménagement du territoire (regional planning 
and development), that is to say `the anticipatory role of public authorities, with a view to 
structuring the territory, ensuring desirable continuities, promoting innovation, encouraging ... 
desired industrial take-off.'
44
 Transport issues had traditionally been viewed as strategic and 
national issues (one can go as far back as Louis XIV's proactive policy towards canals and 
turnpikes). As a result, SNCF was often used as an instrument of national economic policy. The 
perception that efficient rail links stimulate local industry and regional economic development was 
widespread within the Administration; désenclavement, or improving access to remote (usually 
mountainous) areas, was a theme often found in the transport policy debate and a well-established 
factor of decision. The association of nation-building with the railways had appeared early in the 
nineteenth century and justified State involvement in financing the network. One State engineer 
argued in the early 1830s that `The importance of the railways is uncontestable ... The unity of 
France, which foreigners admire and which gives us our strength, will be fortified'
45
; a feeling 
echoed a decade later by a parliamentarian: `Brought together in military camps, in schools, under 
the same masters and under the same flag, the French of the North will become those of the South - 
everything that can strengthen national unity should have the highest priority.'
46
 More recently, the 
argument was used to justify the modernisation of services: `The organisation of frequent and fast 
rail services between urban centres situated at a medium distance from each other can contribute to 
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giving a new face - perhaps a more harmonious one - to the growth of very large urban centres.'
47
 
 Also railway equipment was seen as an extremely valuable source of export earnings and 
its manufacture was considered strategically important for the national economy,
48
 especially in the 
face of stiff German competition. 
 
(c) Social factors 
 The third function of the transport sector, according to the Planning Commission, was 
`social development', which included accessibility and `the protection of the living conditions and 
environment of all the populations'.
49
 
 The French State imposed social transfers between users, consisting of favourable rates 
that applied to specific categories of users, such as families with three children and more, military 
personnel, students, apprentices etc. These transfers, if they ran contrary to the undertaking's 
commercial interest, gave rise to financial compensation by the State in the shape of `public 
service' grants agreed contractually, introduced by the 1969 Reform. The social dimension of the 
railway was felt to be legitimate, even at a time when financial concerns had come to the fore: the 
then Transport Minister's Head of Cabinet argued that `One cannot indeed exclude certain public 
service duties.'
50
 The second contract, signed on 30 March 1974, recognised the difficulties faced 
by SNCF in competing with more commercial means of transport and gave it accordingly a greater 
amount of financial compensation to enable the company to meet its social obligations. 
 Employment levels and industrial relations concerns could also come into play when 
financial decisions concerning SNCF were made: the railways had traditionally been a large 
employer, with moreover powerful unions that could only be ignored at the government's peril. 
Thus the reduction of the workforce was never achieved through outright redundancies, but was 
gradual and continuous. 
 
 
(d) National defence 
 Railways having strategic military importance, especially in a country with a relatively 
large landmass and long borders, the defence factor was commonly listed among reasons why the 
French State had to play a unique role in rail policy. Thus the Commissariat général aux transports 
(which depends from MdT) was generally headed by a State engineer seconded by a General from 
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the armed forces, and another military presence was ensured through its subdepartment, the 
Commissariat aux transport terrestres, which was also headed by a State engineer and usually 
seconded by a Colonel. Furthermore, a Haut fonctionnaire de défense (Defence high civil servant) 
unit existed within MdT. 
 To sum up, a relatively large range of factors were considered by railway policy-makers 
and unlike in Britain financial factors did not figure exclusively. It was as if the needs for a given 
policy overrode other, more prosaic considerations: if the case for new investment could be made, 
then funding solutions would be found. 
 
(3) Raising revenue 
 SNCF has had two main ways of raising funds for its activities: internal and external, the 
latter including both public and private sources. 
 
(a) Internal revenue 
 The main source of internal revenue was self-financing through ticket sales. The 
government had the power to influence SNCF's commercial policy: the 1937 Covenant established 
the principle that all users should be charged according to the same criteria, irrespectively of their 
status, except for those categories allowed by the State to benefit from reduced rates for social 
reasons. The political principle of equality was given precedence over commercial considerations, 
therefore for a long time, SNCF was not allowed to offer commercial discounts. After the Reform 
however, fares were determined by SNCF, who had to submit the proposed charges to the Minister 
of Transport at least six days before they were due to be implemented. The Minister could `oppose 
the proposal on two grounds: abuse of dominant position, and non-recovery of marginal costs'
51
, or 
refuse a justified fare increase that ran counter to government economic policy, as happened 
throughout the 1970s (in 1972, 1974, 1976 and 1977 for instance) when the fight against inflation 
overrode any other considerations. From 1970 onwards, such delays involved financial 
compensation from the State for loss of earnings.
52
 Therefore the railway enjoyed a form of 
redress. 
 Fares were established along rigid principles until 1979: the obligation to treat equally all 
users meant that fares had to be evened out across the board. Differences in cost due to 
geographical diversity, temporal factors (such as peak periods) and types of services were ironed 
out in an effort to achieve `equal treatment': `whatever the line being used - on a plain or in the 
mountains - whatever the actual cost of transport may be, pricing is the same, the ratio of first to 
second class is always of 1.5, and everyone knows that wherever they may be, they thus contribute 
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to the equalisation of costs.'
53
 Only since the State - SNCF Contract for 1979-1981, has the 
company been able to charge different prices depending on the time of travel. The temporal 
element in the principle of equality of treatment has thus been dismissed. Expansion of the 
customer base being an objective for economic reasons (rail transport was treated as a product with 
increasing returns), SNCF pursued a low fares policy, and encouraged discounts: in 1986, 79% of 
the passenger traffic took place on a discount basis. But SNCF has not been granted complete 
pricing freedom: equalisation of fares between regions continues and allows densely populated 
areas to cross-subsidize rural ones. 
 The management of subsidiaries provided another source of internal income; the Reform 
made it easier for SNCF to diversify its activities and allowed the undertaking `to sell at its own 
benefit land and buildings not needed by the railway'.
54
 
 
(b) External funding: borrowing restrictions 
 SNCF was able to seek three types of external finance: loans on the private markets; loans 
from FDES; subventions d'équipement. The State underwrote loans from a number of lending 
agencies and SNCF, like a number of other public undertakings, was able to borrow both in France 
and abroad on financial markets, subject to approval by FDES. In 1968, the extent of overall public 
enterprise borrowing was of some concern: it represented `30% of loans issued for the benefit of 
the productive sector ... This situation is not unrelated to the difficulties experienced by private 
companies in financing their own plant';
55
 that year SNCF borrowed FF460M, rising to FF1 billion 
in 1969, 1970 and 1971; as regards foreign loans, in 1974 SNCF borrowed $130M, in 1975 160M 
Florins and $100M.
56
 SNCF operations on the capital markets were conducted by its Treasury 
Directorate, a specialised unit with a very business-like image and well-established in financial 
circles. Because it was felt that the French State would not let down SNCF, a public undertaking, 
the railway benefitted from a very good rating on financial markets, and SNCF's Treasury 
Directorate was able to get favourable terms. The Comité ministériel d'Orientation des entreprises 
publiques, which depended on the Treasury Directorate for its administrative support, arbitrated in 
cases of disagreement regarding borrowing on financial markets by public firms.
57
 
 
(4) Investment programmes 
 Investment funds were equally welcome whether it be from private or public sources: in 
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1975 for instance, 43% of new investment was financed through borrowing, rising to 50% in 
1977;
58
 and SNCF could receive loans from FDES, whose specialised Transport Committee met 
twice a year and supervised investment programmes. Both before and after the Reform, SNCF's 
investment proposals had to be vetted by FDES. The procedure was eased after 1969: from then on, 
ministerial approval was necessary only for large infrastructure projects above a ceiling set by 
decree (FF30m in 1974). Large investment decisions involving FDES have been described as `the 
reserved territory of the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Transport - the regulator in 
principle - is present, listened to but rarely followed.'
59
 One former Budget official described the 
power configuration as railway and sponsoring ministry on one side, Ministry of Finance on the 
other.
60
 
 When the State attempted to disengage itself from public sector funding in the late 1960s, 
railway investment levels fell (by 11% between 1967 and 1971).
61
 Investment by SNCF was again 
restricted in the early 1980s: it was cut by 20% between 1981-1986, and the electrification 
programme halved. Then investment levels rocketed, from over sixty billion francs (1985-1989) to 
over one hundred (1990-1994), but these swings were highly unusual and investment levels were 
generally not a bone of contention, quite unlike in Britain. Partly this was because SNCF external 
borrowing was allowed by Finance: it was not included in the national budget (since the railway 
was not part of the central administration) and the railway therefore enjoyed more financial room 
for manoeuvre. Also different methods of investment appraisal were used in France. 
 The approach to appraisal tended to be comprehensive; both direct, financial costs and 
non-financial ones (economic and social) were considered legitimate. The use of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) was widespread for public sector investment - SNCF was no exception - and was 
justified in the following terms by Finance: `The economic theory regarding State choices aims at 
defining the conditions which are necessary in order to maximise the benefits to the community 
accruing from such choices.'
62
 
 CBA involved putting a monetary value on all relevant advantages and disadvantages 
flowing from projects under evaluation, with a view to ranking them as objectively as possible. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the approach could be extremely ambitious: `An Act of 9 July 1949 
stipulated that one must "use the transport mode that results in the minimum real production cost to 
the Nation". But it quite refrained - and with good reason  - from saying how one would calculate 
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the cost.'
63
 Because such calculations were inherently difficult, a continuing debate on methodology 
took place within the transport policy world and a great deal of economic research was carried out 
within the State apparatus. 
 
Conclusion 
 There was a marked shift both in rhetoric and practice towards a more commercial railway 
from 1969 but the approach to financial control was pragmatic. There was a definite change in the 
way SNCF and the State related to each other, in rhetoric most visibly,
64
 but also in practice: 
corporate autonomy increased. Whilst all governments at some point used SNCF as a tool of 
economic and social policy, they also encouraged the railway to make full use of their freedom of 
action. Among all the factors listed above, financial ones were very prominent; but, whereas in 
Britain they came to dominate the whole policy process, in France they were tempered by the 
continued perceived importance of other factors. Social factors for instance remained salient even 
under right-wing governments of the 1970s, at a time when they were being diluted in Britain, and 
not only by Conservatives. Although the powers of Finance were considerable, they should not be 
over-estimated. Even in the 1970s, when the emphasis was on reducing SNCF's deficit, the 
railways actually received more State money than before.  
 Even though a commercial era began in 1970, it was accompanied by a renewed emphasis 
on public values,
65
 and on the fact that the `public service' ethos should be the overarching principle 
that bound together profitable and loss-making activities into a whole. Indeed, the balance of power 
was not always tilted in favour of Finance, for there was a counterweight which in the case of the 
railways, was particularly effective: the integrated nature of the technical, administrative and 
political elites, which is the subject of the coming section. 
 
C. THE PROFESSIONAL INTERFACE: THE RAILWAY TECHNOCRATS 
 The professional interface between the State and the railways included civil servants and 
senior railway officers, the vast majority of whom had a shared educational background. 
 
(1) A remarkably integrated technico-administrative elite 
 During the period covered by our case studies, personnel mobility between the public and 
private spheres was far more widespread in France than in Britain, so much so that it has been 
stated that it is difficult to make `a clear distinction between the French administrative elite and the 
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French industrial elite ... The ability of the French administrative elite to move on and colonise the 
highest echelons of society is particular to France.'
66
 It stemmed from the high regard in which top 
servants of the State were held, which in turn was derived from the `innate' prestige of the State in 
the socio-economic strata from which most high-flying civil servants were recruited.
67
 The 
considerable overlap between the public and private sectors was also due to the prominent place 
occupied by the engineering profession: `technocrats' were members of various professions and this 
was particularly true as regards railway engineers. Ecole nationale d'administration (ENA) and 
Ecole polytechnique graduates could join the civil service, later move into industry but might also 
go into politics, and switch from one sphere to the other.
68
 
 Horizontal movement between different parts of the sector of interest to us was 
widespread, as a few examples will show: Bernard Félix (X-P&C)
69
 worked in Public Works and 
Transport administration (1966-1973), briefly in the Transport Minister's cabinet (1972-1973) 
before founding the Matra company in 1973. Pierre Bilger (ENA) headed the Transport Unit at 
Ministry of Finance (mid-1970s), joined Alsthom (rolling stock manufacturers) in 1987 and 
became President of GEC-Alsthom in 1991. Claude Gressier (X-P&C; ENA) headed the Transport 
Ministry's DTT (1986-1993) then joined SNCF as Deputy DG (1993- ). Michel Fève (X-P&C) was 
a technical adviser at the Transport Minister's cabinet (1968-1971), then headed the Roads 
Directorate (1971-1983), and joined SNCF in 1983 as Deputy DG. Guillaume Pépy (ENA) was a 
Councillor of State (1984-1988) who briefly advised the Budget Minister (1988-1989), joined 
SNCF as head of the President's office (1989-1990) before becoming director of two ministers' 
cabinets (1990-1991, 1991-1993) and returning to SNCF in 1993. 
 The separation between generalists and specialists was not as marked as in Britain. 
Specialists had a relatively broad training in fields outside their own; they were provided with a 
general scientific culture, and were not necessarily practical engineers, although they might have 
attended an engineering Grande école such as Ecole nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC) or 
Ecole des mines. Generalists trained at ENA also benefitted from a relatively technical training. 
There was no split between managerial functions and policy-making ones: one civil servant might 
have all these at different stages of their life. 
 Many senior civil servants had spent five years in engineering State schools supervised by 
technical ministries, which enforced strict quotas for new pupils, and had obtained a professional 
                                                 
     
66
 Michelle Cini, `The renewal of the French ruling elite', Politics, II (2) (1991): p. 11. 
     
67
 Even today, in spite of the cries for `less State' that resounded in the 1980s, serving the State is still 
considered as noble and prestigious as it was at the beginning of the period under study, in the mid-1960s. 
     
68
 For instance in early 1993, `two hundred former ENA students hold positions in ministerial cabinets' 
while many members of the same ENA cohorts are top civil servants (`L'Etat malade du pantouflage', Le 
Monde, 9/02/1993, p. 29). 
     
69
 `X' stands for former graduates of Polytechnique, P&C for those of Ponts & Chaussées. 
  
 
 73 
title (Ingénieur diplômé), itself under the control of a State structure, the Commission des titres, set 
up in 1934 to protect the title. French engineers had a much higher status than their British 
counterparts: `In France, engineers occupy the greatest number of top management posts, 
competing with other specialists, such as economists and business school graduates, for the highest 
positions in government and industry. Prestige and salary put the French engineer near the top of 
the social ladder.'
70
 They were more likely to be listened to even when they did not work in the 
public sector. This high status was not at all a new phenomenon. As early as 1862, the Chief 
Inspector of Public Education felt compelled to exclaim: `I grant you, gentlemen, that engineers are 
the kings of the modern world', a type of discourse which Dhombres argues `was to be taken up in 
diverse ways until today.'
71
 
 Part of the prestige derived from the fact that access to the best engineering schools was 
extremely difficult: they attracted `a high percentage of the most scientifically-gifted students'.
72
 It 
also stemmed from the fact that technical expertise (in the widest sense) was extremely valued in 
the French referential framework: `A "grande école" engineering education ... benefits the student 
... it benefits industry, by forming managers with sound engineering background, broad knowledge 
of several technical fields, and expertise in applying technology. And finally it benefits the country 
as a whole by producing talented leaders who can successfully compete in today's highly complex 
international arena.'
73
 The duration of engineering degree courses was also somewhat longer than in 
Britain (5 years as opposed to 3-4).
74
 The curriculum at the State engineering schools was very 
broad, increasingly including non-scientific subjects, to the extent that the `Ponts et Chaussées, for 
example, now trains more engineers for Finance than for Civil Engineering.'
75
 Professional 
engineers were not restricted to narrow, technical career paths, unlike their British colleagues. 
 The prominence of engineers in the French State apparatus was something which some of 
the British respondents in the case studies found striking. It made for a`technocratic bias' in public 
administration.
76
 The presence of an integrated elite had a very practical consequence, the existence 
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of strong network links: `The governmental authority enjoys ... the support of the most powerful 
institutions in public management and they provide it with a network of cross-acquaintances, and 
with a mechanism for cross-organisational co-ordination, thanks to their members everywhere 
present, speaking the same language, holding similar interests, veritable negotiating diplomats.'
77
 
As a result, policy-making could take place in a fairly consensual environment. Self-preservation 
dictated that differences of opinion be ironed out away from the public eye in one of the many fora 
for discussion that existed (Planning Commission, CGPC etc). 
 One should not over-emphasise the influence of State `Great Corps' as a whole however, 
for `In ordinary times, the corps is a polycentric milieu, which is relatively apathetic ... behaves in a 
conformist way in relation to the political world, and which is careerist but devoid of risk'.
78
 Also 
the existence of a remarkably integrated technico-administrative elite did not mean that all of its 
members shared exactly the same values and interests. What they did share was an outlook, habits 
of mind and of practice. 
 
(2) The State grandes écoles: `X' 
 The French State required engineering expertise for military purposes and decided to 
positively encourage the profession by setting up Ecole polytechnique in 1794: `Over the long term, 
a State chose for its managerial elite science as the means and objective of education. From this 
explicit choice, it organised a system whereby the School could only be a generalist one and 
provide theoretical training in science ... this political and cultural choice ... often ... contested, was 
never overturned.'
79
 The teachers recruited tended to be generalists, rather than scientists, perceived 
as too specialised and therefore narrow in their outlook.
80
 
 Polytechnique did not seek to turn bright pupils into research scientists. There was a 
marked preference for `the established forms of knowledge, for definite and certain science ... and a 
correlating distrust of knowledge in the process of being constituted'.
81
 Only in 1937 did a report 
suggest an introductory course on the experimental method, which would familiarise pupils with 
empirical procedures, and laboratories only began to be set up within the School between 1937 and 
1940.
82
 But applied, `useful' research continued to be emphasised, and from the 1930s onwards, 
there was strong internal disagreement on the research issue, with traditionalists upholding 
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encyclopeadism and polyvalence against specialisation, their credo being that `Polytechnique trains 
engineers, not scientists'.
83
 
 Even so, X did not produce fully-fledged engineers, partly because of `The policy of the 
corps, who favour high administration and management functions';
84
 the aim of X was `not to train 
scientists ... but to educate the country's elite', which in practice meant two things: to provide moral 
and physical training for future leaders, including the inculcation of a `sense of the State', and to 
give them a broad general and scientific cultural outlook, hence the name `poly-technician'.
85
 By 
the early 1960s `one of the criticisms most commonly levelled at the School by University 
academics was that it "sterilised" too great a number of young French people gifted for science by 
diverting them away from fundamental research to the benefit of technique or administration.'
86
 
The Administration in any case preferred `to have their own, applied research laboratories and 
[saw] no practical utility in fundamental research.'
87
 
 This last point is crucial in that it illustrates a salient feature of the French referential 
framework: science and technique were encouraged (by the State, in schools training State 
engineers) only insofar as they could be made to serve the State; pure research was a matter for 
universities. For this very reason, an enduring feature of the polytechnician's outlook has been a 
strong interest for issues of `flow', be it of air, water, light, people or vehicles, which have 
inherently very practical applications.
88
 Because of the polytechnicians' interest for such issues, 
they acquired an intellectual appeal and even `glamour'. 
 The predilection for `practical' technical problems was paralleled by an interest in concrete 
economic issues. Following the 1929 crash, a group was set up by polytechnicians to reflect on 
current economic problems, using scientific methods and mathematics, `away from any partisan 
influence'.
89
 By 1933, the group - X-Crise - set up its own organisation, the Centre polytechnicien 
d'études économiques: `What is remarkable in X-Crise is the methodology it instaured in the 
economic debate: statistical data, but also mathematical models, played a considerable role ... 
Economic policy became a matter of expertise, concentrated in the hands of technocrats with a 
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scientific - polytechnician for the majority of them - background.'
90
 
 A continous feature of polytechnician education was a belief in the objectivity of technical 
reason and the ensuing desire to forge rigourous instruments in the very image of mathematical 
knowledge:
91
 instruments that would be equally applied to technical projects in the first instance, 
and then to public policy in general. State intervention in France thus acquired its peculiarly 
technical tenor, combining both boldness (based on confidence in one's technical expertise) and 
attention to detail. Technocratic intervention was perceived by its practitioners to be both rational 
and neutral, at least until the 1970s. The belief in the superiority of technical reason was 
constitutive of the belief in progress, itself closely connected to the concept of modernity. These 
three elements (technical reason, progress, modernity) were the pillars ot the polytechnician 
culture, which permeated the higher reaches of the Administration. 
 
(3) Transport officials: from Ponts et chaussées to Equipement 
 In the railway sector, the presence of engineers from one of the State Corps, namely Ponts 
et chaussées (`Bridges and Roads') both in public bodies and private firms, was inescapable. 
Engineers trained at Ecole nationale des ponts et chaussées (ENPC) were found everywhere in the 
railway policy-making community: inside MdT's Land Transport Directorate, on the SNCF Board, 
among railway manufacturers such as Alsthom and at the head of OFERMAT (Office Français de 
Coopération pour les Chemins de Fer et les Matériels d'Equipement), a State agency which 
sponsored international technical cooperation in the public transport sector.
92
 As a result, one can 
argue the existence of a closely integrated French technocratic community in the transport sector. 
 In the words of two French sociologists, `The Equipement divisions, better known under 
their old name of Ponts et chaussées, occupy a prominent place in the public sector. This is through 
their weight: personnel numbers over 110,000, they use close to 1/3 of State and local authorities 
investment, and have jurisdiction ranging from transport and civil engineering to housing and town 
planning. It is also through their institutional longevity: already created in the seventeenth century, 
this technical administration has lived through the political history of France without experiencing 
a significant change in its structures. It is finally through their prestige: their heads, the engineers of 
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Ponts et chaussées, are recruited amongst the best pupils coming out of the Ecole polytechnique.'
93
 
 One particular feature of ENPC of interest to us is its tradition of calcul économique public 
(which very loosely translates as cost-benefit analysis), which began to be developed in the mid-
nineteenth century: `this tradition was an old concern of P&C engineers, passed on within technical 
lectures themselves, before giving rise to its own teaching.'
94
 Dupuit, who developed the concept of 
consumer surplus, was himself a P&C engineer. More generally, P&C pupils were taught to take 
interest in economic matters; a professorship in Political Economy was set up as early as 1846 by 
the Public Works Minister. Clément Colson and François Divisia taught there as well as at 
Polytechnique. Colson (a P&C engineer) became the specialist of transport economics, first as a 
senior civil servant at the Ministry of Public Works then as a lecturer from 1885 (in later life, he 
was to become Vice-President of the Council of State). 
 Similarly, the Ecole des mines, which provided a number of engineers in the transport 
sector (not least the influential Deputy DG / President of SNCF between 1949-1958, Louis 
Armand, who also headed Polytechnique's managing board from 1957 until 1968), had its own 
teaching in economics and the seminars on economics of future Nobel-prize winner Maurice Allais 
attracted a number of P&C engineers working in State services in the early 1960s. 
 
Conclusion 
 The existence in France of an integrated technical / political / administrative class with a 
tradition of going into industry, both public and private, meant that there was within the State 
apparatus a broker, as it were, for the national railway and the rail industry in general. French 
railway engineers could exclude governmental influence on decision-making quite successfully, 
partly thanks to their monopoly on technical expertise, and mostly because of the high regard in 
which their profession was held. In fact SNCF exploited the administrative system; after a difficult 
period in the 1960s when government policy turned to motorway-building and the railways seemed 
an obsolete technology, they acquired a new respectability, both by developing new technology and 
taking advantage of the technocratic bias in French administration.
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3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 In the first two sections of this chapter I presented the British and French policy actors and 
arrangements. Many similarities between the two will have appeared clearly in the course of these 
sections, and I will mainly dwell on the differences in this comparative section, in order to arrive at 
a first approximation of the referential frameworks of public action in the two countries. 
 Relations between State / central government and railways have never been easy or 
comfortable in either country; there have always been grievances of one type or another, both on 
the side of the authorities and on the railway side. But the ways in which an inherently problematic 
relationship has been handled since 1965 in the two countries differed greatly and I will argue that 
in the French case, strenuous efforts were made to nurture a partnership characterised by mutual 
respect, whereas on the British side, a confrontational mode accompanied by a degree of mutual 
suspicion tended to prevail. 
 
A. Confrontation or partnership? 
(1) The hard road to greater autonomy 
 In France rationalisation of the relationship was achieved to some extent; there remains a 
certain amount of State involvement, which is however not resented by railway managers.
1
 If 
anything the (British) Morrisonian concept found a more congenial ground in France in the late 
1970s. In Britain, the arm's length relationship failed to materialise in the way it was intended and 
attempts at reforming it only appeared to compound the problem. The public corporation model 
failed to achieve its professed goals principally because the relationship simply could not be 
sustained at arm's length: NEDO regretfully concluded that `Ministers do not and cannot in practice 
keep their involvement restricted within predetermined guidelines. The major nationalised 
industries' positions in the economy are too strategic and their market power too politically 
sensitive for Ministers to accept self-denying ordinances for more than a very limited period of 
time.'
2
 
 The shorthand way in which practitioners referred to railway undertakings (in policy and 
professional literature) was indicative of a number of conceptions. In Britain, BR was mostly 
referred to as `the industry', `the business', which stressed commercial aspects, as though the 
railway was no more than a firm that happened to be in the public sector. BR was viewed as part 
and parcel of the business world, not as an extension of central government. Yet it was also part of 
the category of `nationalised industries', a phrase which one Chairman (Parker) sought to replace 
by `national industries', with a view to removing the ideological connotations of the term 
`nationalised'. The working conception of officials was to let the railway get on with it, as if it was 
a private company. In France, SNCF was mainly called either `the operator' (l'exploitant) or `the 
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national company' (la société nationale) and the phrase `public service' was frequently used in 
conjunction with it; it was sometimes - though rarely - referred to as an administration,
3
 although 
during the first decades of SNCF's existence, senior management were officially called 
fonctionnaires supérieurs (higher civil servants). The French flag flies from SNCF's headquarter 
buildings, and the general feeling was that the railway was a national firm which naturally 
belonged to the public sector. SNCF was treated by officials as a public asset, for whose fate they 
were at least partly responsible. 
 Relations between the two parties were conducted in a confrontational mode in Britain, the 
lack of contact and shared academic backgrounds resulting in a gulf of incomprehension. The 
relationship was often conducted at the highest level, since accommodation could not be found at 
the administrative level and no institutional departmental presence existed on the Board; there were 
for instance two encounters between the full Board and the Transport Minister, the first one in 
1981 to request from him the formulation of a long term rail policy, the second one to make the 
same request from the first Minister's successor.
4
 Yet when central government took more than a 
passing interest in the railway and requested data, railway management felt besieged.
5
 There was a 
widespread belief that government should not be seen to meddle in the affairs of industry - public 
or private - and that in general, `the influence of Parliament, government and key interest groups 
such as consumers, can and should be exercised from the outside.'
6
 A clear separation between 
central government and Board was thus maintained at the institutional level, where there was no 
overlap. In France, State presence within the undertaking on a continuous basis was expected and 
accepted, responsibilities were clearly delineated, and medium to long term goals set clearly so that 
SNCF was on the whole able to get on with it.  
 British arm's length sponsorship rested on the principle that nationalised industry and 
department operated at the same hierarchical level, whereas tutelle implied the hierarchical 
supremacy of the Ministry. The first arrangement was conducive to a constant power struggle 
between equals whilst the second fostered concertation. The British framework of control, a 
`mixture of vagueness and precision',
7
 was harshly criticised in a Select Committee on Nationalised 
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Industries report on capital investment procedures (1973-1974) which found that the Government 
failed to exercise control over the industries publicly and according to well-defined rules. Perhaps 
this was because informal control was preferred, and when ministers did intervene, it was mostly 
on an ad hoc basis. The overall impression one gains is of successive governments `muddling 
through'. 
 One might argue that this had nothing to do with general state practice, but rather with 
sectoral policy-making, in other words, the lack of sustained interest in railway matters might be 
the reason behind this incremental approach. But if one turns to roads policy, where the 
commitment of successive governments to road-building was beyond doubt, a similar picture 
emerges of short-term uncoordinated policy-making,
8
 which contrasts with French roads policy: in 
1960, a centralised Master Plan for the National Road Network was formulated, which had no 
equivalent in Britain.
9
 
 A different climate prevailed in France, where more direct State participation and 
concertation with industry were institutionalised, for instance through the contractual process. The 
French State proved a reliable partner in the eyes of SNCF. Although it made great demands upon 
the railway, it was willing in counterpart to provide a sufficient degree of political commitment, 
financial stability and natiowide planning necessary for cost-effective expansion and modernisation 
of the network. The large amount of negotiating that took place, first around the National Plans, 
then around the contracts allowed the two parties to understand each other's position clearly and at 
an early stage. This was made all the more easy as most senior railway managers / engineers and 
their opposite numbers at the Ministry had similar educational backgrounds. 
 The relationship State - SNCF was a symbiotic one, a fact which, paradoxically, allowed 
the `partners' to retain their full integrity, whereas the more distant relations between British central 
government and BR made it difficult for the Board to resist the application of more coercive 
methods. The background of those heading the railways is an important clue in this respect: BRB 
chairmen were mostly either from within the railway or from the business world, whereas SNCF 
presidents were always from outside the railway and from the public sector or civil service, but 
definitely not business; they were figures with insider knowledge of the State machinery and with 
well-garnished address books. The status of these figures was also indicative of different state 
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practices: SNCF presidents were listed among the `State' representatives on the Board, whilst BR 
chairmen were just that. 
 To sum up, in France a model of `joint action' prevailed in the overall strategy for rail 
transport, while in management matters, SNCF was encouraged to be autonomous; in Britain on the 
other hand, the relationship was an `arm's length' one only as far as overall commitment to the 
railway was concerned, but involved a great deal of central government interference. State action in 
the UK was constrictive (imposition of limits), whilst State action in France tended to be enabling 
(objectives, together with means to reach them, agreed by all parties). The fact that SNCF and 
politico-administrative thinking developed along the same paths was no happy accident, but rather 
the result of its close involvement, at the highest level, with the State machinery. Clearly this was 
not the case with BR. In practical terms, this French consensus meant that SNCF never criticised 
the government openly although it might call for specific measures to solve a particular problem; 
public dissent was unthinkable. In Britain, there were no such reservations and BR senior 
management did not hesitate to openly voice their discontent at periodic intervals. 
 
(2) Financial arrangements: shackles or springboard? 
 Figures regarding state assistance per head and government support as a percentage of 
GNP all pointed to the same conclusion: `Compared with other European railways, BR receives a 
low level of support ... In addition, the grant does not sufficiently acknowledge the benefits offered 
by rail in terms of accessibility, speed, reliability, environmental impact and safety.'
10
 Central 
government support for Britain's railways had always been low, and already by 1982 support for 
the railways as a percentage of GDP was lowest in the UK, out of nine European countries.
11
 The 
overall figures for 1982 were £928m for BR; £1.4bn (FF14.5bn) for SNCF.
12
 
 By the 1960s, both BR and SNCF were prone to chronic deficits, which required ever-
increasing state assistance. This situation was perceived as intolerable by both governments, which 
sought to reduce the railway's call on public funds, using a number of direct and indirect devices. 
But the means to this common end were totally divergent: in France, reliable State backing in times 
of hardship was seen as the prerequisite to making the company financially viable in the long run, 
whereas in Britain, financial disengagement was seen as a precondition to increased efficiency in 
the railways, no matter what the economic situation might be. 
 British central government was the first to take action in 1961, with the appointment of 
Beeching, a businessman, then under the Wilson Governments of 1964-1970.
13
 France followed 
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suit with the publication of the Nora Report in 1968 and the decision to implement its 
recommendations in the railway sector. Both governments sought to make it more difficult for 
railways to obtain public funds and a more commercial approach was implemented during the 
period covered by our case studies, from 1961 in Britain and from 1969 in France. The British 
railway network was not treated as a national asset, but purely as a commercial entity. Unlike BR, 
SNCF was not subjected to deep, continuing cuts in its overall funding and continued to stress its 
function as provider of a public service. The perception in France was that reaching financial 
break-even point was a long-term task which required careful planning; furthermore, the drive to 
eliminate railway losses was tempered by social factors. 
 In both countries, financial objectives ran up against the fact that secondary lines often 
could not break even. Imaginative solutions were sought on both sides of the Channel from the 
mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, in particular much effort was expanded on defining a (highly 
controversial) `core railway', stripped of all loss-making components, but this particular 
philosophical stone could not be found.
14
 Consequently similar arrangements were devised in both 
countries whereby losses incurred on unprofitable lines that had to be kept open for social (or 
political) reasons would be financially compensated. However this in France was viewed as a first 
step, the second being further modernisation, but in Britain, `a good little railway' seems to have 
been many people's sole ambition.
15
 
 Several types of financial instruments are available to support public industry generally 
and the mix favoured by one country over another is very indicative of conceptions of public 
action. The UK tended to rely on direct grants, whereas France `used capital market instruments - 
equity participation, soft loans, and loan guarantees - heavily.'
16
 Thus British Rail was in practice 
extremely dependent on the goodwill of central government, principally the Treasury, a situation 
which set it apart from private firms. French public undertakings - including SNCF - were less 
reliant on direct subsidies and had at their disposal some (if not all) of the financial instruments 
available to private firms. Also all means of external funding in Britain were budgetary and 
therefore directly implicated general public expenditure policy. In France both budgetary and off-
budget means co-existed, which provided for greater leeway. 
 There were some striking differences between British and French railway investment 
levels: for instance, BR planned to invest £200m in 1983, while SNCF, in spite of a deficit more 
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than double BR's, projected an investment figure equivalent to £900m.
17
 The cross-party British 
view was that government should get a return on public investment and BR was asked to return 
profits; whilst there was no such assumption in France, where Finance sought to allocate 
investment `rationally', and SNCF was only required to break even: the railway benefitted the 
whole Nation, over and above any financial returns for the undertaking. State aid was therefore 
taken for granted in the French referential framework, whereas in the British it was regarded as a 
bane. 
 These differing views also underpinned the approaches to fare-fixing: BR benefitted from 
a much higher degree of commercial freedom in setting its own fares, not being bound to a nation-
wide standard rate per mile, whereas SNCF had to maintain the public service principle of equality 
of all users. Pricing principles adopted by the two railways represented two fundamentally different 
approaches: a `cost-based pricing system' had long been applied in France whilst in 1968 BR began 
to apply `market pricing'. Consequently fares covered 71.2% of BR's costs, as against 55.3% of 
SNCF's, and average fares per passenger mile were higher in the UK, at 8.4p., compared with 6.0p. 
in France.
18
 Paradoxically, commercial pricing was introduced by a Labour government but cost-
based pricing was retained unchallenged by successive right-wing French governments. 
 We can also account for attitudes towards accumulated debt and for the vastly different 
sizes of the railway deficits (e.g. £173m for BR, £485m for SNCF, in 1982)
19
 in terms of general 
conceptions: BR's deficit was part and parcel of the PSBR, SNCF's was its own. Under those 
conditions, it is not surprising to find that BR debts were written off three times in the space of 
twenty years whereas SNCF was expected to find its own way of dealing with them. This duality of 
conception also applied to the railways' subsidiaries: British ministers required BR to dispose of its 
subsidiaries in the early 1980s but deprived the undertaking of the proceeds of the sales; SNCF 
enjoyed far more freedom in the running of its subsidiaries and retained profits from asset sales. 
  The roles of Finance / Treasury officials were strikingly different. Finance were directly 
involved in policy proposals through their being represented as a matter of course on SNCF Board, 
Planning Commission working parties and interdepartmental committees. Furthermore there were 
both routine and exceptional direct contacts between Finance and SNCF. The British Treasury for 
its part operated at one remove: direct contacts with the Board were exceptional and it had no 
continuous institutional presence within it. 
 To sum up, central government attitudes towards the railways in Britain changed little 
from the late 1950s, `a significant watershed for ... [government] shifted back to treating the 
railways in economic isolation, to be evaluated purely in terms of profit and loss ... overall the 
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predominant attitude came to be that of viewing railway economics in terms of annual accounts and 
balance sheets.'
20
 The hierarchies of factors influencing the decision-making processes in Britain 
and France differed; in Britain financial considerations were by far the most salient, even when a 
good case could be made for a new investment. This narrowly financial approach meant that the 
railway was an easy target for spending cuts announced at short notice: one Chairman stated that 
`The staff at British Rail became demoralized because they never finished working out the 
implications of the last set of Treasury cuts before the next lot were upon them.'
21
 The general 
thread in British policy was to reduce central government's overall financial commitment, whereas 
in France policy aimed both at creating a high quality system and getting more value for money: 
funds were made available, but only after lengthy consultation and negotiation. 
 
(3) Four concepts of control 
 `Control' can broadly be conceived in four ways: the first meaning of `control' is to do with 
public accountability, of which there was rather little in the two countries. With the second 
meaning, the control function consists in auditing the activities of the controlled body to ensure that 
they conform to given standards. This was a particularly important function in France. The third 
meaning is one of simple restraint: the control machinery is there to prevent the industry from 
getting out of hand, e.g. excessive spending. This is the sense which emerged most clearly in 
Britain, where from 1961, control mostly took the shape of financial constraints and cuts in 
subsidies. The fourth meaning was prominent in France but virtually non-existent in Britain: 
positive guiding of the enterprise was something which the French State was inclined to engage in. 
 It is worth dwelling on these four conceptions a little longer. The first one, that is control in 
the a posteriori sense of ensuring accountability, was mainly carried out through parliamentary 
activity. In both countries, parliamentary control was far less effective than government control, 
since British governments normally rested on a parliamentary majority which loyally supported 
their policies and the French Parliament has played a minor role in the policy process since the 
beginning of the Fifth Republic. 
 Turning to the second control function, jurisdictional control was far more a reality in 
France, where auditing and continuous financial control were carried out directly by the Court of 
Accounts and by Finance officials, unlike in Britain, where DoT provided auditors annually and 
BR allowed no continuous access, having fought off plans for the Comptroller-General to audit 
railway business. Technical control a priori was inexistent in Britain but highly developed in 
France; whilst the a posteriori type was an important feature in Britain and has only recently been 
introduced in France. In Britain safety measures were left to the discretion first of the private 
railway companies, then of the public undertaking, on the understanding that all reasonable 
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endeavours would be made. When safety broke down, the public was entitled to know why, in the 
name of public accountability. In France, public safety ranked so high in the referential framework 
that it was felt to be a direct duty of the State to enforce it on a continuous basis and to prevent 
accidents at all costs. There was therefore a strong emphasis on preventive action. When accidents 
happened, the responsibility was purely the railway operators' and no longer a matter of public 
policy. Where British inspectors from the Board of Trade, later MoT, had the duty to report on all 
serious accidents, their recommendations being published (but not necessarily implemented), 
official inquiries into railway accidents in France were not carried out until recently. It was for 
SNCF to make its own inquiry and take action. 
 As regards control in the restraining sense, the British predilection for financial controls 
can only be explained in terms of the referential framework, which was dominated by issues of 
taxation and public finance.
22
 The approach to financial control was dogmatic, bound up with the 
Treasury ethos of financial orthodoxy; the French Finance approach was a great deal more 
pragmatic. 
 Control in the fourth, developmental sense was effected through the institutional 
framework in France. The presence of State officials on SNCF's Board was not replicated by that of 
British government representatives on the BRB. Although attempts were made, they did not come 
naturally and mostly failed (Sir Peter Baldwin, DoT Permanent Secretary who sat on the BRB in 
the late 1970s, was one exception; Sir David Serpell, who had been MoT, then DoE's Permanent 
Secretary in 1968-1972, only became a Board Member afterwards); interestingly, one talked of 
introducing `cross-postings', which implied reciprocity, whereas in France, the traffic was one-way, 
with a very tangible State presence within SNCF taken for granted. The presence of departmental 
officials in the midst of BR management was perceived as an intrusion. 
 Encompassing the four categories of controls presented above, there were two antithetical 
controlling styles in the British and French railway sectors. A marked dislike of formal 
arrangements on the British side was evident in the arm's length relationship, the absence of 
contracts and medium to long term planning, and the fact that one Permanent Secretary had sat on 
the BRB but not others. The French habit of institutionalised relations and formal arrangements 
manifested itself in the inclusion of railways in the five-year National Plans after the war, in the 
contractual relations established in 1969, in the automatic membership of the SNCF Board for 
certain Transport and Finance officials and the existence of national consultative / policy-making 
bodies (National Transport Council, CGPC). 
 
B. The weight of party politics and professional interests 
(1) The politics of technical education 
 We have already established that the engineering condition differed sharply in the two 
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countries. This was directly linked to the referential frameworks.
23
 Britain had been traditionally 
committed to the idea that training in practical skills should be left to the employer and to 
professional organisations, whereas France had long cherished State involvement in the provision 
and supervision of vocational training.
24
 
 The strict separation in Britain between on the one hand, broad (academic, university) 
education and on the other specialised (vocational) training was not replicated in France, where the 
more prestigious State schools were professional in orientation. Nevertheless in both countries 
generalists were more prized than specialists and the focus of elite education was on intellectual 
training rather than on the acquisition of knowledge. Where Britain and France differed was in the 
definition of a good generalist education: in France it was grounded in mathematical training whilst 
in Britain it was based on the humanities (less frequently, the natural sciences). 
 Engineering education and regulation of the engineering profession reflect cultural values 
of a given society and more particularly political assumptions about the role of the state in the 
economy. British policy towards engineering was non-interventionist until the 1980s, whilst French 
policy was hands-on from the very beginning, an approach which has not been challenged. The 
traditional British emphasis on market competition, independent private firms and financial returns 
led to a fragmented engineering profession which could not assert its technical values. The French 
concern with the consolidation of centralised State power, often on the basis of technical 
achievement, made it seem natural that engineering education should be closely controlled, and in 
return made it possible for engineers to decisively influence State policy in technical sectors. 
Engineering in Britain began and remained a matter for the private sector; in France it was nurtured 
and developed as a matter of public concern and therefore controlled to a very large extent by the 
State.
25
 
 
(2) Partisan differences and state practice 
 In the UK, railway issues generally had a high political profile: on the one hand, in the 
words of former Labour Transport Minister and BR Chairman Marsh, `political troglodytes' were 
convinced that `the very act of nationalization transformed formerly efficient undertakings into a 
slap-happy shambles led by incompetents and, since they elevated purely pragmatic argument for 
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and against nationalization to the prime political issue between the two main parties, they missed 
no opportunity to indiscriminately attack nationalized industries.'
26
 On the other hand, Labour 
politicians had believed in 1945 that public ownership would solve everything and that government 
should keep out of railway management. In France, railway policy was on the whole 
uncontroversial, and SNCF was not criticised simply by virtue of belonging to the public sector. 
 The terms of the transport debate were not identical in the two countries. French transport 
practitioners perceived an irremediable tension between `commercialism' and `public service', with 
the ideal transport policy a balance of the two. British practitioners saw policy in terms of a 
continuum that stretched all the way from `free market' efficiency as the best guarantee of the 
public interest, to public ownership as the ideal solution. In the French debate, the question was not 
whether the State ought to intervene at all, but whether it was giving due regard to both commercial 
and public service aspects of transport policy. In the British debate, there was no fundamental 
cross-party agreement concerning the role of central government in the railway sector, whether 
simply regulatory or actively interventionist. It is hardly surprising that with such a lack of common 
ground, the railways in the UK should have been caught between conflicting, partisan policies, 
whilst French railway policy displayed a large degree of continuity overall. 
 Although from an ideological point of view, there were stark differences between 
Conservative and Labour thinking, in terms of practices continuity was quite common: `The most 
frustrating aspect of the return of the Labour Party to power in 1974 was that it produced no 
difference whatever in the relationship between Government and the nationalized industries ... One 
of the great myths is that there is some fundamental difference between Conservatives and the 
Labour Party. There is none as far as the administration of public sector industries is concerned';
27
 
this, according to Marsh, was because neither Conservative nor Labour governments had `any 
comprehension of the length of time it takes to make major changes in industrial plans efficiently ... 
Parliament is not designed for sophisticated, detailed, industrial planning'.
28
 
 This brings us to conceptions of time horizons. The distinguishing feature of the State in 
the French framework was its proclaimed ambition to rise above the fray of party political 
considerations and contingent issues to take the long-term view of the Nation's interests. Party 
political influence was deemed to represent organised, particular interests and perform a divisive 
role; against such a threat, the bureaucracy led in the name of the general interest. This was one of 
the reasons why it saw itself as the natural guardian of national prosperity and why markets never 
could be. The dominant influence on State practice was administrative and industrial, not political, 
time. In British policy, the timespan of policy was consistently a short one, dominated on the one 
hand by party political considerations and on the other hand by short-term financial imperatives: 
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`very few Ministers were able to think five years forward in terms of industrial planning. That is 
not a criticism of the individuals but of the system.'
29
 On the government side, nowhere can one 
find references to investment lead times, and the necessarily long delays between the formulation 
of a new policy and its effects on the transport network. State practice was dominated by the 
politician and the accountant's, not the industrialist's, time horizon. 
 Although the Civil Service was dominated by a `mandarin' culture which favoured policy 
continuity, there was no degree of overlap, between central administrative services and more 
peripheral public services such as the railway, comparable to that found in France. The large degree 
of integration of technical, political and administrative personnel in France facilitated continuity in 
sectoral policy, which was simply not found in Britain, where the type of training received by 
aspiring public servants differed strongly from that of railway officers. British civil servants were 
skilled in weighing the pros and cons of a question, whilst their French counterparts were far more 
action-orientated and not likely to passively await government instructions. There was no 
overarching public service ethos binding all British officials into an entity with a common goal. In 
fact there was no common goal for administrators other than to serve the political masters of the 
day. For in the final analysis, the Civil Service served the Government, not the nation.
30
 
 
(3) Two ideas of public service 
 The French transport policy elite shared the same educational and professional background 
and the public service ethos, instilled into aspiring civil servants by technical Grandes écoles, and 
after 1945 by ENA, which favoured intervention and equipped civil servants with a strong sense of 
mission. As regards the railways, the `mission' involved the creation of an integrated national space 
in which every part had efficient, good quality transport links with the centre. The ethos was non-
partisan: `Regal and Republican traditions, in agreement on this point, have deeply embedded the 
idea of public service "by nature" in the French political culture'; the idea itself could not be said to 
have been born on the left or the right exclusively.
31
 The reference to both regal and republican 
traditions directs us to a crucial point: the enduring presence of the public service concept, which 
has not been challenged, in spite of a lengthy and learned debate on its crisis and impending demise 
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throughout the twentieth century. By way of definition, `public service' refers both to an abstract 
doctrine with an imposing body of legal argumentation and to actual economic activities falling 
within a defined sphere and carried out by undertakings such as SNCF. 
 In 1842, the railway was placed under the concessionary regime and by the 1850s public 
service principles had begun to be applied to the private railway companies. The concept of public 
service was formalised by the `Bordeaux School' of legal experts
32
 around the turn of the century: 
`The public service doctrine sought then to renew the theory of the State, by complementing the 
idea of power with the idea of service.'
33
 The new philosophy of State action coalesced around the 
notion of public service. Three great principles, known as the `laws of public service', were 
formalised by Rolland:
34
 (1) continuity (operations must be carried out without any interruption, in 
the interest of users); (2) equality, `which rests on the extension of the principle in the 1789 
Declaration of judicial equality before the law and rules, and which demands that users be placed 
on an equal footing, without discrimination or special advantages;'
35
 (3) mutability, `according to 
which services meet needs and evolve both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The notion of 
public service is not static, but dynamic.'
36
 
 Even in the last thirty years, French policy-makers have used the public service notion as a 
point of reference.
37
 The abiding presence of this concept in the French referential framework was 
the consequence of its being deeply rooted in three critical terrains: `legal (jurisprudence of the 
Council of State [...] ), economic (public economics) and socio-political (trade-union movement, 
municipal socialism, nationalisation)'.
38
 It was also a function of its inherent flexibility: in the wide 
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interpretation of the concept, `public service [combined] efficiency, commercial approach, 
competition ... without opposing them' and had thus been associated with the public sector 
modernisation drive, in particular in the transport sector.
39
 
 State and public service became closely identified because at the outset service public had 
been closely linked to ordre public (law and order), the enforcement of which was the prerogative 
of the State.
40
 The connection was part of a rationalistic search for political order through economic 
welfare. Secondly, the public service concept rested on the unquestioned postulate that `certain 
social activities must be free from ... the search for profit, in order to be managed according to 
specific criteria ... thus contributing to the economic, social and cultural balance and cohesion of 
society'; the type of activities that fell into this category were those that were essential for all, either 
because they `flow from a common strategic interest, or from a necessity of solidarity or equity.'
41
 
The referential framework was not subservient to economic forces; there was a perception that 
social imperatives were just as important and that `social solidarity does not easily flow from 
market forces alone ("between the weak and the strong, it is law that liberates and freedom that 
oppresses")'.
42
 This perception was institutionalised, e.g. in the Economic and Social Council (an 
advisory body) and the Finance Ministry's FDES (economic and social development fund). 
 If we now turn to Britain, there was no overwhelming sense among policy elites that the 
free play of economic liberalism might have destabilising social effects, which central government 
had a duty to prevent, a perception which was prevalent in France. Shonfield had noted that `the 
French appeared to proceed from the consciousness that insurrection is within the realm of 
possibility'.
43
 The ever-present threat of insurrection partly explains the greater willingness of the 
French State to engage in social dialogue, or at the very least, to appear to engage in it. Throughout 
the postwar period, the progressive, continuous decrease in French railway staffing levels 
contrasted with the much steeper drop in BR personnel. 
 
 
 
 Public service `was used by the public authorities as a multi-dimensional reference':
44
 a 
legal dimension, defining the remit of administrative law; a socio-economic dimension, involving 
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the existence of public undertakings, and an ideological dimension, namely that State action was 
legitimate in the areas deemed to belong to the sphere of public service. If we now apply these 
three dimensions to the British case, we find that the only meaningful one was the second; `public 
service' denoted actual services (e.g. railways) rather than a doctrine. In fact, one came across the 
phrase `public utility' far more frequently than `public service', and `the very translation of the 
expression "service public" as it is understood in France ... is nearly impossible in English ... the 
English expression "public utilities" is more apt than "public service"' yet is not entirely 
satisfactory.
45
 
 Or else the phrase tended to apply to individuals who had served their community rather 
than to impersonal organisations: discussing the British Monarchy, David Starkey stated that it 
stood `as any sensible reading of the honours system shows, not for mere wealth, but for public 
service';
46
 even a traditional Conservative politician such as Douglas Hurd, who argued: `We have 
to place public service back at the heart of our political idiom' added immediately that it was best 
provided by the marketplace for `the most invaluable improvements to our quality of life come 
from the behaviour and decisions of individuals, acting on their own and in their communities.'
47
 
Public service rested on individual rather than collective action. However, could one go along with 
the statement by former SNCF Deputy Director General (in charge of relations with BR, 1957-
1974), that `the British tradition is hardly conducive to large public service projects'?
48
  
 The public sector and Civil Service in Britain tended to have a lacklustre image, long 
before the neo-liberal agenda became established in the 1980s. For instance `Civil service 
mentality' was a disparaging expression. More generally, attitudes towards public officials tended 
to be negative. The often derogatory attitude towards the Civil Service was echoed in the relative 
contempt in which public industries were held, both by Whitehall and Westminster. There was a 
fairly widespread perception that British public sector management had tended to be over-
bureaucratic, and that many job holders had been inadequately qualified.
49
 Such contempt was at 
its most vocal with Mrs Thatcher, who during her premiership made a characteristic comment on 
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`talent' necessarily going to well-paid private sector jobs.
50
 British Rail particularly suffered from 
adverse perceptions: one scientist who joined BR Research in the early 1960s said that at the time 
it `was a very foolhardy thing to do in many people's eyes.'
51
 
 Within central government there appeared to be an institutionalised obsession with `public 
enterprise' and competition at the expense of `public service'. The commercial function of the 
railways was clearly emphasised from 1961 and displaced the public service ethos which had until 
then been upheld by railway management. At the same time, the railway's role as a possible agent 
of public policy was downplayed or rejected. Both central government and BR chiefs tended to 
view the railway as above all a commercial business. Some at BR did have a wider frame of 
reference than a purely commercial one but it could not be translated into policy because most of 
the time it was not accepted as legitimate: the public service language used by some railway 
managers was drowned by the official language of financial returns, which in any case the BRB 
tended to borrow. The following excerpt shows how far a BR chief had internalised the 
government's financial concerns; asked whether he had ever considered himself a `public servant', 
he replied: `I was conscious that we were trying to spend the country's money sensibly. I was very 
conscious of that ... So I suppose in that sense I was thinking of myself as a public servant. I wanted 
to use the money wisely.'
52
 There was nothing more to public service than cost-consciousness. 
 In Britain `public service' generally applied to actual undertakings rather than to the 
abstract principle, but even when viewed in abstract terms, it bore little resemblance to the French 
acception; one BRB Chief Economist considered that there was a `basic inconsistency between 
"co-ordination" and "public service"' since `Co-ordination can only mean the restriction of choice 
to reduce costs' whilst `"public service" implies the widest possible choice.'
53
 In his definition, there 
was a strong element of individualism which was totally absent from the French definition; the 
latter implied that transport should be co-ordinated precisely in order to fulfill the public service 
obligation; individual choice was a non-issue. The same Board member also criticised the fact that 
the public service objective imposed by the government had remained `undefined', which contrasts 
with the highly formalised rules of public service in France. 
 To sum up, the French referential framework was grounded in a highly developed 
economic, legal and social doctrine of public service informed by a strong sense of collective 
obligation, whilst the British framework used the same phrase in a more descriptive sense, 
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emphasising its individual facets, and did not possess a comparable formal basis for public action. 
 
Conclusion 
 BR management lost their sense of a railway fulfilling the needs of the Nation and became 
a purely commercial entity. In France there was both a more commercial approach and a continuing 
attachment to traditional notions of public service. SNCF continued to see itself as `general carrier 
of both passengers and freight' whilst the self-image of BR became that of a `specialist carrier' for a 
minority of passengers.
54
 In Britain the railway was perceived as a `problem' rather than as an 
opportunity or an instrument for economic improvement, which was the dominant image in France. 
 In Britain as in France, central government's main source of technical information was to 
be found in the railway enterprise itself and in the private railway industry, but when it came to 
technical expertise the situation was contrasted: expertise in Britain was located outside central 
government and its development (through education and training) was left to non-state agencies. In 
France, central administrations had their own in-house experts and actively fostered technical 
education and training through State-sponsored schools. Furthermore management advice did not 
have to be heeded by central government, warnings from the industry could be ignored and 
financial constraints tightened against the wishes of the Board, as happened in Britain, where there 
was an extremely `thin' interface between central government and the railways, and no common 
public sector values. In France the concerns of railway engineers and managers stongly influenced 
the formulation of railway policy owing to the presence of a technical elite spanning both the 
Administration and industry and the existence of shared, non-partisan values centred around 
technical progress and public sector excellence. 
 Finally, we can provide a first approximation of the national referential frameworks of 
public policy in the two countries: the British one was divided, both along partisan lines and in 
terms of dominant imperatives: short-term financial and/or electoral concerns prevailed at the 
politico-administrative level, whilst longer term, technical considerations were more prevalent in 
the industry. In sharp contrast, the French referential framework was relatively homogeneous, with 
technical, social and broad economic concerns ranking high, and a longer time horizon. The case 
studies which follow will enable us to explore further these differences and to build a more detailed 
picture of state practices and of the prevalent conceptions of public power in Britain and France. 
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 CHAPTER III 
 PIONEERING HIGH SPEED RAIL TECHNOLOGY 
 IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (1965-1985) 
 
 
Introduction 
 By 1990, according to the Confederation of British Industry, `France [had] taken the lead 
in high speed rail development'
1
 thanks to its high speed train, TGV (Train à Grande Vitesse; at 
300km/h it was then the fastest train operating in the world). However the British railway 
manufacturing industry had for a long time been the most advanced and developed of its kind: `BR 
had acquired a digital computer as early as 1957 and was the first railway in Europe to use 
computers for scientific and engineering applications'
2
. But BR's most advanced project to date, the 
Advanced Passenger Train (APT), never went further than the R&D stage. 
 The revolution in high speed rail development that took place in the 1960s and 1970s 
followed sharply contrasting ways in France and in Britain. I shall not seek all the reasons for this 
contrast since many of them are unrelated to the public policy referential framework in the two 
countries. For instance, each railway undertaking operated according to its own traditions and 
evolving organisational culture, which greatly influenced the outcome of the projects. I shall 
concentrate instead on the main features of the environments in which the R&D processes took 
place that can increase our understanding of policy-making practices and of the place of the 
State/central government in the referential frameworks, such as: the political climate, methods of 
appraisal and financing of new technology, the impact of an international event such as the oil 
crisis of 1973, the condition of the private rail industry, and the professional dimension of the 
policy process. I shall also discuss the ways in which central government support for the new 
technology was enlisted - or not - in the two countries. The above-mentioned points will be 
discussed in the context of the British case-study first, then in the context of the French one; finally 
a comparative analysis will highlight the salient features of the referential frameworks in the two 
countries. These did not arise in a vacuum; they were shaped to some extent by natural geography 
and by historical factors, so before turning to the case studies proper, it is essential to remind 
ourselves of the geographical and historical constraints that diversely affected the British and 
French railways and restricted the options available; a brief outline of different strategic 
approaches to high speed rail travel will then be provided. 
 
The geographical and historical contexts 
 What criteria were used to make high speed rail policy decisions? The first, inescapable 
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criteria were linked to geography, in particular national patterns of population distribution and 
densities, which had repercussions on the economic viability of building new lines. In some 
transport corridors, a great deal of traffic could be generated by significant improvement to railway 
services, so that investment in new railway infrastructure was worthwhile. On the contrary, where 
traffic generating potential was relatively low, it became very costly to build new track or to 
upgrade existing track, and improvements could best be achieved through new train designs. The 
latter situation prevailed in the UK, where demand for rail transport was spread over a much wider 
area, across a high number of very large cities, whereas urban population in France was 
concentrated in fewer cities, several hundred kilometres away from each other. A second factor 
was the size of the country: longer distances are more economical to run and time savings made 
through increasing train speed are also more apparent. In this respect, SNCF therefore had an in-
built advantage over BR. 
 One important characteristic of the British network at the beginning of the case study was 
the curvaceous nature of many trunk lines (roughly fifty per cent of BR track was on a bend). This 
considerably slowed down trains and made their energy consumption a lot higher than it would 
otherwise have been. Short of relaying entire lines, it therefore seemed sensible to seek increased 
average speeds by designing a train such as APT that would be able to negotiate corners at a third 
higher speed than normal trains. In France on the other hand, the problem was more to do with 
numerous and steep slopes, which were difficult for trains to climb and therefore had to be skirted 
around. The TGV's technical characteristics were chosen on the basis that new track was required 
in order to exploit wheel-on-rail technological potential to the full. A new, straight line following 
natural ground contours - rather than avoiding them - would overcome the need for winding, low-
gradient track and could be tailor-made for trains that had no difficulty in tackling steep hills, 
thanks to their vastly increased motive power. 
 
Strategic approaches 
 There were three possible strategies in the field of  high speed rail development, according 
to the professional literature: 1) an entirely new network may be built, which is incompatible with 
existing lines (the Japanese approach, with the Shinkansen line opened in 1964, and the German 
approach, with the decision to build a new, incompatible infrastructure for the Transrapid magnetic 
train in the 1990s); 2) existing railways may be extensively upgraded for use by new `medium-tech' 
trains, and new track built where track improvement would not yield sufficiently high speeds (TGV 
approach); 3) existing track may be used more or less as it is by sophisticated (high-tech) new 
trains (as with APT). The more new track can be built, the less technically complex the train needs 
to be. The fact that TGV was designed to operate at very high speeds on purpose-built track meant 
that, even though it was a far less innovative train than the APT, it was capable of surpassing the 
performance of British Rail's high-technology train in terms of speed. 
 Let us now turn to the first case study, the British Advanced Passenger Train. The first part 
of the case study provides a brief chronological summary of the R&D process; it is followed by an 
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exposition of the context in which decision-making took place; the last part deals with the 
fluctuations of central government support for the project. Throughout these sections (and all 
subsequent case study sections), much use is made of interview material. For reasons of space, I 
have not qualified the statements but their content clearly should not be treated as established fact. 
Some of the statements are highly subjective but as such provide pointers to the kind of working 
environment in which decisions were taken. 
 
 
1. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE R&D OF THE ADVANCED PASSENGER 
TRAIN 
 The mid-1960s were a time of transformation for BR; the modernisation of the network, 
launched in 1955, had been watered down by government in 1961 and it was now being 
`rationalised' following the initiative of Dr Richard Beeching. As a consequence of delayed 
improvement to services, as regards speeds in particular, rail was steadily losing traffic to the roads 
(by 1970, the dominant feature of the transport system was the motor-car, whose rise had caused 
the number of passengers carried by the railways to decline by one quarter in ten years);
3
 some, 
even in BR, saw it as `the inevitable beginning of the end for the inter-city passenger train.'
4
 Within 
senior management, reflection on the long-term future of the railway was taking place. One policy 
document prepared under Beeching's chairmanship, The Development of the Major Trunk Routes 
forecast that by 1984, inter-city passenger traffic would have slightly diminished but would be 
`concentrated upon fewer routes.'
5
 It would therefore be in BR's interest to operate a policy of 
`selective development and intensive utilisation of a more limited trunk route system' and `to 
concentrate railway investment upon the selected trunk routes'.
6
 
 At the same time however, the seeds of a railway revival were being sown: the `accelerated 
East Coast service, using the new Deltic diesel locomotive ... was inaugurated in 1962 and is 
generally viewed as the turning point for British Rail's post-war inter-city services.'
7
 Also a full 
electric service between London and Liverpool/Manchester was launched in April 1966. These 
new services, although they had only required a relatively small investment and the application of 
small-scale, evolutionary innovations, increased passenger traffic considerably (traffic doubled 
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between 1965 and 1973 on those lines), so that `The commercial impact of that mid-1960s 
inauguration of revolutionised East Coast and West Coast main line timetables ... confounded the 
sceptics in the corridors of British power as well as within British Railways management ... [it] 
made a nonsense of the Beeching regime's pessimistic outlook.'
8
 As a result, both railway managers 
and government changed attitudes. It became clear that higher rail speeds were generally desirable 
and a High Speed Policy was developed which envisaged operation of most of the InterCity 
network by 200km/h trains in the late 1980s, instead of the then maximum speed of 160km/h 
(average speeds on WCML services were only about 125km/h)
9
. A detailed study into reducing 
city-to-city journey times with a view to winning back passengers, especially businessmen, was 
launched, which examined four potential high speed routes. 
 In this period of actual and projected decline, followed by the renewal of hope in the 
viability of the railway, the Advanced Passenger Train was born. The initial impulse for a very fast 
train project came from the Advanced Projects Group in BR's Research and Development Division 
in November 1966, in other words from the engineers rather than from the commercial managers. 
The proposal was received with interest by the commercial section and followed up, for `there was 
a perception that one of the big things that needed to be done in terms of passenger market ... was 
to get inter-city times down ... to reduce journey times was seen to be a strategy which from a 
commercial point of view would pay a lot of dividends. And the question was how to do it.'
10
 
 The traditional approach in the British railway industry was an evolutionary one, in which 
step by step improvement to passenger services was pursued, known as `cut and try'. But the APT 
project represented a new departure, a more `scientific' approach, in which radical design 
innovation was preferred. It followed the reorganisation of BR's research facilities by Dr Sidney 
Jones (a non-railway engineer), in particular the establishment in 1964 of a new Railway Technical 
Centre (RTC) at Derby, which aimed at strengthening research capability and implementing an 
`offensive' research strategy, and attracted a significant number of engineers from the aeronautics 
industry.
11
 
 It took two years for the proposed plan to be accepted by the Railways Board, and for 
funding to be agreed, from the first proposal by BR's Advanced Projects Group in November 1966 
until the Labour Minister of Transport, Richard Marsh, offered support for the project in Autumn 
1968.
12
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 A. Phases in the Research and Development process 
 The APT programme can be divided into three phases (as defined by BR engineers 
Boocock and King): the experimental, which lasted seven years, the prototype, lasting well over ten 
years and finally the production phase. There was some overlap between the first two phases; the 
production phase never fully materialised. 
 
(1) Experimental phase: the APT-E (1969-1973) 
 The R&D programme for APT-E (experimental train) was approved in January 1969. The 
decision covered the construction of an experimental train, but also the building of laboratory 
facilities at Derby and the preparation of a special test track. During this phase, the R&D of novel 
technical concepts took place. For instance, `gas turbine traction using aerospace's new compact, 
low fuel-cost engines looked the white hope of economical high speed trains.'
13
 Some of the 
research on aerodynamics was carried out outside BR: `There were excellent facilities at the 
National Physical Laboratory at Farnborough and one or two university departments' and the 
researchers also made use of French facilities at St Cyr.
14
 
 Throughout the early stages, the future of the APT project was far from being assured 
technically-speaking. Very high speed could only be achieved on the existing, winding network 
(without causing discomfort to passengers) by trains with tilting bodies, a new breed that would 
require a great deal of technological innovation. Because of the high technical risks involved, of 
pressure from `traditional' railway engineers and because `it was evident that it would be several 
years before those risks could be resolved ... BR developed its high speed strategy on the basis of 
first exploiting the potential of faster conventional trains and then exploiting APT.'
15
 Thus from 
1970 BR had two main rolling stock research programmes, APT and the less ambitious High Speed 
Train (HST), a quickly developed `low-tech' diesel-powered design, which applied some of the 
research done for APT but otherwise contained nothing truly innovative; it was approved by 
government in August 1970. The latter project gave birth to the InterCity 125 fleet of passenger 
trains, which came into service in 1976 (BR was then only one of three railways in the world with 
200km/h commercial services, France and Japan being the other two). 
 In 1970, APT was subjected to a government review, which found that APT services 
would be commercially viable. A subsequent BR review in May 1971 recommended the 
commercial development of APT and advocated the development of HST as an `insurance' against 
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any major difficulties with APT. By 1972, the construction of the experimental train was 
completed and in 1972 and 1973, it was commissioned and tested. 
 
 
(2) Prototype phase: the APT-P (1973-1981) 
 Following successful test runs of APT-E, a second review of the project was undertaken 
between November 1972 and February 1973 by a team of engineers from BR Research and from 
CM&EE (Chief Mechanical and Electrical Engineer's Department). At the outset of the project, 
APT had offered attractive prospects at considerable technical risk, but by 1973, `technical risks 
were considered sufficiently small for [APT] to be firmly integrated into BR's commercial plans.'
16
 
Government approval for three identical prototype trains was secured in July 1974. 
 Unlike APT-E however, the prototype train was to be electric-powered. `There was always 
a plan, from the very early days, that an electric version would be produced'
17
 so that APT trains 
could operate both on electrified and non-electrified routes. Gas turbines were necessary for the 
first application of APT, which was to be the non-electrified Bristol-Newcastle route. But 
government decided to let BR complete the electrification of the West Coast Main Line (WCML); 
the 1971 review decided that the first application for service trains would be WCML
18
 and 
concluded that APT-P should proceed as an electric train. 
 By 1977, the prototype had been delivered and began to be tested on reserved track. But 
tests of APT-P in full passenger service were delayed time and again by BR owing to technical 
failures; this put them in an embarrassing position for `The Department of Transport would only 
authorize a production run of APTs once the prototypes had proved themselves in actual passenger 
service.'
19
 Passenger trials carried out in December 1981 experienced serious technical problems 
and as a result, APT-P was withdrawn from passenger service shortly afterwards. 
 
(3) Production phase: the APT-S (1981-1985) 
 The third phase of the APT programme had as an objective the consolidation of all 
previous developments into a final train design. In early 1981, BR was `awaiting government 
approval [for] a programme to build an initial fleet of 60 APTs',
20
 sufficient to cover the London-
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Glasgow route and expected to be in full service from May 1984. Following the misfortunes of 
December 1981, BR admitted in 1982 that APT-Ps would not be used for passenger service, only 
as relief trains or in peak summer periods. Some engineers thought that the December trials had 
`demonstrated' that the APT concept was `achievable'; all that was left to do was to make it reliable, 
at the production stage.
21
 But as Peter Parker, the then Chairman, reflected, `We could not protract 
the development any longer ... There had to be something ready to take over as the HST aged and 
our electrification programme was widely introduced over more of the network ... this was a 
defeat'.
22
 
 In August 1984, APT-Ps entered passenger service as relief trains on the London-Glasgow 
route. In December there was even a record run, Euston-Glasgow in 3 hours 53 mns. But `we had 
decided in fact that APT would not proceed and we had conceived  ... the IC225'.
23
 Passenger trials 
ceased in early 1985 and in 1986, the design, development and construction of Class 91 `Electra' 
locomotives started for the `InterCity 225' project: this new electric train was to be non-specialist 
and non-tilting, though it used elements of APT technology and is considered to be APT's direct 
successor. It took only two years to be designed, developed and built, and in October 1989, the first 
complete Class 91 trainset entered service on schedule (IC225 London-Leeds). 
 
 
 B. The decision-making context 
 Decisions regarding APT were made in a multi-dimensional context, which yields several 
elements of the British public policy referential framework. The dimensions have not been listed in 
a hierarchical order, but in order to maximise ease of understanding. I argue that the political 
environment in which the project was launched was favourable, whilst other elements of the policy 
context were sources of difficulty. 
 
(1) The political environment 
 APT was born in a favourable political configuration, both as regards science and 
technology policy and rail transport policy although there was no publicly acknowledged 
connection between the launch of APT research and Harold Wilson's call for the `white heat of the 
technological revolution' to modernise Britain (and the Labour conception that science could revive 
the economy).
24
 In fact, `the project was considered of sufficient importance for a special 
laboratory to be built at Derby ... The comprehensive nature of this test house is indicative of the 
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massive investment made into the whole APT project.'
25
 The government `undertook to give 
financial support to selected areas of engineering research and the Advanced Passenger Train was 
an early beneficiary.'
26
 One former head of Research at the RTC recalled that `Wilson and the 
Government gave us a bit of a fair wind' because it was a public transport project,
27
 and this 
appealed to a traditionally public sector-minded Labour Party. The Advanced Passenger Train 
could embody the power of socialism to harness technology to public ends. The Wilson 
government wished to see a renewed development of rail transport; to this end, a Joint Steering 
Group (JSG) was set up in 1966 `to commission, oversee and report on a series of studies which it 
was hoped would plot a lasting solution to the railway problem.'
28
 JSG's review of railway policy 
helped APT inasmuch as `it established that there were going to be no more cuts ... therefore the 
future of the railway was assured'.
29
 Under the guidance of a strong Minister of Transport, Barbara 
Castle, a new railway regime was ushered in: `the government was very concerned about the future 
of British Railways ... they saw the Research Department as something pretty different to what was 
the norm at British Rail ... so the Ministry of Transport, and particularly their Chief Scientific 
Adviser, were very keen on enhancing the role of BR Research ... the proposals for APT were 
actually part of a larger programme'.
30
 A High Speed Policy, supported by the Ministry, was 
launched, and BR adopted a new slogan, `Fastest Through Crowded Britain'. 
 Even in an auspicious political climate there were narrow limits to what could conceivably 
be attempted: `the extent of the electrification on the British Railways network was fairly minor at 
that stage and although there were plans to electrify at a future date, it was going to be clearly a 
slow progress. So APT was designed predominantly as an independently-powered train' rather than 
an electric one,
31
 and `was intended for the East Coast main line as an alternative to 
electrification.'
32
 The Japanese bullet train option (straight, new track) was not feasible in Britain: 
`For right or wrong, it very quickly stopped being a technical matter and became a political matter 
... there was no way of getting from London to Glasgow without passing somewhere around the 
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heart of Birmingham, Manchester, Coventry, Liverpool and thread your way through that lot, with 
the 1000s of houses, 1000s of factories ... the Minister of the day would have had to have said 
"Look I'm sorry, I can't sell that, not to either side of the House" ... Neither side could do that sort 
of thing so we had to go about it some other way!'
33
 
 
(2) Financing and appraising new technology 
 Policy constraints were not solely political but also financial: new rolling stock was an 
attractive idea but did anyone at BR wish to push for new infrastructure? 
  No, we were very realistic in the industry ... We looked at our inter-city business 
in a very commercial way, not in a total cost-benefit approach, we looked at it 
purely as a commercial business ... and recognised that we'd never be able to make 
a business case for building completely new infrastructure.
34
 
 Passenger traffic could not be sufficiently increased: `BR studied the cost per seat/km of a 
high speed Inter-City network in relation to the passenger flow and concluded that a larger flow 
than was ever likely to be attained in Britain would be required to justify the expense of building a 
new line. Therefore we decided to take a different route by making use of the maximum railway 
infrastructure. And so the Advanced Passenger Train was conceived.'
35
 An early study into the 
reduction of journey times concluded that new tracks were not a workable idea because they 
`would require massive investment, not to mention Parliamentary Bills and public inquiries.'
36
 In 
any case there was not a great deal of enthusiasm for very high rail speeds even within BR; at the 
Vienna High Speeds Symposium of June 1968, BR emphasised its belief in `the "value for money" 
criterion attached to railway engineering development in Britain.'
37
 
 The train would have to run on the existing, winding routes, since the relatively low level 
of railway investment meant that investing in new lines - even on a limited scale - could not be 
contemplated: `the capital cost involved in providing this significantly better service should 
principally be that of the trains themselves.'
38
 This made the most well-known characteristic of 
APT, the `tilting body', more than a technical necessity: the research team had to adopt a more 
                                                 
     
33
 Interview with former Under-Secretary (Railways), DoT. 
     
34
 Interview with former Vice-Chairperson (1980s), BRB. He also described the idea of building new rail 
infrastructure in Britain as `commercial cloud-cuckoo land as we operated here.' 
     
35
 Peter Parker, `High speed travel on both sides of the Channel', Rail Engineering International, Vol. 10, No 3 
(August/Sept. 1981): p. 66. 
     
36
 According to Williams (1985), p. 10. 
     
37
 Johnston and Long (1981), p. 82. 
     
38
 A H Wickens (then BR Director of Research), `R&D on high speed railways - achievements and prospects', 
Transport Reviews, Vol. 3, No 1 (Jan.-March 1983): p. 95. 
  
 
 103 
risky high-tech strategy.
39
 As an MoT official put it then, `Our problem was to see whether the 
application of modern technology could squeeze more out of the existing system, simply by 
improving the vehicles rather than the tracks'
40
 (my italics). This telling metaphor implied that 
central government had to make the best of the legacy of the Victorian era, as a fresh start was 
unthinkable. Later, when the project had encountered difficulties and alternatives were being re-
examined concerning the WCML, the `alternative of straightening the track [was] ruled out on cost 
and environmental grounds.'
41
 
 The lack of financial means had a second technical implication: the replacement of the 
signalling and safety systems was deemed too expensive an option, therefore the new train would 
have to use the same signals as conventional trains, and be able to brake in a relatively short 
distance; train drivers had requested some form of cab signalling; BR `had ... a system in readiness 
but could not cope financially with the costs of its widespread application.'
42
 The system was not 
applied. The requirement for powerful brakes led to another technological challenge, the 
development of high performance, hydrokinetic brakes, which were unique to APT: `the impetus 
for this was really the general approach of the APT project which was intended to avoid the need 
for expensive infrastructure'.
43
 
 The decision not to re-signal had a critical implication as regards APT's maximum 
commercial speed: the original design speed of 250km/h was reduced to 225km/h because it was 
eventually found that the existing signalling system would not be able to cope with speeds above 
that limit, in particular if a train needed to be halted in an emergency. In 1970, it was already 
apparent to the Working Party on inter-city transport that there was a contradiction between the 
objective of high speed operation and the fact that `The Train Control Project for advanced 
signalling systems is not part of the APT program'; they argued that `Operation of APT at 200km/h 
... is expected to be possible using present modern signalling equipment. Nevertheless, for 
operation at higher speeds, some parts of the TCP system will be needed'.
44
 By 1973, the 
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professional literature made it clear that `signalling and level crossings [would] limit [power cars] 
to 200km/h on the West Coast main line' and that this would have to be the top commercial service 
speed.
45
 
 Railway engineers themselves had absorbed the prevailing ethos of financial restraint, 
justifying their technical choices thus: `The approach to high speed transport through the APT is 
more cost effective [because] the very high capital value of existing track is exploited to the full'.
46
 
A statement from A H Wickens went even further: `Whatever system of support, guidance and 
propulsion is chosen, the major objective for research and development must be the minimization 
of infrastructure cost.'
47
 The ratio of cost to quality did not enter into the equation and costs were 
the main consideration from the very beginning. The Victorian legacy of track layout was to be 
built upon in organic fashion, rather than modernised or replaced. 
 Ways of financing the APT research programme were left to BR Research managers at 
first but they had very little for manoeuvre in financial terms; BR Chairman 
  Stanley Raymond said he was very willing to progress research along the lines 
Sidney Jones wanted but he had a deficit of several hundred million a year ... he 
said "If you can find the money, you can go ahead". So Sidney Jones and other 
people looked all around, in private industry, and eventually secured an agreement 
with the Ministry of Transport, that they would put in pound for pound what the 
railways would put in, on work on track, work on signalling, and particularly work 
on the Advanced Passenger Train.
48
 
 The APT proposal took two years to be accepted by BRB and government, partly because 
`it was about that time that public expenditure figures were becoming much tighter and also there 
were cuts following the devaluation'.
49
 But MoT officials backed it and `made sure it got the 
money'.
50
 The government approved the APT expenditure plan in November 1968 on the basis that 
BR and MoT would provide 50% each, as part of a larger, jointly-funded programme of railway 
R&D. A Joint Research and Development Committee (JRDC) made up solely of BR and MoT 
representatives, was set up to monitor the funded research programme; its parent body, the Joint 
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Research and Development Working Group (JRDWG) met monthly and was chaired alternately by 
BR's Head of Research and by an official from the Railways Directorate at MoT. Within the 
framework of the joint programme, `in order to satisfy [MoT officials] we had to have proper 
reporting procedures, proper financial procedures'.
51
 This arrangement meant that APT was 
dependent on central government approval at every stage of the R&D process, that BR had no 
budgetary room for manoeuvre and that the departmental input into budget allocations was very 
consequential. JRDC meetings reviewed the progress of the project and the next milestones, and 
divided up the budget: `there was no way that the Board was given a set of money and then it could 
go off and do what it liked for that year. No there was a fairly close involvement of the government 
departments in making sure that the money was being well spent.'
52
 
 On their own admission, Transport officials `monitored, quite fiercely what they were 
doing, we had regular meetings ... we quizzed them. We had to do that because we in our turn had 
to bring the Treasury along with us'; the Treasury were being neither more nor less difficult than 
usual but `were doing their proper thing ... They were tough, we knew they would be tough, we 
used the fact that they were being tough on us to justify our being tough on Alan [Wickens] and 
Sidney [Jones] and the rest, but at the end of the day ... it did go through!'
53
 There were no 
`triangular' meetings between MoT, Treasury and BRB representatives: financial matters were 
always settled on a bilateral basis because the Treasury role was to `put [Transport] in a corner' and 
Transport's role was to go away and deal with BR in turn; in a triangular arrangement, DoT 
officials would have been `the chaps in the middle' with `loyalties in both directions' and courtesy 
would have `got in the way' whereas in bilateral discussions you could really say what you meant.
54
 
Inevitably, two sets of bilateral procedures gave more scope for delays and misconceptions than a 
single triangular arrangement. 
 One BR scientist's perception was that 
  the Department of Transport ... actually interfere on a day-to-day basis ... In fact 
the top layer of management of British Rail was in fact in Marsham Street, not in 
Euston House. Every investment decision was made down there. They were never 
submitted until they were sort of given approval ...
55
 
Another APT engineer deplored `the slow process of gaining government approval for each stage 
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of expenditure'.
56
 
 Following the second internal review of the project, a proposal was submitted to the BRB 
in April 1973, but `the authority to construct prototypes was to take seventeen months to come 
through. This delay was largely connected with a wrangle between the British Railways Board and 
the Government over the financing and scale of the APT project.'
57
 Also, a new government had 
just been elected: `The Labour government was squeezing BR spending ... In fact, BR was lucky to 
continue with the project at all ... it narrowly escaped cancellation.'
58
 The national economic crisis 
resulted in the railway investment programme being greatly reduced, and in this new atmosphere of 
financial restraint, APT was particularly exposed. Although ministerial approval had been given for 
4 prototypes, `because of cash restraints at the time the Board decided to build only 3 trains',
59
 a 
decision approved by the government on June 24 1974.
60
 
 Unlike the experimental phase, which had been financed jointly by BR and MoT as a 
separate research project, the prototype phase was to be financed internally by BR, in the same 
framework as decisions on other investment projects. But BR did not have sufficient resources to 
devote to it and wished to apply for a loan of £11.6m (40% of the estimated cost of 3 prototypes) 
from the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 1976.
61
 DoT supported BR's application but at first 
the Treasury wished to defer it; following an exchange of letters between the Railways Directorate 
and the Treasury in March 1976, the latter allowed the application to be made and BR obtained the 
loan.
62
 Throughout the project, BR were entirely dependent on the level of government support, 
either directly or indirectly; because of this, any change in policy was keenly felt. 
 Although APT was often portrayed by its detractors as an expensive piece of technology, 
the total cost of the project was £43m, over a period of over fifteen years (1967-1982).
63
 BR's 1977 
APT Prototype Progress Report (No 6) stated that expenditure to date had been `closely in accord 
with the planned expenditure'. To go into production phase however, involved approving 
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expenditure in the region of £150m (in 1977). This was felt at the Department to have considerable 
political implications. 
 Funding was dependent on continued positive appraisal of the project. By the late 1960s, 
`Passenger surveys ... suggested that the key factor was journey time':
64
 the `1968 formula' (revenue 
would increase if trains ran above the speed of 100mph) was derived from market research.
65
 The 
traffic expansion experienced in the late 1960s was analysed by BR, who found `a clear 
relationship between journey time and traffic increase. More elaborate analyses have been made 
using computer models ... These have confirmed that the common thread of improvement resulting 
in rapid traffic growth is that of journey time. Independent market research has confirmed these 
conclusions.'
66
 Some argued that `If the argument of `generalised cost' is accepted, reduction in rail 
journey time will increase the rail share of the total market as well as attracting traffic generated by 
a progressively more affluent society.'
67
 Yet as with other railway investment projects, appraisals of 
APT were conducted purely on a financial basis, without taking into account wider, non-financial 
or indirect, benefits, such as time savings. These were not included in appraisals of new rail 
schemes, even though they were for road schemes appraised by Roads officials. By late 1978, BR 
chiefs were still convinced that journey times had `a significant effect upon the share of the market 
which is attracted to rail' on WCML routes.
68
 But time savings continued to be excluded from 
appraisal procedures.  
 Even when cost-benefit analysis (CBA) was attempted, as it was in 1970 within the 
framework of the interdepartmental working party on inter-city transport (IWPICT, an ad hoc 
group set up by MinTech in 1969, bringing together officials from MoT/DoE, TRAG, MinTech, 
DTI, and several members of the Railways Board), central government expertise was found 
wanting. IWPICT assessed new forms of inter-city transport for which there was a great deal of 
interest in the late 1960s: the Tracked Hovercraft and the Vertical Take-Off and Landing aircraft 
(VTOL), both of which would require new infrastructure. Although its terms of reference had been 
`To co-ordinate and direct a comparative assessment of the ... costs ... and the relative social merits 
... ensuring that a common basis is used for the assessment', it took an approach `which determines 
the operators' financial profit or loss, and does not attempt to make a broader assessment of other 
effects on the community'; therefore `the possible future modes of inter-city transport [were] not ... 
placed in order of social merit' and the report (Comparative Assessment of New Forms of Inter-City 
                                                 
     
64
 Potter and Roy (1985), p. 12. 
     
65
 Johnston and Long (1981), p. 82. 
     
66
 Smith (Dec. 1971): p. 8. 
     
67
 Ibid. 
     
68
 BRB, Chief Executive memorandum, Advanced Passenger Train: the evolution of a policy for a West Coast 
Main Line service fleet (31/01/1978), p. 4. 
  
 
 108 
Transport) did not constitute a costs and benefits assessment.
69
 
 Nevertheless, APT appeared `to be assured of success. In the possible future situations its 
revenues substantially exceed its costs, even when it has to compete against other modes operating 
at a loss.'
70
 This was because `any transport system requiring a new fixed track does not seem able 
to pass the economic tests of profitability that are currently applied, at least in this country - so that 
the APT, which (so to speak) rides on the back of previous railway investment, has a head start.'
71
 
Thus the APT project was allowed to be pursued purely on financial grounds and clearly benefitted 
from the foresight of BR managers, who had realised at an early stage that the only high speed 
services that would be officially approved would have to run on existing infrastructure.
72
 
 Why was the appraisal of social benefits beyond IWPICT's resources? There was a lack of 
methodological tools in several domains which the report deplored; it called for further research in 
transport appraisal methodology and for later studies to deal with whole networks, rather than 
single London-based routes.
73
 One member of the working party thought that there were two 
obstacles: `1) the computer models that didn't exist would have had to have been written. 2) You 
didn't have the origin / destination matrices, you had to assume them ... that is not simple ... and 
therefore when we talked about the resources which would have been needed, it would have been 
immense survey resources ... an immense amount of data collection would have been required ...  
There wasn't the money available to make the surveys and we would have had to develop survey 
techniques'.
74
 One official thought that the Ministry at the time did not have any in-house capability 
which would remotely have allowed them to evaluate the soundness of the project and that `British 
Rail was ... judge and jury if you like as to whether this should go ahead within its overall research 
spend'.
75
 
 Little faith attached to such studies anyway. One MoT official directly involved in the 
APT project remarked that TRAG's `connection to APT was limited to a paper study ... There was 
not a clear cut outcome, nor would one really expect there to be one. ... as always with such studies, 
the outcome is sensitive to market forecasts. Furthermore, the target is not a stationary one.'
76
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Another official felt that `The British Rail people were, I think with some justice, seeing the entire 
exercise as being a little theoretical and were trying to say I think ... that life is more complicated 
than that'.
77
 The underlying feeling was that of an unfathomable market which might unpredictably 
alter. The same official on the working party was himself sceptical about the virtues of CBA to aid 
decision-making: 
  The fact of the matter was that as soon as you came to these questions and started 
to look at the thing in its actual complexity, two things happened: firstly the thing 
ceased to be a matter of economics and became a matter of politics and the 
economists were very chary about moving into the decision-making area of the 
elected politician! and quite rightly too ... in any case the problems could be 
formulated, and you could in principle state how you could investigate them. But 
in practice there wasn't enough time, there wasn't enough money and there weren't 
even enough economists.
78
 
The lack of expertise and resources, together with the fear to impinge on ministers' territory, appear 
to have been a powerful deterrent. 
 Even within the BRB, CBA was not pursued with great devotion; although a table in a 
1978 BRB memorandum showed the cost-benefits of APT,
79
 Chairman Peter Parker believed that 
`cost benefit analysis falls down because it depends on those costs and those benefits which can be 
relatively easily valued, but tackles less well those factors which do not lend themselves easily to 
expression in numerate terms'; also `the naive position adopted by early cost benefit man ... seemed 
to imply that every consideration could be perfectly weighted and that therefore there was a single 
best solution.'
80
 Parker went on to argue that multi criteria analysis (MCA) would be more 
appropriate `in sectors such as transport where there are often several objectives in potential 
conflict - such as objectives on efficiency, mobility and environment ... [it] might provide a means 
in which various policy options could be compared, with each policy option representing a 
different balance of objectives and of funding.'
81
 
 Even though the Chairman was sceptical towards CBA, he did suggest `that if we have a 
way of subjecting the various competing options to some sort of agreed quantification, than we 
have a means of taking the heat out of the debate and concentrating our minds on the real key 
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issues.'
82
 He clearly perceived the need for a more rational approach to policy-making, but this ran 
against the grain: TRRL (which was considered to be independent-minded) began to produce 
studies which influenced some aspects of rail policy and `The idea that these things could be 
studied in any other way than by political negotiation was alien and of course they didnt like it!'; 
for it was `alien to the administrators in the railway divisions and not very welcome to British Rail 
either, who had ... got to know how to twist the arm of the administrators and what sorts of things 
to say to them'.
83
 The politicised nature of DoT / railway relations could not have been put more 
clearly. 
 Appraisal is highly dependent on experts' assumptions, which are part of the referential 
framework. The 1970 inter-departmental report discussed above, for instance, `did not take account 
of new trips which might be generated by improvements in transport.'
84
 It did not conclude that 
frequency of service had much influence on modal choice either `partly because an operator will, in 
practice, adjust the service frequency to match the demand.'
85
 In other words, the underlying 
assumption was that demand leads and supply of transport should not anticipate, even less seek to 
direct, future demand (e.g. by creating improved conditions which will induce new demand, either 
as additional traffic or as traffic diverted from other forms of transport). 
 An MoT official, speaking of the choice that needed to be made between APT and rival 
technologies, such as Tracked Hovercraft and VTOL, declared: `eventually the market will make a 
choice, and no doubt it will be one based on an overall assessment of reliability, cost, speed, safety, 
engineering elegance, and the level of interference with amenity. It will be an interesting struggle.'
86
 
The assumption here was that the Department could sit back and watch market forces compete. The 
official then concluded that `we have to think of the future of transport not as something pre-
ordained ... but as a highly competitive situation in which many modes of transport are vying with 
each other for the public's favour ... The transport policy-maker will, of course, make full use of the 
modern techniques of system analysis ... and all the rest;' but techniques in his mind were 
subservient to public finance, for `In the end, a country gets what it is prepared to pay for'.
87
 The 
decisive role of the market was again highlighted; a further assumption was that central 
government had to provide what the country wanted as a consumer of services, rather than what the 
government thought it needed for its welfare. The recurring concern with financial costs also 
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surfaced in this statement, which was made in 1970, before neo-liberal thinking had become the 
common currency of Conservative political language. Clearly, market ranked higher than society. 
 This assumption was not wholly shared by the railway operator. The Chairman declared: 
`the nation needs the railways, and they are here, adapting themselves to the country's needs, to 
stay.'
88
 (My italics.) Mike Newman, the then Deputy Director of Laboratories (R&D Division) 
stated: APT `is aimed at fulfilling a need for fast interurban passenger transport.'
89
 (My italics.) 
Transport `needs' is a more hypothetic, qualitative concept than transport `demand', which is more 
readily quantifiable. So whilst BR would have wished to both match existing demand and fulfill 
potential transport needs, the latter was not viewed as a legitimate argument by central government 
officials, who were content to react to changing rail transport patterns but were not prepared to 
forestall them. 
 More generally, qualitative arguments were automatically excluded from the appraisal 
process, although the BRB's inter-city strategy was to improve quality of service, and senior 
managers did make use of such arguments: the Passenger Executive Director on the Railways 
Board referred to `heavy investment needed to improve quality' (in the London area) and to the fact 
that `research [had] indicated that passengers [would] pay more for higher quality'.
90
 One Chairman 
stressed that APT would operate `at a net benefit to the environment' and that `In terms of reduced 
road congestion and accident costs, not to mention aircraft noise ... this all adds up to massive 
social benefit.'
91
 Similarly, two of the senior engineers engaged in APT research considered that 
`Higher speeds are worthwhile ... until the economic, social and environmental advantages to the 
nation grow more slowly than the disadvantages.'
92
 BR's inter-city strategy was also defined in 
terms which combined service quality and commercial sense: `to attract passengers to rail travel by 
running fast comfortable trains at economic cost to maximise net revenues.'
93
 But the vocabulary of 
the market was a dominant part of the referential framework whereas the vocabulary of society was 
not and such transport-centred discourse carried little weight in the policy process. 
 There was dissatisfaction about the appraisal process by the end of 1977
94
 and it was 
decided to launch an Inter-Urban Study covering all modes, which would examine `how well the 
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institutions work in practice' and `the way that operators draw up and departments appraise long-
term strategies'.
95
 It was to be carried out by TRRL and look at a time horizon of 10 to 15 years. 
The Treasury however objected to this medium-term approach; it `argued for a less far-reaching 
study which would be more relevant to imminent decisions'.
96
 Appraisal continued in an ad hoc 
fashion. To sum up, appraisal was conducted on a narrow, financial basis. Those at BR who sought 
to widen the terms of appraisal were unsuccessful. 
 
(3) The international environment 
 The international market for railway equipment was an important consideration throughout 
the decision-making process, following a change in government policy. Clause 45 of the Transport 
Bill (Clause 48 in the Act) which Barbara Castle was preparing in 1967 empowered the Railways 
Board to manufacture for sale to outside persons, which meant that railway workshops could now 
manufacture for exports on a commercial basis. The Minister was `taking a fantastically wide 
extension of the manufacturing powers of nationalised industries'; officials were very anxious that 
there should be a way to control the use of the powers, and accordingly made a provision whereby 
the Minister had to approve all proposals for their use; the Clause on the whole was quite 
controversial and was the object of a `big debate' in the Standing Committee.
97
 It opened a new 
fund-raising avenue for the national railway. 
 In order to protect the name of BR's new train, a limited company was set up as a 
subsidiary of the Board in April 1969 (`Advanced Passenger Trains Ltd'). Richard Marsh thought 
that `The export potential was vast. Throughout the world there was a massive railway 
resurgence.'
98
 In particular, the public railway corporation Amtrak had just been set up in the 
United States. DoE was very enthusiastic about APT, as it was believed that export sales might 
result in the cost of research being defrayed by external revenue. The proceeds from any export 
contract `would have benefitted the Treasury in terms of the support of BR' since pound for pound 
BR would have `needed less from the Exchequer to stay afloat' and it would have improved the 
national balance of payments.
99
 It is worth noting that the railway would not have gained additional 
revenue over and above state funding, which it could have re-invested as it wished. The only 
beneficiary in financial terms would have been the Treasury, which perhaps explains why the 
export sales argument (to which Treasury officials would have been sensitive) was so prominent. 
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 In the midst of the tremendous international attention which the project had aroused in 
professional circles, BR signed a technological co-operation agreement with the US Department of 
Transport and in October 1969 signed a licence deal with the American company Budd Co.
100
 In 
October 1971, a BRB delegation including the Chairman was invited to Washington to outline BR's 
projects before the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Surface Transportation.
101
 An MoT official, 
referring to `the market for APT and similar trains', stated that `rail transport should be able to hold 
its own against air services over distances of the order of 300 miles' that is in inter-city travel 
corridors, many of which existed in Europe and America.
102
 One member of the original APT team 
thought that `the government ... or certain people, were ... excited by this idea of ... revolution and 
Britain will be seen to be ... producing new technological trains ahead of other people ... here was 
something which would portray Britain as once again taking the lead in the railway field as it had 
done when railways started.'
103
 BR produced optimistic statements such as: `on America's 
indifferent tracks British Rail's Advanced Passenger Train would show to advantage';
104
 the Head 
of Research, Dr Jones was reported to have spoken openly of a 400km/h APT in 1971
105
 and he 
`recruited somebody ... who went tramping around the world ... trying to sell BR Research, the 
major bit of which at that stage was to do with APT.'
106
 In 1980, export hopes were still strong: `we 
shall see a tremendous upsurge of interest in this train from overseas ... wherever electrified tracks 
link large centres of population within the range of daytime travel, APT will offer the smoothest 
ride of any train built to date - and the cheapest too in terms of value for money.'
107
 This factor was 
of great importance to some Transport officials, to the extent that an official visit to China in 1980 
involved displaying a model of APT; it was thought that on Chinese railway tracks, APT would 
bring much improvement at little cost.
108
 
 The common thread running through these activities of the Board and Department was the 
high hope of commercial benefits, all the more so as railway funding continued to be a thorny 
issue. One of the reasons why they did not materialise was the peculiar organisation of the railway 
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manufacturing industry in Britain, the subject of our next section. 
 
 
(4) The industrial environment: the railway manufacturers 
 The private railway manufacturing industry at the beginning of the APT programme was 
`Fragmented, backward-looking', because `When steam went out, that industry very largely 
collapsed'.
109
 On the whole, the 1960s and 1970s were very much a difficult time of transition for 
the private railway industry. The manufacturing of locomotives, rolling stock and other machinery 
followed a unique pattern, inasmuch as it `was carried on much more extensively by the railways in 
Britain than anywhere else. In other countries it was more usual for railways to buy their equipment 
from commercial manufacturers. Both systems existed side by side on a great scale in Britain'.
110
 
The 1968 Transport Act enabled BR to continue building a large share of its own rolling stock, 
henceforth through BREL (British Railways Engineering Ltd).
111
 This historical state of affairs left 
comparatively little work to private manufacturers: `The old BR-dominated system tended to 
relegate the supply industry to little more than a production line operation.'
112
 Hence contractors 
were used for APT not right from the beginning, but once design specifications were sufficiently 
advanced. 
 In other words, responsibility for the whole project rested squarely with BR, with 
designing (at RTC) and building (at BREL) both taking place at Derby; one of the reasons for 
technical failures experienced by APT was poor quality control within BR and the fact that a 
number of BREL workshop managers gave APT work a low priority.
113
 An ACARD report in 1980 
(R&D for public purchasing) `recommended that, in order to improve their export competitiveness, 
state-owned companies should rely less on in-house research and more on their suppliers and other 
contractors to develop new products.'
114
 The traditional railway engineering work pattern was 
heavily criticised in the Report of the Committee on the Review of Railway Finances (1983). It was 
felt that partnership between the public and private sectors needed to be developed. 
 As regards the work contracted out to private firms, the relationship between BR and the 
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firms `was fairly ... well understood by all parties ... We didn't just stick to one manufacturer.'
115
 
Foreign companies were used as regards certain components of APT, for instance power circuits: 
`No British suppliers had suitable components available or was willing to bear the development 
costs just for prototype quantities and so the equipment was ordered from ASEA in Sweden which 
had a suitable system already developed'
116
 in 1972. Similarly, APT power cars for prototype sets 
were to be manufactured by ASEA because the only British supplier, GEC, could not meet the 
required specifications. But `This choice was not well received either politically or by the British 
firm concerned.'
117
 This was indicative of the sort of relations that prevailed between BR and its 
native suppliers. 
 Generally speaking, both public and private manufacturers were in a difficult predicament 
owing to the lack of a clear, long-term government policy.
118
 In the 1970s, `they had been through 
what can only be described as a British railway recession ... This culminated at the end of 1981 in 
the government's refusal to countenance further electrification. ... Only with the East Coast 
electrification [in 1984] did the tide begin to turn.'
119
 Even after 1984, relations between BR and 
private manufacturers continued to be characterised by uncertainty. For instance, `in 1984, the 
Board produced ... a plan for saying that over the next 15 or 20 years we plan to build the following 
amount of rolling stock; and it was very large! ... The industry was anxious that it was going to put 
a lot of money into development and no orders would be forthcoming. So the Board saw it as 
important to make a statement to the industry and it held a huge meeting where all the managing 
directors were invited ... now unfortunately within the space of two years the whole thing had 
fallen flat on its face ... It was politics ... The government would not allow, or placed very severe 
limits on ... public spending ... so we were not able to invest in new rolling stock'.
120
 This particular 
development took place in the same period when APT was finally shelved. 
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(5) The professional dimension 
 Difficulties of a professional nature were prominent right from the start. Research at BR 
until 1964 had mainly been `defensive', but the arrival of Dr Sidney Jones, a non-railway engineer 
with a scientific training, heralded a new era of `offensive' research strategy. The creation of RTC 
was `largely an initiative of Sidney Jones', who `persuaded the Board that they should invest in 
some longer-term thinking ... in particular higher speed'; the Board however `were not easily 
convinced, partly because they were not technically qualified, mainly - and even on the engineering 
side - they were very down-to-earth ... empirical ... mainly engineers from the steam age'.
121
 In the 
mid-1960s, some perceived the BRB as being `nearly all railwaymen, a lot of them anti-
engineering, anti-technological', with a background in operating and maintenance, a `lack of 
technological expertise' and `very narrow in their outlook'.
122
 In fact `The threat of the project being 
axed was a very real one'
123
 even at the beginning. Jones recruited a number of `bright young men' 
from other industries, mainly aeronautics, but also the car and the coal industries; `They came with 
... scientific procedures' and `an entirely different perspective' on technical problem-solving, 
because for instance `In the aircraft industry they were pushing the limits of development, they 
were breaking new ground themselves'; the research people `thought if you threw enough time and 
money ... you could solve anything!' whilst the `traditional' railway engineers `had a greater 
awareness of the restrictions being placed' on the railways from their nationalisation in 1947 
onward.
124
 The old `cut-and-try' approach `was challenged by a radical research-based "scientific" 
approach'
125
 and professional rivalry ensued, embodied in the rival designs of HST and APT. 
 The split between `research scientists' and `railway engineers' was to prove an enduring, 
perhaps even fatal, one. MoT/DoT most definitely was on the side of the researchers, at least until 
the late 1970s: `In the eyes of the departmental officials they were a welcome change, very 
welcome change from the traditional and rather blinkered approach ... I mean we all had enormous 
enthusiasm for the work that was being done at Derby, we were very impressed by it and we 
thought the railways would benefit from it.'
126
 MoT's Railways Division felt that `The railway had 
just come through a period of quite considerable change in their thinking' thanks to people who had 
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come in from the outside `and the whole place had got a degree of ferment about it, a new sense of 
going somewhere and it was in that environment that the APT idea managed to sprout and grow.'
127
 
Some officials were aware of the internal dissension at BR: one BRB member (Research) could not 
visit the Permanent Secretary because he `didn't want to be seen with [him]!'
128
 It was clear to those 
officials that `Sidney Jones carried the APT banner with the Department, carried it successfully 
with the Department, with the Railways Board marching along carefully ... but they never got in 
front of him!'
129
 
 Internal rivalries within BR were able to surface partly because HST and APT were 
indirectly in competition for limited resources, and because central government was the only source 
of financial support for investment, which could never be taken for granted: `major engineering 
resources, at that time, around the mid-1970s, were put into making sure the HST would work and 
would be a deliverable product, and what was left over ... would go into APT ... They were trying 
to do too many different things at once, a very innovative APT and a slightly less innovative HST. 
There just weren't enough people and money around to do both properly.'
130
 
 Another element of the professional dimension was the background of Transport officials. 
Most of the questions expected from them were practical, rather than technical ones: one APT 
engineer said that the regular meetings held jointly by the railway and MoT/DoT `were essentially 
about the Department wanting to be convinced that this programme which they were supporting 
was sensible.'
131
 He went on to say that `they wanted to talk about the generalities ... they had 
obviously argued for budgets from the Treasury, so they had to have ammunition ... to go back to 
the Treasury ... They certainly weren't technical experts, no, definitely not.' This partly explain the 
fact that technical sticking points were not detected by the authorities at the development stage, in 
spite of the very close involvement of MoT/DoT through JRDWG. One senior engineer did not 
think officials could have questioned technical choices made by the APT team: `I don't think they 
had anybody there who could discount it ... The Ministry so far as I know is comprised mainly of 
economists and civil servants!'
132
 As for TRRL it did house technical specialists but had no railway 
expertise to start with and was only involved on rare occasions. 
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 When discussing the professional dimension, one also needs to look outside technical 
expertise to more commercial skills. The APT team's `best support in the railway, were the 
Passenger Business, not the engineers ... Right from the early 1960s, they identified that speed was 
important to railways. They were the first people outside Japan ... to measure the effect on revenue 
as they increased speeds'.
133
 Commercial managers did not have a decisive input to start with for 
the in-house economists did not constitute `a very strong or cohesive group ... really!'
134
 Indeed `If 
you go back to the 60s ... the railways were dominated by engineers. There's no question about that 
... I don't think they [the economists] had a particularly strong voice.'
135
 As a result, the Passenger 
Marketing Department `didn't have a very big impact ... The argument, really, was around the 
engineering and how adventurous could you be in the engineering.'
136
 The research scientists did 
not have a specific main trunk line in mind for APT: `we were developing what we saw as a 
generic technology and it would be applied generally.'
137
 The more ambitious claims of the APT 
engineers were not checked: the top speed was set at 250km/h because `this was considered the 
fastest speed that could initially be achieved' and it was 50% higher than the speed of existing 
trains.
138
 But 250km/h did not really make commercial sense: `I think that figure came from the 
engineers. The commercial people came on board, but I don't think there was an attempt, certainly 
in the early days, to do any form of cost-benefit analysis which says: what extra are we paying to 
go this bit faster? I think the questions were asked, but they were asked when the decisions had 
been made and then the engineers came forward and tried to defend their figure of 250, rather than 
it being a rational examination'.
139
 
 Until 1976, BR did not seem to have influential economists at senior level. For instance, 
the BRB's Chief Economist at the beginning of the 1968 Transport Act regime, Dr Stewart Joy, 
only remained three years (1968-1971) and was so unhappy about his experience that he published 
a book soon afterwards, `not written under the auspices, or with the records, of the British Railways 
Board.'
140
 There was no tradition and few attempts at economic thinking within the organisation: 
`The highly complicated business of transport economics was not what railwaymen were brought 
up to think about. They were not trained in the argument, they couldn't actually handle the 
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debate.'
141
 This view was echoed at DoT: `They hadn't been thinking of the railway as anything else 
than an operation, that was the tradition ... Introducing the business attitude was certainly quite a 
business, it took a long time!'; as a result, BR `were terrified of the economic quality of the 
Department' and were often `criticised by economists' but unable to disprove them; in fact, it was 
apparently on the initiative of the then Permanent Secretary that in 1976 the BRB took on a 
respected economist, Michael Posner (previously at the Treasury), which `stopped this business of 
being afraid of us and we could talk on equal terms'.
142
 The lack of economic input into BR policy 
was particularly in evidence with the APT project. 
 To some extent, the dearth of economists at BR during the first half of the APT case study 
had for a long time previously been matched at MoT by a lack of institutionalised economic 
thinking. It was not until Barbara Castle's term of office at Transport that an Economic Planning 
Unit was set up, in 1966: `there were no economists in the Department until 1965. In 1965, I think 
as a result of pressure from the Treasury or from the Department of Economic Affairs ... Michael 
[Beesley] came in on a part-time basis ... and he was joined by one man ... from Reading'.
143
 Even 
MoT's road policy sections had no economists to speak of: those brought in by Castle, according to 
one Railways official, `were the progenitors almost of cost-benefit analysis in the transport field, a 
serious attempt to measure, assess, on an economic basis, the costs and benefits of road schemes' 
from around 1966-1967, under Christopher Foster.
144
 By 1971 `the number of economists in the 
Department of Transport had grown enormously ... I mean it had a lot more economists than the 
Treasury did!'
145
 A marked imbalance in economic expertise emerged, as BR still lacked 
economists, which by the mid-1970s was working against the railway interest.  
 The chronological gap between the establishment of economic thinking at the Ministry and 
at BR meant that professional dialogue was difficult, but it seems that communication within 
central government was not smooth either, for instance between TRRL and DoT. In October 1977, 
officials envisaged some kind of collaboration between DoT economists, TRRL and BRB, to move 
the APT project forward, but 
  no organisation was formed ... it would have been a very uncomfortable 
combination too! ... an exercise of this kind does have political and administrative 
and technical components, and economic components, and it was a series of 
failures to have a meeting of minds ... the great difficulty was I think, the 
difference in background was so great, people spoke to one another, without really 
realising that there were hidden assumptions which made the conversation mean 
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different things to different people. So it looked as if they were communicating 
when they actually weren't.
146
 
 To sum up, those involved in the APT project had very diverse professional backgrounds. 
Although in theory this could have been a factor of mutual enrichment, in practice it made for a 
fragmented policy network, often dominated by internal politics which had a deleterious effect on 
the development stage. 
 
 
 C. The fluctuations of central government suppport 
 In the previous section, we saw how part of the decision-making environment gave rise to 
difficulties in the development of the ambitious APT technology. These were mainly of an 
industrial, professional, financial and methodological nature. The political context for its part was 
highly conducive to the venture, but did not remain so. The project, initiated under Labour, 
survived several changes of government and was finally shelved by the Conservatives. The first 
phase, between 1966-1973 benefitted from a number of favourable factors, including strong 
ministerial and departmental support; MoT officials seized the opportunity to modernise BR in a 
far more pro-active fashion than one might have expected. Support gradually dwindled between 
1973 and 1981, a period of delays and uncertainties. After 1981, the project became increasingly 
disconnected from the concerns of the Thatcher government and from BR's perceived needs. 
 
(1) Initial enthusiasm (1966-1973) 
 The initiative for the Advanced Passenger Train came from `the "gang" at Derby and the 
Ministry were happy to go along with it'.
147
 The two-year gap between the original proposal in 
November 1966 and the agreement by the BRB and MoT to fund the research in November 1968 
was caused by `difficulties ... of two sorts really. The first one was how much money was worth 
putting into it and the other one, opposition from the traditional engineers who said ... "It doesn't 
work" ... on the whole [MoT officials] were more keen to break the traditional mould than the 
actual traditional engineers in BR itself.'
148
 A new Deputy Chairman had just been appointed at BR 
and one MoT official `largely persuaded [him] that if the railway's future, apart from the grant-
aided railway, was to depend on their InterCity service, they needed new technology to achieve 
higher standards and it would be a great mistake not to back the work that was being done at 
Derby! I mean I was very impressed by it, my Ministers were very impressed by it, I think I had a 
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considerable say in persuading him to go on.'
149
 Indeed the matter was so contentious that one APT 
senior scientist thinks it had to be raised at Cabinet level: `It was a Cabinet decision ... we got 
support at Cabinet level because the British Railways Board itself was lukewarm'.
150
 
 The innovative APT engineers had found kindred spirits in central government: `at that 
time we had some very forward-looking people in the Ministry of Transport on the scientific 
advisory side;' furthermore there was strong support in the ranks of administrators: `There were a 
number of civil servants who also were pretty fed up with the British Railways Board in the sense 
that they regarded them as irresponsible in a way ... basically there was no commmercial outlook'
151
 
and they saw the Research Department as a factor of change. Relations between BR Research 
engineers and Transport civil servants were good; one APT scientist thought that `there's absolutely 
no doubt that they championed what we were trying to do'.
152
 One Transport official recalls that 
`the APT was a technological leap forward towards the solving of our particular problem which 
almost in a nutshell could be described as the west coast main line ... a railway line as unlike the 
bullet line as it would be possible to contrive ... The west coast main line was a horror! ... we had 
concluded that straightening [it] ... wasn't open to us'.
153
 
 Although according to one official, `it was never a ministerial involvement ... really, I 
mean Ministers were persuaded but it wasn't them who pushed for it',
154
 the Transport Minister 
Richard Marsh `really was a good supporter of it in the early days', the pound for pound agreement 
was done `with his encouragement and support ... He came up to the Derby Labs a number of times 
and fired up the people there with his enthusiasm, he was that sort of chap!'
155
 The Conservative 
Minister for Transport Industries (1970-1974), John Peyton, also `strongly supported the APT 
project'.
156
 One administrator remembers `going to Derby every few months ... and liking going 
there because I found it an inspirational place. It was a place where everyone felt they were doing 
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something positive'.
157
 It is fairly easy to understand why government scientists were enthused by 
the project, but what about the generalists? Perhaps `Part of the reason for this ... was that the 
economists in Marsham Street had softened up the administrators to being receptive to technical 
thinking and the scientists were saying very strongly that this looked as though it'd work at least for 
Britain.'
158
  
 What made it possible for government to virtually impose the decision on the Board was a 
provision in the 1968 Transport Act whereby it `reserved to itself decisions belonging to Research 
and Development. In other words the Board could be overruled and that was always a 
protection'.
159
 This statement clearly maps out the line of demarcation: MoT and BR Research on 
the one side, the Board (at the very least its more traditional members) on the other. 
 The Joint Steering Group's supporting mechanisms, such as JRDC (which followed a bi-
annual cycle) and JRDWG (which met monthly) proved to be a useful arrangement (the R&D 
programme was to run until March 1978 but was eventually extended);
160
 one Head of Research 
found it `valuable ... for both parties and we had to agree on a programme and the amount of money 
that should be allocated to the different bits of it, so it drew the Ministry into being associated with 
the success of the programme'; at that stage, the Ministry and BR `were partners in trying to 
develop the concept.'
161
 One Transport official felt that `In principle there is a lot to be gained in the 
joint approach and my objective ... was to get as close as possible to my opposite number in British 
Rail'.
162
 The `interim rail strategy of 1973' intended to have 120 APTs in operation by the end of 
1981.
163
 The change in government in 1970 had no discernible effect on the project. So how do we 
account for APT's ability to obtain government funding in spite of previous relatively low levels of 
investment into the railway? 
 Firstly, the objective was ambitious and promised noticeable change to rail transport, 
which made it a very attractive proposition in political terms: the new train was to become `the 
general high speed train for the whole of British Railways'.
164
 That objective was being pursued by 
                                                 
     
157
 Interview with former Permanent Secretary, DoT (3). 
     
158
 Interview with former senior TRRL/ DoT scientist. 
     
159
 Interview with former Head of Research (2), RTC, BR. The Act required  the Board `to take such steps as 
appear to them to be practicable and desirable for promoting ... research on lines settled from time to time with the 
approval of the Minister' (Transport Act, 1968, HMSO, Chapter 73, Part IV, par. 45, p. 67). 
     
160
 BAM (1977 Part II). 
     
161
 Interview with former Head of Research (1), RTC, BR. 
     
162
 Interview with former Deputy Secretary (BR Policy), DoT. 
     
163
 Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, First report, The Role of British Rail in Public Transport, vol. I, 
session 1976-77 (London: HMSO), p. civ. 
     
164
 Interview with former APT Project Manager, BR. 
  
 
 123 
scientists with a `new attitude to engineering', a good track record and a certain `glamour': `after all 
there had been quite a few successes in the aircraft industry'.
165
 The technical complexity of the 
project did not deter politicians from lending it their support; if anything it was felt as attractive: `It 
was the desire of the government at that time ... to try and bring British Railways into the 21st 
century ... We'd gone through the Modernisation Plan of 1955 ... it coincided ... with the Harold 
Wilson statement'
166
 (on the technological revolution). 
 Secondly, the rail sector seemed more promising than it had been for some time: 
`passenger traffic grew by nearly 5 per cent a year during the late 1960s, and revenue by over 10 
per cent a year. In 1969 for the first time passenger traffic yielded more revenue than freight, a 
landmark in the history of the system.'
167
 Ambitious claims made by the railway were taken at face 
value by officials and the media: in 1972, it was stated - in the usually sober pages of The Times - 
that the first version of APT would `run at 155mph, although 185mph and even 250mph models 
could follow once the commercial case for such speeds is proved.'
168
 APT as initially conceived, 
was `a bright idea by some very talented engineers' but `the rigour of the whole project was not 
satisfactorily established. ... it was enthusiasm that was driving it rather than cold-headed 
evaluation.'
169
 There does not appear to have been a fully worked out strategy: APT `was more of a 
gleam in the eye ... it was sort of out there ... and if it didn't work, "Well, too bad, speeds will come 
back down to whatever they were, 90mph"...'
170
 The point about enthusiasm (made over and over 
again throughout the interviews) gives us an important clue: for what is enthusiasm if not a quality 
required of politicians? That is to say, politicians want to see quick results and are more likely to be 
swayed by the promise of a spectacular breakthrough than by a long haul programme methodically 
pursuing a less ambitious goal.
171
 A corollary of this was that `In order to get funding to do 
anything, we had to sell the idea and to that extent, it was oversold right at the beginning ... if you 
didn't have a strong sales pitch, to try and sell the idea, it was difficult to get support.'
172
 Bargaining 
between BR and the Ministry was conducted on the mode of persuasion rather than on `rational', 
technical grounds. 
                                                 
     
165
 Interview with former Director of M&EE (2), BRB. 
     
166
 Interview with former Director of M&EE (2), BRB. 
     
167
 The Times: Special Report on passenger services (17/03/1972). 
     
168
 The Times: Special Report on passenger services (17/03/1972): p. III. 155mph is about 250km/h, 250mph is 
400km/h. 
     
169
 Interview with former APT Project Manager. 
     
170
 Interview with former Principal Private Secretary to Minister of Transport (late 1960s). 
     
171
 The same former APT Project Manager said: `it was this vision of something extraordinary  ... which would 
have caused a fair amount of attraction to the government.' 
     
172
 Interview with former Head of Research (2), RTC, BR. 
  
 
 124 
 Thirdly, APT promised to bring all the benefits of high speed travel on a shoe-string so to 
speak: `The APT was to be Britain's way round having to invest in new and straighter track.'
173
 
Whereas the conventional method of modernisation, electrification, was costly because it affected 
fixed, costly capital equipment as well as requiring new rolling stock, and involved retraining the 
workforce, the APT method was to change only the rolling stock: `The whole thrust of the APT, 
the thing that we were constantly being reminded about was that ... you would not have to 
reconstruct the infrastructure and therefore the investment was going into the train and not into the 
infrastructure ... if you have to modify the infrastructure, it becomes hugely expensive and I think 
that was a unique kind of selling-point of the APT'.
174
 Clearly that argument was a weighty one in 
DoT's dealings with the Treasury. 
 Fourthly, the APT concept was derived from an important technical breakthrough in the 
mid-1960s concerning `hunting' (the unstable vibration of wheel-sets at high speed, leading to 
derailment), which had been a total barrier to commercial rail services above 160km/h: `there'd 
been various people who'd come up with kind of empirical solutions, which were good and worked, 
but nobody actually had a fundamental understanding. Now Alan [Wickens] cracked it and 
demonstrated ... it by building wagons which could run at extremely high speeds ... That brought ... 
an enormous amount of credibility to this new little Research Department and then the realisation 
came that if we can do this to wagons, we can do it for passenger trains and here lies the basis for 
making an enormous leap in speed'; both the BRB and MoT `had seen a big breakthrough in the 
application of aerospace technology to railway vehicles' and thought: `we really are on the dawn of 
a new era for railway technology'.
175
 Most importantly, that first achievement of the years 1964-
1966 was followed up by more; throughout the first half of the 1970s, the project was demonstrably 
successful: `Initially, progress was rapid; the ... APT-E train was completed in 1972 and from then 
till 1976, undertook a series of impressive trials, raising the British speed record for rail to 
245.4kph in the process.'
176
 
 
(2) Fading fortunes (1973-1981) 
 The R&D process was down-scaled in 1973-1974. It is difficult to establish which of the 
BRB or the Department was most active in this respect. In 1973, DoE wanted to order a large 
number of prototypes (10) and to provide 80% of the funds but `the BR Board were not prepared 
for such a substantial commitment'
177
 because of the ongoing work on HST. It would seem that the 
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Board actually turned down an offer of public funds, which was `typical ... of the relations between 
the Board and the government. Often there was ... a kind of battle ... they wanted to score points ... 
indulge in these silly games. Whereas if they'd had some kind of strategic view ... people on the 
Passenger Business understood this but the Board was somewhat remote'.
178
 Although by 
December 1973 `the necessary financial backing [had] been agreed in principle ... by the 
government',
179
 the whole negotiations took over a year to come to a conclusion, mainly because of 
delays on the departmental side.
180
 In January 1974, the BRB submitted a proposal to construct 4 
prototypes but following the election of a Labour government `the whole APT programme ran 
some risk of being scrapped altogether due to a squeeze on railway investment'.
181
 In its submission 
to the new Labour Transport Minister (Fred Mulley), the Department `acknowledged that, since the 
development of the APT had long been encouraged by the Department and previous Ministers, it 
was inconceivable that the Government could at that juncture discontinue support for the 
project.'
182
 
 Yet at the same it was recognised that `agreement to build the prototypes would make it 
difficult to draw back from further expenditure in due course ... Major doubts were expressed about 
the Board's forecast of a 3-fold increase in revenue on the WCML between 1973 and 1986 
resulting from electrification and the introduction of the APT'; as a result the submission concluded 
in favour of a `limited decision' and when the BRB were given authority to build 4 prototypes in 
July 1974, `they were told that the approval carried no commitment to proceed to full-scale 
production.'
183
 Senior BR figures have pointed out that the scaling down from 10 to 3 prototypes 
completely altered the fate of the project: the minimum number actually needed to operate a service 
properly was 8;
184
 the decision to go for 3 meant in effect that it could be sidelined. Central 
government prevarication, combined with misgivings of the more traditional BRB members, 
diluted the impetus of the project. From then on, BR modernisers struggled to keep APT alive. 
 Central government had been unwilling to commit itself fully to the project in 1974, and 
from around 1977 official support appeared to wane. Despite this the train continued to be 
developed under the Conservative government elected in 1979, partly owing to the good 
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performance of the railway as a whole: `passenger mileage [in 1979] was the highest recorded 
since 1961, when the rail network was 30% bigger' and the Chairman of BR felt able to speak of `a 
renaissance of the railways worldwide'.
185
 Also one APT-P set a new British speed record 
(260km/h in December 1979). But there were serious difficulties. 
 In December 1975, the APT Team won the MacRobert award (considered the Nobel Prize 
for engineers) for its work on suspension design, an integral part of the APT project; at the prize 
ceremony, Dr Jones warned the audience that APT needed more cash `running into tens of 
millions', whilst the BR Chairman remarked that Britain `was ahead the rest of the world ... in rail 
technology. There was great enthusiasm abroad for the BR developments but, ironically, not 
apparently in Britain itself.
186
 Another complaint aired by railway chiefs was the unpredictable 
nature of government policy: at the end of 1978, the Chief Executive wrote that `We have over 10 
years experience of the development of APT, painfully acquired through a period of fluctuating 
railway policy and financial status within the national economic scene.'
187
 
 Perhaps these judgements were somewhat unfair on the Railways Directorate, which had 
fully backed the BRB's application for a loan from the EIB and managed to overcome Treasury 
opposition: in one letter to a Treasury official, a DoE official stated that `whatever the investment 
ceiling, the initiative for BR's investment priorities must be with BR' and turning down the 
application would `cast doubt on the Government's attitude to the APT development project and we 
see no reason for doing this'.
188
 Similarly in the autumn of 1977, whilst one official thought it 
`highly desirable' to defer a decision on production APTs by one year (from September 1978 until 
autumn 1979), another stressed that the Department did not wish to `convey the impression to the 
Board that we were beginning to take a view against APT'.
189
 
 At first, the Treasury seems to have played a neutral role: `I am not aware that they were 
specifically ill-disposed to APT. On the other hand I couldn't say that thay were in any way 
enthusiastic  ... They were very much more concerned about the general finances of British Rail.'
190
 
But as time went by, the Treasury began to stress the need to keep projects such as APT `under 
constant review in the light of changing circumstances'.
191
 By 1978, financial restrictions imposed 
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in the wake of the IMF intervention were having an effect on the Departmental outlook: one 
Transport official wrote that `Cost reduction and the more efficient operation of the present system 
would be the right emphasis for research over the next few years.'
192
 
 At the same time, the APT-P programme was characterised by numerous delays, which in 
the long run harmed official perceptions of the project. By June 1977, officials were expressing 
deep concern and by the end of 1978, BR acknowledged that 3 years had been lost through delay. 
Industrial relations within BR were one cause: the first test phase of APT-P was disrupted by a 
number of industrial disputes between September 1977 and February 1979.
193
 
 Technical difficulties were a second cause of the delays. The possibility of an APT 
overturning in high winds on the windswept WCML gave rise to a great deal of correspondance 
between DoT and TRRL in 1977: a meeting at Marsham Street on 13 May 1977 concluded that 
`technical success [was] by no means assured.'
194
 By August, it had been decided to seek an 
`independent check on BR's evaluation' of aerodynamics in strong winds by making use of facilities 
at the Meteorological Institute, the National Maritime Institute and the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment.
195
 One DoT official was anxious not to encroach on the BRB's responsibility for 
safety but felt the involvement of the Chief Scientist in this case was justified.
196
 In 1979-1980, 
technical difficulties led to `a rolling programme ... to modify all vehicles.'
197
 The introduction of 
the prototype into passenger service, scheduled for October 1980, had to be cancelled owing to tilt 
problems. Breakdowns and system failures were such a common occurence that `The project was 
in real danger of losing momentum and the support of the government, the public and even some 
sections of BR Management was now in jeopardy'; the situation became so precarious that the 
Board wished for `a very competent, nationally-recognised engineer to come and have a look'.
198
 
They `took the unprecedented step of calling in an outside consultant to report on the engineering 
viability of the project.'
199
 
 The report by the consultant, Ford & Dain, found the project to be sound in technical terms 
and led to a new date being set for the introduction of the prototype into commercial passenger 
service (7 December 1981). The inaugural APT run covered the Glasgow-London route in 4h 
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14mn, setting a speed record for paying customers. Two days later however, the worst December 
weather conditions for thirty years exacerbated existing technical problems and created new ones; 
the second and third runs were embarrassingly delayed, amidst much publicity. The fact that BR 
decided to go ahead with the runs in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions is in itself 
an indication of how much pressure management was under at the time. Following this disastrous 
launch, the train was withdrawn from passenger service. 
 The future of APT was tied up with the progress of electrification but `the Government 
was keeping a tight grip on the electrification purse strings'.
200
 Electrification was proceeding at a 
slow pace, because of the high capital costs it incurred and the reluctance of successive 
governments to bear them: e.g. the WCML programme of electrification launched in the late 1950s 
was only completed in 1974. DoT acknowledged that APT was connected `not just to Inter-City 
strategy but the infrastructure upgrading and electrification strategies as well.'
201
 If APT was to be 
British Rail's new all-purpose train, it would need to run on ECML, the electrification of which was 
clouded in uncertainty. It was all the harder to justify a new electric train when such a relatively 
small percentage of the network had been electrified.  
 Perhaps this explains why as late as December 1976, a diesel APT was being talked about, 
both within and outside DoT: `an opportunity may exist for developing a diesel APT'.
202
 By 
January 1978, the BRB had approved an £80,000 feasibility study for a diesel APT, on the basis 
that it would form part of the jointly funded research programme. This proposal was approved by 
JRDWG;
203
 but design work on a diesel APT was only taken to a preliminary stage and by 1982 
had been suspended; two senior APT engineers pointed out that `Providing the proposed 
electrification of the Inter-City network is authorized, there will be no case for pursuing the diesel 
APT further.'
204
 
 Thus APT was intimately linked with a railway strategy - electrification  - that had already 
suffered many delays at the hands of ministers. One commentator felt that `APT's future on British 
Rail seems now to hinge on authority for more electrification.'
205
 The joint study of electrification 
being undertaken by the JSG was based on the assumption that `the Board's investment programme 
                                                 
     
200
 Freeman Allen (1978), p. 102. 
     
201
 Letter from K Peter, RB Division (21/12/1976), BAM (1977 Part I). 
     
202
 Ibid., p. civ. 
     
203
 JRDWG, `7th Report to the Steering Committee', BAM (1978 Part III). 
     
204
 Boocock and King (1982): S34. 
     
205
 Freeman Allen (1978), p. 112. The HST train on the other hand was compatible with all parts of the network 
and proved itself very quickly; for a long time, HST services were at the top of the world railway league table as 
regards the number of kilometres travelled at high speed. 
  
 
 129 
is unlikely to accommodate major electrification for 10 years or more'.
206
 In 1982, BR's Director of 
Engineering stated that `APT continues to be central to British Rail's Inter-City strategy and is 
expected to provide 60 to 70 per cent of passenger services on the planned electrified network we 
are all so anxiously awaiting.'
207
 In 1983, a statement by the Head of BR Research, Alan Wickens, 
confirmed this view: `The timescale for large scale service application of APT is difficult to 
estimate depending as it does on the policy to be adopted for future electrification of British Rail 
and the general level of railway investment in Britain.'
208
 
 The link between APT and the electrification programme is not universally acknowledged 
at BR however, even at senior level. Many respondents had not been aware of one: `I don't think 
the APT was regarded as part of an electrification programme. It was a form of traction.'
209
 Another 
respondent thought that `it was simply a question of the West Coast main line. We weren't really 
interested in promulgating electrification'.
210
 It follows that the development of the new train was 
perhaps not always placed within a more comprehensive, consistent framework, in which an 
electrified railway would be portrayed as commercially desirable. The formulation of this sort of 
strategy would have required the input of railway economists, of which BR was lacking. 
 Concerns regarding the commercial viability of an APT fleet had also arisen by 1977. DoT 
felt that BR had overestimated the increase in traffic and revenue to be expected and wished to 
make use of TRRL expertise, in order to check the validity of BR's forecasting techniques. 
Following a review meeting on 12 September 1977, one official described the picture of APT's 
commercial prospects as `chilling' and the Board's plans as `overprovision'; as a result, he asked for 
a study of travel times to be carried out within the Department to have a better basis to judge BR's 
claims.
211
 In January 1978, a TRRL official wrote that `it had not been quantitatively demonstrated 
that the investment in APT would pay off in revenue terms'
212
 and pointed out that the study carried 
out by IWPICT in 1970 was now outdated and its forecasts had been proved false. Doubts 
concerning the market share that APT could secure were fuelled by the `experience of the WCML 
electrification scheme where traffic and revenue estimates had not been fulfilled.'
213
 
 Also by December 1978 the Board advised a revised configuration of the APT production 
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train,
214
 which represented a significant change in commercial policy and called into question the 
validity of previous policy. DoT's fears were that the BRB saw APT `primarily in terms of its 
operating advantage and with a much poorer concern for its commercial prospects.'
215
 Clearly 
sponsoring department and sponsored industry were not debating the project using the same 
parameters. Perhaps this explains why there existed such an enormous discrepancy between the 
fleet sizes recommended by BR and DoT. In 1977 DoT made use of a TRRL model to estimate the 
number of train sets required to run London-Glasgow services and concluded that only 8 sets, 
rather than the 60 originally envisaged by BR for a full WCML fleet, would be required.
216
 But BR 
planners, by 1980, still felt that `To replace all daytime trains out of Euston except those to North 
Wales ... requires around 60 APTs' and proposed `to seek authority in principle for about 60 trains, 
rolling the programme forward each year by firm authorisation of 15 to 20 depending on evolving 
technical and market experience and the finance available.'
217
 How could such basic disagreement 
be solved? According to one DoT official `it seemed to be resolved basically by a sort of a political 
power struggle rather than by technical argument ... whatever TRRL might have said, the higher 
ups in the Department of Transport didn't wish to be seen to be taking on advice from other 
sources, didn't wish to be seen to be relying on TRRL.'
218
 
 Another factor holding up the project was BR's lack of autonomous resources. The parallel 
development of HST absorbed a large part of the resources available. The Department 
acknowledged in 1978 that the APT programme had slipped both because of the higher priority 
assigned to HST and because of `shortages of skilled manpower'.
219
 Yet `there were funds for the 
development of the P-trains that were not used ... it was done too much on the cheap and when it 
was then put into service, there were failures ... people at the top got very impatient ... they put it 
into service prematurely in the worst possible conditions.'
220
 Underspending in the last phase of the 
project was the result of the squeeze on public expenditure starting in 1976; savings were sought 
across the board somewhat over-zealously at times: by 1978 underspending within the framework 
of jointly funded railway research was a worsening trend; the total underspend for 1977 was 
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£1.138m, out of a Joint Research Programme totalling £3.009m.
221
 This meant that BR was failing 
to take full advantage of the government support that was available. 
 
(3) Final pressures (1981-1985) 
 By the time of the Ford & Dain Report (1981-1982), concrete results were demanded both 
by Transport officials and `the Board [who] were looking for quick results or else':
222
 returns on the 
initial investment had to materialise. APT was made more reliable and saw passenger service for a 
few months (from August 1984) but in the meantime, market conditions had so altered that the 
APT design no longer corresponded to BR's perceived needs. 
 The first Thatcher government was intent on transport privatisation, deregulation and the 
phasing out of public spending on railways to the largest possible extent. Coach travel was boosted 
by the Transport Act, 1980 (deregulating the express coach industry), and was feared as a 
potentially very powerful competitor in the sector of inter-city travel (which had not been the case 
when the project was launched); and between 1979 and 1982, BR's investment programme was cut. 
The rules of the InterCity game were changed by government with no apparent concern for the 
effect this would have on existing plans; although `there was a recognition in the Department that 
this was going to be jolly difficult for the railway to manage ... the Treasury had probably 
insisted'.
223
 As a result, the new APT Project Manager was asked in 1983 to carry out a review of 
the strategy for high speed trains on WCML in order to `determine whether the P-trains [were] in 
fact ... the things we should actually build for serial production'.
224
 
 In 1977 the BRB had been set the target that InterCity should cover its allocated costs by 
1981, but this was to be dependent on the government adopting a `policy of growth for the business 
through investment'
225
 which had not materialised. The APT project had been relocated within the 
InterCity sector and now the government demanded that all public funding for the sector be phased 
out. In the new inter-city market APT no longer was a viable proposition: 
  The thing that really stopped it was the fact that there was a lot of pressure on the 
InterCity business. The government gave us ... a new set of objectives. One of 
them was that the InterCity business not only got to break even but got to produce 
... a real rate of return on its assets ... people ... began to realise that what was 
coming out in terms of the likely cost of these animals ... was not going to help 
them on the road to this total viability ... so it really was this new focus on 
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commercial objectives that killed it in the end.
226
 
 BR's high speed policy, embodied in the May 1971 document, Inter-City Passenger 
Business: A Strategy for High Speed, was consequently overturned in 1984, when another BRB 
policy document, InterCity into Profit, stated that `increased speeds are not an immediate priority' 
for BR. The weight of ministerial, particularly prime ministerial, opinion had overpowered the 
Board's (and DoT's) attempts at spreading electrification, not to mention APT. 
 The abandonment of the project to introduce APT services on WCML was also partly 
brought about - paradoxically - by the decision (22 July 1984) by Transport Secretary Nicholas 
Ridley to approve the electrification of ECML, billed as `the largest electrification project ever 
authorised in Britain.' The Board had for several years been attempting to get DoT approval to 
electrify ECML: `it was about the fourth attempt, and they got it ... There was a package which was 
electrification of the route and the provision of new traction and rolling stock ... When the 
electrification came through, it was all hands to the spades on the East Coast. The West Coast Main 
Line, frankly, got forgotten at that stage. All the resources had to go in the East Coast Main 
Line.'
227
 BR resources could only deal with one major programme at a time and the long-awaited 
approval of ECML electrification (first planned in the late 1950s) was another nail in APT's coffin. 
 Looking at the question from a larger perspective, one former departmental scientist's 
perception is that `At the root of the issue as compared with developments in France is the relative 
government subsidies to BR and SNCF ... the latter has always been far more generous'.
228
 One 
Chairman thought that `The APT had been ... steadily under-resourced'; although for the first few 
years BR was years ahead in the railway world with its sophisticated research, the APT's 
`development was harassed and inhibited by "all the changes in investment policies"'; there had 
been a mismatch between the high aspirations of the research team and the quality and quantity of 
resources devoted to the project: `There is no point in wishing for the moon and not willing the 
resources'.
229
 A former Chief Secretary of the Railways Board held a similar view: APT `missed 
the market' because it had been too long in testing, which was due to the fact that not enough 
resources had been devoted to it; for `at the end of the day, the Treasury dominated relations 
between government and railways'.
230
 
 Comparisons between APT and the Japanese Shinkansen, French TGV and Italian Fiat 
tilting train would be unfair for a number of technical reasons, but as two BR engineers pointed out 
during a Labour term of office, `all three projects demonstrate a level of single-mindedness on the 
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part of the respective authorities from which Britain could learn a lot.'
231
 The 1974 decision to 
avoid commitment to full-scale production typified the approach of British central government to 
long-term railway projects: whilst support for R&D of the Advanced Passenger Train was granted 
because it constituted a `key research project', this in no way implied `commitment to full 
production'.
232
 This `wait-and-see' approach was detrimental to the project; one APT engineer at a 
joint meeting reviewing the progress of the prototype train stressed that 
  it was important not to underestimate the psychological effect of the Government 
giving its wholehearted support to the project, which would help the recruitment 
of good quality staff and facilitate dealing with suppliers. It would be better for the 
entire project to be given early authorisation and then this withdrawn if APT-P 
trials proved unsatisfactory, than to give authorisation in a piecemeal fashion.
233
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 There were several factors behind the failure of the APT project to move into production 
phase and it is not my purpose here to provide an exhaustive explanation, which would take us 
beyond the confines of this work. What this case study shows is an illustration of themes developed 
earlier: the lack of firm purpose and long-term commitment in public policy, together with a 
marked tendency to let the market decide, as opposed to planning transport development; an 
overwhelming emphasis on financial costs (and this long before 1979), with an attendent disregard 
for wider social and economic costs; a lack of departmental interest for forecasting future needs 
and distrust of such forecasts when attempted by others, even within central government; the near-
absence of a common referential framework between traditional senior railway managers, research 
engineers, government officials and politicians. 
 APT was an instance of pro-active departmental behaviour. One Transport official who 
participated in the whole venture expressed regrets: `I've learnt my lesson ... I have ever since then 
taken the view that it is a mistake for a Department to press something unless it is confident that the 
management already back it ... I have since felt that it was a mistake on my part to have pushed 
them because ... I think it was never a priority of the Chairman.'
234
 Another remarked that the 
Department provided `political support with ministers ... we backed the APT project. So when it ... 
didn't really achieve all it was hoped, people working with me were criticised as much as British 
Rail. It was a great disappointment.'
235
 MoT had taken the lead and had been powerful enough to 
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press on with the project, but unable to enlist the support of wavering Board members, and later to 
overcome political (in the narrow, ministerial sense) pressures. The project, launched in 1968 under 
a Labour Government, was nearly cancelled in 1974 under the following Labour Government; this, 
according to one senior engineer showed that `Our politicians are completely inconsistent, they 
think they can turn things on and off'.
236
  The high politics of the day had a decisive impact on the 
Railways Board's policies. 
 The long lead time necessary for such an innovative technology could not be reconciled 
with the short-term financial constraints that so dominated the referential framework. It cannot be 
over-emphasised that this domination was not simply the product of Thatcherite policies, or even of 
the Labour government slashing public expenditure in 1976 following the sterling crisis. Did the 
alternance of political parties in government play an important role? `Not on a practical basis, no' 
replied a former Head of BR Research, who went on to say: `I suppose you could say in broad 
terms, the Labour government was more in favour of public transport and the Conservative 
government was more in favour of private transport ... The road lobby was extraordinarily, is, 
extremely strong. So it didn't really mean much ... which government was in power.'
237
 Another 
railwayman thought that politicians `make noises when they're not in power ... but when they're in 
power, they all have the same pressures on them and the same attitudes emerge to some extent', the 
latter being that `at the end of the day, they're all about the public purse. That dominates, what 
money can the Exchequer raise and how do you spend it ... therefore the public purse creates the 
attitudes that they then can adopt!'
238
 Both Labour and Conservative government policies towards 
the railways were tightly constrained by Treasury influence. One former Conservative Minister 
echoed this feeling: `We're much too inclined to look for short-term results and not worry about the 
long term', adding that the country was `really structurally wedded to the short term' both because 
the Treasury's `principal concern is with, very much with current affairs, short term things' and 
because politicians `are looking to get re-elected next time'.
239
 In other words, financial and 
political imperatives were dominant and both were inherently short term. 
 Recent developments tend to show that the overall strategy was sound: Potter and Roy 
have showed that tilt technology has matured and is becoming widespread in Europe; from being 
`innovative', it has become `state-of-the-art' technology; the Swiss are currently developing a design 
for Swiss Railways and a growing market is anticipated for tilting trains.
240
 APT was an attempt on 
the part of the railway to engage in strategic long-term thinking and innovative technological 
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development which could not be accommodated within a basically short-term referential 
framework and was shackled by the problem of the railway's insufficient autonomous resources. 
Long-term political and financial commitment, involving reliable central government support 
(directly or indirectly) was a requirement which could not be fulfilled in Britain. 
 
 
2. TGV: A FRENCH STATE GRAND PROJET? 
 TGV is considered by some as one in a series of State-sponsored `grands projets' (or 
`grands programmes'), defined as projects where `national interest' is at stake, `a large number of 
industries or firms' are concerned, which have `abilities' but not sufficient resources or else lack 
initiative.
241
 One participant in the TGV project however violently rejected the idea that it could be 
called a State project; it was `purely' an SNCF project, `for which SNCF simply implored the State 
to give it permission to do it'; it was `not a State-sponsored' but a `State-authorised' programme.
242
 
One civil servant concurred with this view, saying that it was `an SNCF great programme, a great 
programme of the nation', not of the State.
243
 What are we to make of this contradiction? Although 
the objective of this section is not to ascribe paternity to one agency rather than to another, the 
depth of State involvement with the project throws some interesting light on the French public 
policy referential framework. 
 Since the TGV project was a fully integrated new track - new rolling stock project, it is 
somewhat artificial to discuss the train (in this chapter), in isolation from the infrastructure which it 
was meant to use (discussed in next chapter). Separating out the two is to a large extent dictated by 
the British case studies, where new rolling stock developments took place separately from, and 
long before, new infrastructure was seriously envisaged, but it also helps to separate the two 
strands of the TGV `story': technology policy issues, from issues of infrastructure planning. This 
section follows the same pattern as the previous one. In the first part, I provide a brief 
chronological overview of the R&D phases; this is followed by a presentation of the decision-
making context; the third and last part is an account of how State support began to be mustered in 
the early stages.
244
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 A. Phases in the Research and Development Process 
 The first phase began in the 1950s, for the TGV project was partly the outcome of a long, 
internal, continuous process of improving rail speeds, and partly the result of external events which 
acted as catalysts. The research proper spanned the years 1966-1971, with development taking 
place from 1972 until 1978. 
 
(1) In pursuit of higher speeds 
 In the mid-1950s higher speeds became the concern of several railway engineers. 
Experiments with existing rolling stock broke the world train speed record in 1955 (331km/h). It 
became apparent that railway technique had not been pushed as far as it could go. But speed was of 
interest mainly to technicians in the Rolling Stock department, who liked technical records, 
whereas commercial managers were more concerned with comfort and reliability. Furthermore rail 
speed limits had always been the province of Transport Ministers, even in the era of private 
railways; the maximum speed had been set by the ministerial decision of 30 July 1853 at 120km/h 
and there it remained;
1
 ministers refused to raise it - even for experimental purposes - until 1966 
(on safety grounds), so that research into high speeds was conducted in the late 1950s and early 
1960s by SNCF covertly. 
 Two powerful incentives to carry out further research into high speeds combined: firstly, 
the development in Japan (`Shinkansen' train, launched in October 1964) and other countries, of 
new rail technology threatened to upstage SNCF internationally; secondly, the revolutionary 
Aérotrain (Hovertrain) was a potentially dangerous competitor (the concept of a hovertrain, under 
discussion in the private engineering company Bertin & Co, was gaining ground in government 
circles). Therefore in July 1966, an integrated Research Centre was set up, inspired from similar 
developments abroad (Britain's RTC at Derby in particular) and from the nationalised electricity 
network's own in-house research centre, which had proved very successful
2
. 
 The TGV concept had emerged in Robert Geais's study (Le Transport T.G.V.: Réseau du 
Nord de la France) in December 1965, for Paris-Lille and Paris-Brussels services, drawing on the 
help of a technical division (DETMT), which had produced the first technical draft project for a 
240km/h `turbotrain' (2 December 1965). From then on, SNCF worked on three parallel projects: 
improved services with conventional designs; improved conventional electric locomotives 
(`Capitole') and eventually the novelty of turbo-traction; the new, high speed train project proper, 
involving the option of a purpose-built track, which is the subject of this section. 
 
(2) The Research Phase 
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 At the beginning of 1966, SNCF engineers took the initiative to develop a new type of 
train, using gas turbines originally designed for aircraft. To this end, they sought help from 
aeronautics specialists in the Air Force: following a meeting between two senior SNCF managers 
and a civil servant from the Technical Services Division of the Air Force, the Délégation générale 
à l'Armement (DGA, Ministry of Defence) offered SNCF the use of an aircraft turbine. Thus 
`Turmo III' (Turboméca), began to be tested on 29 July 1966 under DGA sponsorship, only days 
before the SNCF's new Research Centre was officially up and running. Throughout the research 
work, SNCF made use of institutes that carried out research for the aeronautics industry, and were 
either part of universities or ministerial services.
3
 As one railway manager put it: `We did not build 
an SNCF wind tunnel, every time we can use the research resources of others, we do so of course.'
4
 
 From December 1966 onwards, the new Research Centre was officially in charge of the 
project to develop high speed trains, known as `Project C03': `Project C03 comprised 4 sub-
projects and required the setting up of 15 teams bringing together over 100 people, both from the 
Research Centre and from central divisions and from SNCF regions.'
5
 It answered directly to the 
Director General and as such was guaranteed a high profile. There were no direct links between the 
person in charge of Project C03 and DTT: `There were no organic links ... the Ministry people 
quite rightly respected our autonomy.'
6
 There were informal links however. As one official recalls, 
SNCF Research had been `instructed not to pass on any papers, any memos, outside SNCF ... so for 
a long time with Fontgalland, I was kept informed but on a wholly verbal basis'
7
 (in 1967-1968); 
SNCF felt compelled to inform its sponsor department as `Fontgalland thought that he really ought 
to have support from some quarters!'
8
 
 On 23 March 1967, SNCF appealed for tenders concerning experimental rolling stock 
based on turbotrain technology and at the beginning of 1968, a technical research programme 
concerning all aspects of high speeds was launched. Several train designs were used for that 
purpose; a modified railcar, TGS, was fitted with a turbine engine and showed promising results, 
breaking a world record on 20 June 1967
9
 (252km/h). The following year, on 12 March, the 
                                                 
     
3
 Interview with railway engineer. For instance, SNCF made use of ONERA (Office national d'études et de 
recherches aéronautiques), a research unit of the Ministry of Defence, for some aerodynamics research. 
     
4
 Interview with former Deputy Director General, SNCF. 
     
5
 Guibert in 1972, cited in Jacq and Fourniau, `Dialogues socratiques autour de la genèse du TGV', RHCF 
(Paris), No 12 (forthcoming, September 1995). 
     
6
 Interview with former Head of Research, SNCF. 
     
7
 Interview with former Head of SCF, MdT. B de Fontgalland headed SNCF Research. 
     
8
 Interview with former Head of SCF, MdT. 
     
9
 Jean Avenas, `La grande vitesse: atout pour la SNCF et pour l'industrie française du matériel ferroviaire', La vie 
du rail, Spécial TGV, No 1682 (25/02/1979): p. 4. According to people involved in these developments, the success 
of TGS kick-started the process that was to lead to the implementation of the TGV project. 
  
 
 138 
Minister allowed SNCF to order two experimental trainsets (TGVs 001 and 002). These were 
ordered in July 1969, one being designed with a tilting body. 
 Whilst turbo-propulsion was being researched, it was also decided by SNCF management 
to look into electric traction,
10
 but results were not to be published. The pragmatic decision to keep 
the `electric option' open was already present in the project in 1967. A research programme into the 
difficulties of tapping electric current at high speed began in July 1969, the very month when 
TGVs 001 and 002 were ordered. 
 In 1970 the tilting train project (TGV002) was abandoned for `SNCF recoiled at the 
expense of the device balanced against its benefits. The French estimated that it added 15% to the 
capital cost of a new car.'
11
 As a result, only one train (TGV001) was now on order. It is interesting 
to note that although tilt technology was pioneered in France (1969-1971, with a view to speeding 
up the Paris-Strasbourg service), development did not go beyond fitting two Grand Confort 
coaches. In fact, SNCF decided to conceal the idea: `We really buried the issue successfully; at the 
Ministry, when they did not want TGV, they would say: "You did involve yourselves with tilting 
trains, didn't you?" "We did but that is really too complicated..."'.
12
 
 
(3) The Development Phase 
 The development phase began with the production in March 1972 of experimental 
TGV001 which, after several months of trials, was shown to the Transport Minister on the Landes 
line.  The first political decision was taken on 25 March 1971, when a Conseil restreint on 
transport chaired by Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas approved the proposal to run TGV services on 
a new Paris-Lyon infrastructure in principle. It took three years for the decision to be confirmed, 
when on 6 March 1974, the go-ahead for the construction of the TGV line was given by a Conseil 
des ministres restreint chaired by President Pompidou. 
 Two pre-production TGVs (01 and 02) were ordered on 12 February 1976, and eighty-five 
standard trainsets on 4 November 1976, to be delivered between 1979-1982. There had been no 
prototype phase between the experimental train and the two pre-production trains, though the latter 
underwent extensive testing. 
 TGV trials focused a great deal on reaching record speeds, despite the fact that it made 
little economic sense to operate TGV services at speeds close to 400km/h. The `political' dimension 
of the speed trials was apparent in Opération TGV 100. On 15 February 1980, SNCF launched a 
scheme to reach a speed of 100m per second (360km/h). A new world speed record (380km/h) was 
set in the presence of secretly forewarned journalists, on 26 February 1981. Thus SNCF asserted its 
technical prowess in the face of past and present political hostility. For, as the following section 
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will show, the context in which the project was launched was far from favourable. 
 
 B. The decision-making context 
 This section is organised around the same themes as its corresponding section in the 
British case study. The political element was very unfavourable, whilst the other elements were 
mostly propitious or at worst indifferent. 
 
(1) The political environment 
 The mid-1960s have been described by the first head of SNCF Research as `sad years' for 
SNCF, the years of `the irresistible rise of Air Inter' (domestic airline), which from about 1965 
began to attract first-class train passengers in droves.
13
 In the words of one engineer, `Distinguished 
economists ... and even fellow P&C engineers all said: "The railway is finished"'; as early as 1955 
to 1960, this was `the leitmotiv of the industrial development programmes'.
14
 Preparatory 
committee work for the Vth Plan took no interest in faster rail travel: a 1964 report on prospects for 
the railway by 1985 (L'orientation générale des activités de chemin de fer à moyen et long terme 
(1985)) concluded that there would be no need for an improved train until after 1985. 
 There was intense competition between air travel and first-class rail travel, with politicians 
in power generally favouring the former because of its more modern appeal, at a time when the key 
concept of socio-economic development in France was `modernisation'. For the same reason, the 
Aérotrain was greeted with enthusiasm by some sections of the political and administrative elites. 
The newly-created Ministry of Equipement, following the lead taken by its Minister (`Mr Pisani 
took a great deal of interest in these innovation issues'), showed `a very strong interest for anything 
to do with innovation, research'
15
 and as a result of the initiative taken by SAEI's Deputy Head,
16
 a 
Research Unit was set up within SAEI in 1967. Its first achievement was the creation of the 
Ministry's in-house research centre (Institut de Recherche des Transports, IRT); the second was to 
encourage new transport technologies through its New Transport Modes programme: its task was 
`to finance transport innovation, of which benefitted ... the Hovertrain', amongst others.
17
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 At MdT and IRT, `people dealing ... with research-development thought that the Aérotrain 
was a very good method ... a promising trail'.
18
 This high-technology means of transport would 
relegate national railways to the `second division' of transport, for coupled with the modernisation 
drive was a strong disdain for the railways, viewed as a symbol of a more archaic age.
19
 One 
Transport official, writing in the P&C engineers professional newsletter, declared: `SNCF is a 
powerful, venerable dowager, a weighty machinery which unflappably pursues its technical, 
administrative or financial course, from which it is difficult to divert it, be it to restrain its lifestyle 
or to modernise its equipment.'
20
 TGV was not viewed as a technological innovation but as a 
`classical train that went faster than others' and `did not fit into the framework of innovation 
policy.'
21
 
 SNCF was challenged from all sides: was it actually capable of competing with road and 
air, and of technological innovation? The recently created DATAR (Délégation à l'aménagement 
du territoire et à l'action régionale, the Prime Minister's agency for regional planning and 
development) in particular was a powerful force against railway development and took the side of 
Aérotrain. In December 1967 it was decided by a CIAT (interdepartmental regional planning 
committee) to build a 10-km experimental line near Orléans, for Aérotrain testing. Others within 
the Transport administration sided with SNCF but were helpless against Hovertrain and its 
powerful backers: `DATAR was behind decisions but then it was for ministries to execute ... I was 
the one who dealt with the tender for the Orléans infrastructure, we did not believe in it at all! But 
we had to make a deal ... there was the DATAR egging us on'.
22
 
 In short, the railways were by no means in a powerful position when the TGV idea was 
first mooted. But they were not defenceless either: they had the capacity to respond quickly to 
challenges, such as a ministerial initiative by Edgard Pisani (Equipement Minister in 1966-1967). 
He was shown the new potential of the railways (during an official visit to the South-West) and 
was so impressed by SNCF's demonstration and the advanced state of its research that he raised 
maximum commercial rail speed to 200km/h
23
 and gave the enterprise six months to come up with 
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a viable high speed service.
24
 Development of the `Capitole' train was speeded up (testing had 
begun in 1964) and the outcome was the `Capitole' service between Paris and Toulouse, launched 
on 28 May 1967.
25
  
 SNCF's unenviable position in political terms was due to a backlash, as the former SNCF 
President Louis Armand `had got everything he wanted as regards rail reconstruction for ten years' 
during the postwar reconstruction period and it was felt at CGPC that `SNCF [had] behaved as an 
imperialist power'.
26
 But as in the `imperialist' past, there were connections with the political world, 
and a habit of working hand in hand with officials from MdT, that could still be exploited. SNCF's 
President, André Ségalat `was acquainted with everyone, he knew everything' in government; he 
wielded `an enormous amount of political and administrative influence'.
27
 A former Deputy 
Director General described him thus: `He absorbed the technical realities we gave him and 
transformed them, made them understandable for the people in government. He did not like us to 
have contacts with them. He did not like that at all ... He kept for himself the absolute monopoly of 
relations with politicians'.
28
 Even senior railway managers were not allowed to cross ministerial 
doors. Another SNCF chief stated that Ségalat 
  knew all the politicians of the Fourth Republic and part of the Fifth Republic's ... 
Here we put our finger on something which is not usually said in books, namely 
that there were between SNCF and politicians, because of ... the tradition of 
having a President who came from State Grands corps and had played a para-
political role at the top, it was of having already prepared the bridges that allowed 
mobilising actions.
29
 
Having been convinced at an early stage by his Director General, Roger Guibert, of the validity of 
the work being carried out by SNCF Research, he put all his weight behind the project. 
 Lastly, government industrial policy throughout the period was not fixed. The initial 
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success of Aérotrain took place within the framework of de Gaulle's deliberate new policy of 
`giving France the means of its strategic independence through a strong scientific and technological 
base.'
30
 But President Pompidou reformed de Gaulle's policy, which he re-directed towards 
supporting industrial applications, rather than fundamental research, in order to `seize the 
discoveries of research and seek to domesticate them, make them usable, and act in such a way as 
to make them serve people, rather than have people serve them.'
31
 This emphasis on controlling 
technological development was also part of SNCF's approach and was vindicated under Pompidou, 
who ultimately approved TGV. The simultaneous demise of Aérotrain (in 1973) and success of 
TGV under Pompidou marked a shift back to applied research. 
 
(2) Appraising and financing new technology 
 Project C03 did not enjoy a smooth run in the decision-making procedure. It was appraised 
on several occasions and found just enough support at critical moments for its funding to be 
approved (this section will only deal with the beginning of the appraisal process, as most of it was 
concerned with infrastructure rather than rolling stock and will be dealt with at length in Chapter 
IV). 
 Many respondents stressed that `TGV would not have been created had it not been for the 
Hovertrain, which was seen as a threat'.
32
 This statement is to be understood in the context of a 
wider renewal of State activity, taking place from the early 1960s, which emphasised action-
oriented State agencies and prospective planning, and favoured high technology: 
  It was a sort of network of prospective administrative services: so there was 
around the General Planning Commission, which at the time, really, was very 
powerful ... DATAR ... SAEI ... and then there was the Forecasts Directorate at the 
Finance Ministry ... [those] were a little bit like itching powder to other 
administrative services.
33
 
Studies done by SAEI and its support for the Hovertrain forced the national railway to react and 
adapt, by devising a long-term strategy. 
 Another element which entered into the appraisal of the project's merits was the potentially 
widespread application it could receive: `So we had to get the project accepted by the Minister 
without him speaking a great deal about it ... I told him: "We must add a second project, the tilting 
train, so we can say this is not just about Paris-Lyon but it's for everyone, it's to improve speeds on 
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other lines".'
34
 This argument was pushed by SCF, even though SNCF itself did not hold much faith 
in the tilting version (TGV002), which was soon dropped. 
 A third element was of a psychological nature. TGV R&D was taking place whilst the 
Ministry and the railways were engaged in discussions about the Reform of SNCF (1966-1970). 
Given the number of people who needed to be convinced, DTT's position was `precisely to bring 
up SNCF psychology. It was the only area where we could pull out a strong enough argument, by 
saying: "You wish to reform SNCF ... but if there are only closures and restricted services in 
perspective, you're not going to motivate many..."'
35
 A letter from the Minister, Jean Chamant (13 
August 1968), stated that `launching a sizeable operation could win over all railwaypeople and 
facilitate the review of the Convention'.
36
 The argument had a very objective basis, namely the 
programme of systematic closure of secondary (`Omnibus') lines scheduled to begin in 1970, and 
involving the transfer of services to coaches; 7,000kms of lines were due to be affected and there 
would be job losses. TGV `brought a positive element to a reform that was really very negative'; 
conversely, speaking of TGV in psychological terms `was then practically the only way to try and 
speak of it, as one encountered extremely negative opposition.'
37
 Retaining SNCF's goodwill 
mattered to government; avoidance of open conflict had been an important element of the 
referential framework at all times, but particularly so in the wake of the May 1968 unrest. 
 As regards financing, it appears that it was never a thorny subject as such: during the R&D 
phase, the project was funded by SNCF's Research Budget and Ministry of Finance approval of the 
budget was only necessary for the overall amount; officials did not go into the details of research 
programming. `We never lacked financial means' declared one senior SNCF manager; research was 
financed out of the undertaking's `normal investment budget'.
38
 The then Head of Research 
(technical) recalled that he `prepared the annual research budget. I asked ... the technical divisions 
what they needed and I put forward a research budget that integrated the needs of the Rolling Stock 
Division, of the Fixed Installations Division, and others.'
39
 Research programmes carried out by 
SNCF Research were deliberately financed through `internal' resources: when the undertaking 
began to have a research policy, `they did not seek public funds, for a very simple reason, which is 
that they wished to keep control of the game. They considered that if they requested public funds, 
                                                 
     
34
 Interview with former Head of SCF, MdT.  
     
35
 Interview with former Head of SCF  (MdT), convinced that this was also the view of President Ségalat.  
     
36
 Letter quoted by Pierre Protat, former Head of SCF (MdT), speaking at AHICF Conference, (31/03/1994). He 
was referring to the Reform of SNCF then being negotiated. 
     
37
 Interview with former Head of SCF, MdT. 
     
38
 Interview with former Head of Rolling Stock, SNCF. Financial concerns were hardly ever mentioned in 
interviews and in primary literature, and never as unsurmountable obstacles. 
     
39
 Tessier in Jacq and Fourniau (forthcoming, September 1995). 
  
 
 144 
the public authorities would therefore be driven to having a voice in the strategy ... TGV ... SNCF 
really made it its baby, they were not keen for the public authorities to meddle too much, notably 
the sponsoring division.'
40
 
 Although there was no need for formal authorisation from Transport or Finance as regards 
research,
41
 there was for the construction of equipment; ministerial approval for the manufacture of 
two experimental TGVs was secured in March 1968. The eighty-five production trainsets 
themselves were provisionally ordered by SNCF on 12 February 1976 and the order approved by 
FDES on 4 November 1976. The total cost for TGV rolling stock was FF3.5bn, at 1981 prices 
(again the bulk of financing questions related to new infrastructure and is discussed in Chapter IV). 
 
(3) The international environment 
 TGV at first was to be powered by a gas turbine, but an electric solution was also explored. 
For instance in April-May 1971, a study on the economics of electric v. turbine traction was carried 
out by M Walrave at SNCF, which pinpointed the threshold above which electric traction became 
more economical; the Director General decided to shelve the study for fear that it would play havoc 
within the railway; `SNCF's official doctrine' remained centred around the turbotrain, even though 
many were by now in favour of an electric solution.
42
 
 Events leading up to the Council of Ministers of 6 March 1974 are worth recounting: 
following the December 1973 oil shock, SNCF's President resolved that he would press for an 
electric TGV,
43
 as this might be a more politically acceptable solution. The decision was not an 
easy one as both the general public and policy-makers had been `sold' the idea of a turbotrain, 
which had a modern ring to it, and turbo-engine manufacturers were very keen to develop a new 
market; also `the electrotrain as such, [SNCF] did not like it that much'
44
 because additional 
electrification costs would have to be incurred and because there were added technical 
complications. Furthermore, Ségalat had already had the greatest difficulty convincing the Minister 
of Finance, Giscard d'Estaing, to accept the development of TGV in its turbotrain incarnation; with 
this new choice of traction, he would have to plead the cause once more, to the same obstructive 
Minister: `Well, he did go back to see Giscard, he spoke for the electrotrain TGV ... and Giscard let 
the first TGV happen, that was Paris-Lyon.'
45
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 The oil crisis had a particularly strong reverberation in France: it was felt to threaten 
national independence. There was a political fixation with energy dependency and a government-
approved turbotrain would set a bad example to the French population.
46
 Any savings in energy 
derived from oil were to be encouraged and an energy-savings programme was duly approved at 
the 6 March Council, in which the railways, thanks to TGV, would play their fair share.
47
 The rapid 
expansion of the civilian nuclear programme was also taken during that Council meeting.
48
 Was 
there a link between the approval of Project C03 and the electro-nuclear programme? `Oh yes there 
was, yes! There is an absolute link!'
49
 A subsequent President of SNCF also established the clearest 
of linkages: `The French Government, having courageously started a policy of French energy 
independence with the launching of the programme for nuclear power plants, adopted at its Council 
of 6 March 1974 the TGV programme within the framework of this policy.'
50
 The case for an 
electric TGV was all the stronger as it had the backing of the EDF lobby, which saw SNCF as a 
potentially sizeable and dependable customer: 
  [The] government was rushing headlong into nuclear power and ... we would get a 
good deal from EDF because EDF likes customers who consume large quantities 
... at night ... in summer ... the crisis helped us inasmuch as we said: "We can get a 
passenger from Paris to Lyon in two hours, using up the consumption of a moped, 
but from a nuclear source. So it was an easy plea to make and which carried the 
decision to electrify.
51
 
 In this light, it is not surprising to find that the person that SNCF's President approached in 
February 1974 in his search for official support, was Jean Blancard, the Government's newly-
appointed Energy Delegate, and long-time policy actor in the field of nuclear power;
52
 Ségalat 
imparted to him the difficulties he was experiencing in getting the project approved and Blancard 
agreed to try and get the Council of 6 March to authorise it.
53
 Nor is it so astonishing that the 
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crucial decision concerning TGV was taken during a Council dealing with energy issues, which 
took a number of important decisions regarding national energy policy (the first two have already 
been cited; a third one concerned the intensification of oil prospection). The TGV project `was put 
across as an "energy" issue':
54
 studies showing that energy consumption per traveller/km was far 
smaller with TGV than with either car or airplane were produced and the fact that an electric 
version would only `use nationally-produced energy - non-imported'
55
 was heavily stressed. The oil 
crisis was a `veritable push in the right direction' and meant that SNCF was able to gain `a certain 
number of supporters' for the electric version.
56
 Ségalat managed to get his point across that the 
new electric train would increase national independence in the energy sector
57
 and by doing so, 
built a case that was politically unassailable (national independence was one pillar of the referential 
framework). The initiative to go electric was the railway's, but officially the decision was a political 
one: President Pélissier in later years spoke of the `decision taken at government level to use 
electric energy'.
58
 Thus the revolutionary turbotrain was quietly turned into a classic electric train 
and last-minute changes to the external design had to be made in order to accommodate overhead 
lines. 
 
(4) The industrial environment: railway manufacturing 
 The railway industry was in a fairly poor shape in the late 1960s. It was `very fragmented 
and shaky, we all wondered whether they were going to have to close down';
59
 it was used to small 
production series for the overseas market and worked in very close partnership with SNCF, its 
main client together with RATP (the Parisian transport operator). One SNCF engineer, who later 
joined the engineering group Alsthom, recalled that `when [he] was ... at SNCF, there were ... 
constantly colleagues from Alsthom talking things out in the office', and as regards TGV rolling 
stock, `the industry and SNCF work in very close symbiosis'.
60
 A `system ... of technical 
partnership ... has always existed between SNCF engineers and rail industry engineers', as 
embodied for instance in `joint project teams'.
61
 The information prospectus produced by the 
French Railway Industry Federation, FIF, refers to `an extraordinary labour of partnership between 
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SNCF and all interested industrialists' having made TGV possible.
62
 This sentiment was echoed by 
the Head of SNCF Rolling Stock: `the construction of TGV sets would not have been possible 
without a French railway industry both competent and strong'; French manufacturers were `inured 
to taking risks', `quick to invest' and their industrial strength branched out down to the level of 
contractors in a way which was `fully adjusted to the technical and financial demands of their 
national user.'
63
 
 It was an unequal relationship however, as SNCF had a monopoly of initiative: little 
research was conducted by the manufacturers themselves. SNCF acted as the `project manager ... 
an extremely demanding project manager ... which somewhat reduced its suppliers to the condition 
of vassals.'
64
 Thus TGV was wholly designed by SNCF itself but was built by private firms. What 
was the factor which presided over the choice of Alsthom as the main supplier of TGV sets, when 
in 1975 SNCF appealed for tenders `in which the whole of the French railway industry took part'?
65
 
  The official answer was costs but Alsthom, well we saw to it that they were first ... 
We knew that to make something like that which was really quite on the cutting 
edge, there were technical capabilities only at Alsthom ... Alsthom did practically 
what we wanted them to do as they knew that losses on the first 80 trainsets so to 
speak would be made up for with the following 800...
66
 
 Such a mark of trust was only possible in a stable policy environment. SNCF took great 
care to provide each firm with enough orders to keep them going: on the one hand, `SNCF cannot 
say I give everything to one and the others will die', because it `needs the competition' and `SNCF 
encouraged things so that on the large [TGV] market to come, the whole of the railway industry 
would be kept alive'; on the other hand, manufacturers shared out the work between themselves `so 
to speak under the aegis of SNCF', so that ultimately the tender was hardly carried out along the 
lines of a truly competitive international tender.
67
 
 From the late 1970s, a process of concentration took place in the private railway industry: 
`The State encouraged [concentration in the railway industry], maybe misguidedly, thinking that on 
the international scene, large companies export more than several small and medium-sized ones.'
68
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The 24 September 1967 Order set up a new legal framework for companies, `GIE' (Groupement 
d'intérêt économique) which involved fiscal benefits and was part and parcel of a `distinct strategy 
favouring concentration.'
69
 In 1972, several railway manufacturers, e.g. Schneider, took advantage 
of the measure to set up Francorail GIE. SNCF had two main suppliers until the smaller one 
(Schneider, the second largest industrial group in railway construction) was taken over by the 
larger one in 1986 (Alsthom, a subsidiary of CGE - Compagnie générale d'électricité). Alsthom 
became the world leader in railway construction and the sole national firm facing SNCF.
70
 
 Both under De Gaulle and Pompidou, industrial restructuring was encouraged through 
large State orders which could only be fulfilled through the standardisation and the production of 
large quantities of a given good. SNCF followed suit even before TGV: 
  SNCF set the cat among the pigeons by demanding long production runs ... By 
bending the rules in a way that I do not know very well because I benefitted from 
it without having actually negotiated it with the sponsor, we managed to make 
long term deals, although French law requires annual investments, as with the 
State budget. Eventually allowances were made for long term deals ... over a ten-
year period!
71
 
This was the case with an order for 3000 `Corail' carriages, a totally unprecedented event. This 
trend in public procurement was actively encouraged by the State, because it was seen as a means 
to secure the wide industrial base that, in the French referential framework, was viewed as 
necessary for national prosperity. The Corail and TGV contracts, both very substantial, were 
instrumental in the concentrating of the industry under the leadership of Alsthom; they guaranteed 
regular, solid financial income, with low profit margins, which was was typical of State guidance in 
public service industrial sectors during the VIth Plan, aiming at the creation of large industrial 
groupings.
72
 
 The partnership between SNCF and manufacturers extended to the promotion of the 
industry abroad by senior railway managers.
73
 The fact that a public undertaking was openly 
championing private manufacturers was viewed as perfectly proper since it was for the benefit of 
the railway sector as a whole.
74
 
 
                                                 
     
69
 A. Rowley, `La modernisation économique de la France', in De Gaulle en son siècle, III, La Documentation 
Française (Paris: Plon, 1992), p. 177. 
     
70
 HCSP (1986), pp. 148-149. 
     
71
 Interview with former Head of Rolling Stock, SNCF. 
     
72
 Correspondence from Fourniau (2/06/1995). 
     
73
 One SNCF President stated: `SNCF, as in the past, will take all possible steps to promote abroad French 
railway technology.' (Interview with Pélissier, La vie du rail, Spécial record du monde, No 1785, 19/03/1981, p. 5.) 
     
74
 `Some years, exports amounted to up to 47% of total turnover.' (Source: FIF prospectus.) 
  
 
 149 
(5) The professional dimension 
 SNCF Research brought together two groups of specialists: rolling stock engineers, egged 
on by the performance of the Japanese Shinkansen train and the possibility of a German train 
running at 200km/h (announced at a professional convention in 1964 in Munich); and managers 
with a background in economics who wished to develop new ideas as regards services (light, 
frequent, fast trains); the alliance of these two groups overcame sceptical managers in the 
Operations Department
75
 (the presence of economists in the TGV team is a crucial point, developed 
in Chapter IV). Technical specifications were laid in accordance with very precise requirements 
from the marketing managers. For the first time at SNCF, a new train was deliberately and 
systematically tailored to the commercial needs of the railway. 
 President Pompidou was `truly convinced that France needed an industrial base', a 
conviction, a `faith' even which he shared `with the people who had graduated at X, and who filled 
government and industry'; when he decided to authorise a programme such as TGV, one could 
speak of `an act of faith'; many `shared the same faith and that helped a lot.'
76
 In these few words, 
one encounters an inescapable dimension of French State practice: the integrated nature of the 
policy-making elite. The world of transport policy-making was a fairly small one. The fact that the 
great majority of SNCF senior engineers and senior Transport officials were Polytechnique 
graduates, and many belonged to the same Grands Corps (mostly P&C but also Mines) meant that 
they spoke `the same language'
77
, that is held the same basic assumptions about public policy, used 
the same methodological tools to argue their cases, and shared the same referential framework on 
the whole. 
 One should not assume however that centralised training led to the formation of an 
homogeneous elite. As regards SNCF, it is both true that a large number of the most senior 
positions were traditionally held by P&C engineers and that the P&C Corps as a whole became a 
hindrance to railway development in the 1950s and 1960s: SNCF was subjected to attacks `By the 
road lobby, the oil lobby and in particular by P&C engineers ... We had an enormous amount of 
wrangling with the P&C Corps ... they design the motorways.'
78
 P&C engineers at SNCF `stood 
apart' because they `were seconded from the P&C ... [they] had an SNCF status'; as a result, the 
ideas of SNCF engineers were less influential within professional circles than those of non-
seconded P&C engineers; furthermore, there were `never more than a few dozen' seconded P&C 
engineers in the top echelons of SNCF, a `tiny minority' in relation to the number of P&C engineers 
in charge of roads within the Equipement divisions (both at the Ministry and at decentralised State 
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agencies in the départements).
79
 All the same, lines of communication between all P&C engineers 
were informal and numerous. 
 Having discussed the various dimensions of the context in which decisions concerning 
Project C03 were made, all of which except the political context were favourable, I now turn to the 
process of gaining State approval. 
 
 C. Project C03: a difficult launch 
 Most respondents emphasised the importance of Aérotrain as a powerful incentive to 
innovative action at SNCF. What is less often mentioned is the fact that the undertaking managed 
to get involved in Aérotrain research at an early stage, encouraged by its Director General, Guibert: 
SNCF was the main shareholder of SEA, therefore sitting on its board, and lent it a disused railway 
line. This strategy of involvement enabled the railway undertaking to demand that it be allowed to 
pursue its own high speed research, and this was allowed since `no-one believed in it'.
80
 Although 
both Project C03 and the Hovertrain constituted technological challenges, with no guarantee that 
they could be turned into economically viable means of transport, a great deal of faith was placed 
in the latter (strongly supported by two successive heads of DATAR, Olivier Guichard and Jacques 
Monod, both influential political figures), at the expense of the former. In spite of the serious 
technical problems that it encountered, `the government kept pushing, pushing, pushing, ... for it 
was a so-called finest jewel of French technology' and critically, Bertin `had recruited as No 2 a 
towering personnality from the oil industry, an X too naturally ... he knew everyone!'
81
 When it 
came to allowing SNCF to order prototypes, in 1969, `the Aérotrain did everything it could to get 
the Transport Minister to refuse, for this was an investment approval, agreement from the Ministry 
was necessary ... it was snatched in extremis'.
82
 
 A second obstacle were various plans for the short or vertical take-off and landing aircraft 
(ADAC): in 1970 `The air transport circles were fiercely stirring and demonstrated that the vertical 
take-off aircraft would manage to solve the issue.'
83
 But plans for ADAC proved to be short-lived. 
 The third obstacle was distrust of SNCF. In some political circles, the TGV project was 
reportedly described as `hare-brained'.
84
 The most notable opponent in the early research phase was 
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the then Prime Minister, `Couve de Murville, who felt a stubborn distrust towards "engineering and 
prestigious investments" of SNCF.'
85
 His opposition was such that when SNCF requested approval 
for the experimental TGVs in 1969, MdT officials sought to circumvent him; in the diaries of one 
official, the 14 March 1969 entry reads: `The construction of two experimental turbotrains has been 
authorised by the Minister (Chamant). Lacarrière and I had to go and get round him in the evening 
so that he would sign the D.M.
86
 without referring to the Prime Minister, by explaining to him in 
particular that those machines will not leave the factory for two years.'
87
 It was apparently `the first 
time ... that the administration was acting illegally and unfortunately it had to be done almost 
secretly.'
88
 According to another civil servant, this tactic was dictated by the fact that 
  SNCF was ill-considered in many right-wing political circles. Hence the desire not 
to make it look as though the decision to build two prototypes was a major State 
decision. Many technical research decisions are taken in this way in France. It may 
look `technocratic' and as though going against democratic control ... but the 
benefit is that it takes the heat out of relatively minor decisions.
89
 
This statement expresses one element of the referential framework, namely the avoidance of open 
confrontation. 
 One SNCF manager summed up the situation thus: `the State did everything it could to 
discourage this project ... it repeatedly delayed decision-making by requesting additional 
information, ... expert opinions, by taking interest in other projects such as Aérotrain'; moreover, 
`everyone was against TGV, no matter which party they belonged to'.
90
 The Transport Minister 
took the following drastic action in 1970: `Mondon confirms to DTT that he forbids SNCF from 
continuing its propaganda in favour of TGV - Hutter must cancel his conference at Saint Etienne'.
91
 
 Were Transport officials, on the other hand, wholly on the side of SNCF? Until about 
1968, DTT seems to have had strong reservations about TGV. It was also in charge of the rival 
Hovertrain project, which it supported. By 25 February 1969, the departmental attitude was 
described thus by a senior official: 
  Meeting of the Le Vert Group with Legrand (DATAR) who supports Aérotrain to 
the hilt - I see Le Vert before the meeting to inform him of Transport's position: 
open mind as regards studies and experiments, no a priori judgement or 
scepticism. SNCF must be allowed to pursue its research during the VIth Plan, it is 
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one of the main psychological outlets in the face of the drastic cuts it is going to 
undergo elsewhere.
92
 
 SNCF had by then the tacit support of the sponsoring authority - resting on the 
psychological argument discussed earlier - at least at the administrative level.
93
 Also the success of 
new, fast `Aquitaine' and `Etendard' rail services, coming as it did during the early R&D of TGV, 
played an important role in making the objective of higher rail speeds a commendable one in the 
eyes of State officials.
94
 
 As regards technical detail, MdT relied on its research agency, IRT, to vet some of SNCF's 
proposals. With IRT, according to an SNCF engineer, `the relationship was one of step-by-step 
follow through. Thus regarding technological choices which we had made and may have surprised 
the Ministry, IRT was asked to contact us ... the Minister's mind was set at rest when he knew that 
we agreed, which was always the case'; the engineer in charge of rolling stock for instance had to 
present his technical choices to IRT, something which he experienced as being before a `tribunal'.
95
 
This close scrutiny meant that railway engineers were not able to embark on over-ambitious 
developments. On the other hand, IRT had its own `pet' projects (e.g. the SENF braking system) 
which it failed to impose on SNCF.
96
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 Although the political class has been eager to take the credit for the technological success 
TGV undoubtedly has become, it cannot really be claimed as a classical grand projet. It is true that 
Edgard Pisani, in his brief term as Equipement Minister, gave a decisive push in the direction of 
higher speeds, but he did not create SNCF's ability to produce and test high speed trains, or the 
organisation's resolve and institutional capability to see the project through. His role can best be 
described as that of a catalyst for a long-standing ambition of SNCF engineers to show how much 
more the old railway could achieve. If anything, Bertin's Aérotrain was the State's transport grand 
projet, receiving both political support and State funds. In his book on Pompidou's industrial 
policy, Esambert barely mentioned TGV, a glaring omission reflecting the fact that the new train 
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was not a political priority at the time and cannot be claimed as such even today.
97
 
 TGV however is considered a national project by senior railway engineers inasmuch as it 
involved sizeable `budgetary commitments' and was `extremely structuring from the point of view 
of the [national] territory'.
98
 Another SNCF respondent added to these two features `the impact on 
the development of the undertaking itself'.
99
 In the referential framework of many SNCF people, 
the importance of the project both for the nation and for the national railway was an important 
assumption. 
 TGV can only be viewed as a grand projet inasmuch as it was `a particular instance of 
integration of policies in industry, technology, competition and public procurement'.
100
 This 
integration did not take place as a result of a deliberate, comprehensive ministerial initiative but 
rather flowed from institutionalised practices which encouraged systematic, medium to long term 
thinking and the pooling of resources. As with a number of other successful projects in France, `a 
homogeneous elite (often a product of the grands corps and combining technical, supervisory and 
managerial functions) was able to rally a high status personnel around the values of progress, the 
entrepreneurial State and national independence.'
101
 In the end, mobilisation around such referential 
values was enough to overcome any political or financial reservations that the public authorities 
might have had.
102
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3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Both the APT and TGV projects were launched in 1966, at a time when there was a great 
deal of interest for R&D in new forms of inland transport technology at central government level in 
both countries: hovertrains and short / vertical take off landing aircraft were being developed on 
both sides of the Channel under ministerial sponsorship. The R&D phases of both APT and TGV 
were carried out almost exclusively by the nationalised railways themselves, for both operators had 
the necessary know-how and a tradition of in-house innovation, although SNCF involved private 
manufacturers to a far larger extent. A third similarity concerned the nature of the planned service: 
`There is no question of introducing the APT ... as a luxury businessman's service like the Trans-
Europ Expresses ... it will probably carry both first and second class passengers from the outset';
1
 
TGV for its part was meant to `democratise speed', unlike previous express services, which were 
first-class only; in both cases, reservation of seats was to be made compulsory. A fourth similarity 
lay in the strategic aims of the projects, which were to enable a declining railway to compete with 
road and air transport: `BR's aim is to use APT to dominate the passenger market on all inter-city 
routes as well as generating a large volume of new business';
2
 SNCF also aimed at increasing its 
market share. 
 However, the two case studies presented in this chapter contain many striking differences, 
not least in their outcomes. Analysing the reasons for BR's failure to implement a highly innovative 
high speed rail policy, and SNCF's corresponding success, would entail discussing points outside 
the scope of this study (such as railway industrial cultures and innovation management). At any 
rate, the case studies are not intended to provide an explanatory framework for public policy 
outcomes. They are points of entry into the public policy referential frameworks of the two 
countries. 
 
 A. Aspects of the projects 
(1) The projects' objectives 
 The TGV project was mostly commercially-driven (`an economist's invention')
3
, whereas 
the APT project mainly rested on a technology pull (`a scientist's train'). In Britain, the technology 
was the driving force, the approach being `scientific', and the emphasis on returning to `first 
principles';
4
 whereas in France, transport objectives dominated the thinking of those involved in the 
project and the approach was `economic' (for full discussion of the economists' input, see Chapter 
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IV). Thinking on the British side focused on technological development per se and on the 
international market for rolling stock, i.e. on an invention and a commercial product. At first, it was 
not known on which trunk lines APT might be used to best effect, for the project began as a 
`generic' research programme: `this breathtakingly original vehicle had been conceived in the 
highest hopes. It was to be the British solution to a need recognised worldwide for a second 
generation of fast trains to succeed the high-powered diesel and to compete with the airways.'
5
 In 
the British referential framework, it was conceivable to think of APT as a potential scientific 
breakthrough on a world scale, whereas in France, the project was first and foremost an attempt by 
the national railway to modernise its appeal and compete more successfully with air and motorway 
travel in France itself. Only secondarily would TGV, running on French railway lines, be a 
`technological showpiece' for French industry. 
 The fact that international trade issues occupied a more prominent place in the British 
referential framework than they did in the French is perhaps not surprising as France was still a 
relatively closed economy in the 1960s and early 1970s. Britain for its part had long been a free-
trading nation and officials were used to thinking in international terms. Also selling APT 
technology would have benefitted the Exchequer, whereas selling TGV trains would `only' benefit 
private manufacturing companies. 
 Time and time again, respondents in France have stressed that Project C03 was viewed by 
its proponents as a transport system (the `TGV system'); it was not simply a product to be sold or 
the solution for one given transport corridor: `We did not seek to optimise on Paris-Lyon, we really 
optimised the system ... I wish to insist on the fact that we followed an overall approach which we 
called system-approach.'
6
 Although the system has over time turned into a successful product on 
the export market, the primary purpose was the radical transformation of inter-city transport, not 
just between Paris and Lyon, but on other trunk routes as well. The new technology offered a 
radical, commercial solution to broad transport issues. Hence the services of both engineers and 
transport economists were enlisted on an equal footing. Potter and Roy have pointed out that APT 
for its part was a particular example of a more general phenomenon: the `reliance in Britain on 
simple "technical fix" innovations rather than considering how the whole system can be improved'.
7
 
The training of the leading members of the TGV team and of those at MdT who approved the new 
technology goes a long way towards explaining the `system' approach; for they were 
polytechniciens almost to a man, which means that they were trained to apply science and to 
manage rather than to research. The British researchers on the other hand had varied backgrounds, 
some in engineering, some in science, and had gained their degrees in various universities around 
Britain, whilst transport officials were mostly classically-trained. 
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 Although I have begun by stressing the highly commercial nature of Project C03, such 
commercialism was combined with a strong public service ethos. Indeed TGV aimed both to 
capture (high-spending) business passengers from the airlines and to `democratise speed' (SNCF 
slogan), by providing both first and second-class accommodation (previous fast trains were first-
class only) and with seats on TGV being priced at the same levels as seats on conventional trains. 
The public service element must be understood in conjunction with the grande école training. 
Technical transport literature continually stressed the dual nature of SNCF - as a commercial 
carrier and a public service undertaking - and the fact that policy-makers ought to seek ways to 
fulfill both tasks without unduly stressing one at the expense of the other. On the British side, the 
commercial remit of the railways had been heavily stressed since the Transport Act, 1962 and 
attempts to re-introduce social criteria were seen as the preserve of the Labour Party. The 
conception of the railway as a public utility was generally not stressed, either by BR or the 
Department. But neither was the commercial approach immediately and wholeheartedly embraced 
by railway management except in its financial component of strict limits on expenditure. 
Paradoxically, financial preoccupations at the inception of, and throughout the APT project did not 
turn it into a full-blown commercial proposition. 
 The new technology was expected by Transport officials of both countries to improve 
railway finances, but in France this was heavily stressed both by officials and railway chiefs, whilst 
in Britain `the fact that it was important for the "finances", was something obvious, but we didn't go 
around ... it wasn't stated, it wasn't overstressed.'
8
 Similarly, deliberately increasing passenger rail 
traffic was not a clear objective on the DoT side, at least at the beginning of the project.
9
 To sum 
up, Project C03 had clearly stated objectives and limited technological ambitions whilst APT was 
both more adventurous and unfocused. 
 
(2) Financing and appraisal 
 How do we explain that the British Transport Ministry should have agreed to partially 
finance a high-risk project, when SNCF had to finance all of the (safer) TGV R&D itself? To 
phrase the question in those terms is misleading because the funding and budgeting arrangements 
were so very different. BR was wholly dependent on public funding and internal revenue for all its 
investment programmes; as the latter generated insufficient cash, it was forced into a partnership 
with the sponsoring ministry. This in turn meant that there was a large degree of ministerial 
oversight of the APT programme. SNCF on the other hand had been more generously funded since 
nationalisation and after the Nora Report was encouraged by government to raise capital on the 
private financial markets, which meant that it was not strapped for cash. And in the field of 
research oversight, SNCF benefitted from a wider degree of autonomy, since railway management 
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was left to allocate approved funds internally as it saw fit through its Research Committee. The 
question of resource availability can be illustrated by the two following examples: firstly, when 
SNCF engineers launched their research into gas turbine propulsion, they chose to experiment with 
helicopter power units, because they were believed to be the best in technical terms; BR Research 
for its part examined a number of `gas turbines ... small automotive engines being preferred to large 
and expensive aircraft or helicopter power units' (my italics).
10
 Secondly the shift from turbo to 
electric traction had an adverse impact on APT because it established a link between the project 
and electrification, itself a controversial policy area. The shift from turbotrain to electric TGV had 
no discernible effects on the fortunes of Project C03 as electrification was already established as a 
worthwhile object for the network as a whole within the Administration and even among 
politicians (electrification was equated with modernisation, always a desirable good in the French 
referential framework). 
 Close, formal links between BR Research and MoT necessarily existed (Joint Steering 
Group) because of direct state funding in the project. In contrast, there were no formal links 
between SNCF Research and MdT: the functional research units, and from 1966 the Research 
Centre, enjoyed sufficient autonomy to be able to conduct quasi-secret research in the early 1960s 
into high speeds, and in the early 1970s into the electric option. There were however, ad hoc links 
with the Ministry's research establishment, IRT (which were not constraining), just as BR Research 
had some contacts with the MoT's establishment, RRL. Overall, SNCF Research enjoyed a far 
greater degree of budgetary and institutional autonomy from its sponsoring ministry than did BR 
Research.  
 As regards appraisal, in France the non-financial dimensions of the TGV project were 
critical. It was possible for SNCF to obtain State approval for a costly project on the grounds that it 
would benefit the undertaking itself, the whole network and have social and economic, as well as 
financial, benefits (the latter being heavily stressed). Again the new train was viewed as part of a 
system, and repercussions on the whole system were therefore assessed as well as appraisal tools 
would allow. In contrast, APT services were assessed as a product for a single main line, in 
isolation from the rest of the network, the economy and local communities. Where the French 
practice was to look at the national economy as an integrated whole, the British practice was to 
assess each case on its own merits. 
 In France as in the UK, officials from the Railways Directorates relied on the railway 
operator for much of their information. This situation of quasi-monopoly did not pose any serious 
problems on the French side, where SNCF was only too eager to prove its case on the basis of 
precise data and where administrators (particularly from Finance) did not hesitate to demand 
information they felt was needed, directly from SNCF. But DoT was somewhat short of expert 
information and was not able to force it out of the undertaking. No independent technical or 
economic audits into APT were demanded by DoT after the 1970 IWPICT Report, in spite of 
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growing doubts. One railway engineer pointed out that because officials `weren't highly technically 
qualified, there was an element of trust there'.
11
 An official felt that `There wasn't really a technical 
basis other than "It is my professional opinion that" to the British Rail proposal. They didn't like to 
see their technical knowledge or understanding challenged and ... they didn't propose to expose it to 
challenge. They may have had for all I know, a lot of detailed calculations and modelling behind it 
but they certainly never showed them.'
12
 The Department did not engage in cross-examination or 
openly seek second opinions: `the whole Whitehall process points towards a kind of associative 
regime within which opinion is formed by going around getting as many cross-bearings as you can 
before anybody forms any opinion. Then you set it all down and add it all up and you say "Right, 
what it comes to then is..., this is all OK by everybody" - except those who've got to find the money 
for whom it is too expensive.'
13
 It simply was not done to seek second opinions, whereas in the 
French State apparatus, the role of experts in State or para-statal agencies was precisely to check 
the validity of public undertakings' claims, e.g. in economic or safety matters. 
 Safety was left to BR unless grave worries arose, in which case the Department's Chief 
Scientist became involved on an ad hoc basis; alternatively, BR might call in an independent 
consultant. The French Transport Ministry exercised continuous a priori control of safety matters 
through its in-house Technical Security Division. In October 1977 DoT frustration (officials 
wanted APT to succeed but had misgivings about its commercial prospects) led to their considering 
a comparative examination of APT and the TGV project; the idea was to look `at the Paris-Lyon 
situation for pointers to the likely outcome of the APT service'.
14
 But this was at a time when the 
French high speed link was only under construction and was not due to open for another four years. 
What was available at the time were results of extensive market research conducted by SNCF and 
scrutinised in depth by French Transport and Finance officials, precisely the kind of data with 
which BR, according to the Department, was not always forthcoming. One government scientist 
thought that administrators `were aware - as indeed we were all aware - there had been market 
studies of the Paris-Lyon route which had not been paralleled in the same way. To put it bluntly, 
SNCF had economists who had done economic studies. British Rail did not have economists and 
was not doing economic studies, and what was wanted I think was ... to try and use the SNCF 
economic studies as a guide.'
15
 
 Discussions of a technical nature had pride of place in French State practice, but not in 
British practice: in the French technico-administrative elite, a great deal of faith attached to 
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technical studies, and there was strong interest for prospective medium to long term studies, whilst 
on the British side, methodologies used in technical studies tended to be found wanting and there 
was a keen awareness of the fine line between the technical and the political. Long term predictions 
were dismissed as too uncertain.
16
 
 In short, appraisal of APT was wholly of a financial nature; as regards the more technical 
and economic aspects, officials relied almost entirely on the judgement of BR.
17
 In France on the 
other hand, appraisal was both financial and economic, and occasionally technical; SNCF claims 
were not taken on trust alone. 
 
(3) Nature of the projects: scientific or engineering pioneers? 
 Two high speed projects were necessary in the UK because one of them (APT) was a 
technological gamble and the other one (HST) served as an `insurance policy', a transitional design; 
only one major project was pursued by SNCF in the conviction that it would rapidly be viable 
technically speaking. This begs the following two-fold question: what made it possible for an 
ambitious, high-risk project such as APT to be approved, then continued in spite of serious 
technical setbacks, all this in a context of financial stringency, whilst SNCF - which enjoyed 
greater autonomy and resources - was `only' allowed a comparatively safe approach based on 
proven technology? In other words, was there something about the French State which enabled it to 
restrain the (presumably) natural, professional ambitions of its railway engineers when British 
central government could not, a situation all the more paradoxical as French engineers were 
apparently so much more influential in the policy process than their British counterparts? And a 
related question was suggested by the comment of a former MoT scientist on the future of tilting 
trains in Britain: `I fear this may become yet another example of the British "disease" of being first 
in with the ideas, but last into operation, buying from overseas.'
18
 What prevented innovative ideas 
from being made operational? 
 We can begin to address this central paradox by examining the professional standings of 
engineers on the one hand, scientists on the other. The prestige of engineers was not very high in 
Britain (see Chapter II),
19
 but that of scientists was significantly greater, stemming from a long 
tradition of scientific experimentation, a duality of status perpetuated by a long history of scientific 
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breakthroughs.
20
 When the APT project was launched, `at that stage the Chief Scientific Adviser 
had a considerable standing'.
21
 One MoT scientist found joining MoT in 1968 `very rewarding in 
that I was very much welcomed by the administrative staff right up to the Under Secretary and even 
to Deputy Secretary level'.
22
 This was not the case with engineers; one former British Minister of 
Transport observed that `Engineers make decisions in France, they occupy places of power. Here 
engineers sit down below the salt ... sit way down the table and speak when they're spoken to!'
23
 
The recourse by BR Research to aeronautics specialists was also significant: in the 1960s, the 
British aircraft industry was the second biggest in the world and the prestige of aeronautics 
engineers/scientists was high. The fact that the APT concept had been initiated by experts from this 
industry strengthened the submission for public funds. Moreover the programme was launched at a 
time when `science-based industry' was being promoted at the highest political level.
24
 
 The APT concept `emerged from a programme of fundamental research into railway 
vehicle dynamics which required the solution of several theoretical problems'; it `was not solely a 
response to a commercial market opportunity'
25
; furthermore the development of the concept itself 
`required a "scientific" approach involving much prior calculation, modelling and simulation, plus 
laboratory and full-scale experimentation' before an attempt could be made at actually producing a 
train.
26
 The BRB Member for Engineering and Research pointed out, `APT is not just another train, 
but the first of a series designed quite literally from first principles'; he also stressed that `this 
fundamental approach takes time, a fact that is well appreciated in the science-based industries and 
is now becoming so in railways.'
27
 APT was viewed as part of the international race between 
scientific nations, a project that scientific advisers to the Wilson Government thought worth 
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supporting to start with:
28
 Labour M.P. Ronald Atkins described APT as an `invention' and wished 
Britain to `reap through exports the rewards of British inventive genius'.
29
 Similarly, the 
Department was aware that APT `was tackled right from first principles ... it was jumps ahead'
30
 
and viewed the new train as `an ingenious solution' in the country with the oldest railway, made up 
of `cheaply and piecemeal-built routes'.
31
 
 The scientific approach of the APT team was not one, however, that could be easily 
comprehended or accepted by managers who had risen through railway ranks from an early age: `In 
the railways', bemoaned a railway scientist, `you could talk to people at quite senior levels ... they 
didn't know what you were talking about, with notable exceptions.'
32
 Transport officials on the 
other hand were more amenable to the scientific approach (which carried more credibility), but 
because they were mostly classically-trained, they had to rely on the judgement of Government 
scientists: `The scientific civil service input to that was to bring to bear the tutored perspective of 
the scientist on the solving of scientific problems' and its influence must have been `considerable' 
because their confidence and judgement convinced DoT to press onward; `To find that their view 
accorded with the layman's appreciation of what he was being told ... their input [was] 
significant.'
33
 
 There was no common technical culture binding together British research scientists, 
railway engineers and civil servants. In France on the other hand, there existed a common, broadly 
technical (though not strictly speaking `scientific') culture both in railway engineering circles and 
in the Administration. TGV exemplified an engineering approach which sought to `stretch' existing 
technology; this approach was favoured both by railway engineers and departmental officials over 
a more innovative one.
34
 TGV engineers have repeatedly stressed that they did not want to make `a 
scientist's train'; whatever check on `natural' engineering ambitions there may have been was 
actually self-imposed. 
 French engineers exercised self-restraint for pragmatic reasons: they were keen to get 
tangible results quickly and were all too aware that rail travel was no longer favoured in high 
places. In both national railways, a fairly cautious approach to technological innovation was 
favoured, because railway engineers wanted something that would work; but in the British case, it 
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was for several years competing with a more adventurous, scientific approach. The research 
scientists' allegiance was mainly to the project itself, the `invention': the `APT project is unusual in 
that it was derived from a research programme ... rather than being a design project to fulfill an 
industry need ... When a group of people are brought together in this way, there is often a strong 
team feeling with loyalties to the project rather than the company.'
35
 French State engineers had a 
strong loyalty to the national railway as a whole. 
 The reasons for SNCF's cautious approach were also partly sociological: there was in 
France in the postwar period an 
  institutional and sociological, cultural and political split which set against each 
other the worlds of intellectuals, scientists and left-wingers on the one hand, and 
of industrialists, the military and the public authorities on the other ... the 
Polytechnique school was on the side of the second pole. Having to provide the 
cadres of the State and firms, it advocated `applications' and national defence but 
was not taken in by the mystique of `pure and disinterested research' then claimed 
as the norm by university lecturers.
36
 
 Unlike the APT researchers, trained in the sciences (in particular physics), TGV engineers 
had mostly been trained at State engineering schools, where the curriculum included transport 
economics. SNCF engineers tended to refer to each other as either `technicians' or `economists', all 
the way to the two Deputy Director Generals, one of whom traditionally represented the technical 
divisions, whilst the other was in charge of more economic and commercial matters.
37
 One railway 
engineer stressed that `We must fulfil the objectives ... not only in technical terms ... but also in 
economic terms. This is the price to be paid for the railway's credibility.'
38
 The TGV team was 
made up both of technicians and economists: `above all we sought to identify the main technical 
elements and the main economic elements and to make explicit the relationship between the two.'
39
 
Therefore TGV's operational speed was determined at a very early stage by SNCF economists on 
the basis of what constituted the economic optimum and was technically achievable. 
  APT's speed, in contrast, was determined by BR scientists solely on the basis of what was 
technically feasible. The APT team focused on technical issues; the interaction between researchers 
and commercial management was so minimal that `to a large extent the design speed arose out of 
the development of [the] suspension design in the first place';
40
 moreover the design speed `was 
                                                 
     
35
 Ledsome (Feb. 1981): p. 106. 
     
36
 Pestre (1994): p. 345. 
     
37
 Interview with former Deputy Director General, SNCF. 
     
38
 La Vie du Rail, 'Spécial TGV' (25/02/1979): p. 9. 
     
39
 Walrave in Jacq and Fourniau (forthcoming, September 1995). 
     
40
 Potter and Roy (1985), p. 23. They also say that `It almost seems as if the design engineers, having 
shown that 250km/h was technically achievable were unwilling to accept anything less, even though no 
commercial case existed at the time for such a speed' (p. 52). 
  
 
 163 
well above anything that the marketing management of BR could evaluate and their eventual 
"design brief" was little more than a modified version of the existing APT specifications!'
41
 Even 
with the most central feature of the project, the commercial side of the railway had very little 
input.
42
 Later, BR commercial models established that in Britain it was not commercially viable to 
run services faster than 225km/h; the drive to produce a 250km/h train was therefore not based on 
economic analysis. BR scientists and engineers, with their specialised training and little or no 
background in transport economics, made the initial judgements regarding initial APT design 
specifications, whereas TGV specifications were the result of interaction between `technical' and 
`economist-engineers'. 
 Until the early 1980s, BR was dominated by specialised engineers in many respects. 
Although it has been argued that `the APT was organised on a multi-discipline project team 
basis',
43
 the team specialists all belonged to scientific/engineering disciplines, unlike the TGV team 
specialists. One official put it succintly: `there was a powerful engineering tradition in BR 
management and a non-existent economic tradition and that's really what the problem was.'
44
 The 
internal shift towards a more market-led business took place at a later stage at BR than it had at 
SNCF, where such a shift was greatly facilitated by the fact that French engineers were already 
versed in economics and management through their broader State-sponsored training. This is 
somewhat ironical as government pressure to make the railways pay for themselves began to be 
applied earlier in the UK (1961) than in France (1969). 
 BR's more adventurous approach was not a handicap however in terms of gaining central 
government approval. It seems that in this respect, BR research engineers and influential sections 
within the Department, together with ministers, shared the same assumptions. The wholly different 
approach to high speed train technology was connected to the fact that TGV was basically an 
SNCF project whereas APT was a joint railway / government programme. Partly this explains why 
the decision-making processes unfolded along such divergent paths. 
 
 B. The projects in terms of decision-making 
 It is also possible to gain an understanding of the British and French referential 
frameworks by comparing the two processes of pioneering technology in terms of policy-making 
dynamics. In both countries in the late 1960s, modernisation and new technology were important 
parts of the political agenda, therefore the more influential state agencies tended to appropriate the 
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more high-tech, prestigious options (Concorde is perhaps the best known example). They were 
willing to embrace technological challenges, MoT with APT in Britain (MinTech with Tracked 
Hovercraft), the powerful DATAR with Aérotrain in France, whilst declining public undertakings 
were anxious to follow relatively safe, `engineering' options, as was MdT, which pursued its 
traditional policy of encouraging existing rail technology to be gradually stretched. APT was 
practically imposed onto a reluctant Railways Board in 1968 by a forward-looking and enterprising 
MoT during the negotiation and passage of the Transport Act, 1968, which was meant to open a 
new era for the railway. MoT officials were highly supportive of the modernisers within BR and 
took a leading role, whilst MdT officials were not immediately convinced by the TGV team and 
subsequently took a supporting role. 
 The above contrast can be explained in terms of two opposed types of innovation, 
`institutional' and `operational', as argued by Jacq.
45
 The first type was promoted by politicians on 
the basis of a new technique that was expected to solve a host of problems and favoured 
spectacular technologies (one entered the domain of political `fiction'); for politicians will tend to 
resort to engineering or scientific `genius'. On the other hand, `operational innovation' concerned 
itself with the more mundane development of a whole system on the basis of existing technologies 
(one explored further the present technological `reality'). The specificity of the TGV project lay 
precisely in that it was almost totally divorced from the world of politics and was developed under 
the aegis of the railway operator and with its own funds, with the discreet support of officials at the 
Railways Division. APT in contrast was a joint BR/MoT project, was directly affected by high 
politics of the day, dependent on funds from government and egged on by Transport officials. 
 In both countries, government approval was only given - or due to be given - after 
successful trials of the new trains; ministers wanted to see concrete results before committing 
themselves to a high speed fleet. But the decisions to go into production did not take place at the 
same stage in the R&D processes. In Britain, the public authorities declined to commit themselves 
to the project in 1973-1974 after the successful experimental APT trials and eventually requested 
that the prototype trains operate successfully in passenger service before taking a decision on the 
production phase, which for DoT was to involve a trial fleet of eight APTs. In France, there was no 
such requirement and in fact no prototype phase: the TGV project moved straight from the 
experimental train phase (TGV001) to the pre-production phase (TGVs 01/02), when the designs 
that had been agreed with manufacturers for the fleet of eighty-five trainsets were thoroughly 
tested. There was both a greater amount of trust in the railway operator and its ability to get private 
industry to deliver, and a greater ability of SNCF to reorientate government policy. 
 As regards outcomes of the decision-making processes, in France the final outcome was 
the approval of the project very much as presented at the outset in 1966. No compromises (albeit a 
great deal of patience) were necessary to reach agreement with the public authorities. The original 
features were not lost in the maze of negotiations, appraisals, and expert opinions because railway 
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managers and engineers had built a very strong case drawing partly on themes that the State was 
then favouring. In Britain, the original objective was lost sight of during the decision-making 
process; the final outcome in 1984 was the abandonment by the BRB of significantly higher speeds 
as a goal. Although the design of APT was found to be basically sound by the independent Ford & 
Dain reports in 1982, BR was not allowed the time to iron out the remaining technical difficulties. 
This was essentially due to a lack of agreement on the means to attain common objective between 
BR and central government and to the fact that either political will or Treasury strictures could 
relatively easily overrule railway management or Transport officials. The abandonment of the High 
Speed Policy was all the more striking as senior figures in the Department had hoped that APT 
would represent a new departure: `That was certainly the way I wanted to develop the policy. I was 
terribly anxious that British Rail should "take off".'
46
 
 The French railways obtained the outcome which they favoured not because they could 
impose it forcefully, but because they were able to win over crucial decision-makers one by one, 
starting with their sponsoring ministry, and this for three reasons. The British railways eventually 
failed to have their high speed policy validated, even though they had strong departmental backing 
for most of the life of the project. There were also three reasons for this state of things. I would 
now like to analyse all these reasons in turn, as comparatively as the subject will allow. 
 Firstly, SNCF presented their case in terms that were rationally unassailable within the 
existing referential framework, using methodologies developed within ministerial agencies (CBA). 
BR for its part sought to present the APT project in terms that would chime with governmental 
concerns, but ultimately the case for it could only be fully developed by including non-financial 
criteria; these however were not consistent with a referential framework that was dominated by 
short-term public spending considerations, and were not viewed as legitimate. Also network 
benefits could have been emphasised but such a comprehensive approach to appraisal ran against 
incremental practices. The case for APT was thus truncated and not as convincing at it potentially 
could have been. Moreover, DoT was not fully convinced of the validity of the railway's 
forecasting techniques and considered that the BRB were not very forthcoming about their 
methodology.
47
 Partly for this reason, the Department felt unable to give their full backing to the 
Board's commercial plans and in 1977 requested more time from the Secretary of State as regards 
the decision to go into series production; it was not a question of bad will on the part of the 
Department (for the project was backed at very senior official level during the prototype phase) but 
rather of a feeling of uneasiness, which had no equivalent on the French side. 
 Potter and Roy have argued that `the case for evaluating state transport investments on a 
systems basis, evaluating the overall effect upon the ease of travel, efficiency in the economy, 
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energy consumption etc., is intellectually strong.'
48
 This would account for this approach's appeal to 
French policy-makers, who will tend to look for `best' solutions with a strong rational basis; and 
once a `best' option has been adopted, it will be adhered to through thick and thin precisely because 
it is perceived (or at the very least portrayed) as the most rational one. On the British side, there 
were too many competing constraints for a strong case to be made: political and financial 
imperatives meant that a sustained, well-funded R&D programme could not be legitimated over a 
long period of time. One BR Chief Engineer remarked that British decision-making was too 
`emotional' whereas French decision-making appeared to him to be more `logical'.
49
 A BR scientist 
stressed the idea that the APT concept had had to be `sold' to decision-makers in order to attract 
funding, and `to that extent, it was oversold right at the beginning.'
50
 The (political) bargaining 
between British railway undertaking and central government was conducted in a mode of 
persuasion, whereas discussions between French railways and State officials were highly technical 
or economic right from the start. 
 Secondly, SNCF pursued their objectives - which they had defined themselves - with sheer 
determination and persistence, with negligible internal opposition; and the fact that the turnover of 
personnel involved in the project was low made continuous lobbying more effective. On the other 
hand, the ranks of BR engineers and the Board were divided over the need for APT; the project did 
not act as a focal point for lobbying action and much of the original impetus was thus lost; in 1968 
the Board was unwilling to commit itself to a high-risk project and was coerced into supporting it 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s by a Department that had the power and the will to do so. 
 Thirdly, SNCF senior management enjoyed privileged access to the State apparatus 
through their President, Ségalat, and at lower levels by virtue of belonging to a fairly integrated 
elite that span public and private industry, the civil service and political circles. The `bridges' 
between administrative, political and technical elites mentioned by one respondent were part of a 
tradition which had a two-fold effect: it facilitated decision-making by maintaining close 
professional contacts and spreading new ideas between all interested parties; and it made it possible 
to mobilise key actors when the need arose. In Britain, the arm's length relationship between public 
corporation and sponsor ministry, together with the disparate nature of the administrative, political 
and technical elites, made it all the more difficult for new transport concepts to circulate among 
decision-makers and for a common understanding of the issues to emerge. As a result, BR 
remained throughout the decision-making process in a position that required repeated 
compromises, and eventually the BRB's half-hearted commitment to a high speed policy was 
dropped in 1984 when departmental backing for it had all but disappeared. By the early 1980s 
SNCF had moved from a position of relative weakness to one of relative strength. As the next 
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chapter will show, by 1993 BR had not at all improved its bargaining power in transport policy-
making circles. 
 
C. Substantivist v. procedural approaches 
 Padioleau, building on the work of Mongin, contends that public action can be of two basic 
kinds: either substantive or pragmatic.
51
 `Substantive' public action revolves around the following 
features: `professional corps of civil servants ... guided by the long term'; normative principles 
(such as the respect of citizens equality) which directly regulate policy content; resources in terms 
of authority, financial and technical means; production - often directly - of tangible policy objects 
(such as rules, plans, infrastructures, community amenities); the use of `legal, technical and 
scientific reasoning allowing the discovery of the common good, or if one prefers, the general 
interest of potential public actions.' To sum up, it claims to be `rational, voluntarist, formalist, 
coherent and comprehensive.' Furthermore, `the actors agree on the substance of the objectives of 
action and on modes of implementation', belonging as they do to a homogeneous community of 
beliefs and interests. Substantivist policy-making relies heavily on the perception of a broad 
consensus and can blossom in  a stable - or very nearly stable - environment. It requires from 
policy-makers the feeling that they are working in a known and controllable universe, that 
problems can be precisely delimited and that optimal solutions are available through the application 
of technical and scientific resources. Such a stable and knoweable world was felt to be in existence 
in the late 1960s, the tail end of the trente glorieuses period of economic growth and social 
progress in France.
52
 
 `Pragmatic' policy-making is, in Padioleau's view, a great deal more prone to disorderly 
compromise, relies on procedural rules to regulate the relationships between actors, and 
implementation does not necessarily conform to original plans. It takes place in a turbulent 
environment devoid of certainties and replete with anxiety. In such an unknoweable - because ever 
changing - world, technical studies are worth little; no methodology is felt to be sophisticated 
enough to deal adequately with issues; more studies are always needed, data always insufficient. 
The focus is on inadequate procedures (methodological tools) rather than on substantive policy 
objectives. With this approach, public action is contingent and success always in doubt (one could 
add that this approach is essentially sceptical). Consensus is not a given, but has to be built up, 
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which is where procedural matters become all important: all parties must be satisfied that they can 
have their say and frank discussion of contradictory interests has to take place in order to enable the 
emergence of a collective settlement. Electoral pressures play a prominent role. The issues at stake 
are not susceptible to `solutions' but can only be settled by accommodating conflicting viewpoints; 
as a result, settlements are always of a fragile nature and may soon be disrupted. 
 To sum up, whereas in the substantive approach the single, overarching common good is 
equated with policy content, the pragmatic approach sees the common good as an outcome of 
procedures involving legitimate debate. As a result, the latter is greatly concerned with the 
formulation of rules allowing divergent interests to act together as far as is possible, and the 
existence of public, debating institutions that can produce collective agreement and eventually 
action (at one end of the spectrum, Parliament and its heavy emphasis on matters of procedure, at 
the other `Question Time'-format programmes on radio and television involving ordinary people 
and/or generalists - not experts - engaging in open debate). Pragmatic public action is essentially 
pluralist and bases itself on principles (e.g. `due process'), whereas substantivist policy rests on 
concepts (e.g. `general interest'). The substantive policy-maker is essentially a decision-maker 
basing decisions on reason and imposing them if need be with the backing of hierarchical authority; 
in the pragmatic case, he/she also has to plead a case and use persuasion, which will win others to 
the cause. 
 The term `pragmatic' is not wholly suitable for our purposes: the substantivist approach 
displays a great deal of pragmatism inasmuch as it cares little about the means, as long as they 
achieve the desired policy objectives. Padioleau's pragmatic approach is only pragmatic within its 
own conceptual universe, which posits the collective reconciliation of divergent views as desirable; 
but this in essence is a procedural concern and I will henceforth refer to this approach as 
`procedural'. 
 I established that financial constraints and political imperatives were prominent in the 
British referential framework, whereas technical and broad socio-economic preoccupations 
informed the French referential framework. Financial matters may be considered matters of 
procedure, that is funds have to be used in the way agreed at the outset, using fixed, established 
means; projects have to conform to set financial objectives (Required Rate of Return) irrespective 
of their nature; Treasury financial orthodoxy dictates that public enterprises be funded either 
publicly or through internal revenue. And politics on the Westminster model relies heavily on 
procedural rules and on the conduct of proper debate, with a heavy emphasis on the way decisions 
are made and on accountability. Technical matters on the other hand are matters of substance, that 
is to say a substantial product results directly from technical choices, which can be discussed and 
changed as the project progresses. Similarly the socio-economic approach is concerned directly 
with the impact of decisions and not at all with the way they are arrived at. My contention is that 
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the British referential framework was basically procedural, whereas its French counterpart tended 
to be substantivist.
53
 
 In this light we can understand the fact that SNCF's original plans were eventually 
implemented in full and with only some minor modifications, whereas BR's were gradually altered 
beyond recognition. Solutions in Britain were chosen because they were `satisfactory' to all 
concerned rather than because they obeyed a strong internal logic. Striking examples of the need 
for accommodation were provided by two former Transport officials. The first one explained the 
two-year delay between BR's proposal for APT R&D and its approval by government: `it just got 
lost in the system and probably on the basis of the sort of minimal questioning ...: "Is this a 
reasonable proportion of your research budget? And is that in turn a useful proportion of your total 
spend?" ... It was going through the motions really, in order to say "Well you know we did look at 
it"';
54
 the second official defined the basis of the Treasury's philosophy: `The argument that I had to 
make was getting a fair share of the cake'.
55
 Now `reasonable proportions' and `fair shares' are 
somewhat subjective matters (even matters of precedent) that do not necessarily correspond to 
objective needs. It did not matter that funds were not needed at a particular time in a given area, 
`powdering up' was necessary, as a former Minister put it: `You have a certain sum of money, then 
there's a whole lot of people sitting around the table and there's a share out! Nobody's powerful 
enough to say "Well you're not gonna get anything!" ... the system doesn't work'.
56
 In the 
(Conservative) Minister's mind, this was due to public ownership, which was about little more than 
`dishing out money'. The French conception was that you should rank projects in order of merit, 
using CBA for instance, in order to focus investment where it was felt to be needed and to achieve 
priority objectives; effectiveness was more important than the satisfaction of all interested parties. 
Thus the fleet size put forward by BR (sixty) was a major bone of contention with DoT, whereas 
SNCF's submission for eighty-five TGVs was approved without a hint of acrimony. 
 The distinction between `procedure' and `substance' also casts an interesting light on the 
public / private spheres divide in the British and French referential frameworks. In Britain, railway 
nationalisation had been very comprehensive, deliberately including both the operating and 
manufacturing arms of the railway companies; as a result, both the operation of rail services and 
the manufacturing of railway equipment were in the hands of BR, as if the whole rail sector had to 
be a public `monolith'. In France, a sizeable private industry worked in tandem with the operator, 
SNCF; a situation of mixed private-public partnership prevailed. In fact, 49 % of SNCF was 
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actually privately-owned until 1983 but this was felt to be a non-issue since the State detained the 
majority stake. As a result of these divergent configurations, APT was designed, built and financed 
by public means and organisations (the only exception being some private sub-contracting by BR), 
whilst TGV was designed by the national railway, built by private companies and financed both 
through SNCF's research and investment budgets, and through private loans. 
 In fact, the combination of public and private resources can be viewed as a characteristic 
feature of French grands projets: they are `fully successful because the State pursues a policy of 
offensive protectionism, because it prefinances industrial development, transfers the results of 
public research, provides outlets through public procurement, enables the writing off of investment 
through long production runs, makes development easier by putting the means of the regal State at 
the disposal of the national champion, whether public or private.'
57
 There was no sign of State 
predilection for public firms: what mattered was the technological objective, not the channels 
through which it was to be achieved. The other distinguishing feature of a grand projet is that it is 
part of a national strategy in a given sector. In the TGV case, the strategy was to make the railway 
an efficient component of a truly competitive transport sector. 
 Similarly, the positive embrace of CBA within the framework of the French case study was 
an instance of the substantive approach, and the preference for MCA in the British one was 
symptomatic of the procedural approach, and this not just at departmental level. Peter Parker 
objected to CBA because it posited that there is a single, best solution, whereas `in sectors such as 
transport ... there are often several objectives in potential conflict'; furthermore, choices in transport 
spending `should be quantified as far as possible (and no further).'
58
 This contrasted with the 
French drive to quantify as many variables as could be managed in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
support for CBA on the grounds that it would be the best available way to obtain the highest 
returns for the community in the broadest sense. Parker supported MCA, as suggested by the Leitch 
Committee,
59
 `where the interests of the banker (Government), the transport user, those who have 
to live or work alongside the road or railways, people concerned with indirect effects and those 
interested in the impact on things of intrinsic worth are all explicitly recognised and the effects of 
the scheme on them as individuals or groups quantified as far as possible.' In his view it was 
essential that all interested parties should have a say and `that various choices in spending within 
the transport sector should be freely exposed to public debate ... In a word, then, more 
accountability.' This approach clearly bore the imprint of the democratic ideal, and stood at odds 
with the French technocratic approach, which favoured `rational' decisions taken by State-trained 
professionals at the service of the Nation. 
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Conclusion 
 Project C03 was an engineering project dominated in equal measures by economic and 
technical considerations whereas APT was a scientific project labouring under strong financial 
constraints and wholly dependent on political goodwill. Even among the APT engineers at an early 
stage, it is clear that financing was a constant preoccupation. In France on the other hand, such a 
preoccupation was conspicuous by its absence; there was almost a sort of distaste for financing 
matters, as though once a goal had been established as legitimate, means should effortlessly  be 
found. Which is to say that policy substance was paramount. The higher status within policy elites, 
of science in Britain and of engineering in France, was also an instance of the procedural / 
substantive divide. The scientific approach is nothing if not based on proper scientific procedures 
(cf. the `experimental method'); the focus is on methodology; moreover the outcome of 
fundamental scientific research can never be predicted confidently and serendipity is elevated to a 
principle of action. Engineering on the other hand is heavily object-driven; it is sometimes the case 
that a technical device works and is used although the engineer lacks a full understanding of 
exactly why it does. The focus is on technical efficiency. 
 As regards relations between railway and state, one finds strongly differentiated elements 
of trust throughout the two case studies: throughout the R&D of APT, there was an almost total 
absence of full-scale, external economic and technical audits, which is particularly striking when 
one notes that the economics of the TGV project were thoroughly scrutinised twice in the space of 
four years,
60
 that IRT and the MdT's safety engineer had their say on the engineering side, and that 
SNCF carried a deliberate and intensive policy of demonstration runs for V.I.P.s designed to prove 
their technical prowess. In the technical field, SNCF had to prove itself to some extent, whilst BR 
Research was left to `get on with it'. As regards funding however, SNCF appears to have enjoyed 
an amount of trust (with wide room for maneuvre within its allocated budget) which was denied 
BR Research, whose budget was defined down to relatively small items. Thus the relationship 
between British Transport Ministry and railway undertaking was arm's length only as regards 
technical aspects and until the late 1970s also as regards economic aspects. But when it came to 
financial oversight the relationship was very close indeed. 
 Today the use of tilting trains is rapidly increasing in Europe. Some have argued that a 
second phase of fast train development is beginning to emerge, which has a potentially greater 
impact than the first phase (building dedicated high speed tracks) because tilting trains have much 
wider applicability (they can be used on secondary, regional lines, as well as main trunk lines).
61
 In 
this light, BR Research's innovative project based on APT was sound; but it did not fit in the time 
frame of British policy-making. The mismatch between industrial and central government practices 
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was fatal to the project.
62
 SNCF's innovative strategy was successful partly because it could be 
accommodated within the referential framework of French public policy-making; there were 
enough commonalities between railway operator and State practices. 
 The British and French high speed train policies were informed, ultimately, by two 
different sets of dominant conceptions: in Britain, the dominant politico/financial rationality meant 
that the project had to conform to expectations of high financial returns for a minimal amount of 
investment and that ministerial action foiled it in the mid-1980s (political decision to alter the inter-
city transport market). Political and financial imperatives did not necessarily point in the same 
direction (hence the use of a slash). In France, what Fourniau has called a `technico-economic 
rationality' meant that a united front of railway chiefs and Transport officials was able to convince 
officials from the Finance Ministry, together with politicians, that TGV, although relatively 
expensive, was sound in wider economic terms. Technical and economic imperatives were in 
practice mutually reinforcing (hence the use of a hyphen). The British politico/financial rationality 
went hand in hand with a procedural approach whilst the French technico-economic rationality was 
the expression of a more substantivist philosophy of public action. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
 PIONEERING HIGH SPEED RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (1965-1993) 
 
 It is today argued that `The unprecedented growth in road and air traffic during the 1970s 
and 1980s has in fact improved the environment for high speed trains.'
1
 SNCF was able to make the 
most of the opportunity, with for instance its passenger traffic on the Paris - South-East axis 
increasing by 81% between 1980-1989.
2
 BR on the other hand ceased to view much higher speeds 
as a policy priority on the main trunk lines from the mid-1980s, when the APT project was shelved. 
The rationale behind APT - avoiding the construction of new track - was proved to have been 
correct when BR faced severe difficulties as they set in motion schemes for new, high speed 
infrastructure between London and the Channel Tunnel. 
 This chapter begins with a section on the high speed line (LGV, or Ligne à Grande 
Vitesse) built between Paris and Lyon following successful tests of TGV and which was designed 
specifically to carry TGV services. This follows up the TGV case study, focusing on the 
infrastructural dimension of Project C03. As pointed out earlier, the separation between train and 
track which I have made runs counter to the logic of Project C03, an integrated train/track project, 
but is a necessity imposed by the British case studies, in which improvement of rolling stock and of 
permanent way were divorced from each other. The section on LGV develops the economic 
dimension of Project C03, which was of necessity only briefly touched upon in the preceding 
chapter. The second part of this chapter deals with attempts by the British Railways Board to 
obtain approval for a high speed link between the Channel and London, first in the early 1970s, 
then from 1987. Comparative analysis follows, highlighting the main differences between the 
referential frameworks of public policy in the two countries. As in Chapter III, interviews with 
policy-makers have provided a great deal of material, which has been incorporated mostly without 
being qualified but should not be treated by the reader as proven fact. 
 
1. TGV - SOUTH EAST: THE FRENCH STATE IN ACTION (1969-1978) 
 The favourable decision regarding the construction of a new (the first new line since the 
late 1920s), radically improved rail link, when cheaper, piecemeal alternatives were available, and 
had been studied, is all the more surprising. It is a testimony to the power of technical and 
administrative elites to convince at best indifferent politicians of the necessity of an ambitious 
project. The decision-making process regarding the new line officially began in 1969; by 1978, it 
can be said that the project could no longer be curtailed, although in the meantime it had nearly 
come to a halt on several occasions.  
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 The new line dramatically increased the quality of services on what was already SNCF's 
main trunk line: between Paris and Dijon/South-East, there were in 1970 a dozen daytime services, 
and many night trains; with TGV about fifty services on `ordinary' days, rising to seventy on 
Fridays, were scheduled from the opening.
3
 
  
A. Political fortunes 
(1) Thinking in terms of new infrastructure  
 There was a great deal of opposition to SNCF's high speed plans from DATAR, who 
backed Aérotrain and the idea of a Paris-Lyon hoverline. Once this idea had been abandoned, 
DATAR argued that SNCF's project for a new Paris-Lyon rail infrastructure ran counter to 
principles of regional planning; it would turn Lyon into a suburb of Paris and further reinforce the 
already bloated capital. But this argument was hardly convincing and ironically, it was DATAR 
which `focused interest in working on high speeds and encouraged a more aggressive style in the 
nationalised company.'
4
 Thanks to Aérotrain, the concept of building new infrastructure could not 
`logically' be dismissed out of hand. Also, `Bertin brought the idea of a specialised line ... Another 
idea that Bertin brought was the separation between passenger and freight traffics, which internally 
we would not have dared to do right from the start'; and he stressed the importance of speed and 
frequency.
5
 All these features of the future TGV services were thus legitimated at the outset by 
virtue of their having been seriously examined by some State agencies in connection with the 
Hovertrain. There was one positive element in the political context of the mid-1960s: `generally 
speaking, the public authorities considered that there were prospects for the development of land 
transport for passengers. ... There was a sort of national consensus on the development of land 
transport.'
6
 
 In May 1968, an internal SNCF report on the proposed new line was drafted, leading to the 
first official contacts on the matter between SNCF and the Minister of Transport, Jean Chamant, in 
August 1968; in his letter of 30 August to the Minister, SNCF's President also presented the new, 
more commercial direction SNCF was taking. The presence of these two items in the same letter 
was not fortuitous; a new, high speed line was presented by SNCF as being the best, maybe the 
only way, to modernise its lacklustre image, and to become a more profitable concern. From then 
on, the Paris-Lyon project was presented as a token of SNCF's willingness to become more 
commercial. 
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(2) Political phases: from indifference (1969-1971; 1971-1975) to intervention (1975) 
 At the very beginning, MdT reacted `very badly' to SNCF's proposals but after a while, `It 
seemed to us ... that this was SNCF's true vocation at the close of the century. ... The first economic 
intuitions ... showed us that there was a sizeable market.'
7
 The appraisal studies soon carried out by 
official working groups also convinced Transport officials that SNCF had a good case. 
 The first step in the policy process was for SNCF to get its project included in the VIth 
National Plan: in December 1969, a working group chaired by Roger Coquand began to examine 
the project within the framework of the VIth Plan preparatory studies. The report by the Coquand 
Group was submitted in December 1970 (Etudes de transports terrestres à grande vitesse sur l'axe 
Paris-Sud-Est); it was broadly in favour of the new line, having counter-checked the detailed 
figures put forward by SNCF. It was on the basis of this report that the transport committee of the 
Planning Commission adopted P-S-E as `priority action No 4'.
8
 This favourable decision, according 
to a former DTT official, was not overly difficult to obtain because `we managed to convince a fair 
number of people, well the Minister, and the Planning Commission too, that SNCF's work was 
reliable.'
9
 
 This decision was not universally popular: two months after the Coquand Report was 
submitted, a complement to it was released, which established a linkage between the construction 
of the new line and the saturation of the old one (forecast for 1978). Such a clear linkage had not 
been part of the original report, which had considered the project on its other merits. The effect of 
the linkage was to lengthen the timetable leading up to the opening of the line. It was a direct result 
from pressure exercised by Finance, whose position was to question the urgency of the project: 
they considered it a `still premature project' and proposed `that its realisation be postponed to the 
VIIth Plan'.
10
 Thus the new line could now hardly be considered a `priority action'. 
 The next stage of the decision-making process was a decisive one, but fell short of the 
railway managers' expectations. On 25 March 1971, a Conseil restreint chaired by Pompidou 
approved the Paris-Lyon initiative in principle but also linked the construction of the new line to 
the saturation of the existing one. It was reported that several ministers had objected to the project: 
the Finance Minister (Giscard d'Estaing) `demanded that the national undertaking "absorb its 
deficit before launching such an ambitious programme"'; the Minister of Works (Guichard) 
considered that the Rhin-Rhône canal was more important; the Mayor of Dijon and Environment 
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Minister (Poujade) requested a different route in order to preserve the economic and environmental 
interests of Burgundy; finally DATAR `was particularly critical of "that rich country's project".'
11
 
With this `in principle' decision, SNCF was allowed to continue planning for the new line, but was 
given no specific commitments. In an annex to the law approving the VIth Plan, the prospect of P-
S-E was simply mentioned.
12
 
 The second political phase (1971-1974) was fraught with difficulties and the years 1972-
1974 have even been called `a time in the wilderness'.
13
 Three years elapsed between the decision 
`in principle' and the decision to go ahead proper. 1973 began with an apparent setback for SNCF: 
on 27 April, the FDES' Committee No 8 was asked by the Finance Minister to set up a working 
group in order to bring up to date the various data; Paul Le Vert was to chair it.
14
 He was, like the 
chair of the previous group that had examined the project (Coquand), a P&C engineer; he had held 
a number of government posts in the transport sector, both in France and abroad. His appointment 
as the chair of a Finance committee may have been prompted by the fact that in 1967, he had been 
instructed by the then Transport Minister, Pisani, to follow up SNCF's projects concerning high 
speed travel and that he had concluded in his Report that high speed was an attractive idea but was 
too costly. This time however, he was progressively convinced by SNCF's economic arguments: in 
July 1973, the Le Vert Report was published, updating the Coquand Report and recommending the 
opening of the line in 1980. Internal governmental opposition to the project continued unabated: 
between November 1973 and March 1974, a parastatal engineering consultant, BCEOM, examined 
it at the request of DATAR but confirmed the conclusions of the Le Vert Report. 
 One official heavily emphasised the point that, in March 1974, the energy crisis had been 
used by French policy-makers to carry through the LGV decision, along with one or two other 
difficult measures; international events were used to buttress projects that lacked support, both 
within the government and within public opinion.
15
 The March 1974 decision was also the product 
of intensive lobbying by SNCF. President Pompidou, a well-known car enthusiast, was won over to 
the idea, partly thanks to the close personal links between himself and SNCF's President, Ségalat 
(which dated back to the days when they were both members of the Conseil d'Etat) and partly 
because he was `modernity-conscious'.
16
 He decided to approve the link against the wishes of the 
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Finance Minister and of the Treasury Directorate, and with the passive support of the Prime 
Minister (Messmer).
17
 The manner in which the decision was taken was characteristic of the 
French policy process. The Energy Delegate, Blancard, agreed with President Ségalat that he 
would seek 
  to get [Paris-Lyon] approved by the committee, although the connection with 
energy was somewhat limited. ... The committee meeting lasted three hours ... At 
the very end of it, I made a brief presentation of the TGV's advantages, which by 
connecting Paris and Lyon in two hours would lead many travellers to leave their 
cars, to the benefit of rail. M. Messmer, whom I had forewarned in an aside, gave 
his agreement which the President immediately confirmed. There was no debate 
and the decision was recorded in the annex to the minutes.
18
 
This decision was one of the very last that Pompidou took before his death. He was succeeded by 
the Finance Minister, Giscard d'Estaing. 
 Even after the March 1974 decision, the project was not entirely secure for the new 
President of the Republic, who had opposed it whilst he was a Minister, continued to hold the same 
attitude and politicians in 1974 `generally did not favour the project. Mr Giscard d'Estaing was 
believed not to be in favour of TGV, and ... the Interior Minister ... Mr Poniatowski, was also not 
very much in favour of TGV. And in fact the question arose at that time of knowing whether some 
people would dispute the decision on TGV'.
19
 Following a phase during which ministerial 
indifference had prevailed and government input had been reduced to agreeing to a project devised 
without its initial backing, a political intervention took place in 1975 following SNCF President 
Ségalat's retirement. 
 His successor, Jacques Pélissier (formerly Prime Minister Chirac's Directeur de Cabinet), 
took up his post in September 1975 and was immediately made to understand by the new President 
of the Republic that the project (which still required a DUP Decree) should be quietly dropped.
20
 
Giscard d'Estaing saw as a transport priority the extension of the motorway network (accordingly 
on 29 November 1975, the Planning Council launched a 1.800kms motorway-building 
programme.)
21
 Furthermore, `he held such a deep distrust towards the railway corps that he might 
have preferred more brutal methods to reduce SNCF to far more modest activities.'
22
 Yet Pélissier 
did not cancel the project and that same month for the first time the government committed itself 
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publicly to constructing the line. Prime Minister Chirac's Economic Revival Plan constituted a 
milestone in the project's fortunes: `There, the Budget Directorate pressed hard for TGV to be one 
of the elements ... of the reflationary policy. And at that time, as the government were looking for 
many projects to be implemented, and as there were fewer possible projects than what they planned 
to spend ... there the government for the first time explicitly, totally accepted TGV and even 
decided that its completion should be speeded up.'
23
 
 The events of autumn 1975 raise an interesting point: SNCF could not be enjoined to drop 
the programme publicly in the first instance, firstly because it would have represented a policy U-
turn; secondly because an alliance formed by the Prime Minister, the Transport Minister and 
possibly the Finance Minister,
24
 together with the SNCF President were able to ignore the President 
of the Republic's wishes.
25
 Furthermore the project was far advanced. It follows that even the 
highest political authority was relatively powerless in the presence of a project with some 
ministerial support, itself the product of administrative and technical pressure. 
 But the story did not end there because, a former Minister recalls, `When we launched 
TGV we had many criticisms within our majority ... There were big debates in the Council of 
Ministers, saying "You are completely mad to go for this fad of SNCF technocrats, of engineers ... 
whereas if you used this money to speed up electrification, to buy modern rolling stock ... you 
would get a far stronger public impact than with your new line, which will be reserved to a small 
elite" ... there was a lot of political resistance.'
26
 There had been in autumn 1976 suggestions within 
government circles that only part of the new line ought to be opened (those sections that would 
relieve the existing bottleneck) and that the new line would therefore not go all the way to Lyon, or 
even that it should be called off entirely. In response to these suggestions, DTT pointed out that 
calling the programme into question would have a number of adverse economic, financial and 
political consequences, far greater than the benefits, which would only be short-term financial 
ones.
27
 
 The political intervention in 1975 did not succeed in thwarting the project; like Finance's 
resistance, it simply delayed its completion. Given the prevailing indifference, not to say outright 
hostility, on the part of most politicians, how could the project be approved by government 
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eventually? It was partly owing to the fact that SNCF managed to overcome ministerial scepticism 
by making use of several potent logics which politicians could not reprove, to which we now turn. 
 
(3) Political rationales 
 In some ways, the political attempts to restrict railway development in the late 1970s were 
paradoxical, for railway transport had been widely perceived, both on the Left and the Right, as `an 
essential element of urban and industrial development'.
28
 At MdT in the late 1960s, according to 
one official, administrators `were well aware that one way of saving the railway system was to turn 
it towards a high speed service'.
29
 The studies carried out by SAEI, and later by Le Vert in the 
1960s convinced both the Director of DTT and his deputy that within the network existed a 
valuable core; `there was something that was profitable, that ought to be preserved and to which 
[the railway] should be reduced ... be preserved and even if possible be improved, hence the idea of 
improving it through high speeds.'
30
 As early as February 1969, the Minister's Directeur de cabinet 
pointed out that the strength of the railway lay on main trunk lines and their major branches, where 
it could make the most of `large passenger flows, high speeds and frequencies'.
31
 The rationale for a 
new line according to the Transport Minister was as follows: the best policy to balance SNCF's 
books by 1974 was to develop profitable sectors and `The implementation of the project that has 
been put forward appears to extend and assert this policy.'
32
 
 This commercial rationale came up against the regional development rationale propounded 
by DATAR: throughout the 1970s, `one of the things that had aroused the most hostility towards 
TGV was that it reinforced the pull of the east and the south-east of France and that it created an 
imbalance in terms of regional planning, which was then very fashionable';
33
 DATAR's view was 
that `The construction of the new turbotrain line comes on top of a whole series of amenities ... 
concerning Lyon and the South-East ... an infrastructure drive is essential for our Atlantic regions 
to make up for their backwardness in amenities.'
34
 The Prime Minister (Chaban-Delmas) was 
sensitive to this argument and held `a similar reservation' as Lyon was already to benefit from other 
large investments; he argued that `The imbalance thus created in favour of Lyon may cause 
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difficulties at the political level.'
35
 DATAR felt that the research carried out by the Coquand Group 
had only dealt with `the "transport" aspects of the TGV project, without attempting to measure the 
implications for regional planning policy'.
36
 
 Clearly the Paris-Lyon line did not conform to the balanced national development ethos of 
ministers. SNCF did try all the same to borrow elements from DATAR's discourse and to present 
the project as `an instrument of regional planning' and an `instrument of decentralisation' which 
could be used to `strengthen the influence of regional capitals and stimulate the expansion and 
attractiveness of medium-sized towns within their economic sphere.'
37
 Thus at the launch of Project 
C03, the new rail link was called `Paris-Lyon' but very soon SNCF realised that if it wanted to 
emphasise network effects in the economic case it put to the government, a better name would be 
`Paris-South East', which implied that connections were improved not just between two cities, but 
between two main economic regions. The full title of the first official SNCF report presented to the 
government, Chemin de fer et aménagement du territoire. Desserte du Sud-Est de la France à 
grande vitesse et fréquence élevée au moyen d'une ligne nouvelle Paris-Lyon (Nov. 1969), 
demonstrated SNCF's awareness of the political context. A measure of SNCF's success was that by 
1976 the Transport Minister used the same argument in a debate at the Senate: `I do stress this 
point ... we are not talking about a link between the Paris region and the Lyon region, but about a 
link which involves the whole of the South-East of France, which will then be served in shorter 
times'; the Minister of Works made the same point in the ensuing debate.
38
 
 The project did not fit in with the government's transport priorities either: `Whatever the 
worthiness of the project studied by SNCF, the initiation of this operation during the VIth Plan 
would not follow the sequence that has been established as regards transport, at the forefront of 
which has been placed the improvement of transport means within large urban conurbations or 
between those conurbations and their periphery. From this point of view, it would be appropriate to 
postpone the investment concerned.'
39
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 Since LGV did not conform to the political agenda and many viewed the railway as 
outdated, why did some people think that it should be helped to survive? From all accounts,
40
 the 
national railway enterprise was feared because of its socio-economic weight, not least because of 
the large workforce it represented and the ever-present possibility of social unrest: `In 1970, not 
everyone liked SNCF, but at least everyone was scared of it. It was a considerable economic force 
and an even more considerable technical force, so much so that when SNCF decided to make the 
TGV, they could perhaps have said no but it would have been tricky.'
41
 One official considered that 
`One could not think that it was the end because we had 500,000 railway workers on our hands and 
no government could explain to 500,000 railway workers that their profession was dead. ... 
Admittedly, the preservation of our system cost us dearly, but at least it is of use!'
42
 The 
preservation of social peace ranked higher than financial stringency in the referential framework. 
When the project was called into question in late 1976, DTT was quick to point out, apart from the 
self-evident transport-centred arguments and those concerning financial implications, that a 
cancellation would provoke a `"blocking" reaction of the personnel of all grades and all affiliations, 
which considers the decision approving TGV as the only government decision embodying its 
declarations of principle favouring public transport and giving it confidence in its future'; the deep 
malaise flowing from such a decision could lead to `protest movements such as striking, and in any 
case to "demobilisation" likely to hinder any improvement in SNCF's situation.'
43
 
 Also, and much to its advantage, Project C03 was closely linked from an early stage to a 
particularly prominent concern in French post-war public policy: the modernisation of the public 
sector, itself part of a wider drive to modernise and internationalise French industry. Modernisation 
was viewed as indissolubly linked to increased competitiveness: SNCF should no longer be 
protected from its competitors, as in the past, but should seek to become a dynamic component of a 
competitive transport sector. The Planning Commission's report on inland transport of 1971 
established a clear link between the reform of SNCF and the need for a large investment 
programme, for modernisation was not synonymous with cutbacks.
44
 One Transport official 
stressed that `the project is considered, with good reason, as very significant in terms of the 
willingness to modernise SNCF.'
45
 Within SNCF itself, it was felt that the railway had to modernise 
in order to remain competitive: `The design of TGV was related to a policy of railway 
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modernisation.'
46
 Discussing the fact that eighty-five TGVs were to be ordered the Transport 
Minister pointed out that `Although focused over a narrow period of time, this order is part of the 
usual orders that SNCF must put in in order to continue with the modernisation of its rolling 
stock.'
47
 The Works Minister for his part asked the senators not to `centre [their] attention on TGV. 
It is not a revolution ... it is simply the modern answer put forward by a national undertaking 
legitimately wishing to improve operations'.
48
 
 The need to modernise public sector firms was also discussed by a number of public sector 
figures, for instance Roger Guibert (SNCF DG), one of the theorists of a competitive railway, and 
by railway economist Roger Hutter (SNCF Deputy DG), which rejuvenated the conception of 
public service.
49
 It is no accident that the development of Project C03 started at the same time as 
the setting up of a new marketing research unit on 1 January 1967. Guibert was behind the setting 
up of both the Research and the Marketing Departments, each of which symbolised a new approach 
to public sector management. Thus TGV was meant to embody SNCF's new emphasis on offering 
competitive services within the public sector. 
 Modernisation of the railway along commercial lines did not mean that the sector ought to 
be totally deregulated or that the railways should receive fewer State funds, but simply that they 
ought to break even. The railways remained a `public service' and continued to embody a number 
of public service principles. One such principle was equality of users; the new service was to be 
priced on the same basic tariff, and to allow the same discounts, as conventional services, `although 
the new line brings a very sizeable improvement in service'.
50
 This argument was stressed at the 
ministerial level in March 1971, just prior to the decision to approve the project in principle: by 
being affordable to the less well-off, `the project boasts a particularly positive social aspect.'
51
 In a 
1976 SNCF brochure, it was stated that `By offering, in 2nd class, travel times comparable to those 
by air, for a price that is one third of that of air travel, TGV will allow the advantage of speed to be 
extended to all social strata, including the least well-off.'
52
 The Works Minister made the same 
point: `improving transport services for all French citizens', or `democratising fast transport', was a 
good principle, that is `putting at the disposal, not of the privileged - businessmen or people 
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travelling expensively - but of the whole population a means of transport in keeping with today's 
world'.
53
 SNCF President Pélissier emphasised in 1981 that `It is certainly the first time in the 
history of transport that advanced technique has been made open to all passengers without 
restriction from its inauguration.'
54
 Project C03, by emphasising that it would lead to the 
`democratisation of speed', exploited the egalitarian ethos of post-1789 France.
55
 
 To sum up, although the project did fit in with the modernisation drive, it also ran against 
several contemporaneous ministerial priorities. The Budget representative on both the Coquand and 
Le Vert working groups considers that LGV `was done by SNCF Research on the one hand and by 
Alsthom on the other ... It certainly wasn't a great programme of the State, which was wholly 
ignorant about it all! ... The State did not take any interest, basically, apart from a few civil servants 
at the Transport Ministry, in the technological development which gave rise to research by 
SNCF'.
56
 The railway slowly built up support among key administrative divisions, won over the 
Transport Minister, Chamant (1967-1971), at a crucial juncture, obtained the backing of Prime 
Ministers Chaban-Delmas and Messmer, and ultimately of President Pompidou. Once the project 
had been given the seal of political approval in 1974, it proved impossible to challenge. This 
peculiar achievement was made possible by the existence of a technico-administrative arrangement 
that some of the decision-makers interviewed have called a technostructure, the subject of the 
section which we now begin. 
 
 
B. Inside the `technostructure'  
(1) An integrated project 
 Project C03 was designed as a system, and presented to successive governments as such. 
The train was designed to reach 300km/h but this was only possible because right from the 
beginning, the possibility of laying new, purpose-built track had been envisaged by SNCF. The line 
was to include new electronic signalling, as conventional visual signalling would be inadequate at 
such high speeds. What is striking here is the fact that SNCF felt confident that it could approach 
the government with a bold, relatively costly proposal for a new transport system and have a 
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reasonable chance of success. A new line was by no means the only solution and represented a 
heavy, long-term capital investment yet it was retained by SNCF as the most viable option. 
 Not only did Project C03 integrate track and rolling stock research (the technological 
aspects), it also brought together the different disciplines relevant to rail travel. On 10th July 1967, 
SNCF's Research Committee divided the project into two separate components, technical and 
economic: this in itself was innovative: `to have economists in the teams ... was really a novelty at 
SNCF.'
57
 But as Beltran has pointed out, it was not a singular occurrence in the French public 
sector: `Just as the economists at Electricité de France became increasingly powerful (to the point 
of taking command of the company), so the economists in the research department played a crucial 
role in the SNCF.'
58
 Such close collaboration meant that it was possible to create profitable services 
using expensive rolling stock; by optimising all the non-technological features of the system, 
savings could be made which would compensate for the (unavoidably) expensive trainsets: `The 
point was ... to reconcile savings and performance in order to offer very high speed transport at a 
cost not far removed from that of existing railway material.'
59
 The motorway-type layout of the 
track followed natural land contours, was entirely free from tunnels and considerably shortened the 
rail distance between Paris and Lyon: `the capital investment involved [was] only about 30% of 
that which would have been incurred if the conventional approach had been applied to the trace and 
layout.'
60
 The integrated, system approach was successfully put across to administrators and 
ministers, partly through a continuous process of discussion and mobilisation of all available 
resources. 
 
(2) Internal discussion and external consultation 
 From 1966 to 1969, the project was internally studied at SNCF but the new concepts were 
also widely discussed with a number of ministerial divisions. Project C03 comprised several sub-
projects: Paris-Lyon, Paris-East, Paris-North. But studies quickly showed that Paris-East would not 
show sufficient returns for the railways
61
 and the line to the North of Europe was wholly dependent 
on the construction of a tunnel under the Channel, which was far from assured. In any case, the 
service between Paris and Lyon had been viewed as the most promising. In August 1966, the first 
layout study started and by June 1967, was completed. 
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 Once SNCF's claims had been validated by the Coquand Committee, the Transport 
administration put all of its weight behind it.
62
 Meanwhile the Aérotrain project was getting bogged 
down: `The day I convinced myself that Bertin would not succeed with his Aérotrain and I said so 
to Mr Lacarrière ... the both of us became convinced that SNCF must be encouraged towards that 
high speed objective and we insisted on putting it in the Planning Contracts and we kept telling 
SNCF: "Make savings faster on your secondary lines, which don't bring in any money and spend 
money faster on a more audacious project".'
63
 The same official considered that `it was ... our role, 
at the sponsoring department, to try and advance faster on good subjects' and that in order to 
mobilise politicians, `one needed audacious objectives.' Precisely for this reason departmental 
officials did not stress the top speed of TGV but the fact that the time needed to travel between 
Paris and Lyon was to drop from 4 hours to only 2, a spectacular achievement. 
 In August 1968, contacts with MdT's Roads Directorate were made, to discuss co-
ordination of railway and motorway layouts. This had never been conceivable in the past because 
of the previously differing requirements for road and rail, but one of the most radical concepts was 
precisely for LGV to adopt a motorway-type layout (characterised by very wide curves and 
relatively steep slopes). It was therefore useful to consult road experts, but things were taken one 
step further with the creation of a joint body, GEFAU (Groupe d'études fer-autoroute), on the 
initiative of MdT, which comprised specialists from the Roads Directorate and from SNCF.
64
 On 
the genesis of this co-operative venture, let us listen to one of the main SNCF protagonists: 
  We moved closer to the Motorway Directorate. We were lucky that the Head of 
Roads and Motorways, Mr Gilbert Dreyfus, was a friend of Geais [`originator'of 
TGV concept]. I found myself one day in a café of Avenue Mozart with Mr 
Dreyfus and Mr Geais. Mr Dreyfus told us: "Your idea is not bad at all, you must 
speak to the General Council of Ponts et Chaussées about it. If you have studies 
that need doing, we have means of study for motorway layouts, cost calculations, 
cost optimalisation". Hence the creation of the GEFAU group...
65
 
 On 27 November 1969, GEFAU's General Report was examined and approved by the 5th 
Section of the General Council of P&C (CGPC). This venture is viewed as an important step by 
railway engineers, as it validated the idea that a new railway was cheaper to build than new 
motorway (a rail solution costing 2/3 of a road solution for the same route).
66
 In 1972-1973 
estimates of construction costs for LGV were made by SNCF in agreement with SETRA (MdT's 
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Roads and Motorways Technical Studies Division)
67
 and could therefore hardly be disputed by 
officials. Also railway people thought they `were lucky to get the P&C engineers in on it. If they 
had not been in on it, we were done for. Ponts engineers were, really, very road-oriented. ... The 
alignment research unit that SNCF set up at the time ... benefitted from the experience of P&C. We 
had, later, the technical and moral support of the Ponts'.
68
 Co-operation between rail and road 
engineers took place swiftly and does not appear to have encountered any administrative hurdles. 
GEFAU itself was only in existence for two years or so. 
 In October 1968, Fontgalland, the head of SNCF Research, announced in a professional 
journal for P&C and Mines engineers (PCM) a feasability study concerning a turbotrain service 
between Paris and Lyon in two hours; the article was intended to test the water. It was in the same 
spirit that during the first semester of 1969, the project was presented to local agencies of 
Equipement and Aménagement du territoire. In July, the Rhône-Alpes Circonscription d'Action 
Régionale, which comprised the city of Lyon itself, registered `great interest' for LGV. It was after 
this period of (entirely voluntary) consultation with the influential `players' in the field of transport, 
which proved encouraging, that railway managers decided to officialise their plans. By 1st 
December 1969, the southern part of the route had been agreed within SNCF and a single route 
could be presented to the government. 
 The delay between the first discussions within SNCF (1965) and the official proposal 
stemmed from the fact that it was vitally important that any new project be convincingly presented, 
benefit from the support of authoritative administrative divisions and include as many resolved 
practicalities as possible; in short SNCF needed to `impress' the administrators and the politicians. 
 
(3) The appraisal process 
 In order to remedy the predicted capacity problem between Paris and Lyon, several 
solutions had been put forward by SNCF in its feasability study: doubling tracks in congested 
sections, construction of a new link between St-Florentin and Dijon, and five routes for a new link 
between Paris and Lyon. The Coquand (1970) and Le Vert (1973) committees studied the first 
hypothesis as well as the scheme for a new link.
69
 
 DTT did not generally have sufficient means at its disposal and therefore had to rely on 
SNCF expertise. But the `distrust of the public authority towards SNCF in-house traffic ... and 
costs forecasts' was such that experts first from SETRA, then from BCEOM (in 1974),
70
 were 
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called in, the latter in turn resorting to American experts, assumed to be neutral, to counter-check 
the figures. They were also examined by the Planning Commission and CGPC (which strictly 
speaking operates outside DTT but constitutes a reservoir of technical expertise within the State 
apparatus) and by ad hoc committees (Coquand and Le Vert committees). Appraisal was very 
searching and relentless: even MdT's figures were the subject of second opinions. Although 
officials at the Planning Commission generally did not initiate much policy, according to one 
former DTT official, `They constituted one step in the course of the decision ... Well we brought 
them studies, they had economists who would dissect them, criticise them ... It was an end-of-year 
examination for me ... It was an important place to get through, almost essential'.
71
 In March 1971 
`The Planning Commission [confirmed] the consistency of Transport Ministry forecasts'.
72
 In 1974, 
it was the turn of BCEOM to examine the project and it `confirmed the conclusions of previous 
studies, as regards both the competitive conditions between the various means of transport, traffic 
perspectives, and the economic advantages of the project.'
73
 It was felt necessary to scrutinise both 
SNCF and MdT figures out of the fear that SNCF's sponsoring ministry might be somewhat biased. 
 A relatively large number of criteria were taken into account during the various stages of 
the appraisal process,
74
 which were quantified into two rates of return: the internal (financial) rate 
for SNCF, and the external (socio-economic, or collective) rate for the community at large. 
Depending on the traffic projections used, the immediate financial return in the first year added to 
9.8 to 12.5%, whilst over a 20-year period it was set between 15 and 18%.
75
 Therefore the scheme 
easily passed the 8% hurdle rate set for all new railway investments. The operating cost per 
traveller/km was found to be very similar to that of existing fast trains, at 7.2 centimes.
76
 One of the 
financial benefits of the project was that it would bring down labour costs from 51% of direct 
operating costs to 35%; it could therefore be viewed as a a `productivity investment', an argument 
which appealed to Finance officials,
77
 and was used in 1976 by DTT when the programme was 
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called into question.
78
 In its answers to questions by the Dijon Town Council, SNCF heavily 
stressed financial return rates of the different options and the fact that its chosen alignment for new 
infrastructure was far more profitable than any other option.
79
 
 The fact that financial criteria, although a major factor, were by no means the sole ones 
involved in appraising Project C03 is central to understanding the French referential framework. 
The call on road specialists in 1968-1969 (GEFAU), was particularly meaningful because they had 
been the first to develop `a sizeable technico-economic apparatus of evaluation' which was 
subsequently extended `to the whole transport field'; these `evaluation methods formalised the 
planning practices of the Ponts et chaussées Corps.'
80
 They were not however forced onto the 
railway by roads officials, rather `The research department personnel introduced new methods, 
particularly those which the Corps des Ponts et chaussées ... had used to promote its motorway 
policy.'
81
 It was concluded that over a period of 20 years, the collective return would be 33% (the 
Coquand group had found 28% in 1970).
82
 One Transport official saw his department's role as 
`telling the truth to politicians, consequently conducting investigations into proposals, in order to 
demonstrate whether ... the project, apart from its technical aspect, had an interest for the country ... 
when we became convinced that there was an interest for the country ... we said so ... 
economically-speaking, it makes sense, this is what we said.'
83
 Transport Ministers also used non-
financial arguments: in 1971 for instance Chamant pointed out that the return rate for the 
community (25 to 30%) would be `far higher than that of motorway projects included in the VIth 
Plan , which is between 10 and 20%.'
84
 In 1976, Cavaillé defended the investment on the grounds 
that both the financial and the collective rates of return were high.
85
 SNCF for its part never failed 
to emphasise that `TGV [would] constitute a powerful instrument of economic stimulation at the 
service of the national community.'
86
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 One former Head of SCF argues that SNCF's knowledge of the market and of its 
competitors, and the quantification of diverse variables played a crucial role.
87
 Economic modelling 
of transport demand made great strides in the early 1960s and when Project C03 was presented to 
the government, `the economic plans were well advanced - much more so in fact than the 
technological side. These economic studies were a complete departure from the usual SNCF 
activities. Traffic forecasts, and not actual traffic volumes on given connections, and planning in 
terms of travel time were entirely new.'
88
 This methodological shift was accepted by the authorities, 
partly because they had been evolved within State agencies in the first place. DTT's opinion `also 
rested ... on the studies requested from those General Inspectors, Mr Coquand and Mr Le Vert, who 
brought to light ... the value of time for SNCF's clients.'
89
 Thus appraisal methods played a 
prominent role in the success of Project C03. This is not surprising since the French transport 
sector was characterised by the `magnitude of conceptual and methodological endeavours aiming at 
legitimating the scientific status of large projects' appraisal.'
90
 
 The favoured method of appraisal derived directly from the French school of `calcul 
économique' (CE), a `formalised procedure allowing for the comparison of alternative investment 
solutions',
91
 developed by `French-style economist-engineers', e.g. Jules Dupuit and C. Colson, in 
the second half of the nineteenth century.
92
 Dupuit's work was the `true basis of modern transport 
investment appraisal methods' and the `French Engineering school of economists' pioneered the 
`first set of formalised public investment criteria' which was later to lead to CBA.
93
 After 1945 
public sector economics evolved under the influence of Mines engineers, in particular that of 
Maurice Allais's seminars at Ecole des mines; these engineers sought `to formalise and apply [CE] 
to the large public enterprises they were in charge of.'
94
 Such seminars played a formative role for 
many policy-makers, who remember them to this day. CE techniques were then `developed and 
refined, in order to include ever more parameters, through the impetus given by economist-
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engineers ... and more particularly by Ponts & Chaussées engineers'.
95
 Meanwhile CE was finding 
favour inside the public administration, where it was used in connection with economic planning 
(e.g. by Planning Commissioner Massé). 
 CE rested on three premises: `Reality is stable and observable. The decision-maker has the 
power to get a system of rational preference to operate. There is such a thing as an optimal 
decision, objectively better than any other.'
96
 With this technique, it was believed that procedures 
could be standardised and dissimilar public projects competing for public funds could be assessed 
comparatively, the ultimate objective being the search for economic optimization.
97
 The setting up 
of SAEI (division of economic and international affairs) within the Ministry of Works in 1960 
`may be considered to be the official acknowledgement of work relating to choice of plant or 
pricing of infrastructures, the origin of which goes back to the the nineteenth century (Dupuit, 
Colson).'
98
 This new economic unit carried out research, made economic analyses of large 
investment projects involving several transport modes and collaborated closely with other State 
agencies within the framework of national modernisation plans.
99
 One of the chief proponents of 
CE at SNCF, Michel Walrave, had done a stint as a civil servant in the newly-created SAEI. He 
took to SNCF the latest thinking in administrative circles, e.g. the concept of time savings, which 
had played an important role in the Planning Commission's assessment of motorway programmes. 
He carried out `the first application' of time values to the railways,
100
 which became a standard tool 
of rail appraisal for State officials: 
  Those were the days of triumphant technocracy, of rationalisation des choix 
budgétaires, there was some degree of naivety regarding the pursuit of economic 
progress ... After what had been done by Massé and Boiteux at EDF, calcul 
économique had acquired a great deal of prestige as a tool to assist decision-
making. Basically, I would say that for the TGV project, all we did was to apply 
that approach ... We sought to have an overall approach, to rationalise - that is ... to 
                                                 
     
95
 Offner and Trigallo (1987): pp. 17-18. They also state that resource allocation became a concern from 1945 in 
the French public administration. Pierre Massé began to formalise issues around 1959; the new techniques were first 
applied to the (nationalised) energy sector, then to transport. 
     
96
 Ibid.: p. 18. 
     
97
 The method was not however universally acclaimed: although the Planning Commission had adopted it, the 
Budget Directory did not favour it as it did not fit in with its own methods, and critics found it to be overly 
quantitative and reductionist. 
     
98
 C Bozon and G Gastaut, `Le bilan de l'expérience au ministère de l'Equipement et du logement, in P Huet and 
J Bravo, L'expérience française de rationalisation des choix budgétaires (Paris: PUF, 1973), p. 245. 
     
99
 Brunot and Coquand (1982), p. 632. 
     
100
 Interview with former Head of SCF, MdT. At SAEI, Walrave had been part of a group developing transport 
economics, with special reference to motorways. 
  
 
 191 
calculate everything we could - and to organise logically all the elements of 
analysis around a model of reasoning.
101
 
In practical terms, CE methodology led to the formulation of the two rates of return detailed above: 
the internal and external rates, and was endorsed by the Planning Commission.
102
 
 The assumption that represented a radical departure from past practice was that better 
supply of transport services generates demand. This central assumption was accepted by all parties 
concerned,
103
 as was its corollary that the railway should aim at increasing its passenger traffic. An 
econometric model developed on this premise was first applied by SNCF on the Paris-Caen line in 
1970 and found to be valid. That full-scale experiment authenticated SNCF's new pro-active 
commercial approach. Some time later, Michel Frybourg, the Director of IRT, proposed to extend 
this approach: he wanted to `turn upside down the usual predicament', whereby capacity 
investments simply aimed at adapting the existing transport systems to needs, evaluated through 
demand modelling, and wished instead to work on the basis of supply modelling.
104
 He therefore 
advocated to replace the old demand-led, reactive approach, by a supply-led, pro-active approach. 
 An essential element of SNCF's new approach was improvement in service quality; this 
was also endorsed by government officials who carried out the appraisal: `Thankfully the 
committee of transport civil servants (Coquand Committee) accepted that the economics be 
examined overall, including service quality and transport capacity, that is to say by reasoning as 
would a firm.'
105
 Frybourg wrote in 1973: `The prime objective of innovation is the rehabilitation of 
public transport through the transformation of service quality in order to provide a genuine 
alternative to car use and open up choice possibilities.'
106
 Finance Ministry officials demanded 
higher fares (in the shape of `supplements') but recognised that `in order to get increased fares, one 
has to have increased comfort.'
107
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 Generally, the terms of the debate were transport-centred. This perhaps is not so surprising 
given that many of the decision-makers had attended the same lectures in public economics and/or 
railway management during their training as P&C or Mines engineers, and in turn had become 
lecturers at one or another of the grandes écoles.
108
 They were all familiar with the same issues. 
Furthermore, the generation of new demand through better services was not only acknowledged by 
government experts, it was also seen as an opportunity to shape transport users behaviour: `The 
improvement of service quality is ... a means to deeply modify users' behaviours'.
109
 The desire to 
influence the transport decisions of individuals was not confined to transport `technocrats'. 
Politicians also endorsed it: the 1974 decision to go ahead with Project C03 was partially taken 
because `It is advisable to favour the most energy-efficient transport modes and to modify the 
behaviour of users by encouraging them to use more widely rail transport, urban public transport, 
together with transport by waterways.'
110
 
 Ultimately, SNCF's case rested on the unquestioned assumption that to increase its overall 
traffic would be a good thing, both in qualitative and quantitative terms: `To think of the railway's 
future was to think of transporting more people. One needed to increase capacity.'
111
 The rationale 
was couched in economic language: roads constituted a transport system, the quality of which 
decreases as traffic increases, unlike the railway, which offered a steady level of quality even 
whilst accommodating expanding traffic.
112
 Increasing rail traffic was also a worthwhile objective 
for a quantitative reason: according to the Planning Commission, `the objective of increased traffic 
is in itself a factor leading to lower costs owing to the phenomenon of increasing returns.'
113
 This 
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was particularly important as one objective set by the VIth Plan to the railway was the lowering of 
production costs. Thus one unique, economic feature of the rail network - the fact that it offered 
increasing returns - was acknowledged as a powerful argument in favour of expanding traffic and 
allowing capital investment. This broad economic rationale was seen as the only basis to achieve 
greater financial returns and was appropriated by Ministers. In 1976 for instance, the Works 
Minister established a clear linkage between `the growth of passenger traffic' and `the problem of 
SNCF's deficit'; France was then one of the very few countries in the world where passenger traffic 
was increasing and this `must be encouraged' because it would be `a step in the direction of 
rebalancing SNCF's operating account'.
114
 
 Eventually, the series of thorough appraisals and reappraisals that were carried out over the 
period 1969-1974 served SNCF well. They all reached similar conclusions, validating SNCF's 
economic case, and were instrumental in convincing Budget officials that the project was 
worthwhile: `those studies showed good economic and financial returns for TGV ... There was no 
debate, we thought those studies were accurate and they showed that it should be done'.
115
 The 
project's economic merits carried the day. 
 
(4) Financing the new link 
 The LGV project submitted by SNCF to the government in 1969 was the most expensive 
of a range of five options, which according to SNCF were all `equivalent as regards freeing up 
capacity on the existing line'.
116
 Yet it was preferred to the cheaper, more piecemeal options 
favoured by DATAR, which would have involved either upgrading or doubling the sections of the 
old Paris-Lyon line that actually constituted traffic bottlenecks, at a cost of either FF816m or 
FF962m; those options, however, only allowed for 200km/h running,
117
 and were not as profitable. 
The cost of LGV, at FF3607m (electrification costs included), was vastly higher than DATAR's 
solutions.
118
 The total cost of the new link (infrastructure plus rolling stock, FF5800m), was 
approximatively equivalent to SNCF's investment budget for one year
119
 and was spread out over a 
period of seven years.
120
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 We have seen however that within central government opinion was divided, and one key 
obstacle stood out, Finance: `It was the difficult place, especially when the Finance Minister 
happened to be Mr Valéry Giscard d'Estaing ... it's always the strongest administration in France.'
121
 
A cautious attitude towards a costly project from that particular ministry was easily understood but 
SNCF argued all along that the project would be financially very profitable; its preferred option 
offered financial returns of over 15%, whilst the other four ranged from 2.6 to 6.7%.
122
 
Nevertheless it was particularly difficult to convince Finance that a policy of massive new 
investment was needed at a time when the Reform of SNCF highlighted the need to break even: `In 
France, the Ministry of Finance has always been considered to be a very powerful Ministry. It has a 
reputation for always saying "No", naturally.'
123
 In spite of SNCF's obvious efforts to placate the 
concerns of Finance officials, the picture that emerges from interviews is one of implacable 
opposition in some quarters. This was apparently due to personalities as much as to sectoral 
considerations. The long-standing Finance Minister, Giscard d'Estaing,
124
 was labelled `anti-
industry' by one respondent, and others agreed that he had no liking for the railways. Generally, 
according to one former adviser to Pompidou, he did not share Pompidou and de Gaulle's tastes for 
large, national endeavours in the field of industry, and no such projects occured during his 
Presidency.
125
 As for Treasury officials, `There may have been some reluctance on the part of the 
Treasury Directorate because ... they sought to reduce investments and the Treasury gave the 
nuclear programme high priority.'
126
 
 But even hostility from the most powerful minister and scepticism on the part of some 
Finance officials could not veto SNCF's project. This was partly because of the main two Finance 
directorates - Budget and Treasury - only one was actually opposed to the project as it stood, the 
Treasury, and it was the Budget that was formally in charge of SNCF matters. Treasury opposition 
was known at MdT as early as February 1970, when one official advised railway managers to 
produce a marketing study `so as to convince the Treasury'.
127
 One former Head of SNCF Research 
alluded to tension with the Treasury, whose representative on committees was `odious and fiercely 
against' the project.
128
 The Budget representative felt that `everyone was convinced, before the 
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Coquand report, I would even say! Except the Treasury, who were always against it, who besides 
were against it right until the end!'
129
 
 At the Budget Directorate on the other hand, officials were more receptive to SNCF's claim 
that the way to wipe its deficit was its own business and that public enterprises needed more 
autonomy. For `the man within the State who defended this conception ... was the Budget Director, 
Renaud de La Génière. When ... the President of SNCF went to see him and said: "Here are the 
means to redevelop our traffic, to decrease our deficit", it caught his attention. ... the big question 
was: is it beneficial for the undertaking? And that was what we examined down to the smallest 
possible details.'
130
 SNCF for its part argued forcefully that LGV would create an operating surplus 
which would improve railway finances. Also, La Génière understood perfectly well that LGV was 
an objective for the whole railway undertaking and was sensitive to that argument: in his view, 
`better management' of the undertaking was a valuable thing, but `better management as well as 
transforming the undertaking' was even better.
131
 The opportunity for change must be grasped. 
 The Budget Directorate viewed the project favourably on the whole, but were concerned 
about some of the particulars. For instance, there were worries that the volume of traffic necessary 
to launch the service would not exist before 1980. The Budget representative in the Coquand group 
recalled that: `Once the group had submitted its report, I visited Mr Coquand ... I told him: "All of 
this is not too bad, but I don't think that the proposed date, which is 1976, represents the economic 
optimum." I said that personally-speaking, the economic optimum started in 1980. Until then it was 
premature, given the traffic forecasts. And he told me: "Indeed, there is no need to rush!"'
132
 
 SNCF argued that LGV possessed a large revenue-generating potential because at one 
stroke, the 415kms (258m.) of new infrastructure would upgrade a substantial part of the network, 
namely the 1,625kms (1,010m.) of lines connected to the Paris-Lyon line, the northern half of the 
most critical trunk line in terms of France's geography.
133
 Finance officials were sensitive to this 
argument: what persuaded the Budget Directorate was that `it was a good deal, both for SNCF and 
for the transport sector as a whole ... if Air Inter was to give up its Paris-Lyon flights, it would not 
be negative'.
134
 Although they were not swayed by SNCF's argument that the collective rate of 
return was extremely high (between 25-33%), for `there would not have been a favourable decision 
if the internal rate of return had been less than 8%', what lay behind the notion of collective return 
                                                 
     
129
 Interview with  Budget representative on Coquand and Le Vert committees. 
     
130
 Ibid. 
     
131
 Interview with former Deputy Director, DTT. 
     
132
 Interview with former Budget representative. 
     
133
 See Potter (1987), p. 85. 
     
134
 Interview with former Budget representative. 
  
 
 196 
was accepted as legitimate: `Of course we were influenced ... not by the fact that there was a 
collective surplus, but for what it meant! It meant that people were going to save time, that played 
an important role in the decision naturally'; another factor was that LGV was designed to increase 
rail traffic tremendously, and this was a recognised objective: `It was the main objective. It was the 
only objective.'
135
 For all these reasons, Finance did not baulk at the additional costs to be incurred 
when the turbotrain turned into an electric train (i.e. electrical equipment between Paris and Lyon 
and electrification of the Lyon - Grenoble existing line, on which TGV was expected to provide 
additional winter services to the Alps). The Transport Minister requested approval from the 
Finance Minister for these additional expenses (FF269m), pointing out that the electric solution 
offered better returns to the community,
136
 and they were duly approved. 
 One practical factor made SNCF's campaign of mobilisation easier: there were direct 
contacts between Finance people and SNCF, both within the formal structures of committees (e.g. 
Le Vert and Coquand), and on an informal basis. Thus railway officers were able to put their case 
directly to Finance, and Finance officials had an input into the project, on points which they 
considered quite central, e.g. price supplements and timing, which were taken on board by SNCF. 
SNCF's President had contacts at the highest levels of the Finance Ministry, as we have seen. There 
were direct contacts with the head of the Budget Directorate's Transport Unit, for instance when 
one Deputy Director General of SNCF visited him at a crucial juncture and was told: `You must 
quicken the pace ... It is politically important to get formal acknowledgement from the 
government'.
137
 Also during the construction phase: `I had a few telephone conversations with 
[him] once it had been decided to finance the operation ... from time to time he would ask me for 
information to find out, if you like, whether ... the estimates we had made could be adhered to or 
not.'
138
 
 How did Transport officials view their opposite numbers at Finance? `We found them 
somewhat obsessed by short-term considerations, but all the same, they were open to long-term 
arguments. We had to see them often, we had to have well-argued discussions, but well, one got 
there!'
139
 
 In theory, new rail infrastructure was to be financed by SNCF, but `In fact, no provisions 
[had] been made regarding the financing of new lines which are not covered by the concession 
granted to SNCF, and SNCF has no prerogatives in this matter, as the State may choose as it wishes 
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how new lines will be operated and financed.'
140
 In order to win over Finance, in March 1971 
SNCF announced that the new line could be built without any subsidies from public powers or 
local authorities. SNCF would therefore require State approval (from FDES) for loans but no 
additional State funds. This approach was fully justified on two grounds: the scheme was highly 
profitable and `One of the conditions for the agreement of the Finance Ministry on the project was 
just this ... that is to say that there was no budgetary cost to the project.'
141
 
 In order to circumvent FDES, SNCF even considered setting up a private venture. In 1971, 
they envisaged a private `Construction Company' made up of public works firms, banks, and local 
authorities; the Company jointly with SNCF itself would constitute a GIE; the advantage of such an 
arrangement was that none of the funds would have to be guaranteed by the State.
142
 But opinion 
within policy-making circles was not ready for such a venture and it sunk almost without trace. 
Again in 1975-1976, SNCF canvassed the idea of a private company. Both Budget and Treasury 
officials were against `because it was clear that a funding arrangement of this type would be more 
costly than a traditional one, since SNCF has a very good signature and such arrangements lead to 
additional costs of 1 or 2 or 3% of the interest rate.'
143
 The consortium of banks which showed an 
interest in such a venture was obviously eyeing up a profit margin but from a macro-economic 
point of view, a private venture `would not change the balance of savings and investment in France 
and therefore was a way to conceal a problem rather than solving it.'
144
 Clearly the method - public 
or private - of turning the project into reality was not the salient point from an overall perspective, 
as long as financial costs were kept in check. 
 Much uncertainty surrounded the precise financial arrangements; the 30 March 1974 
addendum to SNCF's Contrat de programme postponed the decision to a future covenant. Finally, 
the Contract for 1979-1982 `guaranteed investment levels which would explicitly include the 
construction of TGV South-East.'
145
 With the 30 August 1978 Covenant, the State gave SNCF a 
concession to build and operate Paris-Lyon. It was financed by commercial loans made by SNCF 
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both on national and international capital markets. A capitalisation scheme was arranged to attract 
foreign capital; `one third of the capital for the first TGV line came from New York banks alone'.
146
 
 It follows that `Generally, SNCF ... acted as would have a private operator, but with an 
important difference: it restricted the remuneration of borrowed funds to the minimum, given the 
going interests and the risks borne by SNCF'.
147
 Indeed SNCF did not resort to venture capital, 
which is far more expensive. Thus private funds financed a public project, but on terms which were 
uniquely favourable, for SNCF's rating in the financial world is very high.
148
 The general method of 
financing the high speed link exhibited a large degree of blurring between the public and private 
economic spheres. 
 Indecision surrounding financial arrangements did not prevent the project from going 
through the varied stages of appraisal. It was as if people proceeded on the assumption that the 
project must be found generally sound in the first place (the element of substance), with financing 
being arranged only once the proposed new line had been validated, by whatever financial means 
were available at that time (the element of procedure). One former Finance representative stated 
that, as regards private funding of LGV, `in any case that was not the sticking point! The point was 
to find out whether it was worthwhile for SNCF to modernise its network - was it going to add 
anything'.
149
 
 To conclude this section, I would argue three points: firstly, SNCF's main concern was not 
to free up capacity, which could have been achieved through piecemeal measures, but to produce a 
new transport system which could be a showcase for a modern, profitable railway. LGV constituted 
a bold but basically commercial venture. Secondly, the opposition of the Finance Minister was not 
sufficient to thwart the project; his arguments were eventually disregarded because SNCF's new 
commercial ethos was backed in some sections of Finance and by Transport officials; SNCF 
`realism' was ultimately validated by officials in the course of searching appraisals and re-
appraisals. Thirdly, `the traditional pair in railway innovation processes, Transport administration - 
operator, worked to promote TGV against other segments of the State, which were little inclined to 
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allow large investments at a time when a policy of balanced accounts was being implemented.'
150
 
The `technostructure' served the railway well; it managed to rally round some politicians (`Once 
again, Transport Ministers ... did not have many ideas'
151
 but their officials did) and bypassed or 
neutralised indifference and opposition of a political or financial nature. One respondent remarked: 
`This is precisely what is interesting in this matter. It is a matter that was settled by technicians and 
civil servants.'
152
 Not surprisingly, politicians sought to discredit the idea that the decision had been 
`taken in secret, under the pressure of some technostructure', which critics often put forward.
153
 
 
 
C. Final stages of planning and implementation: 1974-1977 
 Once ministerial approval had been secured in 1974, final planning and consultation could 
take place. These were noteworthy for the way in which the technico-administrative apparatus - 
both at central and local level - had a dominant voice, whilst local representatives were only 
brought into the process on the terms of the technostructure. In this section, I shall discuss in turn 
the four main facets of the final planning phase and of construction: administrative consultation, 
the public inquiry, land purchases and construction issues. It has proved impossible to keep to a 
strictly chronological order because some events were taking place simultaneously. 
 
(1) The instruction mixte 
 The 6 March 1974 Council of Ministers decided that preliminary administrative 
procedures could be launched. On 18 March 1975, the instruction mixte procedure began; this 
involved the consultation of all interested government departments regarding final details of the 
project: Ministry of Quality of Life (environmental matters), Ministry of Culture (Division of 
Architecture) and Ministry of Agriculture. Before this procedure had even begun, informal 
discussions had already taken place and `significant modifications to the route were made', for 
instance avoiding the Chablis vineyards and the environmentally sensitive Serein valley.
154
 
 The new line disrupted the passage of road convoys to and from the Creusot-Loire plant (at 
le Creusot), which manufactured tanks for nuclear reactors. Road works would have to be carried 
out to make the new itinerary suitable for these extremely large trucks: the costs for the works `had 
to be borne by SNCF, which is why it was fairly difficult to secure; the task of SNCF is precisely to 
prevent things from costing too much and the task of other administrations was to safeguard public 
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interests. So one of the public interests was to have itineraries for wide loads'.
155
 Eventually, 
instruction mixte settled the question of which bridges ought to be raised etc, and left aside the 
financing, `but as it was SNCF who carried out the works ... in the end it amounted to having SNCF 
pay for the raising'.
156
 It is interesting to note that the procedure was not halted by this financial 
issue and what seemed to matter most was deciding which roads the trucks should use. 
 Military contingency planning was part of instruction mixte, which `initially ... was a 
procedure which made it possible to designate military protective measures on structures, for 
example for the positioning of mines in order to blow up bridges in case of conflict ... during the 
construction phase one could indeed reserve the possibility of destroying them for national defence 
purposes. This was how instruction mixte originated'.
157
 As well as the above measure, military 
contingency plans allowed for the possibility of using the rail network even if partially destroyed. 
 In case of conflict between sections of the Administration during the procedure, an 
interministerial council would arbitrate, but with difficulties of a technical nature, `technicians sort 
it out amongst themselves ... in the majority of cases, one manages; this particular inquiry is 
intended to prevent the appearance of two projects.'
158
 Although the procedure only lasted just over 
eight months, `we arrived after discussions at compromises more or less everywhere, which 
eventually silenced just about all the difficulties.'
159
 On 4 December 1975, the procedure was 
closed by decision of the Transport Minister. 
 During the informal discussions prior to instruction mixte, MdT had recommended 
twinning LGV with part of the A5 motorway and the Digouin-Mâcon express road, so as to 
minimise environmental impact (this was done for 75kms out of a total 409); and `In the same 
spirit, the Post and Telecommunications Ministry decided to juxtapose a telecommunications cable 
on the edge of the railway track' along its entire length.
160
 As a result, consultation was carried out 
simultaneously for those three other schemes and SNCF made provisions for the purchase of 
additional land. It was vital that the DUP Decree for all the schemes be granted at the same time: 
`SNCF, yours truly, applied itself to making sure that all these matters kept in step.'
161
 In parallel 
with the internal administrative consultation process, public consultation was also carried out. 
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(2) Siting and the public inquiry 
 SNCF's feasability studies put forward five alignments;
162
 the BCEOM study added two 
further options in early 1974. DATAR favoured a route which served Dijon (for purposes of 
regional development), whereas SNCF favoured the most direct route which, according to 
DATAR, could worsen the `centralising effects of the railway masterplan of the nineteenth 
century'.
163
 BCEOM compared the costs of various routes but only the SNCF favoured option had 
been researched in depth and included a full cost-benefit analysis.
164
 This dearth of detailed studies 
of competing options does not seem to have been an issue. 
 Two distinct issues as regards siting aroused controversy: the terminal (in Lyon) and 
whether Dijon should be on the line. Although the siting of the terminal in Paris had been very 
straightforward, the decision being made on purely technical grounds, the Lyon terminal for the 
new line was a vexed issue, with two options being considered. At the beginning of 1970, SNCF 
was advised by a Transport official that it ought to choose the site of La Part-Dieu for its Lyon 
terminal `in order to stand a chance'.
165
 The first feasability study for siting the terminal there was 
carried out in June 1970,
166
 but the final decision was only taken in 1978. SNCF's estimates for the 
cost of LGV deliberately did not include costs associated with a new terminal in Lyon. 
 SNCF engineers were absolutely determined that P-S-E should be as straight as possible, 
which meant that the capital of Burgundy, Dijon, would not be served (a time saving of 20mns). 
But Dijon stood to lose its traditional position as a railway centre, and the link did not fit in with 
DATAR's plans for regional development, where Dijon was officially designated a métropole 
d'équilibre.
167
 Ultimately the State railway's choice was vindicated but `the then Prime Minister, 
Jacques Chirac [...] compelled SNCF to connect Dijon to Paris' through the connecting spur and to 
provide a minimum frequency of ten high speed trains a day in each direction between Paris and 
Dijon;
168
 Dijon was appeased and an intermediate station was located at Mâcon.
169
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 It was felt that Lyon for its part could only gain from better transport connections but there 
was disagreement as to whether these should be by air or by land. On 28 September 1970, the Lyon 
Town Council came out in favour of the new line, and the Rhône-Alpes expansion committee 
thought the project interesting, albeit not pressing.
170
 However `Lyon economic circles, financially 
very involved in the creation of the Satolas airport, did not conceal their reservations.'
171
 According 
to Pélissier, `The reluctance encountered in Lyon was not found in any other of the towns and cities 
served by the TGV.'
172
 This somewhat optimistic statement overlooked the fact that in 1971 the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Paris had concluded, following a study by its transport and 
regional planning committee, that existing Paris-Lyon services were satisfactory and had expressed 
regret at the government's decision to approve the project.
173
 
 As regards local elite opinion in the six départements crossed by the planned link, 
reactions were mixed: some wished the line to serve their communities, others wanted to keep it at 
bay. At the département level, SNCF `only found support with representatives from Côte d'Or, 
Saône et Loire, Ain and Deux Savoies.'
174
 Some of the local opposition outside Dijon described 
TGV as a `Concorde on rail'. Active opposition took place between 1973-1977 and was at its height 
in 1976-1977, according to Charon.
175
 The press reflected local concern; according to one SNCF 
President, the press campaigned violently against the scheme and railway people `during that 
difficult period ... felt rather lonely, facing a generally indifferent public opinion.'
176
 
 DTT wished to adopt SNCF's route as it was, though adding a connecting link to Dijon.
177
 
The Minister approved this option in May 1974 and on 21 November 1974, the Finance Minister's 
agreement to the cost of the latest modifications to P-S-E allowed the public inquiry to proceed. At 
the end of 1974, the Director of DTT proposed that the statutory public inquiry be launched, a 
move which the Transport Minister approved. In January 1975, the Government chose the final 
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layout to be submitted to the public inquiry; it was the same as that submitted by SNCF `for we had 
had previously a great many discussions with mayors and we had been to all the localities, to make 
detailed presentations ... in 2 or 3 places, we accepted to make relatively large modifications ... 
which therefore resulted from preliminary discussions ... having taken place for several years in 
advance.'
178
 During the provisional consultation phase, all local authorities concerned had been 
asked to give their agreement in principle on SNCF's proposed best route.
179
 It seems that the real 
public inquiry had already taken place in the period 1970-1974, in a quiet and informal way: 
preliminary discussions `were informal for the most part but we compelled ourselves to telling the 
mayors: "We're going to have a scheme for a high speed link, it will affect your locality; this is 
roughly the situation you will find yourself in, concerning this layout." So we systematically met all 
the mayors ... the General Councils, the parliamentarians'.
180
 One should not assume however that 
SNCF representatives had a free hand in their dealings with local officials; there was a degree of 
ministerial control. For instance when in 1973 Dijon Town Council sent a detailed questionnaire to 
SNCF on the scheme, the `official replies to [the] questions [had] the backing of the sponsoring 
minister.'
181
 
 Public inquiry practices dated back to the procedure instituted by the 8 March 1810 Act, 
and were updated by an Order in 1958 and a Decree in 1959. These statutes demonstrated the great 
stability of administrative rules and safeguards; they asserted the idea that the government was 
uniquely qualified to determine whether a link was in the `general interest' or not, and 
institutionalised the State guarantee of property rights, founded on compensation and the payment 
of damages for expropriation.
182
 Originally public inquiries were instituted as a means to protect 
private property; only after P-S-E had been started was environmental protection included in their 
remit.
183
 
 Prefects of the interested départements were sent the public inquiry files, to be displayed in 
every affected locality. The Minister appointed a centralising prefect (Jean Périer) on 3 February 
1975, who was to collate the results of the preliminary inquiry and express an opinion. He in turn 
appointed the inquiring commissioner, which ensured a certain degree of pliancy. The 
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commissioner was `generally a civil servant, sometimes retired ... who was for instance an Eaux & 
Forêts engineer, or a Ponts & Chaussées engineer, who therefore already had had the opportunity 
to take an interest in public works in the field.'
184
 On 17 March 1975, an interprefectoral order was 
issued, to be displayed in all interested localities and published in the main newspapers. From 7 
April until 7 May 1975, the public inquiry took place (inquiries concerning the twinned road and 
telecom infrastructures all took place exactly at the same time).
185
 Legislation set a minimum 
period of two weeks for public inquiries. Registers in which residents could write their 
observations were deposited in the affected localities. Observations could also be sent directly to 
the inquiring commissioner. The Inquiry Committee had two weeks to sift through the evidence 
and consult anyone they wished. The public inquiry from SNCF's point of view `went off in a fairly 
satisfactory ... way, we did not get many complaints insofar - precisely - as we had preempted 
[them] ... the complaints we received remained ... very limited and after the general interest inquiry, 
we did not make any sizeable changes to the project.'
186
 
 Of all the observations and criticisms made during the public inquiry, the Inquiry 
Committee decided to only examine those that `question the very principle of the project, that is its 
public utility' and the essential features of the alignment (cities to be linked, junctions towards 
other cities or countries, intermediary station), which is to say that criticism of alignment 
particulars was not taken into account at this stage but was left to the phase of preliminary studies 
leading to the detailed survey:
187
 `modifications desired by some may lead to the protestations of 
others ... The Committee has therefore resolved to set aside all declarations relating to sectional 
alignments, leaving their authors to reiterate them during the parcel inquiry.' The Committee 
validated SNCF's argument that the new line met an `absolute need' arising from the congestion of 
the existing line and that upgrading existing track would be `inadequate to reach the objective 
being pursued'. It defended the need for large-scale investment on the grounds that public works 
which would be a factor of `progress in speed and comfort' could not be appraised solely in 
financial terms. Under the heading `favourable opinions', it listed only the opinions expressed by 
the Le Creusot - Montchanin Council and by the prefects of the six interested départements; there 
was no mention of the high profile debating in Dijon. The Committee drew three positive 
conclusions, based on arguments of service improvement, of benefits outweighing costs, and on the 
fact that LGV was `the most rational as well as the most economic solution to the problem'. It ruled 
unanimously in favour of the proposed route on 10 June 1975. 
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 It was on 23 March 1976 that the scheme was granted a DUP Decree. The Council of State 
was the final hurdle: its specialised public works committee (Section des Travaux publics), which 
deals with legislative and regulatory matters from the economic and technical ministries, 
scrutinised the whole LGV file in depth.
188
 This involved summoning representatives of ministries 
and of SNCF to clear up any points that had remained unclear, or had been raised during the public 
inquiry, including technical points. Opponents to the projects could not be received however 
because it was considered that they had already had their say during the public inquiry. It follows 
that the procedure was weighted in favour of the project's supporters, namely the Administration 
and the public undertaking, since they had already put their case too, but were being allowed to 
have the final say. The Council of State's committee, having heard all summoned representatives, 
would then deliberate, weighing the pros and cons of the project in a qualitative perspective. Once 
the Council of State had made a favourable recommendation to the government, the link was 
declared to be `in the public interest and urgent' by Prime Ministerial decree (23 March 1976), 
signed both by the Prime Minister (Chirac) and the Transport Minister (Cavaillé).
189
 
 In 1976, there was still a degree of public controversy surrounding the new line, 
concerning the DUP Decree in particular. Local protesters had taken their case to the courts and on 
5 January 1977, the Council of State rejected the request to annul the Decree on environmental 
grounds and confirmed that the line was in the public interest. 
 Why was it so difficult for local opponents to the project to make themselves heard? Of 
course there never was a united front against the project, comparatively few people lived on the 
route, and the affected constituencies mostly did not have much political weight. Furthermore the 
State had at its disposal a most effective weapon: the concept of `general interest', to which no type 
of private, or particular, interest could legitimately be opposed. The regional prefect for instance 
expressed a `very favourable opinion' on the project, arguing that it was `destined to fulfil interests 
of a general order, the reality and magnitude of which cannot usefully be questioned.'
190
 The 
Expropriation Act was adopted precisely in order to uphold the public interest (Loi sur 
l'expropriation pour cause d'utilité publique, 7 July 1833). More generally, `expropriation was 
founded on "the public service necessity"'.
191
 The economist Bastiat put the philosophy quite 
succintly: `when service becomes public, all individual laws disappear, become general and melt 
into a written, coercive law, which is the same for everyone, which takes no account at all of 
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individual situations'.
192
 Where the State could invoke the full force of the law, farmers could only 
invoke `good reason' or `legitimate rights' (le bon droit).
193
 In the hallowed phrase, private interests 
must bow before the general interest. 
 The public inquiry procedure may have had all the appearances of democratic consultation, 
but it basically retained `its function as a posteriori legitimation of projects already formulated and 
technically complete which could only be the object of marginal alterations';
194
 as one senior SNCF 
figure pointed out, the planning team did study a host of possible routes, `But one cannot stir all 
this in the public ... I could not imagine myself discussing points of detail ... in an environment of 
30 screaming people, it's not possible! ... We only submitted to town halls the one route which 
seemed to be, let's say, the best one.'
195
 The belief in the one best solution was not confined to the 
economists of SNCF Research but also operated at the operational management level and was 
vindicated by central administration and politicians, who did not publicly discuss any routes other 
than the one chosen for submission to the public inquiry. 
 
(3) Land purchases and compensation 
 The DUP Decree stated that `The expropriations that may be necessary will have to be 
carried out within a timescale of eight years from the day of publication of this decree' (Art. 2), an 
obligation which limited blight on residents affected by the line. A `parcel inquiry' had to be carried 
out in each affected locality; the objective was to identify plots of land affected by the link. The 
expropriating party had to publicise the inquiries and notify each owner individually. The first 
parcel inquiries took place in July 1975; by the end of 1977, the purchase of property was virtually 
over for the southern part of the line, and had been carried out mostly on a friendly agreement 
basis. In 1978, real estate and `domanial' operations were practically completed, including the 
regrouping of land due to expropriation. By the second semester of 1980 all land purchases were 
actually completed. 
 As regards agricultural land, negotiations first took place between SNCF, the local Fiscal 
Offices (DDSF, local agencies of the Finance Ministry), and local Chambers of Agriculture and 
farming unions, rather than directly with the affected residents: 
  the price of land was first jointly decided by SNCF, Fiscal Offices and 
representatives of farming professions because we wanted to avoid discussing 
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things with each landowner without a starting point. Consequently we had 
meetings with the Chamber of Agriculture, wich represents agricultural 
landowners ... the Services départementaux d'exploitation agricole, which 
represented interested farmers as a whole, and then also the Fiscal Offices and us, 
SNCF. With those people we devised price scales and we said: "Well, 1 hectare of 
vineyard will be worth this much in Saône et Loire, 1 hectare of wheat this much 
in Seine et Marne, it was therefore so to speak the price around which arose ... an 
agreement, a preliminary agreement ... 
Following these general negotiations, the business of settling each particular case could start: `In 
actual fact, the Fiscal Offices, DDSF, negotiated on our behalf, that is to say they would visit the 
landowners and tell them: "Your land is worth so much" and seeing that the landowners had 
agreed, SNCF would then set in motion the change of ownership.'
196
 The price scales were not 
inflexible however; `If indeed the farmers had a particular reason (for a scale ... may be criticised), 
the Fiscal Services official could award a small supplement.'
197
 According to Hughes, `Landowners 
were in most cases well compensated'.
198
 If a price could not be agreed, the matter could be decided 
before a tribunal: in Seine et Marne, about half the purchases were settled in this way but elsewhere 
there were very few, isolated cases. On the whole, most purchases were settled out of court. 
Purchasing and compensation matters were made easier by SNCF's `systematically adopting a 
distance from dwellings far greater than is the case with existing lines'.
199
 In fact, only about one 
hundred dwellings were to be situated less than 100m from the track, and about 30 less than 50m 
(the statutory distance for motorways).
200
 
 The DUP Decree specified that the owner of the works (SNCF) `will be bound to remedy 
the damages caused farm units' (Art. 3) and the decree of 26 July 1976 on land purchase further 
specified that `the localities through which the track ran could ask the expropriator ... to 
compensate the localities for all their damages by carrying out land consolidation. This decree or 
law had been taken for motorways and it was extended to the new line'.
201
 But SNCF went further 
than the letter of the law; expropriation was carried out with the welfare of farmers in mind: `In 
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order to avoid the departure of expropriated farmers, the principle retained was that of an overall 
re-allocation of land of the severed units, leading to the loss of 5% of cultivated area for each 
farmer.'
202
 
 Compensation was conceived of on a broad basis and carried out systematically. For 
instance, consolidation could involve farm units a long way from the line: `With a consolidation, 
one has to define the perimeter to start with ... one has to get to understand why in a given place, a 
given damage will have repercussions 3kms away from the line. Now here, the technicians from 
Agriculture are the competent ones'.
203
 Compensation included roadworks to be carried out in order 
to re-establish traffic flows interrupted by the presence of new track. Thus more than 400km of 
road improvements were carried out.
204
 
 Both land purchases and the costs of consolidation were paid for by SNCF but the 
undertaking made extensive use, as we have just seen, of local agencies of the ministries of 
Finance, Agriculture and Transport. The working relationships between the various parties 
involved appear to have been satisfactory. 
  
(4) Construction and first results 
 The first building site was officially opened near Montchanin in December 1976. During 
the construction phase proper, the responsibility was fully SNCF's and DTT played no role: it `gave 
its agreement for the project to be executed but did not intervene in the organisation of the works of 
any kind.'
205
 The process of constructing a new railway line, which involved the use of heavy 
earthworks vehicles, exacted a heavy toll on local roads and this involved SNCF in litigation with 
local towns. 
 The line was opened in two phases: firstly on 22 September 1981 at Montchanin, President 
Mitterrand inaugurated the new train and the southern section of P-S-E; secondly on 25 September 
1983, the line was completed at the scheduled time and opened in its full length. On that very day 
Mitterrand called for preliminary studies regarding an Atlantic LGV. 
 The scheme for new infrastructure that SNCF had submitted to ministerial approval in 
March 1975 was costed at FF2901m. The actual cost, calculated after LGV's completion, was 
FF2926m, at January 1975 prices, that is with an overall 1% overspend.
206
 This total included land 
purchases and compensation, as well as construction proper. As regards rolling stock, the 
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overspend was of 4.1%.
207
 These figures would suggest that SNCF's calculations and the process of 
interdepartmental consultation had been extremely detailed and searching, something which would 
seem all the more surprising as costs were never the main issue. Similarly, SNCF's traffic estimates 
were validated by operational experience; in fact, new traffic had even been underestimated, as had 
revenue per passenger.
208
 This perhaps is less surprising since traffic forecasts had been thoroughly 
scrutinised by official committees in 1970, and again in 1973. As for financial returns, the rate 
achieved was 15%, which tallied with the predicted rate,
209
 and the prediction by the Le Vert 
Report that the payback period for the investment would be about 10 years proved accurate.
210
 
SNCF's objective of democratisation of high speed transport was also achieved, with `TGV users 
[from] all social strata of French society.'
211
 A consequence of having reached these objectives was 
that SNCF's credibility was heightened. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In terms of State practice, the LGV decision exemplified the tendency of public policy-
making in France towards compactness and centralisation. Decisions were taken at the highest 
echelons both of the Republic (Pompidou) and of SNCF (Ségalat). Those that were the object of a 
fair degree of controversy were presented as virtual faits accomplis: according to a former SNCF 
Board member, the route for the new link was `already decided in all its details' in December 1970 
and the discussions around the siting, from 1970 until 1979, were `a false debate'.
212
 As a number 
of decision-makers have pointed out, decisions in those days were `less democratic and more 
technocratic':
213
 one former Finance official half-jokingly admitted that `all the politicians were for 
the Rhin-Rhône canal and all the politicians were against TGV, and [...] all the civil servants were 
for TGV and all the civil servants were against the Rhin-Rhône canal... There is some truth in this 
all the same!'
214
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 This lack of political accountability was lamented by the Court of Accounts, which in its 
1978 annual report, strongly criticised the way in which studies of LGV had been carried out in 
1969, and the decision to build the line taken in 1974; it concluded that it was unable `to determine 
the respective shares taken by the State and the National Company in deciding this investment'.
215
 
But such misgivings were easily brushed aside, for the technico-administrative bias was rooted in 
tradition: as Dobbin has pointed out, in the nineteenth century, the Conseil des Ponts & Chaussées 
`initiated all railway projects, and while legislative approval was required for new lines, the efforts 
of private interests and local governments to initiate projects on their own, or even to sway the 
Board, were ignored';
216
 this at a time when railways were privately-operated. 
 The technico-administrative bias upheld national concerns and relegated regional / local 
concerns to second place: DATAR's regional planning policy sought to deconcentrate the national 
territory into regions gravitating around regional `métropoles d'équilibre' to be linked with each 
other by high speed land transport such as Aérotrain but this vision had to give way before the 
somewhat more old-fashioned conception of the centralised national territory with Paris as its hub, 
which lay at the heart of SNCF's policy of `contraction of the national territory'; with TGV links, 
only large cities were made closer to each other: `To a political rationale focused on regions, SNCF 
opposed a societal rationale of the global network which links up the country as a whole and, let's 
say it, the Nation.'
217
 Needless to say, the French railway's traditional centralising rationale had no 
difficulty in finding legitimacy within the high Administration, given the French practice of 
centralised and nationwide planning. Ultimately national considerations (such as the financial 
health of SNCF) ranked higher than local or regional considerations (such as serving Dijon), but 
since regional development was high on the politicians' agenda, SNCF made strenuous efforts to 
present its plans as part of a policy of regional planning in the widest sense. 
 Although LGV was decided within the technostructure, it was far from being an arbitrary, 
simple decision: 
  In France, getting approval for carrying a scheme through to a successful 
conclusion is a veritable obstacle race. I will spare you the details, both technical 
and legal, as one has to request agreement from such a multitude of committees 
(technical and financial studies, Planning committees, Regional Planning 
committees, Protected Sites, Architecture, etc) before finally ending with the 
Council of State's opinion.
218
 
Technico-administrative appraisal in particular was extremely demanding. Rigorous appraisal 
methods were deemed to increase the rationality of decision-making. What mattered was the result, 
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that is the content of the decision, rather than the propriety of the decision-making process, that is 
procedures. In this sense, one may speak of the LGV decision as an illustration of the substantive 
rationality model expounded in the previous chapter. 
 
 
 
2. CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINKS: THE PARALYSIS OF PUBLIC ACTION (1970-93) 
 There have been two schemes to date for new railway infrastructure between London and 
the tunnel portals. The first one was launched in 1970 and abandoned in January 1975 when the 
Channel Tunnel itself was cancelled; the second officially began in 1987 and was still at the end of 
the period covered by this study going through official procedures. This section will deal with both 
projects, as they both cast an interesting light on the British referential framework. There are many 
similarities and one major difference: approval of the first scheme was dependent on continued 
commitment to the Channel Tunnel by the British government, although the tunnel scheme itself 
became embroiled with the controversies surrounding the rail link to such an extent that it has been 
said that `In matters of environmental protection and of financing, the Dover to London rail link 
worked more against the project than the tunnel itself.'
219
 On the other hand the second scheme is 
being decided wholly on its own merits, since the agreement to build the Channel Tunnel was 
finalised before a new rail link was proposed. 
 In both cases, it was legitimate to view the scheme as `a project which could revitalise rail 
travel in the UK.'
220
 Indeed the densest air route in Europe was London-Paris and a less than three-
hour journey by train would be highly competitive with air travel. But in both cases central 
government action was slow, uncertain and often contradictory. There was a definite lack of 
purpose, both at departmental and political levels and in the first scheme at least, also at BR level. 
 We begin with a brief presentation of the most salient aspects of the first Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link scheme (CTRL1) before turning to the second scheme (CTRL2) and finally to a more 
detailed analysis of the Westminster-Whitehall nexus as thrown into relief by the two projects. 
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A. The first CTRL scheme (1970-1975) 
 The idea for new railway infrastructure between the Channel Tunnel and London 
originated at UIC (based in Paris and chaired by former Head of SNCF Research, Fontgalland) 
rather than at BR. Dr Michael Bonavia, who for 7 years was in charge of Channel Tunnel 
operational planning at BR (1966-1973), recalls that it was in early 1970 that French railway 
engineers announced to their British colleagues their proposals for a new train service, to be called 
`Europolitain', which would provide a direct, high speed link between the two European capitals, 
Paris and London. They asked whether the British could not for their part `plan a Europolitain line 
from the tunnel terminal to the outskirts of London'; with only 60 miles of track involved, this 
would be `a modest contribution to a splendid joint project' for SNCF would concurrently build a 
high speed link from Paris to the tunnel (Paris-North).
1
 The new link would cut down the new 
journey time between London and Paris from 3h 40mns to 2h 40mns.
2
 As a result of this 
suggestion, BR launched some studies and engaged in provisional planning. 
 At first, `the ministry was sceptical about the justification for the project' so BR planners 
`recognised that a fall-back strategy must be retained'.
3
 At the same time, it seems that railway top 
management `took a rather detached view about it' and `British Rail were never as enthusiastic as 
they ought to have been', given that a fixed link to the Continent would provide them with the 
prospect of several hundred-mile runs, say from Glasgow to Milan, and would enable them to 
compete with roads.
4
 By the time the British government signed an agreement releasing funds for 
initial work on the Tunnel to proceed (October 1972) it had become manifest that a new rail service 
between London and the tunnel portal was needed to obtain the full benefits of a cross-Channel 
fixed link. But planning was beset by many difficulties and actual government support for the 
scheme was only officially announced in September 1973 (whilst support for the Tunnel itself had 
been made public in 1968) and spelt out in the Government Review of Railway Policy published the 
following November. And in the meantime, opposition to both the Channel Tunnel scheme and the 
rail link had given rise to a fierce debate in the public arena. 
 
 
 
(1) An under-resourced scheme 
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 Lack of enthusiasm at BR was partly to do with the perceived lack of resources (in a wide 
sense: expertise, funding, manpower) for anything other than day-to-day running. Managers from 
the Southern Region showed little interest for the scheme even though it concerned them directly; 
they rejected early proposals to use existing, improved pathways, rather than build new 
infrastructure to run trains from London to the Tunnel, because `the management had its hands full 
with running the existing train service and coping with day-to-day problems.'
5
 They argued that 
such new traffic would interrupt suburban traffic to an extent that would be unacceptable. Southern 
Region's position meant that the more expensive alternative of building brand new infrastructure 
had to be considered by the Channel Tunnel planning team at BR headquarters. 
 The BR officer in charge of Channel Tunnel matters pointed out that the task involved in 
submitting a private bill to sponsor the construction of a new link `would strain the resources of the 
engineering, estate and legal departments' within BR; this concern about stretching thin resources 
had been apparent right from the moment the idea of a new link had been mooted, in 1970: BR's 
technical resources had been taxed `over the recently completed electrification schemes ... Civil 
and signal engineering resources were stretched by permanent way and re-signalling demands, not 
to mention many structures urgently needing replacement'
6
. 
 Private consultants Livesey and Henderson had to be engaged to carry out a feasibility 
study of Europolitain routes, since `BR chief civil engineer [had] indicated that he had no resources 
available for such a task.'
7
 On the other hand the mechanical and electrical engineering department 
was `busy designing new overhead line equipment suitable for speeds of 155mph and capable of 
being used on new lines such as the Channel Tunnel Link Line at speeds of 300km/h'; but all the 
same, the Chief Engineer had misgivings about a high speed strategy because `there may be many 
cases where we can't afford to go to this solution.'
8
 The Department did not have the necessary 
expertise to carry out studies itself; in 1973 for instance, DoE and Kent County Council 
commissioned a study from Economic Consultants Ltd
9
 (the practice of hiring consultants was very 
common). 
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 Generally speaking, lack of enthusiasm at BR for the idea of a new link is best understood 
in the light of the continuing struggle to maintain adequate investment levels: one of BR's `big 
problems, of course, is the definition of railway investment. We have very little expenditure on 
things that are completely new. ... The reason for this is quite straightforward - the present level of 
investment is insufficient to meet renewal needs, and therefore expansive ideas have taken a back 
seat. There has been little motivation for railwaymen to develop totally new projects which do not 
have a replacement element since they have been fully aware that there is little chance of such 
projects ever seeing the light of day. Railway "investment" thus turns out to be very largely long 
term maintenance.'
10
 This situation was by no means new; as we saw in the preceding chapter, it 
was the very inconceivability of building new infrastructure that had led to the APT project. 
  
(2) Public consultation 
 The first study of potential routes, carried out in 1970 by consultants Livesey and 
Henderson for the BRB, selected four options. Owing to the controversy already surrounding the 
scheme, DoE urged BR `to conciliate objectors as far as possible by following in effect motorway 
construction procedures (apart from a full public inquiry), namely by offering a choice of routes 
and, so far as practicable, giving weight to public preferences in making the final selection.'
11
 
Democratic imperatives were valued more highly than technical ones. The fact that the public 
consultation stage was modelled on that used in the case of motorway planning meant that any 
individual or authority that stood to be affected was entitled to make formal enquiries. BR issued a 
Document for Consultation in January 1974 and was inundated with enquiries (over 3000 in 
correspondence). They produced a booklet as well, Your Property and the Rail Link, which was 
sent to enquirers and to affected landowners. 
 During the public consultation stage, some MPs from within the governing party, whose 
constituencies were to be affected by the link, attacked BR's proposals; this according to BR's 
Bonavia, was for electoral reasons; he also argues that the overall Channel Tunnel scheme was not 
helped by `the often irrational attitudes of members of parliament.'
12
 The then Minister of Transport 
had to spend quite a lot of his time going `down on that route ... trying to calm people's anxieties' 
because south east England was `a very desirable place to live, occupied therefore on the whole by 
rich and articulate people! ... There was every resistance here, and there were lots of ministers'.
13
 
Public controversy surrounding the alignment was soon overtaken however by anxiety about the 
financial cost of building new infrastructure. 
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(3) Escalating costs 
 The first cost estimates were produced by Lively and Henderson (November 1970) and 
were notional; furthermore, they only estimated `capital' costs, thereby excluding expensive items 
such as signalling, electric traction equipment, land purchase and work on railway terminals; the 
costs of the four routes examined ranged from £44m at the lower hand to £61.5m for the most 
expensive option. At that time, `It was suggested that a "charm price" of £99 millions should be 
regarded as the absolute limit: the psychological (even if quite irrational) effect of going into three 
figures might well cause the project to be ruled out of court straight away.'
14
 The reference to 
`psychological effect' points to a referential framework dominated by politics and the quite 
arbitrary financial limit of £99m is an indication that formal financial constraints took precedence, 
no matter what the intrinsic merit of the case might be. In fact nowhere in the sections of his book 
dealing with CTRL does Bonavia mention the returns expected from the scheme; constraints and 
objections are dealt with at length but not opportunities and benefits, an accurate reflection of the 
type of public debate that was then taking place. 
 When it came to establishing detailed costings, BR had a very tight time-scale in which to 
work because official support was belated: `Both the engineering draughtsmen and the estate 
surveyors (as well as the lawyers) were desperately hard pressed by the demands of the timetable'; 
the planning that had gone on had `remained merely provisional until the government made up its 
mind about the international rail services and the investment required by the alternative strategies 
on offer.'
15
 One gains the impression that BR was wholly dependent on the government, not just for 
investment, but also for direction. 
 Departmental concerns about the potential political fallout of the scheme contributed to 
increasing costs, e.g. the amount of tunnelling along the proposed route gradually increased: `The 
local authorities and other influential groups demanded such protection from noise that the railway 
was forced either underground or in cutting and the cost became unacceptable.'
16
 The Conservative 
government had eventually decided that the link should be `high quality'; higher technical standards 
were more costly and BR had to lay aside cheaper solutions which they had been considering; it 
soon became apparent to the BR officer in charge of the matter that `a dangerous situation was 
developing ... [He] wrote a paper entitled The Slippery Slope ... It was agreed that an up-to-date re-
costing of the whole project was needed, before the design could be completely finalised'; the new 
estimate was worked out with a great deal of caution in an effort to seek `protection from 
subsequent criticism of under-estimation.'
17
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 The somewhat astonishing result of the exercise was a new price tag of £373m, which was 
very near the cost of the Channel Tunnel itself, as compared to an earlier feasibility study estimate 
of £123m. BR Chairman's view was that `Part of the increase was due to inflation, part probably to 
specifying a higher quality of track than was really necessary. It is also possible that the very able 
railway staff who dealt with the early estimates, did so in a rather cursory fashion, because they 
could not believe that the Government would ever renege on the project.'
18
 The alarming new 
figure was released on 26 November 1974, in the middle of parliamentary debate; it has been 
argued that the announcement `had very probably been made on the request of the Prime Minister', 
by then Harold Wilson; it created an outcry and for certain people sounded the deathknell of the 
project.
19
 On the same day, Secretary of State for the Environment Crosland declared `that it was 
"out of the question" that the Government should approve or finance an investment of £373 million 
pounds on the rail link.'
20
 He suspended procedures and put forward a proposal that ratification of 
the Channel Tunnel Treaty should be delayed by one year in order to enable BR to examine lower-
cost options for the rail link. 
 
(4) Cabinet division and parliamentary hurdles 
 The new rail link was entirely dependent on the construction of a fixed cross-Channel link 
and thus followed the fortunes of the Tunnel project itself. The latter began to be undermined in 
1974, when the incoming Labour government (elected in February) found three large investment 
projects committed to the budget by the outgoing (Conservative) government and the new Labour 
Chancellor, Dennis Healey, announced in March that `expensive projects favoured by the previous 
Government - the Maplin Airport and the Channel Tunnel - were to be reviewed, as was 
Concorde.'
21
 Environment Secretary Anthony Crosland wrote that the Cabinet found itself caught 
in the following dilemma: Concorde or the Tunnel, and that it was Tony Benn's plea for the 
supersonic aeroplane that had saved it from the axe in March 1974.
22
 Benn fought off successfully 
Dennis Healey, who wanted to cancel Concorde, at a Cabinet meeting on 21 March 1974, and 
again on 23 May; in July, the Prime Minister authorised the construction of 16 Concordes. But it 
was only a matter of time before the Tunnel was cancelled. 
 Labour politicians were divided over the issue in opposition as well as in government. 
Tony Benn recalled the Shadow Cabinet of 22 October 1973 `when the Channel Tunnel came up ... 
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Peter Shore and Michael Foot are strongly opposed to it, as I am, with Tony Crosland in favour.'
23
 
The Transport Minister `Fred Mulley made little secret of his opposition.'
24
 In November 1974 
Barbara Castle noted in her diary that one Cabinet meeting had started with `mutterings about the 
Channel Tunnel Bill (which clearly no one but Tony C. wants)'.
25
 The Chancellor in particular was 
against financing CTRL.
26
 At the Cabinet meeting of 21 November 1974, `Cabinet agreed to Tony 
C.'s plea that we should not scrap the channel tunnel project right away despite the unfeasibility of 
the cost of the rail link, but await the Cairncross Committee's report and allow him to negotiate a 
year's delay with the French.'
27
 
 Marsh (BR's Chairman), was very committed to both elements of the scheme. He `put in 
hand a crash programme to see how far the costs of this link could be cut' and came up `with a new 
set of figures which were about a hundred million pounds less than the previous estimate'.
28
 On 
learning that the Cabinet meeting on 16 January 1975 was likely to drop it, he sought to have the 
issue removed from the agenda so that there would be a reprieve during which he could present 
BR's revised estimate; he was told by Sir Robert Marshall (DoE's Second Permanent Secretary) 
however that `it is not a matter of figures, but of politics.'
29
 A Cabinet decision was taken on 16 
January 1975 to abandon the Channel Tunnel project altogether and compensate the shareholders, 
even though the companies had indicated their willingness to re-negotiate a timetable, and BR now 
had cheaper options for the infrastructure at the ready.
30
 The Cabinet's position was made public on 
20 January 1975 in the Commons, who ratified the decision (294 votes to 218). 
 With CTRL1 we find features of the referential framework similar to those of the APT 
project, namely the pre-eminence 1) of financial constraints, 2) of partisan considerations and 
practices (ministerial intervention) over more technical issues. The main criticism of the project in 
the public arena was its cost, yet Bonavia asserts that `British Rail had indicated clearly that, if the 
government so required, alternative and cheaper strategies could be put forward quickly ... At one 
stage in the planning, no less than eight rail strategies, each with different levels of first cost ... had 
                                                 
     
23
 Tony Benn, Against the Tide: Diaries 1973-1977 (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 73. 
     
24
 Marsh (1978), p. 195. 
     
25
 Castle (1980), 14/11/1974 entry, p. 217. 
     
26
 Bonnaud (1994), p. 210. 
     
27
 Castle (1980), p. 217. 
     
28
 Marsh (1978), p. 196. 
     
29
 As recounted in Bonnaud (1994), p. 210. 
     
30
 See Castle (1980), entry of 16 January 1975, p. 281. BR Chairman believed that `the Government decision to 
drop the Channel Tunnel was taken while the figures on the revised cost of the rail link were still in the offices of 
British Rail ... It was a typical example of the frivolous way in which major decisions are taken.' (Marsh, 1978, p. 
196.) 
  
 
 218 
been identified by BR's Channel Tunnel department ... it was always recognised that a fall-back 
solution might be required at short notice.'
31
 The pre-eminence of political factors was noted by 
Bonavia, who argued that the official reason for the sudden abandonment of the Channel Tunnel 
and CTRL projects in January 1975 - escalating costs - was not the real reason. In his opinion, the 
`British political system' had failed those projects: `the most important single factor was the 
disruption to the progress of the Channel Tunnel bill through parliament caused by two general 
elections in quick succession, coming at a critical time.'
32
 The Bill automatically lapsed at the 
dissolution of Parliament in February 1974, after a successful second reading and whilst it had 
already made good progress through the committee stage; it had to be reintroduced on 10 April 
1974, when it went through a second second reading before going to the committee stage again. 
This delay enabled opposition to gather strength. The change of political majority that took place in 
early 1974 was equally harmful: the Conservative government had called for a high quality link, 
but Labour soon requested that a lower cost solution be put forward.  
 Yet the Channel Tunnel had been given the official go-ahead in 1966 under Harold 
Wilson, who was again Prime Minister during the second crucial period, but following four years 
of Conservative government during which the project had received official support, he appeared to 
have lost his initial ardour. This illustrated `the way in which public and political opinion tends to 
swing backward and forwards'; he ascribed `the true cause' of the scheme's failure to `the changing, 
uncertain world of politics where one year's enthusiasm becomes next year's scepticism, one year's 
energy next year's lassitude.'
33
 The politician's horizon was perceived as being inimical to projects 
requiring a great deal of planning. Chairman Marsh also points out that only weeks before the 
Cabinet dropped the project, `many people, including myself, had been assuring French officials ... 
with the full support of Ministers, that there was no question of the UK ratting on the project; but 
we did just that.'
34
 
 High level political intervention overrode expert study: the Labour government elected on 
28 February 1974 had promptly set up an advisory group chaired by the economist Sir Alec 
Cairncross. The group's brief was to re-evaluate the Channel Tunnel project as a whole. But the 
decision to cancel the project was taken six months before the Cairncross report was even released. 
Such disregard for expert opinion is evidence that the scheme was not being appraised on its 
intrinsic merits but on the basis of extraneous - political and financial - considerations. The report 
found that the Tunnel scheme was viable although some organisational changes were needed and 
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made the following comment on the manner in which affairs had been conducted: `We have been 
conscious as our work proceeded that everything seemed to be happening in the wrong order.'
35
 
 
Conclusion 
 If we examine the configuration of the main players, it is clear that although the initiative 
for a new link came from the railway, BR soon became dependent on government direction and 
decisions throughout the planning stages and did not play a leading role. They did not possess 
sufficient resources to press ahead and to lobby for the scheme they really wanted. Some may argue 
that they did not really want to lobby since the project was not a priority at senior level but this in 
itself was symptomatic of a more general wariness at management level vis-à-vis costly, ambitious 
projects which, it was felt, were likely to be rejected, or if approved would distract management 
from more pressing problems. It would also seem from this account that lines of communication 
between BR and DoE were deficient. 
 With its scheme for a new link, Bonavia argues, `BR had the worst of both worlds - the 
stringent procedural requirements of private bill legislation, and the public consultation methods 
employed for motorways.'
36
 There was an emphasis on making sure that all interested parties were 
heard and on justifying all aspects of the scheme fully, even though there was a clear danger that 
this might prejudice the outcome. Transport Minister John Peyton had to try and calm `people's 
anxieties, saying "We will listen to you..." and all that sort of thing'.
37
 Procedures outweighed 
policy substance. 
 Finally changes of government proved fatal to CTRL1, both from a practical point of view 
and also for political reasons. Paradoxically it was a Conservative government which demanded a 
high-quality link, whilst Labour - the party of public ownership - were prepared to settle for a 
cheaper option. Thus ministerial preferences based either on party political or on financial grounds 
overrode technical and economic imperatives and led to an irrevocable decision being taken before 
the economic review of the project was even completed. 
 
 
B. The second CTRL scheme (1987-1993) 
 Once Franco-British talks about a fixed link had been revived, the option to which the 
BRB committed itself in January 1981 (Cross-Channel Rail Link) involved the use of existing lines 
in the Southern Region rather than the construction of a new link and `When the Channel Tunnel 
Bill was deposited, British Railways maintained that the existing network of lines and stations was, 
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in the main, adequate for the foreseeable future.'
38
 This option had been pursued ever since internal 
planning for the project had resumed; it was the BRB's own decision (not DoT's) in the late 1970s 
that the new project `should be based on our existing Southern Railway network, not on the 
unrealistic assumption that we would have the funds to construct a new line', a hope which `would 
have been scorned as extravagant and fanciful.'
39
 Once more, railway ambitions were self-curtailed 
so to speak. 
 Following the signature of the Channel Tunnel Treaty in February 1986, a Concession 
Agreement with Eurotunnel committed the British and French governments - in rather vague terms 
- to `use reasonable endeavours to carry out the infrastructure necessary for a satisfactory flow of 
traffic', which on the British side was translated as making use of existing, albeit upgraded, lines. 
By the end of 1988, the government had `approved, in principle, expenditure of about £600 million 
(1988 prices) by British Rail for investment in passenger services through the Tunnel from 
Waterloo and also for freight services. About half of this ... is for infrastructure, including track 
improvement, depots and passenger terminal facilities, mainly at Waterloo.'
40
 
 However, once the Channel Tunnel Treaty had been signed by both the British Prime 
Minister and French President of the Republic at Canterbury (February 1986), ratified by the 
French Parliament (June 1987) and the British Parliament (July 1987), rendering the process 
irreversible, it was pointed out that a new, high speed link between the Folkestone end of the 
Tunnel and London would improve transport links with the Continent; international services to 
Paris and Brussels in particular would greatly benefit. The Kent Impact Study, published by DoT in 
August 1987, `found that rail capacity would be required if growth in rail traffic was not to be 
constrained.'
41
 DoT's official viewpoint now was that 
  In 1986 British Rail took the view that existing lines would provide sufficient 
capacity for international traffic for the foreseeable future, and that a new railway 
was therefore not needed. It was not clear at this time how commuter traffic in 
south-eastern England would grow beyond the short term ... In August 1987, the 
Kent Impact Study questioned BR's view that a new line was unnecessary until 
well into the next century.
42
 
 From the autumn of 1987, BR therefore carried out feasability studies for a link which 
would be 68 miles long and would cut down journey times from 70mns to 37mns. But no new 
major railway had been built in Britain for nearly a century,
43
 and the same two formidable 
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obstacles encountered by CTRL1 stood in the way of a new railway: the fact that the area to be 
traversed was densely populated and the sheer cost of the scheme within the framework of British 
public policy (in his Budget Speech on 16 March 1993, Chancellor Norman Lamont referred to the 
new rail link as `one of the largest infrastructure projects in this country since the war'). 
 
(1) Financing the new link 
 The Eurotunnel fixed link project was essentially the 1960 scheme `as refined and 
developed during the 1970s by RT-Z and the French project managers, but with one important 
difference. The British Government had now ruled out any substantial investment by British Rail in 
a high speed link from London to the tunnel and the estimates of rail traffic accordingly had to be 
based upon use of the existing Southern Region routes, with the limitations this would impose on 
speed and capacity.'
44
 The UK government had insisted that private capital alone fund the project in 
its entirety (i.e. tunnel and transport links to it). It was only because the French government were 
very keen to go ahead with the project that they agreed to terms which they did not really favour 
and which did not coincide with common practice in France (where `mixed' financing of large 
infrastructure projects is common through sociétés d'économie mixte).
45
 The French and Belgian 
railways had now accepted that trains built to the British loading gauge would have to operate 
between London-Paris and London-Brussels, because this would not entail costly modifications to 
bridges and tunnels in Britain. Thus a financial restriction imposed by politicians dictated a 
technical feature of the link. 
 The terms of the Channel Tunnel Act confined public funding to domestic rail services, 
specifically prohibiting the Transport Secretary from providing a direct subsidy for international 
services, such as would be operated on the new link.
46
 The international rail link was to be entirely 
funded by private sources and it was several years before a way of using public funds without 
breaching the terms of the Act was publicly advocated; perhaps this was to do with the fact that 
between 1984-1985 and 1988-1989 UK public expenditure on rail had plummeted from over 
£1,500m to about £500m.
47
 
 In November 1989 BR selected the Eurorail group (Trafalgar House and BICC), as its 
joint-venture private sector partner. In March 1990 Eurorail warned that the plans would fail 
without government cash support (nearly £2bn in grants and cheap loans, to make the project 
financially viable). The scheme collapsed only four months later, when on 14 June 1990 the 
Transport Secretary, Cecil Parkinson, ruled out a public contribution: both Trafalgar House and 
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BICC pulled out. In the summer of 1990 however, DoT indicated that `it would not rule out a 
"backdoor" injection of public money into the existing rail network to deal with congestion caused 
by Channel Tunnel traffic.'
48
 This would not contravene the terms of the Treaty since the money 
would not be used to provide international services. A few months later, Cecil Parkinson 
announced that `The External Finance Limit for 1991-92 is 50 per cent higher than in last year's 
settlement ... BR can go ahead with its ambitious programme of investment in Channel tunnel 
services'.
49
 
 The 1992 Autumn Statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, 
introduced `significant changes to the rules for the private financing of major infrastructure 
projects',
50
 a significant departure from past practices: the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) `aimed at 
attracting private-sector funding into transport infrastructure projects'.
51
 And in the meantime the 
nature of the services to be provided on CTRL had altered. BR was now planning the link not as a 
fully dedicated international service but as a mixed international / commuter infrastructure, a fact 
which had crucial financial implications; a report by Union Railways Ltd (URL, BR subsidiary in 
charge of building the link, formed in late 1991) stressed that `some £1.1 billion NPV of economic 
benefits have been identified associated with domestic passenger traffic, which might be 
considered by the Government as a possible basis for grant.'
52
 On 16 March 1993 in what the 
Financial Times described as `a climbdown from the government's previously-stated intention of 
getting the line built entirely by the private sector', the Chancellor conceded that the government 
would have to `make its own financial contribution, recognising the benefits that will accrue to 
domestic travellers from the new link';
53
 the project was to `be taken forward as a joint venture' 
with the private sector. 
 A week later, the Transport Secretary pledged `substantial financial support'
54
 but did not 
provide detailed figures, although his pledge was understood to mean up to half the total cost. The 
cost estimates, above £4bn in 1991, had by then dropped considerably: much of the (expensive) 
tunnelling had been abandoned and generally `intensive development work ... [had] identified more 
economical solutions than previously considered',
55
 thus dramatically reducing the cost from 
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£4.5bn to £2.5bn. It was on 3 March 1994 that the government gave some indication of the size of 
its contribution: at least £1bn of public money would be provided. But the precise sum remained to 
be determined: `The amount of support to be provided would depend on the outcome of the 
competition' as `Consortia bidding to build and operate the railway propose the amount of 
Government money they think they need, and also ways in which they think the risks associated 
with the project should be divided between them and the Government'; the latter was to select the 
consortium `which offers the best deal on both fronts.'
56
 At the end of our case study, financing 
arrangements had still not been finalised, and the possibility of a European Union contribution was 
becoming increasingly likely.
57
 
 Estimated costs for the link fluctuated enormously, not just because totally different 
alignments were being assessed, but also for a particular alignment. DoT encouraged the 
presentation of competing proposals by BR and various private consortia as a way of pushing the 
Railways Board into bringing costs down. There was a belief that costing techniques could not be 
trusted. Even the Labour Transport Spokesman believed that `costing is neither easy nor entirely 
reliable.'
58
 Furthermore, financial constraints shaped policy to such a large extent that a satisfactory 
financial arrangement could not be arrived at quickly; different options had to be explored in turn 
and policy continuity could not be achieved. 
 
(2) Siting and public consultation 
 On 14 July 1988, four alternative routes were published by BR. In January 1989 BR 
selected Kings Cross as the second international terminal for CTRL. On 10 March 1989, following 
consultations with organisations in London and Kent, BR put forward its preferred southerly 
approach route for the link to Kings Cross. The 1989 route was different from BR's four 1988 
routes in that it featured a great deal of tunnelling through South London in order to reduce the 
environmental impact and was therefore more expensive. BR had pledged to `use all reasonable 
endeavours to ensure that the design of the line will make the best use of natural features' so as to 
minimise noise pollution,
59
 but the government rejected the proposal. 
 In October 1989, two south-easterly alternatives were put forward, both running to 
Stratford. In late 1989-early 1990, BR was `persuaded' to modify the proposal to reduce 
environmental impact, at an additional cost of £500m. This led BR to announce a 12-month delay 
in bringing its Private Bill before Parliament. The Joint Venture 1990 Route (BR/Eurorail), an 
amended south-easterly approach, submitted to DoT in April 1990, featured less tunnelling than the 
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1989 route. In June the Transport Secretary rejected the amended route as unacceptable and 
requested BR to re-examine routes to King's Cross via Stratford. 
 From November 1990 to April 1991 the BRB study team, with the help of engineering 
consultants W S Atkins, made a comparative study of four new options for the link: its own revised 
southerly approach terminating at Kings Cross; engineering consultancy Ove Arup's Cheriton-to-
King's Cross via Stratford Easterly Approach (published separately in March 1990); private 
company Rail Europe's eastern link (the `TALIS' route); Newham Council advisory team's 
southerly proposal for a link to Stratford. 
 The government had insisted that all proposals should be channelled through BR, which 
found itself both judge and jury, rather than through DoT or an independent commission. This was 
perceived as being quite natural, since neither DoT nor the Treasury had the necessary expertise to 
carry out such studies.
60
 In May 1991, BR submitted a new scheme to DoT, confirming the choice 
of Kings Cross as second terminal and selecting a southerly route to serve it, to be named the New 
Kent Main Line;
61
 it `concluded that its Southern Approach was superior in business, financial and 
economic terms whilst the Ove Arup proposal was considered the best Eastern Approach.'
62
 The 
least controversial route was Ove Arup's; it would cost only ten per cent more than BR's scheme 
which, whilst it was cheaper and more direct, ran through politically-sensitive areas of south-east 
London. Regarding the London terminal, there was disagreement between the Department and the 
railway, with the BRB favouring Kings Cross
63
 and John MacGregor, the Transport Secretary 
(along with the Treasury), supporting St Pancras. 
 BR's New Kent Main Line proposal encountered opposition from MPs across the party 
spectrum and the Cabinet was reportedly split on the matter: DoT supported BR's southerly 
approach, whilst the Environment Secretary (Michael Heseltine) and the Trade Secretary (Peter 
Lilley) were `said to be openly backing an alternative scheme to route the link along the river 
Thames corridor in Essex', via Stratford into Kings Cross, namely the Ove Arup route; this more 
easterly route was preferred by the Environment and Trade Secretaries because it would help to 
revitalise the area between Stratford and Southend. Also it would `help stop the capital's economic 
drift to the west.'
64
 The Environment Secretary also had plans for a new town east of London.
65
 The 
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Transport Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, had planned to make an announcement on the route by the 
end of July 1991 but as protests from south Kent residents grew, no consensus on the best option 
could be reached. The announcement was postponed. 
 On 9 October 1991, the long-awaited announcement about the route was made at the 
annual Conservative Party conference. Ove Arup's easterly approach was chosen (as the `Published 
Route', Cheriton to Kings Cross) and BR's second version of a southerly approach scrapped. This 
represented a `victory' for the easterly route lobby headed by Michel Heseltine and a severe setback 
for BR, who had spent four years working on its scheme and buying up property that was to be 
affected in South London. No timetable for the construction of the line was put forward however 
and the opening of the link was put off until the beginning of the 21st century. 
 Once the main corridor (the Published Route) had been decided, it still remained for BR to 
develop the precise alignment. This was carried out by Union Railways in close co-operation with 
the Ove Arup team, local authority officers and departmental officials. For when Malcolm Rifkind 
invited BR `to undertake such refinement of the route proposed by Ove Arup as is needed to 
safeguard it', he stated that he `should also like officials to play a full part in this work'; accordingly 
a joint Government/BR Steering Group was established and met at monthly intervals; although it 
was chaired by URL and comprised senior BR officers, representatives of interested departments 
were also members; this enabled close liaison to be maintained with departments.
66
 In fact, central 
government input was sizeable, as officials were briefed in detail on individual route options at 
each stage of the `sifting' process and their comments were taken into account.
67
 During the 
development process, URL also `consulted the Statutory Agencies (The Countryside Commission, 
English Heritage, English Nature, The Royal Commission on Historic Monuments in England and 
The Royal Fine Art Commission) in detail on the emerging results of route development.'
68
 The 
resulting Report, presented to the Secretary of State in January 1993 put forward a complete 
railway meeting government requirements, including `add-on' options that could be tailored to 
available financing.
69
 The add-on approach reflected the prevalence of financial imperatives over 
technical ones. 
 Following this discussion of policy-making at the central level, I would now like to turn to 
the local level input into the alignment. A High Level Forum chaired by the Secretary of State was 
set up as `the most senior level of consultation with local authorities'; at officials level, DoT chaired 
a number of working groups with local authorities; URL also participated in these discussions.
70
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Confidential consultation with individual authorities was carried out by Union Railways in `some 
70 formal meetings, primarily at officer level', between May and December 1992; the views and 
comments of authorities were sought at each stage of the route options selection process, and `local 
authorities' responses were taken into account in the further engineering and environmental 
development of the options'.
71
 As a result, local authorities had a significant input into the 
alignment. 
 A new order-making procedure for promoting railways through Parliament was enacted in 
the Transport And Works Act, 1992, which brought it into line with the procedure for roads: 
namely a local public inquiry was to be heard by a government-appointed Inspector, before a 
ministerial decision could be made, and Orders issued. After URL's Report (March 1993), the 
government announced the route chosen for public consultation; local authorities began to be 
formally consulted at the end of March 1993 and the public's views began to be sought in April 
1993. The public consultation period, which lasted six months and was carried out by URL could 
in principle lead to modest changes to the alignment: DoT `said that modifications can be 
considered "up to the point where the nature of the scheme changes".'
72
 The Secretary of State had 
`asked Union Railways to carry out a full consultation exercise'
73
 and the programme of public 
consultation, which involved setting up information centres along the route and organising 
numerous meetings, is said to have been `the most extensive ever carried out for a rail proposal.'
74
 
 In October 1993, BR submitted detailed proposals listing the options for `fine-tuning' the 
route. The government announcement expected the following month was postponed to January 
1994. On 24 January 1994 and following further consultation with BR and local communities, a 
final refinement of the March 1993 route was announced, which incorporated changes published 
the previous March. 
 Both the Ashford Borough Council and Kent County Council wanted a central route to 
serve the new international station at Ashford (approved by the Transport Secretary in spring 
1993), located on the existing railway line, in order to maximise its potential, and originally `the 
Published Route was designed to pass through the centre of the town' but `The Government 
subsequently asked BR to consider whether a more economical station scheme could be devised.'
75
 
Two other schemes were devised, DoT for its part preferring the one bypassing Ashford to the 
north; the URL study considered in 1993 that there was `no longer any need for the new line to 
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pass through the centre of Ashford' and that its Reference Route passing north of central Ashford 
was `superior to the Published Route in environmental and planning terms', as well as being 
cheaper.
76
 But in February 1994 the central route was suggested by BR as a compromise, based on 
the earlier proposal which had been `rejected by DoT because of £65 million cost of tunnelling'.
77
 
Eventually, on 28 April 1994 Transport Secretary John MacGregor announced that he had opted 
for the compromise central route. The one-year gap between the decision to approve the new 
international station at Ashford and the decision to choose a CTRL route that would connect with 
it, rather than one which would bypass it, is clear evidence that policy formulation did not follow 
an integrated approach. Also this episode illustrates the way in which government could impose 
financial constraints on plans already well-advanced, only to go back to the original plan 
eventually, owing to the presence of conflicting objectives. 
 Why was the siting of the new link the object of so much heated debate? In electoral terms, 
the stakes were high because some proposed routes ran through half-a-dozen marginal, 
Conservative seats, in Kent and in south London, threatening homes and locally cherished parts of 
the countryside, and were thus potential vote-losers for the government. The perceived threat to the 
`Garden of England' in particular aroused a great deal of opposition. Some of the towns affected by 
BR's scheme began to organise as early as December 1987, only weeks after BR had started 
feasability studies. The London Borough (LB) of Hackney resolved to oppose the railway 
proposals. The prospect of houses having to be compulsorily acquired and/or demolished played an 
important part: BR's southerly route implied the acquisition of 127 homes and the destruction of 
24, whilst Ove Arup's easterly route at first involved the acquisition of only two houses and no 
demolitions.
78
 The easterly route was therefore perceived to be sounder in political terms and the 
Secretary of State emphasised in October 1991 `the importance that the Government attached to 
minimising the demolition of residential property resulting from the new railway.'
79
 
 Another factor which may have increased public uncertainty was that after BR's earlier 
proposed alignment had been rejected (June 1990), the Board apparently ceased to back its own 
proposals: on April 4 1991, the Guardian newspaper stated that because of the high degree of 
controversy, `Sources [said] BR [would] not make a firm recommendation to Malcolm Rifkind, the 
Transport Secretary', leaving him to shoulder the possible repercussions of the decision.
80
 And 
Union Railways' report stressed that its route proposals `are not recommendations, but options for 
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Ministers to consider.'
81
 BR was not seeking to put pressure on politicians to choose a `best 
solution' and thus acknowledged their powerlessness to influence the decision-making process. 
 Wavering on the part of government created a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. 
Sections of the route that the government had either already safeguarded or vowed to safeguard 
were later altered: Malcolm Rifkind announced that `Given our preference for the easterly route I 
will be revoking the existing safeguarding directions for the route which British Rail had proposed 
in mid Kent between Cheriton and Upper Halling ... replacing them with new directions ... where 
the Ove arup route diverges from the existing safeguarded line.'
82
 Protesters from the areas of Kent 
that would have been affected by BR's southerly route breathed a sigh of relief when the 
government chose the easterly route in October 1991, only to find in the spring of 1993 that the line 
would after all run through some of those areas, because `significant deviations from the original 
route drawn up by engineers Ove Arup' had been made, even though the government had `insisted 
that the Ove Arup route was "safeguarded".'
83
 A report by the Parliamentary Ombudsman, William 
Reid, published on 8th February 1995, found `"unremedied maladministration" in the way the 
Transport Department had handled proposals to build the link through Kent' and criticised `the 
period of "limbo" from June 1990 ... to last April [1994] ... The effect', said Mr Reid, `was to 
prolong the "uncertainty and associated blight for a period of unknown duration with no certainty 
that the position would be resolved".'
84
 
 To sum up, negotiations were long, complex, and highly controversial. As with CTRL1 
there were at all times several routes simultaneously under study; naturally, this multiplied the 
number of potential objectors but there was no desire on the part of government to only present to 
the public one fully worked out alignment. On the contrary open competition between the various 
routes was encouraged to ensure cost-effectiveness. Once URL set to work on the Published Route 
from late 1991, in all `about 1000km of route options were considered for the 108km of route from 
Cheriton to Kings Cross, involving well over one hundred individual sub-route options.'
85
 This 
extremely thorough process was inherently costly and time-consuming. 
 
(3) Land purchases and compensation 
 The early private railway companies had been granted rights of compulsory purchase on a 
fairly flexible basis: `The legislature leaves it to the company to determine what lands are 
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necessary to be taken.'
86
 This practice continued once the railways were nationalised. The purchase 
of property and land could be carried out in two ways: through compulsory purchase orders (CPOs) 
under the parliamentary procedure introduced by the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 or through 
voluntary purchase schemes devised by British Rail itself.
87
 
 BR spent £100m purchasing 1,081 houses and flats in south London and west Kent that 
were set to be blighted by the link along its preferred, southerly route. BR was able to go ahead 
with such a major undertaking before the route had actually been confirmed because it was carried 
out under a voluntary purchase scheme. But when the Stratford route was chosen by government in 
1991, the properties were no longer needed and had to be sold off (at a loss, owing to the property 
slump of the late 1980s and early 1990s).
88
 The fact that BR and government had been at odds over 
the precise alignment had made it impossible for BR to plan ahead with any certainty. It had also 
meant that residents in south London suffered from property blight during the four years when a 
decision was being made (1987 to 1991). 
 Compensation constituted a thorny problem: `One of the troubles here has long been that 
you get these tremendous resistance movements because people ... do not feel they are being 
properly treated!'
89
 One interviewee described the compensation regime in the following terms: 
  There are things on the statutory book ... in the usual British way there is no 
overarching legislation, there's something about noise, something about 
compulsory purchase, you know little bits and pieces which have been built into 
the system progressively.
90
 
For instance, the traditional rule as regards the date of assessment of compensation was that it 
would be the same date as that when notice to treat for purchase was given by the authority. But 
notice might be served several years after the CPO had been confirmed and `in 1970 the House of 
Lords held that this so-called rule of the 19th century would work injustice in the 20th century in 
an economy of rising prices and unstable values where delays between service of notice to treat and 
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expropriation could cover decades.'
91
 Also no legislation applied specifically to railway noise; 
although there were regulations for new roads, there were `no equivalent regulations for new 
railways'; BR at first `decided that policies equivalent to those adopted for the construction of new 
roads should be adopted for the construction of the new railway line through Kent.'
92
 Residents 
who lived very close to the line would qualify for compensation under statutory rules if they could 
prove that the noise levels were unacceptable;
93
 which is to say that `they must live with the noise 
of the trains for a year and a day while the noise levels are measured'.
94
 The actual compensation 
payments would therefore not be made until construction of the link had been completed and 
services were running. The complexity of the legislation made disputes more likely and more 
protracted. 
 Following the choice of the Ove Arup route, eleven houses, all in East Kent, would have to 
be demolished and a number of houses close to the North London line could be expected to be 
affected by noise and pollution. Valuation of the affected properties would be carried out by a local 
estate valuer, and in case of disagreement the owners could appeal to a Lands Tribunal. The terms 
of compensation depended on guidelines from DoT, in particular regarding the size of the 
compensation belt, which BR were awaiting after the final route announcement in March 1993. 
This time, it was `clear that BR wants to avoid a repetition of what happened last time around'.
95
 
Eventually, the compensation terms in connection with the easterly route were worse than those 
offered by BR for its earlier, south London route: the compensation belt was going to be narrower 
and restricted to a `blight zone', in which claims could be made by affected residents and 
compulsory purchases might take place. But the wider, `voluntary purchase zone' that BR had 
created around the southerly route was not to be repeated; residents who lived within a 240-metre 
belt would no longer be able to invite BR to buy their properties. By January 1994, Union Railways 
estimated that `only around 30 properties will be judged "seriously affected"' that is rendered 
uninhabitable.
96
 Owners of such properties could apply to Union Railways lawyers to be 
considered under BR's voluntary purchase scheme. 
 The compensation arrangements were widely perceived as unfair by the local population 
and criticised by a number of public bodies: the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors for 
instance called for `the blight provisions to be extended to properties adjacent or very near to the 
                                                 
     
91
 Newman (1975), p. 332. 
     
92
 BRB (Dec. 1988), p. 1. 
     
93
 In order to qualify, the noise level must exceed 68 decibels for an 18-hour daytime period (or 63 decibels for 
an 18-hour nighttime period) in sound sensitive rooms. 
     
94
 The Guardian (29/01/1993): p. 31. 
     
95
 Comment in The Guardian (27/03/1993): p. 33. 
     
96
 The Guardian (29/01/1994): p. 31. 
  
 
 231 
land being acquired.'
97
 The Parliamentary Ombudsman found that DoT had `failed to consider the 
need for special compensation for householders suffering extreme or exceptional hardship from the 
prolongation of blight to their property.'
98
 
 
(4) Building and operating the link 
 In May 1992, Ministers stated that an independent operator would own CTRL and the 
Transport Secretary formally announced the government's commitment to privatising Union 
Railways. On 11 November 1993 the Transport Secretary announced that a competition would be 
launched early in 1995 in order to select a private sector partner to design, construct and operate 
the link. This would entail a delay of two more years. The fate of the project now rested entirely on 
the willingness of the private sector to take responsibility for its development and completion. 
 
Conclusion 
 At the end of the lengthy and tortuous process presented above, which had lasted seven 
years, both BR's original route and its original choice of main terminal had been rejected. 
Following delays in decision-making, completion of the link could not be expected to take place 
before 2002 at the earliest. Even by January 1994 the link had only been planned, with no 
guarantee that it would actually be built, as the financing of it had yet to be worked out and the 
parliamentary bill had to be approved. 
 The second CTRL scheme encountered difficulties of the same nature as the first: financial 
(funding) and political (siting). Politico/financial imperatives dictated the alignment of the route, 
the type of works to be carried out (e.g. tunnelling), and the services that would eventually run 
(commuter, international and freight). The operator's (technical) preferences were overriden most 
of the time even when they produced less costly options. BR neither had the resources nor the 
opportunity to put forward a single route so as to minimise public controversy, for open 
competition between various options was seen as the way forward by central government. Whilst 
decisions were being taken, provisions had to be made nonetheless for Channel Tunnel traffic that 
would flow whilst the line was still in the planning and building stages.
99
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 Following the detailed presentation of CTRL1 and 2, let us now turn to the core of the 
policy-making machinery and examine the assumptions and practices that gave the two schemes 
their particular colours. 
 
 
C. Looking at the Whitehall-Westminster politico/financial horizon 
 Having run through the various controversies that dogged both Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
schemes from their inceptions, we must bear in mind that according to one senior practitioner, `The 
Channel Tunnel offers British Rail the biggest opportunity for expansion in many years.'
100
 It might 
have been expected that such prospects for growth would have been seized, in true commercial 
spirit, and that both BR and government would have cooperated to make a success of a venture 
with a high international profile. But this was clearly not the case (much to the puzzlement of 
French observers). Some of the reasons for this are well beyond the scope of this work. In any case, 
we are focusing on conceptions and practices of public policy, not on policy outcomes, and several 
features of the British referential framework are thrown into relief by the CTRL case study: the 
Treasury ethos clearly impacted on both CTRL projects; Parliamentary procedures unequivocally 
slowed down the policy process both times; the terms of the debate around both schemes were such 
that controversy was inevitable; and lack of policy direction was apparent in both instances. 
 
(1) The Treasury ethos 
 It has been argued that `The Treasury has never been convinced of the need for a high 
speed line in the first place'.
101
 It was its refusal to provide any public funding at all that caused the 
collapse of BR's original plan to build the line with Eurorail in the summer of 1990. Eurotunnel's 
chief executive, Sir Alastair Morton, described the delay between the opening of the tunnel and the 
inauguration of the new line as a `disaster' and put the responsibility for it squarely on the Treasury: 
`The decision has been made under orders from the Treasury to avoid spending money.'
102
 
 Further Treasury influence could be detected in February 1993, when leaks suggested that 
the Treasury was in favour of the `cheap' option through the capital (using part of the existing 
North London line and terminating at St Pancras), then under discussion. This modified plan - 
which would save £1bn - had been requested at the eleventh hour from Union Railways and 
industry sources claimed that the Treasury would only come up with some funds if BR dropped its 
plans for a Kings Cross terminal and backed the St Pancras option.
103
 A Treasury meeting was held 
                                                 
     
100
 Henes, Co-Chairman of Channel Tunnel Intergovernmental Commission (1989): p. 303. 
     
101
 FT (10/10/1991): p. 11. One BR Chairman recalled with characteristic understatement that the Tunnel was 
`never a favourite item with the Treasury' (Parker, 1989, p. 242). 
     
102
 The Guardian (10/10/1991): p. 24. 
     
103
 The Guardian (2/03/1993): p. 4. 
  
 
 233 
on 15 March 1993 `to decide the final strategy' for unveiling a number of transport projects 
including the Chunnel link.
104
 It was the following day that the Chancellor announced that St 
Pancras had been chosen, a choice which `was understood to have been prompted by the Treasury, 
which is pressing for the cheaper option'.
105
 But this preference had not been agreed by other 
Ministers, chief amongst them the Transport Secretary and it was not until January 1994 that the 
Chancellor's choice was confirmed. 
 Treasury cuts also had a detrimental effect on the scheme. On 1st November 1993, the 
news that deep spending cuts were to be imposed by the Treasury on DoT's baseline budget were 
made public; the cuts of up to ten per cent meant that the project would have to be delayed further. 
This was officially confirmed a few days later, when the government announced that the project 
was being postponed possibly until 2002.
106
 The Hybrid Bill for the intended railway had been 
expected to be lodged in the House of Commons in March 1994 but because of the impending cut 
could now only be ready for the autumn of that year. Repeated delays and uncertainties over the 
Channel link led to criticism by Tory backbenchers of that latest postponement. The Treasury was 
clearly pinpointed as the main culprit by the leading Conservative `rail' MP, Sir Keith Speed, who 
described MacGregor as `the latest in a line of transport ministers who have been pushed into a 
corner by the Treasury. This is simply a delaying tactic.'
107
 
 A further development originating in the Treasury took place only days before the final 
`safeguarded' route was announced, when it emerged that the Treasury wanted `to allow private 
sector investors to make further changes to the route.'
108
 This added flexibility was meant to make 
the project more attractive to the private sector but would increase blight and was politically 
insensitive. 
 There has also been criticism of the Treasury's rigid attitude to compensation of residents 
along the route: one former official depicted it as `breathing down necks of course all the time to 
say "You pay exactly what the [statutory book] says and nothing more". No favours, no bribes, no 
inducements'.
109
 
 Lastly the Treasury also held sway when it came to the institutional dimension of the 
project. At first it indicated that if the link was to be built, then operators other than BR should be 
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able to use it in order to maximise revenue. Later, in May 1992, ministers stated that an 
independent operator would own the line. Finally the Chancellor announced that `Full 
responsibility for the project, its management and completion will be transferred to the private 
sector.'
110
 A week later the Transport Secretary formally announced that the government was 
committed to privatising Union Railways. 
 As regards the possibility of European Union funding, the Treasury's `additionality rules' 
stipulated that any grants from EU sources would be deducted from government grants which had 
been agreed, rather than provide assistance over and above what the British government was 
prepared to commit. This was but one instance of what commentators have often described as the 
rigidity of Treasury rules. 
 The weight of Treasury opinion could not be countered in most instances. The Chancellor 
enjoyed a remarkably high profile in a decision that was after all the province of the Transport 
Secretary. The tight financial controls traditionally imposed on the nationalised railway were much 
in evidence throughout the funding controversy. Proposals involving expenditure (that is nearly all) 
were all scrutinised by Treasury officials and the pace of decision-making was greatly dependent 
on Treasury action. But it was also greatly affected by parliamentary developments, which are the 
object of the next section. 
 
(2) Parliamentary procedures 
 Parliament was involved in CTRL planning in several ways: legislation could be amended, 
and had to be passed by both Houses, hearings were carried out by committees of MPs and the 
BRB had to give a number of parliamentary undertakings, for instance `that Kent commuter 
services will not be curtailed to provide capacity for Channel Tunnel services.'
111
 
 CTRL had to pass the test of parliamentary procedure, which was `essentially the same as 
has been used since the first, Victorian, railway building era.'
112
 In the days of private railway 
companies, a company would sponsor a railway Bill whenever it wished to build a new line. This 
could be a fairly lengthy process: the London & North Western Railway Company was promoting 
a railway Bill in 1880 but only obtained their Act in 1883. BR fared even worse: in early 1989, 
they hoped to present their Bill in November 1989,
113
 yet it was not until five years later 
(November 1994) that the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) Bill was actually deposited. The 
organisation promoting the scheme, that is the Railways Board, had to obtain specific powers from 
Parliament in order to purchase land and construct new track (in fact, BR had to seek parliamentary 
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approval even for minor changes to existing routes, which happened on a regular basis).
114
 This 
also applied to new stations: in November 1989, BR deposited a Private Bill for a new international 
station at Ashford in Kent. BR also wished to develop the King's Cross area in London through a 
joint-venture company, the London Regeneration Consortium, in connection with the international 
CTRL terminal that was planned there, and deposited a King's Cross Development Bill. 
 Originally BR had considered sponsoring CTRL through a Private Bill, which would have 
to be examined by a group of MPs and by a group of Lords, taking evidence from any affected 
people who had decided to petition. Under the Private Bill procedure, objectors - such as local 
authorities or residents - could lodge petitions against the BR Bill, which would be heard by a 
Select Committee. Hearings would be of a semi-judicial nature: petitioners could be represented by 
counsel and witnesses could be called. But by April 1991, BR was considering the feasability of a 
Hybrid Bill, less likely to get bogged down in the parliamentary process for years.
115
 DoT's 
International Railways Division also envisaged this possibility during 1992,
116
 but it was not until 
22 March 1993 that the Transport Secretary announced that the project would indeed proceed as a 
Hybrid Bill; in effect the government itself would be the sponsor, since public money was to be 
used, and so that it could pass more speedily through Parliament. A Select Committee would be 
established to take evidence. Because it was `one of the biggest and most complex in parliamentary 
history' however,
117
 it was expected by the end of 1993 that it could still take as much as two years 
to complete its passage through Parliament. The Bill was introduced to Parliament in November 
1994 and January 1995 saw its Second Reading, unopposed. Piloting the Bill through Parliament 
was an uneasy task not simply because a parliamentary majority had to be secured at each Reading, 
but also because `the process may provide opportunities for interested parties to convince MPs of 
the need for fresh changes to the government's proposed route', which would lead inevitably to 
further delays.
118
 The committee of MPs did not have to accept proposed changes to the route but 
with 993 petitions being considered, hearings were bound to be lengthy.
119
 
 Transport practitioners disliked the parliamentary process: whenever the need for 
parliamentary approval was mentioned, either in the transport literature or during interviews, it was 
stressed that `the passage of a Bill through Parliament was a large undertaking'
120
 or that it had a 
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dissuasive effect on rail policy. The CTRL Bill was no exception and securing its passage through 
Parliament was not perceived as an easy task. When considering this possibility in 1988, 
Conservative M.P. Robert Adley saw three obstacles: `environmental factors'; the fact that `the 
Kent Members of Parliament through whose seats the line would pass would need to be persuaded 
of its acceptability'; and `Additionally Parliament would have to be persuaded that a modus vivendi 
had been agreed with BR, and this may not be as easy a task as the promoters might believe.'
121
 
This last hurdle became very prominent in the years following Adley's remark, not least because 
the terms of the policy debate were contested by the interested parties. 
 
(3) The terms of the debate 
 Differences of opinion amongst pro-link supporters and between the authorities involved 
gave the appraisal process a heightened relevance. From the very beginning of CTRL1 the need for 
a new link was disputed; The Times stated that `Links from London to Foulness and the Channel 
Tunnel apart ... Britain is unlikely to need much in the way of new railways',
122
 and the Railways 
Board had always envisaged the need for a new line if the Channel Tunnel were built, but were 
faced with politicians who did not even want the Tunnel.
123
 Those who did had no conception that 
a new rail link should be considered concurrently. 
 DoT's position was not necessarily supportive of the industry it sponsored and BR's case 
for the high speed link was all the more difficult to make. There was disagreement between DoT 
and BR over the issue of capacity on existing lines, with BR insisting that they could only manage 
until 1998, whilst Transport officials and the Transport Secretary Malcolm Rifkind foresaw no 
problems until 2005.
124
 The Prime Minister later declared that `The present rail lines through Kent 
have been improved to take tunnel traffic and will provide sufficient capacity until some time after 
the turn of the century.'
125
 BR's view was supported in a report by the House of Commons 
Transport Select Committee, which concluded that `With the exception of the department, our 
witnesses believed that the link will be needed before the turn of the century.'
126
 Conservative M.P. 
Robert Adley had gone even further and stated that `It is an open secret ... that BR do have a line 
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capacity problem in Kent. Parts of the route proposed for the International trains are, frankly, 
already saturated.'
127
 
 This disagreement was due to disputed estimates for Channel Tunnel traffic; some 
interested parties saw very promising prospects whilst others predicted slow growth: e.g. BR's 
forecasts were more cautious than those of the other two main companies involved in the project; 
SNCF, drawing on its extensive experience of traffic generated by TGV services, was the most 
optimistic.
128
 But scepticism as regards traffic levels was strongest within the Treasury, and the 
postponement of the rail link announced in October 1991 marked `a triumph for the Treasury, 
which does not believe that BR's traffic forecasts will justify the opening of a new line until at least 
2005.'
129
 The time frame being used was crucial; in the mind of a transport professional from 
Transmark (BR's international consultancy), `One key element of any launch of high speed services 
[was that] demand elasticities have to be considered over the long term rather than the short term'
130
 
and the Treasury was insensitive to long term arguments. 
 Furthermore, the argument that higher speeds generate new passenger transport demand 
was not universally agreed. On the one hand, the importance of journey times was emphasised by 
the engineering consultancy Ove Arup, who argued that `the south-east has amongst the worst 
journey times to Central London for equivalent distances. Even without the Channel Tunnel, a case 
could perhaps be made for a new high speed route ... to cut journey times by more than 40 
minutes.'
131
 And the studies commissioned by Eurotunnel from independent consultants were based 
on the assumption that journey times were one of the main factors influencing demand and that `the 
introduction of more attractive services (in terms of time and cost savings)' would lead to `the 
creation of additional trips'.
132
 URL argued that using CTRL for domestic passenger trains would 
present `an opportunity to generate additional passenger revenues'.
133
 And some, particularly on the 
Labour side, were in favour of deliberately influencing demand, arguing that the damages caused 
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by road transport `can only be mitigated by stimulating a greater demand for public transport, 
particularly the railways'.
134
 On the other hand, such arguments had traditionally not been validated 
by DoT. For instance, one Transport official stated that as regards the question: `Have increased 
rail speeds affected demand and market share? ... one could only answer, if that were possible at 
all, by means of an in-depth study ... the data we have at our disposal until now have been limited ... 
it is extremely difficult to isolate the effects produced by improvement in railway services from 
more general economic changes.'
135
 
 From around 1992, there was a series of marked shifts from such professed scepticism to 
an acceptance of transport-centred arguments, e.g. time savings: the modelling techniques 
eventually used to assess the benefits of CTRL in 1992-1993 did take them into account, using the 
DoT-defined `assumed values of time, which are also used in the evaluation of highway 
schemes.'
136
 One major principle of road schemes evaluation was transferred to the evaluation of a 
railway trunk line, albeit belatedly. 
 Similarly between 1987 and 1994, appraisal criteria evolved quite considerably. At first 
investment could not be justified by including non-financial factors: `the unwillingness of HMG to 
allow BR to enlist social and environmental factors to support claims for rail infrastructure 
investment decisions ... [has] to date precluded any serious consideration of following the French 
example by building a brand new railway for Channel Tunnel trains on this side.'
137
 By the time 
URL produced its report however, economic factors had been legitimised.
138
 The report identified 
two main investment cases: firstly, the `Board Reference Case' was designed to `maximise the 
financial performance of the route'; secondly, `The Government [had] asked Union Railways to 
identify any further options beyond the Board Reference Case which would be justified on a 
cost/benefit analysis of the total economic benefits of domestic services',
139
 including `benefits to 
those using the new line, reductions in overcrowding on existing lines, and reduction in road 
congestion'; the analysis carried out by URL corresponded `broadly to a cost/benefit analysis of the 
project.'
140
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 How do we account for this sudden change of heart as regards the appraisal methodology? 
The possibility of a EU financial contribution carried with it a number of conditions: applications 
for EU funding had to show that a project was consistent with regional planning, had to include an 
environmental impact assessment, but above all had to include a cost-benefit assessment as well as 
financial analysis. Also recent macroeconomic research had produced new evidence in favour of 
CBA which had elicited a `renewed commitment, increasingly evident on both sides of the 
Atlantic, actually to proceed with CBA-passed projects and realise thereby the full range of their 
transport benefits.'
141
 The departmental change of attitude towards the application of CBA to rail 
projects, which it had resisted for so long, needs analysing but taking place as it did at the very end 
of our case studies cannot be fully explored in this work. It points, at any rate, to the dynamic 
nature of policy-making. 
 BR was looking for evidence of transport integration: members of the Board stated in 1985 
that `The evaluation of a fast services project must take place within the context of the railway 
network as a whole in which it is going to fit in.'
142
 Some parliamentarians were also keen to 
promote a more integrated approach to transport: in November 1989, the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Community `expressed alarm at the evidence which showed the 
inadequacy of ground level transport infrastructure in the EC and particularly in the United 
Kingdom ... The select committee concluded ... that there was a need for integrated policies within 
the individual member states which have been particularly lacking in the United Kingdom'.
143
 
Transport integration had been a main plank of Labour policy since at least 1945 and the then party 
leader Neil Kinnock re-asserted this belief: `amongst the most vital components in the modern, 
integrated transport system that Britain needs to succeed, there must be modern high-speed rail 
links running from Scotland and Wales through England to the Channel Tunnel and the European 
mainland.'
144
 The Government itself adopted a relatively integrative approach in the remit they gave 
URL in 1991: the financial evaluation was to be carried out both on an incremental basis - that is 
looking solely at CTRL services - and on a whole business basis - that is including both new CTRL 
services and existing EPS services; the rates of returns obtained were a great deal more attractive in 
the whole business evaluation (at 10% for the IRR against 4%, and 13-15% for the economic return 
against 10-11%).
145
 However the evaluation remained integrated at a purely regional level and did 
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not take into account benefits to the railway network as a whole, which was hardly surprising since 
the Government was by then seriously considering railway privatisation and splitting the railway 
into separate businesses. 
 The argument that the competitiveness of the Channel Tunnel against air travel could only 
be assured if good, integrated rail links served it on either side does not seem to have carried a lot 
of weight, to judge by the leisurely speed with which decisions were made. The day after BR's 
preferred route had been rejected, the Chairman of the Railway's Board declared that `It's a shame 
we can't get an integrated transport solution in place that makes sense for the 21st century.'
146
 He 
also believed that the decision had been taken on political rather than transport grounds.
147
 The 
Transport Secretary on the other hand claimed that the easterly route had significant environmental 
advantages, as well as economic ones such as commercial development and employment 
opportunities along the east Thames corridor
148
 and denied that the rejection of the southerly route 
(October 1991) implied criticism of British Rail, stating that: `They [BR] were quite properly 
looking at it from a transport point of view ... We have had to look at the wider implications.'
149
 
The subtext of this statement was that (technical) transport considerations were inherently narrow 
and must be superseded by ministerial considerations. 
 The prominence of economic factors on the central government side increased between 
1974-1991. With CTRL1, the perception had been that Britain had very little to gain; during the 
January 1975 Cabinet meeting that decided to abandon the project, Crosland (who had been a keen 
supporter of the Channel Tunnel project) was reported to have said `that the French had far more to 
gain from the project than we had: they did not face the need for a highly expensive rail link.'
150
 
Wider economic gains do not appear to have been considered by the Labour Government then. 
With CTRL2 however, Adley conceded that `Undoubtedly the Government ... made much of the 
regional benefit to be derived from the project' but, the M.P. continued, `the Government has not 
yet taken the essential steps fully to exploit the regional advantages.'
151
 At that stage BR confined 
itself to stressing benefits to transport users which ministers could not dispute: BR's CTRL 
proposal in its final form (May 1991) did its utmost to provide `wider' user benefits, improving 
travel not only to the Channel but also for 50,000 Kent commuters. The new infrastructure was to 
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be used both by high speed trains for international passengers and by high speed suburban trains.
152
 
Once Heseltine had publicly stated his wish to see the link used as an instrument of urban planning 
in East London, stressing wider economic benefits such as urban regeneration, and the Government 
had taken this argument into account when selecting the easterly route (October 1991), with the 
Secretary of State stressing that `the easterly route offers substantial new development 
opportunities',
153
 BR also began to put forward economic arguments. 
 The economic benefits of Tunnel services were taken into account as regards the South-
East but planning designed to foster regional benefits for the North and Scotland was conspicuous 
by its absence; as a result there was widespread concern that the Channel Tunnel would exacerbate 
the North-South divide. Section 40 of the Channel Tunnel Act required BR to make proposals to 
serve the regions but those that were published in 1989 were criticised for their minimalism. BR 
did not wish to get involved in issues of regional planning, viewed as overtly `political'. Later URL 
did briefly point out that Kings Cross, with its InterCity connections to the North and the Midlands, 
would make a good CTRL terminal: `the project to add the international connections represents an 
outstanding opportunity for London and for the North.'
154
 St Pancras on the other hand offered no 
such connections. This point had previously been acknowledged by the Secretary of State, who 
argued that the eastern route he had selected `should give a major economic boost, not just to the 
South East, but to other regions as well, particularly the North of England and Scotland, where 
passengers need a rail link terminating at King's Cross.'
155
 But the Treasury overrode regional 
development imperatives and St Pancras was chosen. 
 On the whole, the debate was fragmented and conducted on different terms by different 
parties: BR tended to confine its case to technical arguments whilst ministers expressed party 
political views, sometimes resorting to economic arguments, and the Treasury exercised strong 
control in the name of financial orthodoxy. The diverse views seemed unlikely to be reconcilable as 
they belonged to different planes of analysis. At the same time, no one view was so dominant that it 
could prevail throughout the policy formulation phase. 
 
(4) The twists and turns of decision-making 
 The decision to build new rail infrastructure between London and the Channel Tunnel was 
fraught with difficulties: twenty-four years elapsed between the launch of the original concept in 
1970 and official approval in March 1994, though in fairness the scheme was (officially) shelved 
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for half of that period. The lack of initial government support for CTRL2 was only overturned in 
the spring of 1993, when both political support (in the shape of a Hybrid Bill) and financial support 
(public funds) were indicated by government. 
 In the meantime, numerous delays occurred, creating a great deal of uncertainty, in 
connection with the parliamentary process, funding and siting. As mentioned above, the original 
hope was for a Private Bill to be presented in November 1989. Then when the possibility of a 
speedier Hybrid Bill was first mentioned, it was hoped that it could be introduced in spring 1991 
and obtain Royal Assent by the end of 1993. Even once political support had been secured, the 
timetable continued to be altered: URL's report in March 1993 made the following assumption on 
timing, namely that `the deposit of a Hybrid Bill in the Winter of 1993/94 will lead to Royal Assent 
in 1995'
156
 but in November 1993 Transport Secretary John MacGregor postponed the introduction 
of the Parliamentary Bill to autumn 1994. 
 The government's position as regards funding of the project was dramatically altered, 
evolving from a stern refusal to even consider a public contribution to acceptance that the project 
should go forward as a jointly-financed private/public partnership. Paradoxically the original 
position was taken whilst Britain was running a budget surplus of about £10bn a year, and the offer 
of public money took place whilst there was a budget deficit of £50bn. It follows that this decision 
was not purely based on a public finance rationale but was dictated by political necessity once it 
had become abundantly clear that the private sector would simply not come forward with the 
totality of the funds required. The delays in the funding decision also played havoc with BR's 
timetable, which initially assumed that `construction will commence during 1995 and conclude in 
1999.'
157
 
 As regards the alignment, the government was very sensitive to political pressure, both 
from parliamentary constituencies and from local authorities. The route initially expected to be 
chosen by government gave rise to such loud protest from some Conservative MPs that it had to be 
dropped. In his capacity as Conservative Party chairman, Chris Patten had been `concerned about 
losing six Tory-held marginal seats in south-east London and Kent through which BR's route ran' 
and had been a `prominent player in the rail link decision'.
158
 Local government, businesses and 
residents were actively involved from the earliest days, setting up organisations which supported 
different options and were involved in lobbying. 
 Besides financing and siting the link, there was another matter to be decided which fuelled 
controversy. BR's original proposal had been for a passenger-only high speed link, which meant 
that goods traffic would have to run on Kent commuter lines, a prospect which aroused fierce local 
opposition. BR began accordingly to plan for freight services between the Tunnel and London. In 
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April 1991 however, `Plans for a four-track route with a freight line alongside a passenger line 
[were] ditched on grounds of cost'
159
 (£8bn minimum). And when in May 1992 the government told 
URL to design the new link as a two- rather than four-track rail line, it must still be able to 
accommodate freight services in future, in addition to passenger trains; URL `were therefore asked 
to consider the possibility of providing passing loops' to allow passenger trains to overtake the 
slower freight trains; the line would also require upgraded track in order to bear freight loads.
160
 
 One striking feature of the decision-making was the absence of firm central guidance as 
regards timing: on 9 October 1991 for instance, it was announced at the annual Conservative Party 
Conference that the construction of the link was to be postponed until the next century. Even when 
the Chancellor announced that `the government [had] decided to make a firm commitment to the 
project' in his Budget Speech of 16 March 1993, no timetable was put forward; instead he stated: 
`We will discuss timing with the private sector' and expressed the hope that the link would be `fully 
completed around the end of the decade', a hope reiterated by the Transport Secretary a week later, 
on 22 March 1993, when he underlined the government's commitment to building the line before 
the end of the century, although in the intervening one and a half-years, the scheme had come no 
nearer implementation. There was clearly no sense that central government should devise the 
optimal schedule and demand compliance with it from all those involved; a spokesman for 
Eurotunnel said that the company was `gravely disappointed at the lack of any urgency in moving 
this project forward'.
161
 It was not until January 1994 that `the Secretary of State ... emphasised that 
the project was to go ahead on the fastest possible timetable'.
162
 Following this statement, and in 
connection with the competition for tenders that began in the spring of 1994, DoT stressed that it 
was `keen to proceed with the competition as quickly as possible ... with the firm objective of 
reaching a definitive conclusion before the end of 1995.'
163
 
 The lack of central government guidance was directly related to the lack of commitment to 
a project which one of its sponsored industries was pushing forward; in the words of Tory MP Sir 
Keith Speed, this was a `most incredible story of bungling and incompetence' and he added that he 
would be `highly surprised if the link gets built at all - there just isn't the will there'.
164
 Both CTRL 
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schemes were subjected to attacks from members of the governing party and even ministers. 
CTRL2 was not at any stage clearly established as a priority by successive ministers; there was no 
apparent solidarity between the BR Board and DoT but at best veiled disagreement and at worst 
open conflict. BR's proposed alignments and London terminal were rejected. Furthermore BR and 
DoT found it impossible to keep route negotiation at the level of officials and outside the political 
arena. This was already true during the early 1970s scheme, when the Minister himself `went to 
endless meetings' in order to assuage fears; communication between the Board, officials and the 
Minister was not well established: as the Minister recalls, `I think it was unfortunate, to put it 
mildly, when the railway said ... "We're gonna have four different options through Kent." It'd be 
much better to have decided at the beginning what they wanted',
165
 for if you listed four options, 
then you would have four groups of people to contend with. But the idea of having several 
alternatives was actually DoE's. 
 The result - with both projects - was lack of certainty and consistency, and the fact that the 
projects were bestowed a high political profile. To a large extent, decision-making took place in the 
public arena and a number of participants felt free to make comments very critical of the 
government's handling of the matter; the Chairman of BR, when asked whether he would resign 
after the government had rejected BR's route in October 1991, replied: `Oh no. For heaven's sake. If 
you are in the middle of a pantomime, you want to stay with it.'
166
 Eurotunnel, the company 
responsible for developing and operating the Channel Tunnel, was self-evidently amongst the most 
active supporters of a new high speed link, for which they had lobbied prior to 1988, and its co-
chairman Sir Alastair Morton voiced forceful criticism of government action on several occasions. 
The level of public recrimination by various participants was remarkably high. Even Cabinet was 
publicly divided over CTRL2 at times. Perhaps most telling of all, the decision concerning the 
route was announced at a party political gathering, the Conservative Party Conference, an 
unequivocal confirmation of the highly politicised nature of the decision-making process. 
 Another similarity between the two CTRL schemes is the inability to see through a 
comprehensive, medium to long-term project: the need for a dedicated high speed link was not 
acknowledged publicly, either by BR or DoT, until plans for the Tunnel were well-advanced. On 
the departmental side, this was because medium to long term planning was not institutionalised, 
either in the 1970s or the 1980s; on the railway side, the perceived uncertainties of government 
policy discouraged forward planning and the experience of CTRL1 illustrated the fact that an 
ambitious, integrated railway project was unlikely to succeed - even under a Labour government - 
if it required investment on a large scale and was predicated on future traffic growth. 
 
Conclusion 
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 With both CTRL schemes, the opportunity to stimulate railway traffic (on a route with 
proven high demand for transport) failed to be seized. Whether this was through sheer lack of 
political will or the inability of central government to process innovative, complex, long-term 
projects involving sizeable public expenditure is difficult to ascertain. But some strong points do 
emerge from the case study, which moreover confirm the findings of the APT case study. 
 As with APT, BR was generally in a poor bargaining position. The experience of CTRL1 
however was not lost on the railway. BR's deliberately incremental approach in the mid-1980s 
(namely not raising the issue of new infrastructure until the Channel Treaty had been ratified) paid 
dividends: the Channel Tunnel project has now been completed, and planning for the new rail link 
is at an advanced stage. The railway had to conform to central government conceptions and 
practices in order to move its project forward. Even so, progress was slow and uncertain. 
 As regards evaluation, one can only concur with Conservative M.P. Robert Adley's view 
that `The harsh reality is that cost not customer convenience; Treasury not transport; bone-paring 
not best; are the prevailing criteria on which decisions to date have been made.'
167
 Financial and 
electoral considerations were allowed to determine the route at first, rather than economic or 
technical criteria, until the intervention of Heseltine resulted in the inclusion of economic criteria 
(regeneration of East Thames corridor). It was not until 1992 that the use of CBA in connection 
with a rail project was legitimated, by which time a great deal of credibility had already been lost. 
 With the CTRL schemes even more than with APT, central government's position was 
quite untenable because financial concerns did not necessarily coincide with partisan or ideological 
considerations and it was found impossible to reconcile forces pulling in opposite directions: 
financial imperatives (keeping the costs down) against political ones (such as appeasing local 
protest by adding costly extra tunnelling). Financial and political rationales played havoc with 
policy-making because they were not mitigated by technical considerations or by taking into 
account wider economic benefits encompassing the whole South-East region, or other regions 
which might benefit more indirectly (the North and Scotland). In the APT case study, I argued the 
prevalence of a politico/financial rationality in Britain.  It is even more imperative, in the light of 
this case study, to define the prevailing rationality as `politico/financial' (with a slash) in order to 
stress that the two elements did not necessarily coalesce. In the final analysis, the policy process 
was slow and tortuous because no single objective overrode all others. 
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3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Both LGV and CTRL were the first high speed rail infrastructures ever to be planned 
respectively in France and Britain. Therefore neither railway undertaking or government had 
experience to draw on, but in one case the whole process of formulating, legislating and building 
the link was completed relatively quickly and painlessly, whilst in the other it gave rise to a very 
great deal of controversy, not to say public acrimony. But it is not my purpose to define an 
explanatory framework for these divergent outcomes, as some of the difficulties on the British side 
stemmed from factors wholly extraneous to the political process: e.g. Kent countryside is both far 
more attractive and valuable in property terms than most of the land between Paris and Lyon; as a 
result the former is fairly heavily populated whilst the latter is not; the expected financial returns 
varied considerably: 12% for LGV, 4% for CTRL (10% for a whole-business evaluation); wider 
returns were equally dissimilar: 30% against 11%. A straightforward comparison in terms of policy 
outcomes would be inherently biased and therefore unhelpful. However the ways the new links 
were conceived and developed in the case studies bring out several salient features of the two 
referential frameworks. 
 
 
A. The place of the railway in the power configuration 
 The total cost of LGV was approximately equivalent to SNCF's investment budget for one 
year (about three years' total investment for BR')
1
; `spread over a period of 7 years, this endeavour 
has not impeded the modernisation programme of the French network';
2
 in other words, SNCF did 
not feel that heavy sacrifices were needed in order to see LGV through. Similarly in the late 1980s, 
in the region of £1,200m was budgeted for the LGV between Paris and the Tunnel, not including 
the cost of the TGV trains themselves, as against around £500m proposed for services on upgraded 
existing track between London and the Tunnel, a figure including new rolling-stock and the new 
terminal at Waterloo.
3
 There was a definite pattern of reluctant and piecemeal investment in the 
British railway network, contrasting with more forthcoming and long range investment in the 
French railway network. 
 This pattern needs to be put side by side with characteristics of transport infrastructure 
projects: e.g. the construction period is significantly longer than for traditional industrial projects; 
returns only begin to be sizeable beyond the pay-back period generally considered by financiers; 
`transport infrastructure financing therefore requires a long-term view often exceeding a generation 
... Immediate profits must not be expected from investment in such projects'; indeed the main 
difficulty stems from the discrepancy between the duration of loans generally proposed by financial 
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institutions and the long, even very long useful lives of projects (from 20 years to over a century).
4
 
Generally speaking, the French referential framework having a longer time horizon, such projects 
have been viewed as legitimate and worthwhile,
5
 whilst the British referential framework, with its 
shorter temporal span focused on immediate financial and electoral returns, proved inherently 
unsuited to the consideration of projects spanning several decades. This was the case no matter 
which party was in government: CTRL1 was scrapped by a Labour government in spite of 
traditional Labour support of public sector activity and public transport. 
 Remarkably enough, some in France considered the P-S-E scheme to be somewhat short-
sighted. DATAR went as far as criticising appraisal based on calcul économique on the grounds 
that it only dealt with a narrow time-span, i.e. 15-20 years, where heavy infrastructure such as a 
TGV line would `have a useful lifespan far longer than 20 years, more probably in the region of 80 
to 100 years.'
6
 One P&C engineer at MdT pondered whether the new line was the right solution as 
regards saturation, since it was expected that the existing Paris-Lyon line would be saturated once 
more 25 to 30 years after the opening of the new link: `The saturation of the new line has not been 
broached. It would be interesting to know the date of it and to see whether ... it would not be 
desirable to provide for profiles ... and curve radii of the new track allowing for speeds higher than 
300km/h on part of the distance.'
7
 
 The chronic lack of resources at BR made it all the more difficult for management to put 
forward a thoroughly-researched scheme that would have been discussed in all interested railway 
divisions, and meant that there was very little room for manoeuvre in which the railway could take 
initiatives. SNCF for its part launched all studies that were felt necessary and nowhere in the 
literature have I found references to a lack of resources. SNCF tended to carry out most of the 
detailed work itself or in partnership with public agencies, as with the layout studies for the new 
Paris-Lyon link, whilst BR had recourse to private consultants for CTRL layout studies both in the 
1970s and 1980s. Both organisations were, however, very cost-conscious; in SNCF's case, this was 
not at the expense of quality, and its cost estimates did not give rise to open conflict; with BR, cost-
consciousness was even more in evidence, yet cost estimates fluctuated widely both for CTRL1/2. 
 One BR senior manager became convinced through his work on Channel Tunnel planning 
that `the French attached more weight to the views of the SNCF than the British Government did to 
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the position of BR.'
8
 And Conservative M.P. Robert Adley also highlighted `the difference in 
strategy, finance and national esprit that separates the relationship between HMG and BR here, and 
that between the French Government and SNCF there.'
9
 There was a two-fold process going on: 
BR was provided with barely enough resources to keep the network going
10
 and maintain 
acceptable safety standards, but not enough to implement long-term strategies; this resulted in the 
organisation having little leverage on the whole, and consequently it could not improve its 
situation. One official thought that there was `a kind of negativism about it, that says "Well [they] 
at the railways will have to struggle on as best they can ... well they can just slow down can't they 
... they can fight their way somehow" ... So I think it was sort of faced with the experience of 
governments would never support the legislation or the necessary expenditure really to straighten 
things out or put in new lines'.
11
 The railway's situation of near-total financial dependence on state 
funding in Britain contributed to maintaining the railway establishment in a subservient position in 
relation to central government. 
 Another factor ensuring that railway views were given more weight in France was the fact 
that a large amount of personnel at SNCF and within the politico-administrative elite had shared 
the same educational training. During interviews, respondents displayed an unfailing sensitivity to 
the educational background of their colleagues, always refering to `Mr X, who is a so and so 
engineer': one senior figure, speaking about engineers at MdT's Railway Division, exclaimed that 
`Most of them besides were Ponts et chaussées engineers, as were many of us at SNCF!'
12
 This did 
not mean that all P&C engineers thought alike but that the two sides understood each other and that 
whatever trust existed was based on solid common intellectual ground. In the British case study, a 
gulf of incomprehension was all too evident, which allowed Adley to argue that the case for the 
Paris-Lyon line `was so strong that it might have met HMG's criteria; but only, as an anonymous 
BR informant said to [him], "if anyone would have believed the figures!"'
13
 
 To sum up, SNCF was in a position where it had the necessary resources in terms of funds, 
engineers and accumulated knowledge to take initiatives, and carried sufficient weight for its 
initiatives to be listened to in State circles. BR for its part was having to manage a chronic situation 
of under-investment which left little room for ambitious projects. Not having all the resources 
necessary to modernise the whole network and develop innovative projects in the first place, it is 
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small wonder that the railway showed little enthusiasm for building new infrastructure in the 
1970s. From the mid-1980s on, the will was there in the railway establishment but the place of BR 
within the power configuration, especially in the run-up to privatisation, minimised its influence on 
decision-making. The place of the two railways in their respective national power configurations 
was further differentiated by the nature of central government / State control, which compounded 
BR's difficulties and increased SNCF's influence on decision-making, and is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
 
B. Strong central control v. diffuse technostructure 
 The case studies in this chapter lead us to encounter what some have called the Thatcherite 
paradox: namely if the functions, or the priorities, of the state are reduced to a small number of 
policy sectors, it can actually be stronger because more focused; it is therefore more impervious to 
pressures from, for instance, the nationalised industries. Whereas if it is over-extended, it loses a 
sizeable amount of control, is inclined to want what public enterprises want. Hence the (not 
necessarily Thatcherite) emphasis on strong government and effectiveness in the UK, whilst the 
(historical) illusion of absolute State control in France made it possible for technical elites to drive 
their priorities through the politico-administrative maze. This disparity was connected to the greater 
degree of ministerial autonomy in France, which the following anecdote encapsulates: in 1966, the 
British Transport Minister, Barbara Castle, held discussions with her French counterpart, Edgard 
Pisani, about the possibility of a tunnel under the Channel. One particular ministerial meeting 
involved visiting a tunnel in the French Alps near Chamonix; following some discussion of the 
issues, Pisani said that since they were both strongly in favour of the development, he would like to 
make an official pronouncement but `Mrs Castle said "Oh we don't do things like that, I can't 
possibly make any public pronouncement" ... She had to bring it back at least to an economic 
committee and possibly to Cabinet before anything could be said. ... all press releases have to be 
sent across to No 10 ... The power at the centre is huge ... the Prime Minister is the First Lord of the 
Treasury' which meant that anything involving public expenditure had to be seen by the PM's 
Office; the French Minister on the other hand `appeared quite free to say that ... it was quite 
striking at the time that little exchange'.
14
 It would follow that policy was made in a far more 
centralised fashion in Britain, whereas the French system allowed for greater flexibility. 
 One of the points about this anecdote is that the Treasury commanded a towering position. 
Perhaps it was buttressed by the bilateral nature of relationships between Treasury, DoT and BR. 
Generally, the fewer the links in the chain, the easier and more effective the passage of 
information: thus the two sets of relationships between the three actors (BR/DoT, DoT/Treasury, 
and vice-versa) meant that messages between them were not always transmitted satisfactorily. But 
it also meant that the Treasury could manipulate Transport officials and that it never had to commit 
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itself directly to a project. The triangular relationship between SNCF / MdT / Finance, on the other 
hand, resulted in direct, closer ties between all three. Furthermore, the place of the French Ministry 
of Finance as a component of the technostructure was quite unlike the aloof position of the British 
Treasury within central government. Because the French Finance Ministry actually took part in 
studies and had a direct input into transport policy, it was bound to support their conclusions and to 
commit itself to agreed objectives; after all, it was a FDES sub-committee which reviewed the 
claims of Project C03. The Treasury, in contrast, could always distance itself from the 
recommendations of study groups in which it was generally not involved; it could be consulted 
over various policy options but would not be drawn into being associated with choices.
15
 This 
dislike for involvement was reminiscent of the arm's length relationship between BR and DoT. 
 In France, the most striking feature of the technostructure was its cohesiveness, which in 
this particular case stemmed from a common definition of transport economics. In Britain, there 
was disagreement at the level of policy-makers as to which evaluation criteria should be 
considered. In the 1960s, French railway managers were able to appropriate appraisal techniques 
used for road programmes but their British counterparts only began to be allowed to do so in the 
early 1990s. This constituted an additional divisive factor in the British transport sector. The 
transfer of methodological tools between sectors took place rapidly in France because there were 
various fora where issues were continuously researched and discussed: although neither the Conseil 
national des transports nor the Planning Commission were the locus of decision-making, they 
provided a constructive environment in which a learning process could take place; and CGPC was 
both a forum and a policy actor. Also within the French public sector broadly-defined, there were 
striking occurrences of cooperation, e.g. between railways and the Roads Directorate. There were 
no similar institutions on the British side, e.g. `there existed few opportunities for railwaypeople 
and men from the City [...] to meet' to coordinate the Tunnel project and the rail link in the early 
1970s,
16
 and inter-agency cooperation was mostly notable by its absence. 
 There was a constant effort of French officials and public sector managers to `keep up' 
with each other and to conduct the policy debate in the same, evolving language. The economists' 
input into SNCF policy was part of a movement across the whole public sector and the 
Administration to make use of, and improve, forecasting, planning and economic analysis. The 
application of CE to various sectors was not contested, least of all by the Finance Ministry, who 
used it in profitability studies of grands projets.
17
 The CE tradition was widely shared and went 
beyond a rationale of expenditure control towards a rationale of economic development, in this 
case of rail transport. In Britain on the other hand, 
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  Rail investment is evaluated on a narrowly defined project basis. SNCF's argument 
that the new TGV Paris-SouthEast and TGV-A lines, although more expensive 
than other options, would prove more cost-effective because of their effect on 
traffic generated by the railway network as a whole would not be accepted as a 
case for investment by the government for British Rail. Projects have to be 
justified in terms of their own costs and revenue.
18
 
Indeed there was a marked preference for non-normative approaches, such as cost-efficiency 
analysis and MCA, in Britain.
19
 Even in road appraisal, CBA was not fully developed until the late 
1960s and its application to rail investment appraisal was resisted by DoT until 1992 (CTRL was 
the first mainline scheme for which it was used). Appraisal methods were a bone of contention in 
central government / railway relations. 
 The diversity of approaches within the British policy-making core made it possible, even 
likely, that policy reversals should occur when the balance of political power altered. No such 
policy reversals occurred in the French case study, where the more homogeneous policy-making 
core ensured continuity; although it was extremely arduous for SNCF to get its innovative project 
approved, once a step in the technico-administrative `obstacle race' had been secured, it was highly 
unlikely to be revoked. One former Finance official believed that by 1976 `the TGV was not very 
popular in political terms. This continued to be true up to the day it was inaugurated.'
20
 In other 
words, Project C03 succeeded in spite of politicians. In Britain CTRL1 and 2 were undermined by 
politicians. 
 In summary, the dominant features of policy-making practices in Britain were the 
centralisation of decisional power in the hands of ministers, and within Whitehall the centralisation 
of power at the Treasury. The policy process in France was remarkable for the high number of 
policy actors involved and the high degree of technicity of the debate around the proposed Paris-
Lyon infrastructure, which did not involve ministers until formal approval was required. A paradox 
was that strong central control was not used to initiate projects in Britain; rather it was exercised 
mostly to minimise public sector commitments, particularly in the shape of public funds, both 
under Labour and Conservative governments. Diffuse control in France was part of an environment 
in which public projects were afforded full legitimacy and were promoted by right-wing 
governments. 
 
C. Public and private spheres 
 From 1987 to 1992, the UK government's approach to funding was quite inflexible and the 
debate hinged on one crucial point: the use of public versus private money to finance the link. This 
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issue did not appear at all as regards P-S-E, since SNCF was expected from an early stage to take 
out loans; in fact the possibility of a private consortium financing and building the link was only 
raised by SNCF as a means to get a speedier decision and was strongly resisted by Finance officials 
on the grounds that such an arrangement could only be more costly. Was the British insistence on 
private funding purely a reflection of Thatcherite values? The Labour Party supported `the 
prohibition on public investment in the tunnel project itself' and would retain it but considered that 
`it is wrong to prevent public investment in the rail link as it is an essential part of Britain's 
transport infrastructure';
21
 the Labour Party leader declared: `We will build those rail links. And we 
will do it through a financial partnership between public and private sectors ... [we] will use the 
combination of public and private funding to the benefit of the public and the private interest'
22
 and 
the then Shadow Transport Secretary (John Prescott) stated that a Labour government `would lift 
the restraints against BR going to the private sector to raise money to build the link.'
23
 But these 
statements constituted a departure from Labour government policy from 1974 to 1979: CTRL1 had 
not been granted public funds then, and the Labour governments had retained the rules restraining 
BR from borrowing on private markets, in spite of BRB requests that they be lifted. 
 Conservative ministers for their part made it a condition that only private sector money 
should be used to build CTRL; administrators thought that bringing in the private sector would be 
more `cost-effective';
24
 but both potential developers and independent transport consultants, as well 
as BR, were convinced that the project could not go ahead without a substantial injection of public 
cash and favoured public/private partnerships, which only began to be encouraged by the 
government in 1992 (Private Finance Initiative). The government's eventual pledge to make a 
contribution had the appearance of a concession rather than of a political commitment. 
 In France `A national company is considered to be a company like any other. It is 
encouraged to behave like any other.'
25
 Therefore it could borrow on private capital markets; none 
of the interviewees could see any reason why this should not be allowed.
26
 The fact that it benefited 
from State backing was not considered to be unfair since it was asked to perform un-commercial 
tasks from which a private company would have shirked. SNCF was an arm of the entrepreneurial 
State: there was no perceived contradiction between the commercial role of the railway and its 
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remit as a public service. Although the balance between the two was not always felt to have been 
struck right, it was generally considered that both were equally legitimate concerns. When SNCF 
began to envisage high speed links, managers thought that `SNCF could get something out of it, 
and public service generally could get something out of it too.'
27
 Here was a public enterprise using 
market instruments; the mixture of public and private was unproblematic. 
 In Britain, there was a perception that public undertakings were inherently a different 
breed; this state of affairs was deplored by Conservative M.P. Robert Adley, who reviled 
`advocates of the purity of "private enterprise" and the curse of "state funding"'.
28
 Successive 
governments' refusal to grant commercial freedoms enjoyed by private firms shows that the railway 
was not definitely not treated as a company like any other; it had a distinct identity as a public 
undertaking, not because it was meant to provide a public service but because public funds were 
involved. Partially as a result of this financial straitjacket, it was arduous for BR management to 
behave in an entrepreneurial manner. Yet there was no remnant of the public service ethos in a 
statement made by the Chairman of BR in 1990, when defending BR's limited plans for services 
from the Tunnel to the regions: `BR's job is to provide a service that is profitable, not what is 
desirable.'
29
 
 The rationale for allowing the French railway enterprise to borrow on the private market 
was simply one of meeting its business needs in the context of agreed objectives (the `object'), 
usually over the medium term. The rationale for not allowing the British undertaking to do the 
same was to do with the issue of financial accountability; strict control over funds earmarked for 
public purposes (the `means') was a condition of their use.
30
 Treasury practice was to control very 
closely the expenditure of nationalised industries hence all railway expenditure had to be included 
in the PSBR whether the funds be obtained from public or private sources. This in practice ruled 
out the use of private funds, until PFI. 
 The sharp delineation between public and private spheres was not as pertinent in France as 
it was in Britain, where state and market were viewed as mutually exclusive: `Traditionally, the 
role of the state in British politics has been defined as part of a zero-sum game between politics and 
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markets; more of one meant less of the other.'
31
 In France, `mixed' State / private ventures were 
common (SNCF was such a mixed economy company between 1937-1983) and the State 
unhesitatingly set about creating markets where it was felt they were needed. In Britain it was 
deemed absolutely necessary to keep public and private spheres well apart: the professional ethic 
dating from the administrative reforms of the nineteenth century `drew a clear line between the 
public domain and the domain of the market-place'
32
 and as a result `The British way of classifying 
institutions [suffered] from too sharp a distinction between public bodies - accountable, and private 
ones - not accountable.'
33
 The Treasury disliked public / private partnerships because it felt that 
private firms' decisions were completely beyond its control and that their financial liabilities should 
not befall the state in case of default. 
 Moreover partisan differences were a great deal less salient in France. When a Prime 
Minister, George Pompidou declared: `There is no longer a purely capitalist economy, nor a purely 
socialist one ... In France we have a mixed system'.
34
 The blurring of private and public boundaries 
was not viewed as a harmful development but as a natural consequence of using all available 
instruments to achieve State-defined objectives: `Indicative planning was seen as the means of 
marrying the private with the public'.
35
 The lack of salience in the French referential framework of 
the opposition between public and private economic intervention, was a long-standing feature: `the 
French politico-administrative tradition is such that between jungle liberalism and fanatical statism, 
it was the path of the mixed economy, with its multiple configurations, concessionary 
arrangements, profit-sharing government corporations, sociétés d'économie mixte, which 
crystallised the forms of an acceptable compromise between the role of public authorities as 
guardians, and the injection of the spirit of enterprise by private partners.'
36
 
 In Britain there was a close identification of the Conservative Party with private enterprise 
- here the road industries - and of the Labour Party with public industries - here the railways - 
which meant that the boundary between public and private spheres was in the main an ideological 
one, and all the more difficult to cross. On the whole, private values infused central government 
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policy-making. Thus the particular preference for private funding echoed a more general preference 
for the private realm. In the British referential framework the private sphere was more highly 
valued than the public sphere, which involved notions of collective interests and public 
expenditure.
37
 The public right to good railway infrastructure clashed with the individual right to 
pay as little tax as possible to the Exchequer and the latter was seen as more legitimate than the 
former. The French preference schedule was the reverse: public rights were more prominent than 
private rights, which must always bow before the general interest, and public service was 
associated with the search for quality and the best solution. In Britain, references to market values 
were a constant feature, including under Labour (e.g. market pricing). Under the Treasury's 
influence, state action was associated with cost containment. But how do we account for this 
dominant preference for the private sphere in Britain, and the relative indifference towards 
questions of ownership in France? 
 In Britain, for historical reasons there existed a deep-seated fear of impingement of the 
public into the private; civil society had been endowed with many virtues and public power vilified, 
or at the very least regarded with suspicion. Naturally this did not prevent a tremendous growth in 
state activity in Britain throughout the twentieth century, in the railway sector as elsewhere, but it 
appears to have been a pragmatic response to demand (by 1947, the private railway companies 
were bankrupt) rather than a deliberate increase in supply, as was the case in France. There, the 
public sphere represented unity and stability in a country perceived as perenially divided. It was 
assumed that State action was inherently superior because unlike private firms, it would not seek to 
`cut corners' in order to maximise profits. Private sector vitality should however be exploited for 
progress was more effectively achieved through `the mobilization of all available sources of 
influence and power, in the public and private sectors, in pursuit of rationally planned objectives.'
38
 
It does not follow that the picture that I have painted is one of a simple dichotomy, with on one 
side, a public sector-obsessed French State, and on the other side, a market-obsessed British state. 
But there was a considerable difference in emphasis, with French railway policy favouring public 
or mixed instruments and valuing the railway as a public service, and British railway policy hostile 
to `messy' public / private overlaps and generally well-disposed towards the private sector and 
market values.
39
 
 The questions of expertise and local opposition illustrate this point well. Whereas SNCF 
resorted to the services of public sector experts (GEFAU, road specialists at MdT), URL made use 
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of private sector engineering and environmental consultants who had `extensive knowledge of the 
standards applied to highway and other schemes, and have used this experience in the development 
of the railway.'
40
 Resorting to private consultancies was common practice in Britain, especially in 
transport matters: DoT routinely used Samuel Montagu as its merchant bank adviser and W S 
Atkins as its engineering consultant;
41
 URL used S G Warburg as its financial advisor and the URL 
Report listed over 30 engineering, environmental, business planning, planning, property and 
communications consultants.
42
 But for P-S-E the nearest to using private expertise was the study 
requested by DATAR from BCEOM, a parastatal organisation managed by P&C engineers. There 
was sufficient technical expertise within the State apparatus to meet most needs. Similarly scrutiny 
of the railway undertaking's work was carried out by State agencies in France, but with the help of 
private organisations in Britain.
43
 Finally, valuation of properties to be purchased was carried out 
wholly in the public sphere in France, through State agencies, local representatives and a tribunal if 
necessary. In the UK, private bodies also took part, e.g. local estate valuers. 
 The French referential framework demanded that decisions be made and assessed by 
national, State experts; the British allowed DoT not to give URL `any specific instructions on 
station and junction strategy' since the aim was `as far as possible to preserve a choice for the 
private sector on the provision of stations and connections along the route'.
44
 In France, business 
interests could not be asked to make decisions of public significance, and individual, private 
interests could not legitimately be invoked to delay or modify the project in depth; but individual 
`sacrifices' (loss of property) for the common good had to be properly compensated. Thus the 
compensation regime strove to be as universal and unchallengeable as possible. In the British 
framework, individual or private sector interests had a legitimate claim to be heard and even to 
have an input into policy, and the elaborate system of hearings meant that opponents could voice 
their grievances, but compensation arrangements were less than generous. In this context, 
differences were of a legal nature: British Common Law stressed the (procedural) `right to a 
hearing', whereas French Law emphasised the rights of property-owners and the right therefore to 
fair compensation (substantive rights). This last contrast leads us directly to our next section on the 
underlying philosophies of public action. 
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D. Proceduralism v substantivism 
(1) Relative weights of internal / public consultation 
 In Britain, it was felt important to `have one's say', hence the importance of hearings, but 
this did not preclude the possibility for the person being heard of losing their case; due process was 
paramount, whatever the result might be; the approach was procedural.
45
 In France, the perception 
was that the State had a right to claim private property for public purposes, subject to 
compensation; the Administration was prepared to pay more sizeable sums to reach a given, agreed 
objective; the approach was substantive. 
 Hence the place of parliamentary institutions and public consultation in the exercise of 
public authority is one area where British and French practices diverged considerably. Parliament 
in general has had a relatively significant role to play in the British transport policy process, 
especially as regards new infrastructure; in France, its role has been limited to approving the 
overall budget for annual public spending which also includes, among a myriad other items, 
railway expenditure.
46
 Indeed, two parallel public procedures dealt - or will have dealt - with 
CTRL1/2 (public inquiry proper and Parliamentary Bill, itself involving hearings) whereas LGV 
only had to contend with an internal inter-departmental procedure (instruction mixte), a one-month 
public inquiry of a fairly perfunctory nature and a belated debate at the Assemblée nationale after 
the DUP Decree (a procedure that does not involve Parliament), had been signed. The 
parliamentary process in the UK was slow, and allowed relatively wide public access, whilst 
instruction mixte was swift and centralised, involved a small number of people and took place away 
from Parliament and the public eye. 
 The nature of the British and French public inquiries totally differed: in Britain, modest 
changes to the alignment were a legitimate object of discussion, whereas in France they definitely 
were not; it was the very principle of the project's public utility which was to be endorsed or 
rejected. Details were negotiated during the land acquisition phase, undertaken after the DUP had 
been issued. Not surprisingly, a comparative study carried out by Ove Arup found that `An 
important difference from British public inquiries is the limited scale of the evidence and 
submissions' put forward in France.
47
 To sum up, internal consultation was preferred in France, 
public consultation was perceived as essential in Britain. 
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 Remarks made by the Budget representative on the Coquand committee pointed to a 
related feature of decision-making: `What you must understand is that in France we are a lot less 
formalist ... written procedures are ultimately a lot less important than oral procedures'; for 
instance, concerning the discussions chaired by P&C engineer Coquand and the subsequent report, 
`Mr Coquand knew very well that all of this only made sense if he himself, personally, behind it all, 
made up his own mind and had the ear of the Transport Minister, of Matignon, of Elysée.'
48
 The 
Chairman's role was not to listen to opinions of all interested parties and work out an acceptable 
compromise, but rather to weigh the pros and cons of the matter and put forward the solution he 
considered to be the optimal one. 
 
(2) Primacy of means or objectives? 
 The object-driven approach to policy-making was not congenial to Britain: there was no 
sense of urgency in getting CTRL2 completed at the same time as the Tunnel. In contrast, the Paris-
North scheme linking the Tunnel to Paris was viewed as an element in a transport project spanning 
Southern Britain and Northern France: the Transport Minister Jacques Douffiagues (Chirac 
government) `maintained that the profitability of TGV-North depends on the link with London via 
the tunnel.'
49
 It should come as no surprise therefore that the emphasis being on the end product, the 
(right-wing) Chirac Government announced on 9 October 1987 its decision to build 322kms of new 
infrastructure for 300km/h TGV trains, to be completed in time for the opening of the Channel 
Tunnel, a project launched by a previous, Socialist government (the cost was estimated at FF12bn - 
at 1985 prices).
50
 
 In the same way, traffic estimates for the Channel Tunnel were on the French side 
predicated upon optimal use of new infrastructure, itself purpose-built to enhance Channel Tunnel 
traffic and railway revenue. On the British side, rail traffic between the tunnel and the capital could 
only be as high as existing lines would allow. Thus Channel Tunnel traffic volumes could not be 
maximised from the date of the opening and were constrained by the condition of existing links to 
London. In short the British government rejected the idea of integrating planning for the Tunnel 
and CTRL, whilst both the French socialist government and the Chirac government went ahead 
with an integrated project for both the tunnel and LGV Paris-North.
51
 
 There was considerable confusion about the objectives of the British government, which 
changed over time: at first the new link was deemed necessary to accommodate international 
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traffic, then it was also required to bring benefits to domestic passengers, to carry freight and 
finally to support regeneration of the East Thames corridor. A commentator observed that the main 
difference between the two countries was not solely the amount of money to be spent: `a more 
important contrast is between a clear French strategy for the development of transport 
infrastructure and the apparent lack of any strategy in Britain.'
52
 
 These governmental characteristics were replicated at the level of the railway undertakings 
themselves. One of the initial aims of SNCF Research economists in the late 1960s had been to 
define the optimal pattern of TGV operations, using econometric models; but as regards the URL 
scheme presented in 1993, `The service pattern presented ... has not been optimised. Rather, it is a 
pattern that has been chosen as a reasonable basis for evaluation purposes.'
53
 SNCF's approach was 
based on `reason' (as the universal tool allowing to attain substantive objectives) whilst BR's was 
predicated on `reasonableness' (something on which everyone can agree), which is a procedural 
concern. 
 
(3) Politico/financial imperatives v. technico-economic rationale 
 With CTRL1 public preferences were very prominent and were allowed by DoE to play a 
quasi-policy-making role; public and political opinion had to be accommodated for party political 
and/or electoral reasons. This is in sharp contrast with LGV: in the `battle of Dijon', a regional 
capital had to accommodate SNCF's technical preference; consultation on the route took place after 
the LGV scheme had already been defined down to great detail and alterations only took place at 
the margins. The consultation process in France was very compartmentalised and hierarchical: 
SNCF dealt directly with local authorities, and instruction mixte involved neither local government 
nor the railway, taking place solely within the central State apparatus. In Britain, consultation was 
both more wide-ranging and interactive and began at an earlier stage in the policy process: both 
DoT and URL were involved in discussions with local authorities, and URL consulted directly a 
number of statutory agencies. The CTRL scheme around which consultation took place was only 
defined in the broadest sense and non-BR bodies had a significant input into the precise alignment. 
 In the case of Paris-Lyon, the technico-economic rationale meant that appraisal was both 
financial and socio-economic. The economic rate of return was not a substitute for the financial 
rate but a complementary tool: `The external rate enabled one to compare [TGV] in an efficient 
manner to a project like Rhin-Rhône which by construction had no internal returns'; in fact the 
concept of external returns `was also used by administrators to show that the Rhin-Rhône canal had 
a negative return for the community.'
54
 Various transport schemes could be ranked on the basis of 
their costs and benefits to the community; this type of ranking was not conceivable within British 
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central government where it was generally considered that the railway market was distinct from the 
road market in terms of their economics, since road users do not pay fares, unlike rail travellers. 
There was no vision of a single, albeit diverse, `transport market' with a socio-economic 
component. 
 It was not until 1992 that non-financial factors began to make a timid appearance; DoT 
stated that when URL's forthcoming report was examined by the government, `Costs, revenues, 
transport benefits, environmental impact and development benefits [would] be the principal factors 
to be considered',
55
 therefore URL eventually conducted its investment evaluation on principles 
similar to those which had been used for the evaluation of Paris-Lyon, listing both financial and 
economic returns.
56
 However the dominant criteria remained, in France economic, in Britain 
financial: the nature of services to be offered on the new infrastructures was defined for LGV by 
economic imperatives (e.g. dedicated passenger link) but for CTRL by financial imperatives (e.g. 
commuter, international and freight traffic). 
 Financing the infrastructure did not take centre stage in the French policy debate: `The 
definition of a high speed link implies a preliminary choice regarding its functions and the 
conditions of its integration within the existing network, technical specifications and resulting costs 
being very largely dependent upon the decisions which will have been taken in that regard.'
57
 
Clearly, issues of `substance' (function of the new infrastructure and its relationship with the old) 
took precedence over issues of `procedure' (both the technological means and funding 
arrangements). In Britain the question of resources (or available means) was prominent with both 
CTRL schemes and appeared prominently in URL's report of March 1993; one critic argued that 
discussions relating to the location of the London terminal were `based on available - or 
unavailable - resources, rather than on an operational or customer ideal, in contradistinction to the 
way the French are going about things.'
58
 
 Not only was the mix of appraisal criteria different in the two countries, but the whole 
appraisal process was conducted in a different fashion. In France, figures were checked and 
counter-checked, not because there was no element of trust between the different players, but 
because of the belief that it was essential to base decisions on the soundest possible knowledge 
base and that such knowledge was accessible through systematic research. In Britain there was a 
definite distrust for second opinions, which were viewed as a breach of trust. The corollary of this 
was that one interested party could claim that another party's figures were misguided and ask for 
further study, without getting involved in the study itself. There was a deeply-ingrained procedural 
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habit of keeping to one's `turf'. More generally, relations with Treasury / Finance officials followed 
different paths: the overall pattern in Britain was of a Treasury putting pressure on MoT/DoT, not 
to choose particular policy options, but simply to keep spending down; in France, both SNCF and 
MdT saw it as their task to find weighty arguments to convince Finance that a particular policy 
option was worth funding. 
 One former BR Chief Engineer was struck by the impression that when the French 
government decided to do something, it would get done even if there was a change of government 
(as there was in 1974, with the Gaullist government of Pompidou giving way to the more neo-
liberal government presided over by Giscard d'Estaing and in 1986 when Chirac replaced Socialist 
Fabius, then was himself replaced by Socialist Rocard in 1988) whereas British policies semed to 
change with every new Parliament.
59
 This again was due to prevailing rationales: in France, once 
the technico-economic credentials of a project had been established, it was almost inconceivable 
that it should be reneged upon. But in Britain, short-term financial constraints might well force a 
reappraisal, or political considerations lead to a U-turn, as was the case - to different extents - with 
both CTRL schemes. 
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 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS. THE BRITISH AND 
 FRENCH REFERENTIAL FRAMEWORKS IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
 The two preceding chapters dealt with the empirical intricacies of high speed rail policy-
making in Britain and France between 1965 and 1993. By the end of the case studies, two very 
different policies were being implemented in the two countries. In Britain, the railway 
establishment was working on IC250 (250km/h services), but the only official policy to which 
government was fully committed was that of railway privatisation, which it was argued would 
improve efficiency; increased speeds were not mentioned in the privatisation debate. In France, the 
government had requested from SNCF a national masterplan for high speed rail links in January 
1989, reviewing possibilities within a 10-20 year timescale; SNCF produced a plan for 16 projects 
(involving both track upgrading and new track), in which `reserved speed' capability of new LGVs 
was between 350 and 400km/h; the plan was adopted by CIAT of 14 May 1991. And by the early 
1990s, substantial investment in new high speed railways was taking place or was planned 
throughout much of Western Europe: over the period 1982-2005 the French had programmed 
4700km of new lines, the Germans 2400km and the Italians and Spanish over 1100km each.
1
 In 
Britain, CTRL's 100km or so was slowly making progress through the policy process: planning 
new rail infrastructure proved as difficult in the 1987-1993 period as in the early 1970s, 
particularly in the context of the stricter public expenditure controls introduced in 1976. 
 The purpose of this work is not however to analyse the reasons for such divergent policy 
outcomes. It is above all not intended to explain outcomes on the basis of the referential 
frameworks which dominated railway policy-making in the two countries. Clearly the frameworks 
do account for some of the differences in outcome but they are only one of several important 
variables. The case studies do no more than provide a deductive path into the two referential 
frameworks and to draw out lessons of a general nature. In this concluding chapter, I relate the 
findings to some of the issues in the political science debate about British and French public 
policy-making. The chapter will discuss both the French `State' and British `central government' 
(and very occasionally `state'), and also `the state' as a political science concept. 
 Why did the British and French referential frameworks develop along such divergent 
paths? In order to sketch out some possible answers to this point, I will eventually place the case 
studies within a wider canvas although this will of necessity raise more questions than it will 
provide answers, and can only suggest avenues for future research. 
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1. STATES AND RAILWAYS 
 Throughout the case studies I made some general points concerning state - railway 
relations. In this section, I draw together the main sectoral findings. 
 The case studies illustrate two widely different power configurations: in the British 
configuration, it was possible for central government both to push BR into a high speed policy 
based on new train design and to thwart (1970s) or at least delay (1987-1994) the beginnings of a 
high speed railway policy based on new infrastructure. The first LGV for its part was 
unquestionably initiated and developed by SNCF before the concept of new infrastructure for high 
speed trains was taken up by ministers after 1983. 
 
A. Frontiers of the state 
 One central question for the political scientist is that of the place of the national railway in 
relation to State / central government, and more specifically of the boundaries of the state and state 
activity. Retaining the definition of the state as a system, that is as a set of bodies and power 
relationships (rather than a single entity) we must ask whether in the framework of our case studies, 
the national railways behaved as quasi-statal organisations or whether, as organisations, they stood 
apart from the state system. I will argue that there was a broad interface between SNCF and the 
State, both in terms of conceptions and practices, whilst BR and central government were 
decidedly remote from each other. 
 Within SNCF a full-time State official ensured that funds were spent according to 
approved programmes (the financial controller), but those programmes were decided by SNCF's 
Research Committee out of the overall research budget approved by the Ministry. British 
authorities had to exercise this control, together with the allocation of funds within the research 
budget, in the course of meetings (Joint Steering Group) which also dealt with other matters. As a 
result, relations on the British side were dominated by financial issues and no economic reviews of 
APT were carried out (the 1970 inter-city study was purely financial). On the French side, financial 
matters appear to have been in the background, whilst technico-economic matters were the object 
of much debate, checking and counter-checking. When French officials or ministers wished to have 
independent expert opinions on the technical / economic validity of the TGV project, they had a 
reserve pool of State engineers to draw from (either at CGPC or at IRT) and of public finance 
specialists (Finance Inspectorate). On the British side, expert opinions mainly had to be sought in 
private consultancies. 
 Suleiman has pointed out that state and interest groups were often undistinguishable in 
France, although official rhetoric upheld the `general interest' against particular ones. To what 
extent was this true of the Transport Ministry and SNCF? Although it is true to say that SCF 
(Railways Division) was close to the railway undertaking, at more senior levels of the Ministry 
SNCF had to prove itself. And it was not so much that the railway interest had a voice inside MdT, 
but more importantly that the State had a voice (and hears) inside SNCF, through the presence of of 
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its representatives on the Board. On the British side, the sponsor ministry could certainly not be 
said to have been captured by the railway interest. However there were a not insignificant number 
of sympathetic senior civil servants at different points in our case studies, both at Under and 
Permanent Secretary levels, who did their best to improve what was generally acknowledged as 
difficult relations. For them APT represented an exciting development which they fully backed. 
However there was no institutionalised departmental presence inside BR and progress was easily 
jettisoned by changes in circumstances or in personnel. 
 On the whole the state - railway relationships differed considerably during the period of 
the case studies. The paradox of the British arm's length relationship was that it was arm's length in 
institutional terms, inasmuch as lines of communication were circumscribed and the main policy 
actors had widely different academic and professional backgrounds. But financial and political 
constraints weighed very heavily on the Board's decisions and did nothing to encourage the 
formulation of a long-term innovative, high speed policy, neither in the 1970s nor in the 1980s. The 
French contractual relationship introduced in 1969 institutionalised the practice of getting the 
railway to carry out difficult tasks in exchange for `rewards'; on the most prosaic level, Project C03 
was seen as a way of mobilising the public undertaking around a modernising project, at a time 
when it was undergoing painful changes (line closures, decreasing staffing levels, a more 
commercial approach). The psychological effect of State commitment to a public project was an 
important element in France and was instrumental in launching an ambitious project in a hostile 
political context. In Britain such an effect did not surface at all. In fact the BR - central government 
relationship was conducted mostly in the manner of a political power struggle whilst the SNCF - 
State relationship was more akin to a technical `debate'. With the former, open controversy and 
recriminations in the public arena were rife; with the latter they were unthinkable, for technical 
matters were expected to be settled dispassionately by experts away from the public eye. 
 It is interesting to note that parallel relationships existed between public authorities / 
railways, and between public railways / private railway industries, so that these constituted 
microcosms of public action at the sub-sectoral level. The State - SNCF relationship involved State 
concern for the welfare and morale of the undertaking (the `psychological' justification of TGV); 
SNCF in turn looked after its private suppliers by adopting a protective attitude and deliberately 
seeking to keep a sufficient number of them in business. This pattern of behaviour was not based 
on philanthropy but rather on pragmatism: retaining the goodwill of opposite numbers in the policy 
circle made for more efficient relations. Partnership was commonly accepted. SNCF benefitted 
from the support of private railway manufacturers (in particular through FIF), with whom it 
enjoyed a symbiotic relationship: long-term commitments providing secure orders for the industry 
were possible because the flow of railway funding was regular. Yet at the same time, SNCF was 
keen to obtain the best prices and standardised rolling stock, which in the long run would cost less 
to maintain. With this in mind, they deliberately demanded long production runs from the 
manufacturers in the 1970s (`Corail' coaches) which forced an hitherto fragmented industry to 
concentrate. It is impossible not to draw parallels between this and the policy of industrial 
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concentration pursued by De Gaulle in the 1960s. TGV may have been only a `State-authorised' 
programme as opposed to a State-sponsored one, as one respondent said, but at the same time, 
SNCF in many ways acted as a willing arm of the State. 
 On the British side, the central government - BR relationship was one where BR was 
treated as a business that looked after its own interests; BR in turn related to its private suppliers as 
competing firms, being prepared in the 1970s to turn to foreign suppliers in order to `stimulate' the 
native industry. Long-term deals with railway manufacturers on the part of BR were not feasible 
(although they were called for by senior figures) because of the stop-go pattern of railway funding, 
which made strategic planning by BR difficult. 
 Thus the national railways appeared to mimic entrenched patterns of state behaviour, 
underpinned by common assumptions: in Britain, these were that market values of free competition 
were superior and that a multiplicity of individual identities was desirable; in France, that collective 
values were best safeguarded by servants of the State and that concerted arrangements were to be 
preferred in order to achieve pre-determined goals taking them into account (e.g. industrial 
concentration, an accessible railway). 
 This was also true at the level of more abstract notions: one French railway senior 
engineer, in an article on the TGV service then being launched, expressed himself in the following 
terms: `There is no doubt that the new service will make a mark on the history of railways and 
show that rail transport, thanks to the persistent technical progress, is capable of adapting itself and 
accommodate under the most favourable conditions, cost and energy, to meet the common good.'
2
 
Two salient elements of the referential framework are visible at once: the belief in (technical) 
progress and allegiance to the general interest. As regards the first one, Fourniau has noted that the 
French public service model `asserts the value of technique as the motor for social development', a 
conception embodied in SNCF's  institutional slogan: `Progress is only worthwhile when it is 
shared by all'.
3
 The French railway undertaking had internalised some of the assumptions held 
within administrative and political circles, which pre-dated its creation in 1937. British Rail had 
also internalised key central government assumptions, mainly revolving around the fact that the 
railway was a commercial entity which should pay for itself and be independent from the public 
purse for its investment as far as practicable. 
 Conceptions of public power were more ideologically oriented in Britain (party political 
dominance) whilst in France they were more professionally oriented (technical expertise 
dominance). The limits to new policy in the British railway sector were set by partisan 
considerations and by the fact that one Parliament might reverse the decisions of the previous one; 
in France, they tended to be synonymous with current technological limits or those set by current 
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thinking within the Administration. In this sense, and this sense only, may one argue that the 
French railway (as a technical organisation) was an integral part of a technically-oriented state 
apparatus whilst the British railway was kept at arm's length from a more generalist and political 
British central government. 
 With regard both to practices and to conceptions, the frontiers of the state were therefore 
not as well-defined as one might have expected. In the British case, central government 
conceptions extended well inside the railway organisation. In the French case, it is debatable which 
of SNCF or the state drew the boundaries most sharply, or even whether there were any clear 
boundaries at all, especially as regards conceptions. 
 
B. Dirigisme and laissez-faire in the light of the case studies 
 When researching British and French public policy-making, one inevitably comes up 
against two very distinct models of public action in the academic literature: the received opinion 
being that France traditionally has had a strong central state that operates in a dirigiste manner, 
with untrammelled power inherited from a tradition of monarchical absolutism, and that the British 
state on the other hand has not grown as the extension of a central political figure (the absolute 
monarch) but reflects the ideal of representation, today embedded in parliamentary democracy, and 
has a laissez-faire attitude towards society and the market.
4
 Such a weak state / strong state 
opposition, however, has sometimes been criticised as overly manichean. It may have been entirely 
appropriate when dealing with the French and British states up to the beginning, or even the 
middle, of the twentieth century, but two world wars and the increasing complexity of 
industrialised societies have all contributed to a dramatic expansion of state activity in both 
countries, which is well documented. 
 Past research has tended to emphasise the differences between the two countries, at the 
expense of the striking similarities that sometimes do exist. This has been all the more easy as each 
national elite has built up over time self-images of the state which suited their own purposes but 
may have been at variance with reality. For instance, the French central administration may have 
played up their powers knowing that authority would only be respected if it appeared to be 
formidable; in Britain on the contrary, officials and politicians alike may have a vested interest in 
appearing less powerful than they actually are because of the widespread centuries-old belief in the 
greater individual freedom of Britons and their ingrained mistrust towards power. 
 Furthermore, different conceptions in the referential frameworks do not necessarily entail 
different practical arrangements: e.g. both BR and SNCF received operating grants at some point; 
both BTC (until 1956) and SNCF were allowed to borrow on financial markets. Different values 
can reflect and be reflected in institutions that are sometimes different, at other times similar. This 
is why the weak state / strong state dichotomy is not fully convincing. It really applies to the realm 
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of conceptions - and then not in all cases - and only occasionally to the world of actual policy-
making practices. Old stereotypes need to be confronted with the realities of state action on the 
ground, which was one of the ambitions of this work. 
 What emerges from the case studies in relation to the weak state / strong state model is 
somewhat paradoxical. The APT case study shows an attempt by British central government to 
initiate innovation. To start with, the policy benefitted from the conjunction of an emerging 
technological project supported by the more `modern' sections of BR and of a pro-active MoT 
seeking to give the railways a new chance. It is highly unlikely that the project would have seen the 
light of day without strong departmental backing, the Railways Board being unwilling to shoulder 
the costs. The French case study for its part points to very different circumstances. The initiative 
for TGV was entirely SNCF's and coincided with the period of its great unpopularity in 
administrative and political circles. But even a declining railway could muster enough strength to 
overcome initial State resistance to railway innovation. This task was made simpler because the 
French configuration of key players included, as well as SNCF, the Ministries of Transport and of 
Finance, the Planning Commission, and various consultative expert State bodies (e.g. CGPC); the 
British configuration was much simpler, involving essentially BR, MoT and Treasury. The more 
fragmented French setup gave SNCF the opportunity to mobilise a number of agencies and a 
correspondingly higher power of leverage, which BR, in its strictly bi-lateral relationship with the 
Department, did not possess. 
 In a sense, the French State proved weak since SNCF senior figures were able to exploit 
their institutional knowledge of the fragmented State apparatus and to make use of the integrated 
elite networks that characterise it, in order to advance their cause. British central government on the 
other hand was strong inasmuch as it could impose an innovation policy onto railway management 
which was only supported by a small number of BR engineers, most of them only recently recruited 
to the railway. It was not strong enough however to elicit support within BR for the new offensive 
R&D policy and not committed enough to pursue the policy through to the end. 
 Indeed it does not follow from the case studies that the dominant image of the British state 
as a benign, regulatory framework responding to, but not creating, the needs of society, described 
the actual workings of British central government. Hayward's assessment that `British public 
corporations tend to be subject to much greater government control than is formally supposed to be 
the case'
5
 is amply illustrated by the case studies. There was often a contradiction between ideals of 
self-restraint (e.g. the arm's length relationship) and interventionist practice (e.g. jointly-funded 
APT research programme, practically imposed on BR by an enthusiastic MoT). This was even 
clearer with the CTRL schemes: CTRL1, proposed in the era of the `post-war consensus', was 
cancelled following  a change of parliamentary majority; CTRL2 was put forward at a time when 
the British state was under attack and called upon to retreat from public action (e.g. rail 
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privatisation), yet it was also the first major rail scheme to be assessed with non-financial criteria, 
an approach underpinned by more comprehensive notions of the role of the state. In fact, the British 
case studies point to two very contrasted situations: with APT, central government showed itself to 
be highly interventionist, whilst with CTRL1/2, it was much more a `spectator-state'.
6
 In the field of 
high speed rail infrastructure policy, there seemed to be a vacuum where the hub of power should 
have been. Policy was neither government-initiated (proposals for both CTRL schemes came from 
BR), coordinated with the railway or integrated with planning for the Channel Tunnel itself; neither 
was an outright veto imposed on CTRL2. 
 Nor should we take the dominant image of the French State at face value and assume that it 
really did shape the development of the railway. To a very large extent, SNCF was in control of its 
strategic choices, particularly as regards TGV. Although Project C03 encountered much resistance, 
it was eventually taken up by the public authorities and allowed to proceed, albeit with some 
setbacks on the way. There was a sufficient amount of trust in railway management and State 
expertise for the Administration, and later for politicians, to agree to what was almost a leap in the 
dark (let us remember that there was no TGV prototype stage and that the decision to go ahead was 
for a full-scale fleet of 85 TGV trains). 
 The traditional weak / strong dichotomy does not therefore reflect accurately the untidy 
realities of the late twentieth century, e.g. the fact that in some sectors of the economy, the British 
state has been very interventionist while its French counterpart has had a very hands-off approach 
in a number of areas.
7
 
 One may find policy objectives which are very similar in both countries but are reached by 
very different means, or by different mixtures of the same policy instruments. This expressed itself 
most clearly in the drive to curb railway deficits. Both in Britain and France, the railways were 
urged to break even by successive governments but BR was not provided with sufficient incentives, 
such as long-term commitment to a modernising project (which perhaps the APT could have been). 
SNCF was provided with just such incentives and it was taken for granted within the 
Administration that if the State wanted something from SNCF, it ought to give something in return. 
This was not dirigisme, but rather policy commitment.  
 The state in the British referential framework acted as an impersonal banker and no more. 
The Treasury's ethos of strict financial discipline, imposed from 1956 at the end of a period of 
laissez-faire in public investment, was seen as nothing less than a necessity, whereas in France it 
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was rather a desirable but distant objective in the context of public sector economics. The concern 
in France was how to optimise the use of public funds, whereas in Britain it was how to minimise 
it. 
 Precisely for this reason, a great deal of effort was put into comprehensive project 
appraisal in France, but not in Britain, where for a long time a form of laissez-faire prevailed in 
public project decisions. For instance the Modernisation Plan of 1955 was devised by the railways 
themselves and approved without being subjected to detailed departmental appraisal, whereas in 
France objectives were set centrally, arguably in dirigiste fashion, by the Planning Commission and 
SNCF plans were closely scrutinised by State experts. But even this contrasted state of affairs was 
changing throughout the period studied. DoT began to demand thorough investment appraisal from 
BR in the early 1980s, precisely when Mrs Thatcher was calling for a retreat of the state. This 
department-imposed requirement led to changes within BR project management. Thus we are not 
faced with static policy-making practices, but evolving ones. 
 The conclusions that I have drawn from the case studies apply to the sector under scrutiny. 
The question is whether the referential frameworks presented here are peculiar to railway policy-
making or whether they provide us with important elements of British and French public policy-
making styles in general. Alternately, they could be shown to apply to some other policy areas but 
to be invalid in others. Hence it remains for further, more exhaustive research to refine or revise 
our findings. In particular, it would be extremely fruitful to conduct a comprehensive comparative 
analysis of all the British and French sectoral case studies which have been carried out to this day. 
This would yield results which could be generalised with some confidence. This task is clearly well 
beyond the capacity of the author but it is useful to briefly mention one of the findings of similar 
case studies of sectoral public policy. In the UK, ad hoc government intervention into the affairs of 
the nationalised industries appears to have been a structural problem, which very much concerned 
BR but not the railways alone. British central government had no established corpus of doctrine 
and/or ancient experience which could have enabled it to function as an economic `manager'. This 
point takes us to our next section, dealing with the presence of a pro-active public managerial 
culture in France, and its corresponding absence in the UK. 
 
C. Managerial cultures 
 The striking point in the French State practices presented in the case studies is the broad 
interface between administrative and technical cultures, which combined to form a public sector 
managerial culture. As Ribeill has pointed out, this `ad hoc managerial culture, both suited to 
technical culture and administrative culture ... is exemplarily that which was to shape the technical 
corps and notably the Ponts et Chaussées Corps',
8
 because as civil servants they had to provide 
both administrative supervision of public networks and technical expertise. Ribeill goes on to say 
that from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, their dual administrative / technical 
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background also made them ideally suited to managing private companies in the public networks 
sector, where they could both use their technical qualifications and function as respected opposite 
numbers to those of their peers who had remained in administrative positions; as for the heads of 
such firms (whose role was perceived as being more political), they were either chosen among 
politicians or former Prefects, who were familiar with the arcane workings of the politico-
administrative system and could rely on networks of connections (similarly with a public firm such 
as SNCF, three of its postwar Presidents were members of the Préfectorale Corps: Ségalat, 
Pélissier and Chadeau). 
 There was nothing resembling a public managerial culture on the British side, where civil 
servants and senior managers of public or private firms inhabited separate worlds. The lack of 
public enterprise managerial culture had long been deplored.
9
 Members of boards and public 
corporation managers did not always adopt a management style suitable for the public sector and 
`there [was] often insufficient willingness to understand the functions performed by government 
departments and to search for suitable means of reconciling differences.'
10
 According to Abromeit, 
British government lacked the `consistent concepts needful for the successful running of a number 
of large state industries'; at the same time, given the ups and downs of public policy, it was not 
surprising to find `a "civil service mentality" in public sector managers, passively awaiting the next 
U-turn of government policy.'
11
 
 The French public sector was not perceived as a `protected' section of the economy (until 
very recently); on the contrary it had (at least in principle) a duty to lead the way. Thus a future 
SNCF Director General (Guibert) wrote his doctoral thesis on Service public et productivité 
(1953). Ultimately, senior managers of SNCF - like many senior managers of other French public 
undertakings - shared private sector beliefs as well as the public service ethos: they were public 
entrepreneurs with both a sens de l'Etat and a strong commitment to dynamism and efficiency.
12
 
Rolland's third principle of public service (mutability), listed in an earlier chapter, provides a 
connection between `public service' and `modernisation', a notion which was at the heart of the 
French referential framework: public services had a duty to `mutate' not just with the times, but 
ahead of them. 
 Jean Monnet's Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement, launched in 1947, gave 
modernisation national preeminence in France and this affected the railway directly as there was a 
Committee for transport modernisation, a sector which was considered a priority. In Britain, 
attempts at modernisation were not taken up by central government with anything like the 
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commitment and enthusiasm found in the French State apparatus. The capital costs of modernising 
in particular proved a powerful deterrent, as did the necessity for policy continuity; success was 
elusive, as the Modernisation Plan of the Railways approved by the British government in 1955 
testified. Former APT engineer Hugh Williams has pointed out that as the French high speed line 
was intended for the exclusive use of TGVs, `it was probably the first time in railway history that a 
line had been designed for a particular train rather than vice-versa.'
13
 This bold approach meant that 
the railway was no longer as constrained by the geographical and historical legacy as it had been in 
the past; those circumstances could to a large extent be transcended. British Railways on the other 
hand attempted to accommodate natural conditions and the legacy of the nineteenth century railway 
mania, which had produced duplicate lines and a winding permanent way in places such as the west 
coast; there was no question of starting afresh, although it would in principle have been feasible to 
straighten tracks in enough quantity to increase average speeds significantly. Railway policy 
differences were thus partly related to the place of the concept of modernisation in the two 
referential frameworks. 
 Perhaps the only element that was shared by all groups of policy-makers in Britain was 
cost-consciousness. One commentator argued that it was more important for whatever was 
produced to be produced as cheaply as possible than for the price / quality relationship to be 
optimal.
14
 Indeed the only consistent thread to be found in British railway policy was the nearly 
obsessive concern with financial costs, then financial returns and lastly from 1976 financial 
ceilings (the latter under Labour as well as Conservative rule); BR managers were all too aware 
that the least costly options always had a head start and that qualitative arguments carried little 
weight with the Treasury, who were solely concerned with minimising public expenditure. 
 BR did not put forward non-transport arguments either (e.g. possible regional benefits) 
which were perceived as belonging to the realm of politics. SNCF on the other hand were not 
debarred from using arguments of a political import; they were very keen to highlight the socio-
economic benefits of Project C03 and to use such strongly symbolic, political phrases as the 
`democratisation of speed'. This was another symptom of the blurring of domains, here the 
technical and political. 
 In both countries, a more commercial approach to running the railway was demanded by 
Ministers. Paris-Lyon represented a radical shift of emphasis for SNCF management, away from 
declining services to more commercial ones: `from Project C03 onwards, SNCF began to invest 
massively in passenger traffic whereas until then it had invested a lot in freight services'.
15
 BR also 
pursued a highly commercial policy but operated in a more highly-charged political environment 
and did not enjoy a sufficient amount of autonomy to implement its preferred strategy. The 
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supreme paradox was that SNCF became more commercially-minded following an influx of new 
methods from forward-looking State units (e.g. SAEI), whereas BR's efforts to become a 
commercial business involved taking on BRB members who had previously been employed in the 
private sector, e.g. Beeching (ICI) and more recently Robert Reid (Shell). In the first case, the graft 
`took' quickly and the opening of LGV in 1983 was the concrete manifestation of the new 
commercial spirit at SNCF. The new managerial culture was actively promoted by the State. In the 
second case, there was too much of a disparity between public and private sector practices and too 
many central government impositions of a non-commercial nature (e.g. the impossibility for BR to 
borrow on private markets) for the transformation to take place smoothly. 
 
D. Values and interests: networks or communities of rail policy-makers? 
 It could be argued that the managerial culture as found in the French case studies was 
based on a set of values shared by civil servants, engineers and politicians, but should we not 
introduce some scepticism at this point? Values held in relation to public service may go a long 
way towards explaining behaviour, but a more prosaic explanation suggests itself, centred on the 
self-interest of those involved. 
 In Britain a civil servant expected to remain a civil servant for the whole of their career, 
whereas a French haut fonctionnaire gained ample opportunity to be seconded to the private sector 
in the course of their career. The self-interest of French civil servants dictated that the railway 
undertaking - as indeed other public enterprises - and its suppliers be successful for they might well 
provide them with later employment through the (widespread) practice of pantouflage. There was 
every reason not to keep public and private spheres at arm's length and to make sure that all 
components of, for example, the railway sector (private engineering firms, MdT and SNCF itself) 
worked hand in hand. The osmosis between the P&C Corps and transport policy-making circles 
meant that some engineers decided investments that fellow engineers would administer.
16
 More 
generally graduates of grandes écoles would choose to work in a ministry that was a good 
launching pad for their careers; as Gilbert Santel, Personnel Officer at the Ministère de 
l'équipement, put it: `The selection of posts offered to graduates from ENA or from X is based 
primarily on the career prospects that the graduates foresee both in the public and the private 
sectors'.
17
 
 British civil servants on the other hand had no established habit of going into nationalised 
undertakings or the private firms of the same sector in the course of their careers, although there 
were some rare instances of civil servants joining BR in mid-career (movement to firms mostly 
occurred after a period of retirement). They saw BR and the railway industry in general as 
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extraneous to their professional concerns, as organisations which could not enhance their own 
careers.
18
 
 This type of explanation does not however account for the fact that the practice for civil 
servants to move freely in and out of state service was established in one country and not in the 
other, and that it was considered quite proper. It can only point to why the existing situation was 
made to perpetuate itself (it was clearly in senior State engineers' interest to keep this advantageous 
system going). Furthermore, one cannot fail to notice that while British civil servants had been 
educated within the university system (leaving aside the issue of an Oxbridge bias), with the Civil 
Service College only having been established in 1968 and playing a minor role, the vast majority of 
their French colleagues had attended specially-designated schools attached to various ministries 
and had received a far from negligible stipend for their education from the State during several 
years. The latters' professionalisation had begun at an early age, was highly prized and viewed as a 
pre-requisite to high office. So although the existence of professional interests clearly must be 
acknowledged, it does not illuminate the whole picture. The contrast between a (British) classical 
generalist education on the one hand, and a (French) technical, somewhat more specialised 
education on the other, discussed in Chapter 2, illustrates a contrasting set of deeply-held values 
about state, society and the economy. 
 The next stage is then to ask ourselves how far one could ascribe contrasting referential 
frameworks of public policy to the existence of dissimilar `values' held by national technical, 
political and administrative elites. There was no simple relation of causality between values and 
referential frameworks in our case studies. Where we would expect the states in France and the UK 
to be different in just about every respect, since they so clearly evinced deeply different values, we 
found in fact some similarities which can only be explained in terms of perceived interests: e.g. no 
matter what values are held about state intervention, administrators will be keen to perpetuate their 
profession and develop new, interventionist policies (TGV, and particularly APT were just such a 
case). Some of the differences can also be explained in terms of interests (which may even be 
conceived differently from one country to the next). French politicians were convinced that their 
interest lay in not antagonising the railway workforce and acted accordingly, whilst British 
politicians had to contend with the powerful air, road, and shipping interests, which relegated the 
railway to a subsidiary position. 
 In the end, the explanatory power of values has to be placed in a proper perspective and 
viewed in tandem with that of interests. Neither a purely sociological approach, nor a purely 
economic one, can fully account for the complexity of referential frameworks of public policy. 
Indeed one of the conclusions of this thesis is that referential frameworks are informed both by 
values and by perceived interests, and that either of these may well differ between the two 
countries, but do not always necessarily do so. 
                                                 
     
18
 At the same time, they were held accountable for every penny to their Minister and to a powerful Treasury, and 
(indirectly) to Parliament. 
  
 
 274 
 This brief discussion of the relative weights of values and interests leads us to another 
conclusion, concerning the character of the policy-making circles observed during fieldwork. The 
case studies demonstrate the existence of a rail `policy community' (with shared values and 
interests) in France, and of a rail `policy network' (in which only some interests were shared) in 
Britain.
19
 BR, the sponsor department and other interested parties formed a policy network which 
had shared concerns and some shared interests out of necessity since they operated in the same 
policy area, but often held divergent views regarding the means to achieve objectives, or even the 
definition of the objectives themselves. SNCF, tutelle authorities and railway manufacturers made 
up a policy community with common interests and values, and a wide degree of agreement, or at 
the very least willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue. The policy community was able to 
build up and preserve a high degree of policy continuity, whilst the policy network stumbled from 
one set of incremental measures to the next. 
 Going one step further, I would argue that the French public managerial culture presented 
above was largely dependent on the existence of an `epistemic policy community', in which 
concepts and practices circulated freely and were widely recognised.
20
 No such culture had taken 
shape in Britain; practitioners operated in a loose, often strained policy network. Thus the main 
difference between the two countries was the existence of a sectoral epistemic community in 
French administrative and technical circles, sometimes also including members of the political elite 
(in particular of ministerial cabinets). This epistemic community of transport experts was at the 
core of a stable, restricted, policy community, which pursued self-defined policies even when these 
might run counter to some of the political concerns of the day (e.g. regional planning) and which 
possessed sufficient authority to win over the support of other ministries and ultimately political 
backing. In Britain, the set of players who contributed to policy-making could not be described as a 
community for they did not share the same policy-relevant knowledge and values. They had to 
work with each other but could not do so `together' towards common objectives, partly because 
objectives kept being changed by Ministers. 
 This discussion of policy networks / communities is relevant to our understanding of the 
referential frameworks inasmuch as a policy community could only function in tandem with a 
national, non-partisan referential framework, whilst a policy network was associated with a 
divided, partisan framework containing conflicting objectives, a point which is developed below. 
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2. TWO DISTINCTIVE REFERENTIAL FRAMEWORKS 
 To begin with, it is useful to summarise the main features of the referential frameworks 
outlined in the course of the case studies. The spatial and temporal frames of reference were 
dissimilar; the French framework was the object of a national consensus whilst the British was 
divided by partisan considerations; finally the notions of `general interest' and `public interest' did 
not fully overlap across the two countries and did not occupy the same places in the two 
frameworks. 
 
A. Spatial characteristics of the British and French referential frameworks 
 SNCF's own strategic choices were eventually approved because they complied with 
traditional spatial conceptions in the French referential framework. For instance the unifying 
powers of the State were paramount; State action traditionally sought to integrate or at least 
stabilize a society perceived to be geographically divided, hence the role of the railways in nation-
building was a crucial factor in the interest they attracted at State level. Both SNCF and the State 
embraced a nation-building ethos which was inconceivable in a multinational unitary state such as 
the UK, a state made up of four distinct nations. In the British referential framework, spatial unity 
did not rank high, unlike in France; if `Modern France, after 1789, was built around a strong 
nation-state',
21
 the railway provided one palpable backbone. 
 However, rail policy was not necessarily truly nationwide: only DATAR seems to have 
pushed for an ideal of balanced development of all French regions, particularly in relation to Paris, 
and to have viewed the national territory in truly integrated fashion. SNCF paid lip service to this 
view for tactical reasons, occasionally invoking regional planning arguments, but DATAR was 
defeated by the more traditional, centralised views of the transport technico-administrative elite. 
 In spite of this it is clear that all players - including Finance officials - had no objection to 
thinking in terms of network and network effects. This point is crucial inasmuch as it affected the 
variables taken into account during the appraisal process, and ultimately the way financial returns 
were calculated. It is also a salient point because French political culture features a `tradition of 
redistributional justice spread over the whole of the national territory, by means of subsidies, or 
plans of development or equipment; the Freycinet Plan ... in 1878 ... provides an exemplary 
illustration of this, with its wish to ensure that every sous-préfecture would be served by the 
railway'.
22
 The State's duty was to ensure natio-wide social and economic improvement. In the case 
of the railway, as with other networks such as water, gas or electricity, beyond a threshold of 
development by private actors, it was felt that `the network is good for everyone, implying that the 
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public authorities take over from the private sector.'
23
 In fact the concept of `network' - more 
particularly national network - has been salient in the French referential framework throughout at 
least the last fifty years: for instance it presided over the nationalisation of gas and electricity 
companies after the Second World War, and even of deposit banks.
24
 
 Spatial assumptions were network-based, but why this stress on networks, which was so 
beneficial to SNCF? Partly because from the point of view of its function, a network fulfills users' 
needs - whether individual or collective - `in a fashion that makes them feel solidarity with each 
other in social and geographic terms, within a territory.'
25
 Networks were therefore viewed as 
instruments both of social cohesion and economic progress, binding otherwise disparate segments 
of the Nation. On the British side, the practice was to think in terms of discrete `units' (lines, or at 
the most regional networks). Each railway project was assessed on its own merits, notwithstanding 
any possible national network benefits. 
 The ways in which railway undertakings were organised also reflected public action 
conceptions and practices. After 1945, there was a relentless drive towards technical 
standardisation in the French railway system, in order to obtain a more homogeneous network in 
which large economies of scale could be achieved, whereas the railway regions in Britain were 
more distinct and some specific norms inherited from the competitive private railway companies 
were retained (for instance, Scotland was run by a separate board and Southern Region uniquely 
still uses a third rail on its electrified lines). In the first case, one is reminded of the `one and 
indivisible Republic' and the constant effort since the Revolution of 1789 to forge a unified nation, 
whilst in the second, the principle of self-government and the toleration of variety are in evidence; 
after all `Scotland was not incorporated in the English state, as Wales had been' and retained her 
own legal system,
26
 something which is absolutely inconceivable in the French framework. The 
British arm's length principle also displayed the preference for railway self-government so to speak, 
as opposed to strong central Administration control of the French railways. 
 In short, within the French referential framework it was expected that the State should play 
a meaningful role in relation to a national technical network of perceived great importance, i.e. of 
general interest. In the British framework, network considerations were not readily accepted by 
central government and it was assumed that the railway needed as little central government control 
as possible. 
 
B. Temporal characteristics of the British and French referential frameworks 
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 The preferred British approach was an ad hoc one which did not involve long-term 
planning. The main duty of public authorities was perceived as a (relatively short-term) financial 
one: central government tended to react as a brake, rather than act as a spur. On the Labour side, 
there was ambivalence in this respect: one former Transport Minister, Barbara Castle, asserted that 
`the major responsibility of any government is to enable its country and its people to pay their way'; 
yet she objected to the power of the Treasury, which as a Minister she had found to be tremendous, 
and to the Treasury's `only ... form of reckoning ...: that of the accountant with his short-term 
arithmetical calculations.'
27
 Government did not take large scale developmental initiatives over a 
long timespan: even MoT funding of APT R&D was for relatively small sums and was short-lived. 
MoT was pro-active and vigorously backed the modernising forces within BR in connection with 
APT, but fell short of committing itself fully to the project at the production stage. 
 If we turn to CTRL, which inherently involved a great deal of planning and was from the 
start on a far more expensive scale, the public authorities were very reactive. There was no 
perceived need at the political level for CTRL to open at the same time as the Channel Tunnel; on 
the contrary, the Secretary of State argued that since capacity on existing lines was expected to be 
sufficient until 2005, this meant that `account can be taken of demand for rail services through the 
Channel Tunnel once it opens. This will help to give a more precise view of when the extra 
capacity of the new line might be needed.'
28
 This reactive approach totally overlooked the argument 
that new capacity on Britain's railway would itself influence the demand for rail services through 
the Channel Tunnel; typically, policy was to be decided once demand levels had been empirically 
established, rather than in anticipation of future demand. The dominant time horizon was short. 
 More generally when initiatives were taken, they were of a restrictive nature (e.g. Dr 
Beeching's remit to make the railways pay, introduction of cash limits in 1976) or sought to solve 
the `railway problem' by altering the organisation of the industry, first through nationalisation in 
1947, then in 1953, 1962,
29
 1976 and finally in the 1990s, when the aim of policy became to 
eliminate direct state responsibility for the industry through privatisation. 
 The French time horizon tended to be longer. The main duty of public authorities was to 
devise strategies that would both contain railway losses, eventually eliminating them, and improve 
rail services in the long run. The case studies certainly confirmed the view that the French 
Administration tends to engage in, or at the very least support, pro-active policies designed to 
develop sectors which are believed to be backward (in need of modernisation) or under-utilised. 
The main duty of the French State was perceived to be the improvement of economic and social 
conditions over a long period, with a view to maintaining social cohesion and ultimately national 
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unity. This could only be achieved, it was believed, by the analysis of economic and social 
conditions, planning and the implementation whenever possible of medium to long-term 
programmes. 
 The French policy time horizon may have been longer but it was not necessarily long-term. 
With TGV, the French State was not so much an instrument of long-term national progress (using 
State-sponsored R&D as a means to increase technological self-reliance), pursuing its goals 
through a grand programme, as a framework-state seeking to foster public sector efficiency in an 
increasingly competitive transport system (e.g. Xth Plan stresses public sector efficiency) and 
engaging in limited, medium-term market-management. Ribeill went as far as arguing the existence 
of `a deep-seated ideology of the "economic" medium-term, respectful as much of public service as 
of the moving forces of the private sector, borne by a same technocracy backing indifferently both 
horses'.
30
 This point is borne out by the TGV case study.  
 The tradition of State forward planning which so impacted on high speed rail policy-
making can be traced back to Colbertism (e.g. the creation of State manufacturing companies 
between 1661-1685).
31
 The railway network itself was planned centrally by nineteenth century 
State engineers.
32
 Later, the Planning Commission, which France pioneered in the 1950s, 
represented an attempt to create an institution which would both be at the heart of the State 
apparatus and politically independent from the government of the day, and would concern itself 
with long-term economic issues; the concept of State planning subsequently did undergo some 
changes (in the late 1970s, it became more indicative than prescriptive) but the underlying 
assumption that it was legitimate for the State to seek to reduce economic risk and uncertainty for 
the nation as a whole, remained even though from the 1970s onwards, it might simply mean 
`making market forces more efficacious'.
33
 
 According to Pierre Massé (General Planning Commissioner, 1956-1966) State planning 
played a role of `uncertainty reducer' partly because `The State alone can commit itself to a very 
long-term scale'
34
 and partly because the State alone had at its disposal the vast amounts of data 
needed to comprehend national - and international - trends. In the words of another General 
Commissioner, Pierre-Yves Cossé (1988-1991), `To prepare for the future is one of the missions of 
the State, which must resist the "dictatorship of the short-term" ... assert itself as a "master of 
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time"'; in his view the State must be above all a `strategist'.
35
 That this might entail deliberate 
shaping of economic forces was accepted. For instance, a former adviser to Pompidou justified the 
1960s motorway-building programme in the following terms: in 1962, Pompidou had obtained 
government approval for a sizeable programme and `From then on, infrastructures were no longer 
in charge of fulfilling the needs of users but of creating them, anticipating them, or directing them. 
... The country's plant must serve the industrial priority within the framework of voluntarist 
regional planning.'
36
 To this end, a roads and motorways national masterplan was formulated 
towards the end of 1971 (a roads masterplan had first been established in 1960). 
 In the case of regional planning itself, again the State was seen as having a meaningful role 
to play, through a `policy of anticipation and rectification of a potentially dangerous development'
37
 
in the way economic forces were located on the national territory. The free play of economic forces 
was viewed as destabilising in the long run. Even a self-proclaimed economic liberal such as 
Giscard d'Estaing defined regional planning and development in highly interventionist terms, as 
`the voluntarist action through which a national community shapes, equips, organises its own space 
according to the fundamental aims it assigns itself ... in order to put at the service of man the 
rational utilisation of resources ... Shaping nature has always demanded, since the origin of time, 
continuous and tenacious action.'
38
 The belief that public power could deliberately shape economic 
development was clearly deeply entrenched. 
 A great deal of research, consultation and discussion went into the preparation of the five-
year plans that were such a feature of post-war public policy in France. Although the plans might 
not be fully implemented and their predictions sometimes found wanting, they provided the 
opportunity for practitioners and academic specialists in a given sector to come together and 
exchange ideas in a common language. Also they enabled discussion of long-term prospects and 
trends. There was no such forum in the world of British transport policy, at least as regards 
railways. Instead government tended to operate on a year-to-year basis, in a piecemeal and 
outwardly arbitrary fashion; railway policy, particularly as regards investment, was unpredictable. 
 There was little evidence of a forward-looking approach, or even of any desire to make use 
of the state's potential planning power, even under Labour.
39
 In spite of Labour's image as the party 
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of central planning, the inescapable facts are that `the 1945 Labour government [failed] to embark 
upon national economic planning',
40
 in particular as regards the railway, and that the 1960s 
planning experiment was launched by Conservative ministers in 1960-1961 and ended in 1966 
under Labour. In any case, the experiment was based on the procedural `belief that national 
economic planning could be achieved by voluntary agreements between interested parties',
41
 rather 
than by the use of more coercive methods. 
 In any case, Labour thinking contained sizeable elements of short-termism, which ran 
counter to the planning ethos: `As a hedonist, John Maynard Keynes believed in the pursuit of 
pleasure in the present and wanted economics to promote current material well-being. When one of 
his proposals for improving short-term conditions was challenged as having harmful consequences 
in the long run, he dismissed this with the familiar epigramm, "In the long run we are all dead."'
42
 
Barbara Castle first came to prominence in 1943 with a famous Party Conference speech in which 
she declared that the rank and file `were nauseated by the generalities about the brave new world. 
"Jam yesterday and jam tomorrow, but never jam today".'
43
 Harold Wilson's motto, `A week is a 
long time in politics', also points to a deep awareness of the fleeting nature of political time. Even 
civil servants were affected by this ethos: `Non-elected civil servants may have a longer time 
horizon, but the more closely they are involved in policymaking with politicians, the more likely 
the time horizon of civil servants is to be foreshortened.'
44
 The emphasis on short-term policy-
making was directly related to the pre-eminence of the electoral cycle in Britain. 
 The British unwillingness and/or inability to engage in planning should not be equated 
with an aversion for intervention. As Hayward has pointed out, `when comprehensive planning 
appeared to have failed, further recourse was had to piecemeal intervention.'
45
 This important 
distinction is vindicated by our case studies, in which comprehensive planning was notable mainly 
by its absence, whilst departmental intervention was all too visible at crucial junctures. 
 
C. National or partisan referential frameworks? 
 The extent to which conceptions and practices of public action were national and 
normative, rather than partisan, within the context of the case studies, is one of the issues which 
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this thesis addresses. Empirical evidence points to a national emphasis in France and to a bi-polar, 
partisan British framework. 
 As might have been expected, general conceptions of the state in Labour elites tended to be 
markedly different from those found among Conservative elites; there was a much higher degree of 
confidence in the possibility of central government `fine tuning' the economy. The authorities were 
also responsible for providing certain needs: `One of these in the twentieth century is a transport 
system which serves the needs of all types of citizens and in which therefore the railways must play 
an essential part.'
46
 In the minimal state approach commonly associated with the Conservatives, the 
Civil Service was mostly viewed as an umpire with regulatory functions, rather than as a player 
with managerial functions. Its purpose was not to pull the market in any one direction.
47
 The 
Conservative view, as expounded by William Waldegrave, was that the state had a role as 
regulator, legislator and creator of the framework within which industries work; `But on the 
evidence of all the decades, the state as industrial manager is not at its best.'
48
 It was therefore 
considered to be far better for the economy to be kept separate from politics, in other words to keep 
private and public spheres well apart. 
 As regards actual practice however, party political differences were generally not so 
clearcut: one author has noted that `the Labour Party has been more disposed to intervention than 
the Conservatives when it has been in office, but its interventions have been remarkably ad hoc and 
pragmatic for a party that purports to have some kind of interventionist philosophy, while many 
significant interventions have been taken by Conservative governments under moderate 
leadership.'
49
 One of the pillars of the post-war consensus, shared by both Labour and 
Conservatives, was that a certain amount of state intervention was necessary; disagreement related 
to the extent and frequency of intervention, not to the principle itself. Heath for instance, while 
supporting competition, passed the Industry Act, 1972, to enable the government to intervene more 
directly.
50
 As Holmes and Sharpe have pointed out, successive British governments `have swung 
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between laissez-faire and interventionism in phases which actually do not coincide with party 
periods in office.'
51
 This was particularly well-illustrated by the case of the railways, with the large-
scale Modernisation Plan being launched under a Conservative government in 1955, active support 
for APT under successive Labour and Conservative governments between 1968-1973, and the 
Labour government's refusal to commit itself to APT in 1974. 
 One should not however totally disregard ideological differences between Labour and 
Conservatives, even before the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979. It is true 
that until then, Conservative governments had broadly accepted the existence of the public sector 
and confined themselves to stressing the commercial remit of nationalised industries; but one 
should not forget that they had disliked their coming into existence in the first place and that there 
was a streak of distrust towards public enterprises throughout the postwar period. Behind the 
privatisation drive launched in the 1980s one could detect the resurgence of the minimal state 
concept, which had a long history behind it (arguably going back as far as Magna Carta) and was 
clearly formulated in the nineteenth century in expressions such as the `night-watchman state'. 
Railway privatisation was not backed by Labour and this ideological policy difference was part of 
`the debate about public or private ownership ... the most divisive in terms of party conflict' and 
according to Richardson the one major instance of the `adversary model' of British politics.
52
 
 The emphasis on the parliamentary process in Britain, together with the dominance of 
party politics, meant that political debate tended to be very polarised. Although there were areas of 
consensus, especially between 1945 and the mid-1970s, the railways as a rule had not been one. In 
France on the other hand, the emphasis on internal, central Administration policy-processing under 
the Fifth Republic reflected a widespread distrust of Parliament, of party politics and a preference 
for non-partisan policy. The railways on the whole benefited from a consensual approach. 
 There was a well-developed doctrine of State intervention in France (public service), 
which had no equivalent in Britain, even within the Labour Left, for in practice there prevailed in 
Britain `a cult of economic non-interventionism'.
53
 Moreover the French public service doctrine 
was shared by all main parties during the period of our case studies and was therefore perceived as 
non-partisan, whereas interventionism in Britain had always been associated with specific political 
parties (in political rhetoric only, since in practice we have seen that governments of all political 
complexions engaged in it). Even within Labour, it was not fully articulated, and the Morrisonian 
conception of public corporations actually eschewed the necessity of close departmental 
supervision. More generally, faith in state guidance tended to be equated with socialism in Britain, 
whilst in France it crossed party lines, if only because it had arisen long before socialist doctrines. 
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Indeed the conception of `public service' was a pivotal element of the French referential framework 
of public action, but not of the British, and was closely bound up with the concept of `general 
interest'. 
 One traditional duty of the State which figured prominently in the French framework and 
was beneficial to SNCF was its guaranteeing the exercise of rights and liberties to all citizens 
equally: `the concern with solidarity between users within the same territory ... the necessity for 
national defence ... fundamental rights or liberties (... the freedom to come and go, the right to 
transport ...) may reinforce the need for a public service that guarantees the actual exercise of those 
rights or liberties and may even lead to obligations'
54
 (i.e. binding the undertaking with a public 
service duty). Access to transport links for all inhabitants of the national territory was `in the 
general interest'. The railway's public service remit was an organic part of its activities. On the 
British side, the railways had ceased to be a `common carrier' by the early 1960s and had no special 
claim to central government attention. By the late 1960s, Market Pricing was being applied to rail 
services by a Labour government, whilst in France the public service principle of pricing all rail 
journeys on a distance basis, the same for all passengers, continued to prevail under right-wing 
governments. 
 Public service principles were applied in France in the name of the general interest, and 
new projects such as LGV were also taken forward in the general interest. It has been argued that 
the doctrine holds `such an important position that when one wishes to provoke or justify 
significant changes, one secures considerable reinforcements by endeavouring to prove the 
compatibility of the new project with the general interest'.
55
 The means employed to achieve 
something in the general interest were quite irrelevant, so much so that the doctrine was `liable to 
cover diametrically opposed management practices: it may just as well justify making the railway 
profitable as its deficit'.
56
 The general interest was the objective to which all else must lead. 
 It was taken for granted however that the guardian of the general interest could only be the 
public authority. Though the doctrine began as a means to legitimate State action which ran against 
the interests of private individuals (e.g. expropriation), it eventually became a great deal more than 
that, through a process of `torsion' analysed by Chevallier: `Torsion takes place at the point when 
the general interest becomes, through the play of discourse, no longer the foundation and limit, but 
rather the attribute of State power.'
57
 This made it possible for a dominant image to be constructed, 
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`the image of a single ... society, in which diversity and particularismes are overcome, transcended, 
integrated, by a power that is at the service of the whole community.'
58
 According to Chevallier, the 
view was that such integration could only be achieved through a centralised seat of power: `Indeed 
the general interest cannot result from the spontaneous adjustment of private interests; it has to be 
mediated by an authority which, owing to its specific position, is able to achieve a synthesis of all 
individual wills and to define a common interest'.
59
 The centralised State fulfilled that function and 
`the general interest ... was for a long time in France defined within a framework that was the 
object of a broad consensus, even if its content provided ammunition for numerous conflicts, in 
particular at the political level: [it was defined] through and at the level of the nation-state, in a 
centralised fashion; on the basis of a technico-economic rationality borne by the technical and 
administrative grands corps; with individual interests willingly submitted.'
60
 
 Why should this doctrine have taken such precedence in the French referential 
framework?
61
 Crucially, the general interest concept became closely entwined with the emerging 
conception of public service, which was viewed `precisely as the main vector of the general 
interest'.
62
 In Chevallier's analysis, public service and general interest were the corollary of power: 
`concern with the general interest and public service justify power'; conversely, the vesting of 
public prerogatives into an organisation became a defining criterion of public service; this 
dialectical relationship between power and service was actually enshrined in French administrative 
law.
63
 The exercise of public power was fully justified if it served the general interest, defined by a 
neutral, impersonal Administration. Civil servants were purported to be the embodiment of the 
general interest, paradoxically, both because they served an elected President and because they 
detained a very detailed expertise that enabled them to remain above the political fray. 
 As regards Britain on the other hand, one may apply Suleiman's remark - made about the 
American political system - that the concept of the general interest was never elevated to the rank 
of a principle and that the influence of lobbying on political decisions has always been viewed as 
something natural.
64
 There was no concept of a `general interest' in the British referential 
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framework. On the contrary, individual interests had a natural right to be heard and it was taken for 
granted that they should be protected against the arbitrary exercise of public power. 
 The notion of `public interest' was commonly found but it was more to do with 
accountability and the disclosure of information to the public than with policies aiming at 
improving public amenities: for instance, Public Interest Immunity Certificates were documents 
signed by ministers in order to prevent the release of official papers in judicial cases. On the 
Labour side, the `common good' was often invoked, but on the whole `The tradition of a common 
or public interest [was] negligible' because the House of Commons was `the instrument of the 
majority party to further its will - not the place where a common interest is expressed and 
hammered out.'
65
 Partisanship was institutionalised to the extent that Prime Minister and leader of 
the ruling party were necessarily one and the same person. 
 Clearly the discourse about the general interest was central to public policy-making in 
France, in a way which was quite alien to British practice. Moreover, general interest and public 
service were mutually reinforcing elements of the French referential framework. The role of the 
State as upholder of the general interest carried with it the obligation for the State to provide 
training in strategic sectors of the economy (e.g. transport, through Ecole nationale des ponts et 
chaussées), to listen to the concerns of the network's managers, to understand the technicalities 
involved (hence the employment of P&C engineers within the Ministry) and to provide backing in 
difficult periods. Ultimately the blurring of public and private spheres was also justified by the 
doctrine of the general interest, which demanded that all available means be used in the pursuit of 
State objectives. In the British framework, the control of public expenditure was the prime 
responsibility of the state, and the public interest dictated that public and private spheres be clearly 
delineated, in order not to obfuscate lines of accountability. 
 
3. STATE CULTURE V. GOVERNMENT CULTURE 
 The stark contrasts revealed by the case studies were not so much bound up with the 
presence or absence of state intervention, than with two divergent cultures of public intervention. 
The French referential framework of public action was part of a `State culture' which emphasised 
continuity of purpose and action, whereas the British referential framework, with its ambivalence 
towards public action, reflected a `government culture' which emphasised adaptability to changing 
circumstances. The former stressed commitment and objective-setting over the long term whilst the 
latter necessarily fostered policy change and shorter commitments. Even within this government 
culture, there existed a strong prejudice against public power: government was associated with 
political interference (hence the arm's length relationship) rather than with expert guidance. In 
France, the State was associated with expertise and impartiality. 
 The following remarks gather a number of threads running through the case studies: 
practices concerning the distribution of power within policy-making circles, the balance between 
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political and administrative imperatives in decision-making, the procedural / substantivist divide 
and finally defines the central feature of each referential framework in terms of a `State mystique' 
(France) and a `symptomatic absence' (UK). 
 
A. The distribution of public power within the central apparatus 
 The process of high speed rail link route refinement casts an interesting light on the 
character of public power in the two countries. From October 1991, British central government was 
closely involved in the process of sifting through the various route options. This hands-on approach 
was quite unlike SNCF's internal process of route development, and is very reminiscent of the 
jointly funded and supervised BR/MoT APT programme. Furthermore, the route chosen by the 
British government in October 1991 was only the `broad conceptual alignment'; it took another 2 
1/2 years for the route to be refined, a process which closely involved local authorities and DoT 
until April 1994, with public consultation taking place 1 1/2 years after the broad alignment had 
been selected (March 1993); and the parliamentary process which began in November 1994 and 
was expected to last about two years could also lead in principle to route changes. When the French 
government chose the route already developed and refined by SNCF in January 1975, it was in 
order that the public inquiry may take place (starting in April 1975) and construction actually 
began soon afterwards (December 1976); in all the process took less than two years. 
 The British government set a remit whereby URL `should identify a series of options 
satisfying different criteria, to allow Ministers to make an informed choice',
66
 thus leaving the final 
choice in the politicians' hands, but the French government let SNCF choose the best option itself, 
which then had to be endorsed at the political level. Investment evaluation was found by URL to be 
`complex', owing to the fact that `the framework of options which the Government has asked Union 
Railways to address is extensive, and the number of possible permutations between options is 
consequently very large',
67
 but SNCF only carried out one fully detailed cost study of a possible 
Paris-Lyon alignment. SNCF was granted a large amount of discretionary power which BR never 
enjoyed. In that sense at least, SNCF behaved like an `arm' of the State (and was perceived as such 
at grassroot level during consultations), whilst BR was merely an `appendage'. 
 UK government control of the railway was in actual practice on the whole very vigorous. 
Yet at the same time, British central control, though strong enough to either launch a project which 
enjoyed far from unanimous support at BR (APT), or to stifle initiative, was not powerful enough 
to squelch opposing views, which were aired publicly, whilst the diffuse, French technostructure 
processed decisions in such a way that they were accepted as final by all interested parties at the 
centre and not argued out in the open: SNCF's preliminary studies, together with the instruction 
mixte procedure, resulted in the production of a single project. This meant that by the time the 
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public inquiry was launched, the railway had the full weight of State authority behind it. This is in 
sharp contrast with the British situation, where several routes were examined in the full glare of 
publicity and where government and Railways Board, and sometimes private companies (Eurorail, 
Eurotunnel) were often at loggerheads, and seen to be so in heated exchanges in the public arena. 
 More generally the collegiate - so to speak - nature of Parliament, reflected in the Cabinet 
practice of debating policies of the day, contrasted with the more hierarchical arrangements in 
France, where the Council of Ministers mainly endorsed decisions made at lower levels. In the first 
case one had collective governance involving a multiplicity of actors on the same level (enshrined 
in the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility), whilst in the second, responsibilities were defined at each 
level in the hierarchy of power. 
 Thus we encounter the following paradox: public power in Britain was both more highly 
centralised and more dispersed (between different parts at the centre) whilst in France it was more 
both more highly concentrated (because of hierarchical arrangements) and less rigidly controlled. 
Strong central control in Britain was accompanied by a relative dispersal of power among 
competing groups of roughly equal standing, whilst in France the technostructure concentrated 
power inasmuch as it left out Parliament, local authorities, and even, ministers. The British 
Parliament for instance was far more deeply involved in decisions than its French counterpart and 
the British parliamentary process was a great deal more demanding; the decision to build the link to 
the Tunnel required the passing of the CTRL Bill. The French Parliament played an extremely 
peripheral role, the decision to build LGV being taken by ministerial decree (DUP of March 1976), 
with just one debate (at the Senate) on 17 December 1976.
68
  
 The above paradox was connected to the fact that open political debate was highly valued 
in Britain, whilst in France administrative efficiency and impartiality ranked higher. 
 
B. The relative weights of administrative and political imperatives 
 Two divergent views concerning the role of the state in relation to civil society or the 
nation were manifest. In Britain, `democratic self-government' was the professed ideal, embodied 
in representative Parliament. In France national sovereignty lay with the people (not Parliament) 
and the State was the repository of popular sovereignty; in fact, the French State identified itself 
with the French Nation and saw itself as its embodiment (hence it was the guardian of the general 
interest far more than Parliament could ever be); this had resulted in `the overinvolvement of the 
State, guardian of sovereignty, which immediately suspects any individual or group of being 
factious, of attempting to undermine the general will by emphasising individual claims.'
69
 This 
preconception also applied to political parties, seen as divisive forces. It was so entrenched that to 
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all intents and purposes it put government in a subordinate position: `The continuity of the 
Administration, beyond political regimes, is a reality not to be neglected: the State is its business 
and the politician, the government, ends up by absorbing such values, by endorsing existing 
institutions, even if they stand in the way of their own interests or run contrary to their deepest 
beliefs.'
70
 In France administrative values were superior to political ones and infused political 
behaviour. 
 The old doctrine of the absolute sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament meant that 
`parliamentary absolutism' lay at the heart of Britain's regime.
71
 Government ministers were drawn 
from Parliament because they were meant to `represent' the people. The House of Commons was 
akin to an assembly of delegates with a small supporting staff (the Civil Service). In France, 
ministers need not have been elected and representation was not an overriding concern. The State 
was meant to `serve' the people; as such, it was akin to a professional organisation with a multitude 
of tasks. Hence British civil servants served the `government of the day' whilst their French 
colleagues were `at the service of the State'. In Britain political values ranked higher than 
administrative ones.
72
 This meant that administrative values were infused with politicians' 
imperatives. 
 Whereas accountability of decision-making was perceived as an important issue in the UK, 
it was hardly raised as such in France. This is not to say that the British government was actually 
more accountable than the French one, but that it had to be seen to be accounting for its actions. In 
fact, the British Houses of Parliament may have played a greater role than their French counterpart, 
but it was Cabinet which had the final say when Parliament and Ministers did not agree on policy: 
the debate about the fixed link promised to the Commons by the Labour Transport Minister in 
1974, prior to any decision on the Channel Tunnel, took place after the decision to cancel the 
project had been taken in January 1975; the change of policy was presented to Parliament as a fait 
accompli and ran against Parliamentary opinion, which had been in favour of the Tunnel by a ratio 
of 5 to 3 over the previous 3 years.
73
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 The above partially accounts for the peculiar dynamics of the policy processes brought to 
light by the case studies. Once Project C03 had gathered sufficient technico-administrative 
momentum, it was able to overcome political obstacles and survive a totally unfavourable change 
of President of the Republic; the initial APT momentum was lost when Labour regained power in 
1974. In France, high politics had a marginal effect on the project, whilst in Britain they were 
decisive. Paradoxically, the initial national political contexts were favourable to APT and hostile to 
TGV, but the dynamics of decision-making reversed this situation. Similarly ministerial politics 
had a different impact on the new infrastructure schemes: split Cabinets regarding CTRL1 and 2 
led to delays and policy reversals, whereas French government division over the Paris-Lyon issue 
only led to a fairly unconsequential delay. Finally it must be stressed that in both countries there 
was a high turnover of Transport Ministers, which noticeably affected British policy-making (even 
when the parliamentary majority remained unchanged) but barely stirred the French policy 
community. High politics had a far greater and damaging impact on the fate of BR's projects than 
on that of SNCF's, at least partly because the French Administration constituted a powerful buffer 
between the sector and the politicians. Thus the sector's remarkable capacity to insulate itself from 
political vagaries rested on the pivotal role played by a strong Administration. Both BR and DoT 
for their part were ill-equipped to resist the imposition of successive short-tenure ministers. 
 
C. Procedural government and substantivist State 
 One cannot comprehend the British and French referential frameworks without a glance at 
underlying legal conceptions. Although both British and French political cultures are ultimately 
founded on the rule of law, that rule is envisaged differently: in Britain, the contractual tradition 
presupposes partners bound by contract, where everything has to be agreed by interested parties 
which are on an equal footing; in France, the Roman, imperius tradition implies unilateral law 
`from above'. Moreover, the British legal system revolves around the notion of jurisprudence 
whereby the law flows from custom and civil society, and evolves constantly owing to judicial 
interpretation. In contrast, French administrative law is `free from the shackles of binding 
precedent';
74
 law was codified from 1804 under Napoleon and rests on a number of strict rules, not 
on tradition. 
 The reason for the emergence of the public service doctrine in France and its absence in 
Britain is that `romano-germanic law favours ... the conceptualisation of notions, whereas the 
Common Law family prefers the use of procedures, more concrete than the creation of notions. The 
public service concept arose in Roman Law countries. It is a Latin concept, inasmuch as it can be 
defined as an abstract, ill-defined notion, formulated by general rules  ... it is in France that the 
concept is the more structured and the broadest, owing to notably the important place occupied by 
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administrative law. On the contrary such a concept is foreign to the British Common Law 
tradition.'
75
 The distinction procedures / substance is apparent here. 
 If we now turn to Jourdan's definition of the conception of power in feudal France, we find 
it strikingly similar to present day British conceptions and practices: `Power is ... personal and 
individualised, it emanates directly from civil society' and is not totally concentrated so that `The 
relative division of power translates as an absence of codification and unification of judicial rules, 
it is customs notably which regulates social relationships between individuals'.
76
 Now the belief in 
the precedence of `customs' - which is enshrined in the Common Law of Britain - is a procedural 
belief: something is worthwhile simply because it has been accepted by a sufficient number of 
people over a sufficiently long period of time, not through its intrinsic value. Legal codes on the 
other hand demonstrate a faith in the possibility of basing justice on rational rules, which is 
essentially substantivist. 
 The different legal bases for public action in Britain and France thus take us back to an 
earlier point, namely the dichotomy between procedural and substantive policy-making, which has 
been more or less directly touched upon by a number of authors. Three are of particular interest. 
Lindblom defined two methods of policy formulation: the `root' and the `branch' methods (the latter 
better known as `muddling through').
77
 The root method identified by Lindblom as comprehensive, 
seeking the best means to achieve desired ends and relying heavily on theory clearly forms an 
important part of the substantive approach; whilst the branch method, with its deliberately limited 
scope, its emphasis on wide-spread agreement by various actors and its more empirical analysis, 
brings together some of the main elements of the procedural approach. Hayward's description of 
`humdrum' decision-making as incremental, based on the criterion of acceptability, and devoid of 
explicit, medium to long-term objectives, applies to the processes in our British case studies, whilst 
his definition of `heroic' decision-making as aiming at comprehensive coordination, involving 
explicit, binding objectives, and based on rational analysis, clearly relates to our French case 
studies.
78
 
 In his discussion of the ideology of the general interest, Chevallier also seemed indirectly 
to define the two approaches. In his view political power may be exercised either by a `Mediator' or 
by a `Master':
79
 in the first case (Mediators), `leaders stress their status as representatives of 
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members [of society] and seek to bring out - by means of a very wide-ranging and open 
confrontation of viewpoints - a common denominator for all the contending interests; they turn into 
clever negotiators, mediators or catalysts who seek through compromise to iron out tensions, 
overcome oppositions ... The general interest is presented as the outcome of a process of 
progressive combining and aggregation of the members' private interests'; contact between 
members and leaders is common. This immediately brings to mind the elements of representation, 
debate and lobbying which we found to be so important in the British referential framework earlier 
(`political' rationality). In the second case (Masters), `leaders must ... retain necessarily lofty views 
and shelter themselves from pressures exercised by members; besides, the solutions they adopt 
must prevail in all cases, by force if necessary, over mere private interests. Full of their superior 
position, confident of detaining knowledge, leaders come to behave as "moralising dispensers of 
justice" who conceive their role as a ceaseless fight against corporate selfishness.' This description 
corresponds to the `technico-economic' rationality which we explored in earlier chapters. 
 These two modes of public action rested on divergent views of the legitimate basis for 
public action: the French technico-economic approach rested on the superiority of substantive, 
rational knowledge, whilst the British approach reflected principles (embodied in strict procedures) 
such as democratic consent, public debate and political representation. The technico-economic 
`object-drivenness' of French public projects explored earlier tied in with basic characteristic 
assumptions about knowledge and the State. It was taken for granted that knowledge acquired by 
State experts was more comprehensive and neutral than anything the private sector could fathom. 
There was a drive from the late 1950s both at State and public firm level, to improve the 
understanding of public economy with a view to rationalising decision-making. The modelisation 
of `reality' in newly-set up State / public firms research units was justified because it provided 
useful, albeit imperfect, instruments at the service of public power. The normative view that 
knowledge ought to be perfected and widely disseminated was very widespread. In Britain, there 
was a preference for reliance on concrete, professional experience, viewed as a better guide to 
decision-making since it was based on actual facts (preferably in the private sector).
80
 With this 
essentially sceptical approach, no modelling procedures were sufficiently comprehensive and 
accurate to render the full complexity of `reality'; modelling was bound to be inadequate - unless 
carried out on a grand (expensive) scale - and therefore hardly worth attempting. As experience 
was necessarily more limited than models of reality, decisions were accordingly of limited scope. 
 At the same time, it was well-established `knowledge for action' which French State 
experts were keen to use, whilst in Britain there was a preference either for fully-fledged `scientific 
knowledge' (which was always open to being challenged and overturned) or for `rule-of-thumb' 
practical operating knowledge. Clearly two theories of knowledge were at work in the referential 
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frameworks, which I cannot begin to unravel in the short space that is left.
81
 But these translated 
into different practices, which are easy to document within the framework of our case studies: BR 
were unwilling for a long time to explain fully what they were doing or to see their unique, 
practical expertise challenged by other bodies (e.g. TRRL); this attitude was institutionalised to 
some extent in the arm's length relationship, which basically demanded that everyone `stick to their 
own patch'. When scientists were taken on by BR, they found willing hears within MoT/DoT. 
SNCF on the other hand were keen to demonstrate the depth of their expertise, not based solely on 
their unique operating experience but also on cutting-edge research by State engineers (in the 
broad, technico-economic French acception of the term). This zealousness was fully appreciated, 
not to say encouraged, by State officials. 
 Knowledge for action was needed as the basis for decisive public action, encapsulated in 
the terms volontarisme (public will or purposefulness) and volonté de l'Etat (will of the State), 
which are in common usage in French political discourse. The French referential framework did 
not overly concern itself with the democratic issue. It was predicated on the assumption that 
expertise cannot be improvised by politicians, that being elected does not confer wisdom on an 
individual, and that rational policies can only be formulated by thoroughly trained, experienced and 
disinterested servants of the State. In Britain on the other hand, securing consent was perceived as 
paramount and one found a lingering suspicion of any government which tried to identify the needs 
of society before society itself had become aware of them. The prevalent view was that civil 
society had a natural capacity for self-regulation (something akin to Adam Smith's `invisible hand' 
in the economy) and ought to be left to take care of itself; elected politicians were meant to give 
people what they wanted, rather than what an unelected administrator in central government might 
think they needed. In France, someone as long-serving as Marceau Long (a Vice-president of the 
Conseil d'Etat), had no hesitation in saying that `To enable people to live together and to direct the 
future of society so as to fulfil its deepest aspirations: that is at the heart of the State and of its 
political function. It is the guardian of social cohesion'.
82
 
 It would be fascinating to trace the origins of these two philosophies of public action, 
which are so distinctive. Although it is well beyond the scope of this work, I will venture one 
suggestion. Marquand has argued that the British `gentlemanly-capitalist state of the nineteenth 
century ... sought to make the world safe for gentlemanly capitalism'; that is `to make sure that the 
rules of the global order were observed' everywhere: `markets had to be open; debts had to be paid; 
and the canons of fiscal orthodoxy had to be observed.'
83
 In other words, proper `capitalist' 
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procedures had to be followed. French elites on the other hand periodically bemoaned the 
economic backwardness of France; Colbertism was in fact born at a time when it was felt that 
French industry lagged behind its English competitor. Such a perception gave rise to the desire to 
catch up and quite naturally to the setting of precise objectives. The British framework emphasised 
and institutionalised profit maximisation in the short term (a financial `principle'), rather than 
productive power in the long term (an economic `substance'), as in the French framework. 
 
D. State mystique and symptomatic absence 
 It is somewhat ironic that democracy should have been of so little concern to French 
policy-makers, since the defining event in French politics was the Revolution of 1789, whilst the 
British polity - which had retained much of its pre-democratic character - exhibited much anxiety 
about accountability.
84
 1789 ushered in modernity for the French State; but the defining event for 
the British state (in home affairs at any rate) was the Counter-Revolution of the 1790s and the early 
years of the nineteenth century, the period of the hard-fought Napoleonic Wars; under the threat of 
a new order imported from abroad, it gathered all its strength and successfully called on the past - 
and reconstructed it to suit its own purposes - to preserve the existing status quo. These antithetical 
responses to revolutionary change became embedded in state practice in both countries; thus most 
of the time we contemplate two opposing movements: a French polity looking forward to an 
uncharted future that remains to be built and a British one seeking to re-assert the perceived 
superiority of traditional ways and to preserve past achievements, `preferring the imperfect but 
functioning institution' born of experience to `promised perfection' based on theoretical 
speculation.
85
 
 Over time, a French State `mystique' evolved: serving the State was the aspiration of the 
brightest in any generation; they would join an elite State school where the sens de l'Etat would be 
inculcated to them. The primary connotations of the word Etat were prestigious. If there was a 
problem on the national scale, people's expectation was that the State should step in, for the 
Administration possessed a high degree of legitimacy and credibility: `the Administration occupies 
a particular status in the French civic culture. Though cynicism is widespread, for instance with 
politicians being perceived as motivated by the search for personal advantage ... on the other hand 
the Administration is a counterpower, the guardian of boundaries in the name of higher principles 
such as law and the nation.'
86
 The reverse side of the coin, providing fiscal revenue to fund State 
intervention was by and large tolerated. As Coleman has pointed out, one's country is something in 
which one has a certain investment, for which sacrifices (e.g. tax money) are occasionally required 
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to keep it going.
87
 French public policy was based on the perception that the population were 
prepared to `invest' more, perhaps because of a stronger sense of national destiny and because 
economic rewards were obvious in what used to be - until very recently - a closed economy. 
 British public policy had to take into account the fact that the economic actors who 
`mattered' were used to living in a more open economy (Empire then Commonwealth), and that 
there was a more diffuse sense of identity in a multinational state. There was a perception after 
1945 that the British people were less inclined to `invest' in the upkeep, modernisation and 
development of the country as a whole and would rather have `jam today' than invest in tomorrow. 
This perception connected effortlessly with the political tradition of constraining public power (and 
expenditure), which Hayward called `traditional self-restraining methods of government'.
88
 
 Instead of a `State mystique' as in France, one sensed in Britain a symptomatic absence of 
the state in any Continental sense.
89
 This translated an uneasiness about unrestrained public power, 
or even power more generally: one never ceases to be amazed at the frequency with which the 
famous quotation `Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely' (Lord Acton) is cited in 
Britain. Although in the British political system `Concentrated executive power was always there 
in reserve' there was until 1979 an `unspoken proviso that it should be kept in reserve as much as 
possible.'
90
 Even in Labour thinking we find strands of distrust for state power. Although the 
Labour Party is seen as the traditional party of the state, industrial corporations (such as the 
railways) created in 1945-1947 by the Labour government were meant to be immune both from 
vested interests and from government intervention. The `arm's length' relationship was thus applied 
by Labour to the railway to shield it from unwarranted political meddling. On a more general level, 
Tony Benn has written that `No serious socialist in the Labour Party, with its deep roots in 
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Christian ethics, co-operative experience, solidarity, dissenting radicalism and Marxist humanism 
has ever argued for the rigid imposition of state control, for our whole history has been a struggle to 
disseminate power by establishing and extending political and economic democracy.'
91
 
 This self-denying ordinance regarding the exercise of power was not at all found among 
French elites; they viewed power in a positive light as something to be used to promote national 
growth and progress. Their British counterparts on the other hand were very sensitive to the fine 
line between use and abuse, which led to a self-conscious practice of public power. This is not the 
same as saying that the British state was weak and the French strong. The former was only 
`minimal' in conceptions but there was a `formidable battery of powers available to the central 
state',
92
 a fact which became palpable during the Thatcher/Major premierships, not least in the 
railway sector. And the latter's `strength' depended not so much on formal powers as on its ability 
to enter into meaningful partnerships with economic actors (such as SNCF) and to train national 
policy elites to conform to one mould. 
 There was more to the British tradition than the constraint of public power on purely moral 
grounds. A more pragmatic reason can be found in the fact that from the eighteenth century British 
identity was inherently imperial,
93
 whilst French identity was first and foremost national (and after 
1789 Republican). Imperial identity meant that imperial affairs had precedence over home affairs: 
the `central state ... managed the provinces through a tacit form of indirect rule ... that left local 
affairs to local elites ... the crucial clause in this unwritten territorial constitution was that the 
interests of provincial Britain came second to the requirements of the global system.'
94
 The British 
state did not focus on national development but on maintaining international influence in finance 
and trade; precisely the reverse order of French State priorities. Thus an inward-looking France 
equated State and domestic development whilst an outward-looking Britain directed state attention 
to international matters; the British state was quite literally absent from the domestic scene. It does 
not follow however that it had no developmental role whatsoever; Marquand points out that `it did 
use public power to promote international competitiveness ... on behalf of the "gentlemanly 
capitalist" service sector in its south-eastern heartland, not on behalf of the "ungentlemanly 
capitalist" manufacturers in the provinces.'
95
 In short, it was more sensitive to the interests of 
(international) trade and finance than to those of (domestic) production, the mirror image of the 
situation in France. 
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 The British referential framework did however to a remarkable extent focus on restraining 
power and emphasised the unfettered exercise of individual freedom. The French framework 
focused on `nationalising' power, that is putting it at the service of the whole Nation, and 
emphasised the effective exercise of collective power for the benefit of all individuals. 
 To sum up, French State culture revolved around the supremacy of the impersonal 
Administration over individual politicians, the steady development of a public managerial culture 
designed to optimise public expenditure, the harnessing of public and/or private forces towards 
public ends, and the belief in economic and social perfectibility. All these elements were at least 
partially compatible with each other, and some were mutually reinforcing, which accounts for 
broad policy continuity. Although Project C03 could appear at first sight to be far removed from 
these general considerations, it in fact displayed all of these central features. As for British 
government culture, it was grounded in the supremacy of elected individuals over professional 
experts, the minimisation of public expenditure, the innate superiority of the private sphere, and a 
deep-seated belief that individuals and organisations were best left to look after their own interests. 
Some of these elements stood in contradiction with each other, or were not shared by all political 
parties, which often led to policy paralysis and reversals. Both the Advanced Passenger Train and 
Channel Tunnel Rail Link illustrated these essential features. 
 
 
4. THE REFERENTIAL FRAMEWORKS UNDER CHALLENGE 
 Referential frameworks are not fixed. Although prevailing conceptions and practices can 
be extremely resistant to change, evolution does take place. Challenges to established state practice 
may be of a very traditional nature, either internal (domestic changes, e.g. in public opinion, 
internal shifts in the balance of power) or external (foreign developments). Challenges may also be 
of a wholly unprecedented nature (European integration, global economic interdependence). 
Furthermore, within their respective national settings the frameworks are only in a dominant 
position. They are by no means accepted by all members of the national policy-making elite, or of 
the public, and have to contend with rival claims to legitimacy. In this section, I briefly discuss the 
most salient of these challenges within the framework of the case studies. 
 
A. Traditional challenges 
 Although with regard to Paris-Lyon the exercise of French public power was conducted in 
the traditional centralising, high-handed manner, with choices made almost exclusively on grounds 
of technical efficiency, it was beginning to face open criticism. The 1970s saw the beginnings of a 
legitimacy crisis of French State practices: State technical competence was questioned, along with 
the neutrality of procedures; prevailing practices were attacked as being anti-democratic and the 
right of the State to intervene in the life of the nation was challenged.
96
 New trends began to 
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undermine the doctrine of the general interest. The `authoritarian state logic, whether it had the 
appearance of le fait du Prince or that of technocratic decisions',
97
 had been granted legitimacy 
through the largely unchallenged claim of `Industrial Colbertism' that the State had a monopoly of 
the general interest.
98
 But it was now pointed out that this monopoly was potentially dangerous, 
and that the Republican state model made it possible for `arbitrary decisions to be imposed, under 
the guise of the general interest'.
99
 Technico-economic criteria have also gradually been challenged 
by other criteria such as environmental and regional ones. Local and individual interests are no 
longer willing to comply with `superior' interests. French practice is becoming somewhat more 
procedural. But the attempt at combining the two modes of public action (procedural and 
substantivist) presently taking place in France is proving extremely trying because the two 
rationales are so distinct and because institutional habits are so ingrained: Fourniau points out that 
the instigators of the Bianco Circular (Circular No 92-71 of 15 Dec. 1992, reforming the utilité 
publique procedure for large national infrastructure projects) `expressed a desire to democratise 
public decisions' whilst `the Authorities see the circular primarily as a way of using local debate to 
renew the legitimacy of a fundamentally unchanged technical and economic approach'.
100
 This 
points to the resilience of established practices. 
 In Britain, the dominant referential framework has equally been under fire. Public and 
business opinion has become increasingly critical of transport policy, both on environmental 
grounds and on the grounds of its inefficiency. Narrow financial criteria traditionally used in the 
appraisal of capital investment rail projects have been successfully challenged and CBA has been 
introduced in connection with CTRL. However, the range of criteria taken into account is still 
relatively narrow: e.g. benefits of the Channel Tunnel and its rail link to the regions of the North 
and Scotland have not been included in the appraisal criteria. Here too, change is slow and new 
practices possess strong affinities with old ones. 
 In both countries, the referential frameworks have also exhibited a high degree of 
resilience to foreign influences. For instance the planning experiment in Britain in the 1960s was 
very openly inspired from French State practice but remained no more than a short-lived 
experiment because there was no institutional capacity for the planning approach, and a great deal 
of intellectual dislike for its underlying principles. In France in the 1980s, in the wake of Anglo-
American neo-liberal thinking, parties both of the Left and Right started to re-examine the role of 
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the modern State. Its omnicompetence was questioned. As Duhamel and Pisier have argued,
101
 the 
new trend in French politics is now to re-evaluate the respective places of State and civil society, a 
trend illustrated by the significant number of press articles and high level gatherings around that 
very theme;
102
 Le Monde even declared: `The notion of the State is in crisis'.
103
 Concurrently, there 
has been a `rehabilitation of the firm'
104
 or in the words of Michelle Cini, a `legitimisation of 
private interests'.
105
 It is somewhat premature to conclude however that by the end of the 1980s, 
`Right and left in France agreed that despite their success in the past, the era of state-led 
development was past'.
106
 
 Might the more far-reaching changes to the referential frameworks be wrought by shifts in 
the balance of power between various policy-making factions? Such shifts did occur in France, 
where DATAR's creation and ascendency had adverse consequences on the railways, but SNCF 
subsequently regained much of its former influence. In Britain, such shifts did not concern the 
railway itself as much as the Transport administration. The temporary ascendency of government 
scientists at MoT/DoE greatly favoured APT. On the whole however, such shifts were likely to be 
reversed if they ran against the grain of established practice. 
 
B. A new type of challenge: European integration 
 Besides the intermittent influence of traditional domestic and international developments, 
British and French policy machineries had to cope on a day-to-day basis with a far-reaching 
transformation of their working environment: the creation and development of the European 
Community. But for over two decades, the EC's Common Transport Policy (CTP) barely existed in 
the railway sector and national policy-making remained largely undisturbed, with the exception of 
the PSO concept, introduced in 1974. Differences of approach to railway policy were felt to be so 
great that policy-making at the European level focused on road issues, which were somewhat easier 
to solve. 
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 It has been argued that the extremely slow progress of the CTP, one of the three foundation 
policies in the Treaty of Rome (Article 3), was due to a conflict between the Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental approaches towards transport; the former being essentially commercial and concerned 
with maximising efficiency whilst the latter treats transport provision both as a state obligation and 
a policy instrument.
107
 If we substitute `French' for `Continental', it is clear that the case studies 
vindicate this diagnosis. There were other conflicting elements in the British and French 
approaches to transport policy, which I now discuss. 
 Given the features of the dominant French referential framework analysed in the course of 
this work, it is not surprising that French governments should be promoting Europe-wide networks, 
viewed as `a powerful factor for the construction of a concrete Europe.'
108
 The nation-building 
ethos is being reiterated, albeit on a wider scale. Conversely British governments, at least since 
Thatcher, have stressed deregulation and the phasing out of public subsidies. So whilst the EC 
adopted for the first time in 1989-1990 a multiannual action programme in the field of transport, 
the UK government took a restrictive view of the role of the European Commission `in developing 
a transport infrastructure in the European Community', arguing that its role `should be "restricted to 
the coordination of national planning"'.
109
 The French preference for integrated policies was 
incompatible with the British wish for plain coordination. 
 Since 1990 the EC has been `more concerned with the development of an integrated 
transport policy, a major part of which is the funding of a network of infrastructure',
110
 and thinking 
and long-term plans have been more in tune with features of French State practice since the 
Maastricht Treaty (Dec. 1991), a milestone in the development of the CTP. The Treaty provided 
for the construction of Trans-European-Networks (TENs) in transport (as well as in the energy and 
telecommunication sectors). By 1993, high speed rail infrastructure projects had become part of the 
policy agenda and subsequently acquired a high political profile. The Commission's approach to 
railway matters since 1993 has been highly reminiscent of the French Masterplan approach, 
involving the prioritisation of specific schemes and targeted spending. The Commission's White 
Book on growth, competitiveness and employment (Dec. 1993) recommended a large-scale 
programme of investment into infrastructure networks; it itemised 26 transport projects which 
deserved priority consideration and gave transport pride of place, listing in its infrastructure action 
plan 9 high speed rail projects adding up to 60% of the proposed investments; also it argued that it 
was the Commission's task `to identify priority projects and to concentrate on them what EU funds 
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there were available'.
111
 Finally, once the High Level Group set up by the Economic Affairs 
Commissioner, Henning Christophersen, had selected 14 of those priority projects, it became clear 
that one of the aims of TENs was `to effect a modal shift in traffic from road to rail ... Thus, 
whereas today roads carry roughly 80% of passenger traffic whilst rail carries less than 10%, the 
balance of investment in the 14 priority projects is just the other way round. Roughly 80% is 
earmarked for rail projects - 10% only will go to road construction.'
112
 
 French policy-makers were no strangers to such blatant interventionism, having for 
decades sought to develop rail traffic and protect it from unfettered road competition, but such a 
strong focus on public transport was unfamiliar to British central government. So how was this 
integrated approach viewed in Britain, where a case-by-case approach was preferred? One official 
acknowledged that there was a different `train of thought' on the Continent; whereas the ideal of 
local planning was dominant in Britain, the concept of spatial development and the tradition of 
central planning were strong in France and had `flowed across' into the European polity; the UK 
welcomed EU initiatives that could develop European trade and provide financial support to 
national projects but did not have to think in terms of network because it was an island.
113
 
 Such stark differences in outlook were problematic at the level of European policy-making. 
By the early 1990s, some in the French Administration were calling for the formulation of a new 
concept, `European public service', whose objective would be `to seek simultaneously utility, 
quality, economic and social efficiency.'
114
 Clearly, this was an extension of the public service 
concept, developped within France from the mid-nineteenth century, from the national to the 
European sphere. The French government embraced wholeheartedly the concept of European-wide 
transport networks and devised new domestic high speed rail policy with a full awareness of the 
implications at European level. In fact one could almost view the emergence of a European high 
speed rail network as an extension of French national railway policy, fully aided and abetted by the 
French railway operator, grounded in a technico-economic rationale. The British government for its 
part allowed purely domestic and ideological considerations to constrain the potential commercial 
benefits of the London - Paris international link; although the Tunnel represented an unprecedented 
commercial opportunity for BR international services, central government appeared unwilling - or 
unable - to exploit it to the full. On the other hand, it was keen to secure a European financial 
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contribution, which goes some way towards explaining the delays experienced by the scheme. 
Therefore both in British domestic and European policies the same politico/financial rationale 
prevailed. 
 It is interesting to note that of the four UK priority projects on Christophersen's Transport 
List (1994), two are of direct relevance to our case studies: the London-Channel section of 
PBKAL, and the modernisation of WCML (on which the APT train had been intended to run). 
These two important railway schemes had foundered against national financial stringency and lack 
of planning commitment but a new lease of life might be provided by EU level long-term decisions 
and funding. 
 Clearly, both the impact of national conceptions and practices on European transport 
policy-making, and the impact of EU policies on national transport policies are extremely 
important developments which constitute a very worthy topic for future research. As regards our 
case studies, the latter type of impact was only in its infancy and influenced policy development 
very little, whilst the former was very much in evidence but regrettably lies beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Despite the evolving nature of the referential frameworks, and the diverse challenges 
which they faced, in the 1990s many of the elements of the British and French frameworks noted in 
the case studies remained prominent. 
 On the whole, the French State in action within the framework of the case studies was not 
quite as described in the existing literature: TGV was not a dirigiste project but an SNCF strategy 
to gain commercial credibility. The project did however rely on state power for its implementation. 
This power was not so much inherently coercive, based on strong lines of hierarchical command 
(though it was, partly) as the result of its ability to work hand in hand with the actors in the sector 
concerned (e.g. local councils, Fiscal Services, farmers' unions). Also it was based on the cultural 
hold of notions of public service, and on the perceived primacy of State over society in a number of 
essential areas. This is what I called a State mystique. It conferred legitimacy to the concentration 
of public power in the higher reaches of the State apparatus, and to the use of the decree-making 
procedure for a very substantial project such as LGV Paris-Lyon was. 
 British central government could not in any way be described as weak, though it might 
lack a sense of solid purpose. It was keen to promote R&D of a scientific type and to provide start-
up funds, but disinclined to play an obviously pro-active role and provide guidance as regards 
planning for (costly) infrastructure. It exhibited great strength when it came to financial control and 
intervention in the affairs of the railways was fairly common. It possessed surprising reserves of 
formal powers which could be used, as indeed they were under Mrs Thatcher, and even under John 
Major (railway privatisation was backed by very few, even within the Conservative Party). At the 
same time, central government was singularly devoid of public purpose, even under Labour and 
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displayed short-term financial concerns more commonly associated with the private sector, because 
the referential framework was devoid of commitment to public action in the productive segment of 
the national economy. This symptomatic absence was the counterpart of the culture of individual 
freedom and public accountability. It justified the dispersal of public power within the broad centre 
of the state apparatus and the use of lengthy but more democratic procedures. 
 Several main features of the French referential framework (medium to long-term planning, 
focused capital investment, systems approach) were highly compatible with the requirements of 
railway development. Those of the British framework (short-term policy-making prone to reversal, 
periodical capital investment famines, case-by-case approach) were inimical to large-scale railway 
projects, particularly those involving infrastructure. But this is not to say that the divergent paths of 
high speed railway development followed by the two countries can be explained solely in terms of 
the referential frameworks. I have already stressed in the course of this work that my purpose was 
not to explain policy outcomes but to derive features of the frameworks of public action from the 
close study of sectoral policies over a given period. 
 In practice, the French State mystique meant that the alliance of boldness in public policy 
(brand new, costly infrastructure) and the drive for effectiveness (proven techniques both for track 
and rolling stock) turned Project C03 into a successful transport system. The symptomatic absence 
of state purpose in the British case meant that the alliance of conservatism in public policy (old 
infrastructure upgraded at the least cost) and scientific discovery (revolutionary APT technology) 
were preferred. Boldness in public policy was definitely not part of the referential framework if it 
also involved substantial financial commitment, a point amply demonstrated by the CTRL stories. 
 The British anti-industrial bias, which adversely affected railway development, had its 
roots in the international economy rationale which historically informed the British referential 
framework. The corresponding dominance of financial imperatives was dictated by the needs of the 
financial services sector which underpinned the imperial system. French industrial patriotism, 
which actively encouraged capital expenditure on industrial infrastructure such as the railways, had 
its roots in a domestic economy rationale focused on productive achievement. The procedural 
emphasis on political debate in Britain was part of a legalistic government culture centred on 
consent, self-governance and a fair hearing. The substantivist stress on socio-economic efficiency 
in France belonged to a State culture focused on national achievements as the ends, political will 
enforcing policies formulated by experts as the means. It is in the light of these twin economic and 
political legacies that we can understand how French public policy came to be infused with 
technico-administrative values, whilst British public policy was often torn between political and 
financial imperatives. 
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 ABBREVIATIONS 
British 
ACARD Advisory Council on Applied Research and Development 
APT  Advanced Passenger Train 
BR  British Rail 
BRB  British Railways Board 
BREL  British Rail Engineering Ltd 
BTC  British Transport Commission 
CBA  Cost-benefit analysis 
CBI  Confederation of British Industry 
CM&EE Chief Mechanical and Electrical Engineer 
CPO  Compulsory Purchase Order 
CTCC  Central Transport Consultative Committee 
CTRL  Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
DoE  Department of the Environment 
DoT  Department of Transport 
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry 
ECML  East Coast Main Line 
EFL  External Financing Limit 
EFR  External Financing Requirement 
EPS  European Passenger Services 
HMG  Her Majesty's Government 
HST  High Speed Train 
IC  InterCity 
IRR  Internal Rate of Return 
JRDC  Joint Research and Development Committee 
JRDWG Joint Research & Development Working Group 
JSG  Joint Steering Group 
JTRC  Joint Transport Research Committee 
MCA  Multi-criteria analysis 
M&EE  Mechanical and Electrical Engineering 
MinTech Ministry of Technology 
MoT  Ministry of Transport 
NEDO  National Economic Development Council 
NRDC  National Research & Development Corporation 
PFI  Private Finance Initiative 
PSO  Public Service Obligation 
RRR  Required Rate of Return 
RTC  Railway Technical Centre 
SRA  Special Replacement Allowance 
STOL  Short Take-Off and Landing Aircraft 
TDR  Test Discount Rate 
TRAG  Transport Research Assessment Group 
(T)RRL  (Transport and) Road Research Laboratory 
URL  Union Railways Ltd 
VTOL  Vertical Take-Off Aircraft 
WCML  West Coast Main Line 
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French 
 
 
BCEOM Bureau central des études d'outre-mer 
CE  Calcul économique (public) 
CEP  Centre d'Essais des Propulseurs 
CIAT  Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire 
CNAM  Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers 
CNRS  Centre national de la recherche scientifique 
DATAR Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale 
DDSF  Direction départementale des services financiers 
DETMT Département des Etudes de Traction et de Matériel  
DTT  Direction des Transports Terrestres 
DUP  Déclaration d'utilité publique 
ENA  Ecole nationale d'administration 
ENPC  Ecole nationale des ponts et chaussées 
ENSTA  Ecole nationale des sciences et techniques appliquées 
EPIC  Etablissement public industriel et commercial 
FDES  Fonds de développement économique et social 
FIF  Fédération des industries ferroviaires 
GEFAU Groupe d'études fer-autoroute 
GIE  Groupement d'intérêt économique 
IRT/ 
INRETS Institut (national) de recherche sur les transports (et leur sécurité) 
LGV  Ligne à grande vitesse 
LOTI  Loi d'orientation des transports intérieurs 
MdT  Ministère des Transports 
Finance  Ministère de l'économie et des finances 
P&C  Ponts & Chaussées 
P-L  Paris - Lyon 
P-S-E  Paris - South-East 
SAEI  Service des affaires économiques et internationales 
SCF  Service des chemins de fer 
SEA/SA Société d'Etudes de l'Aérotrain/Société de l'Aérotrain 
SETRA  Service des études techniques des routes et autoroutes  
SNCF  Société nationale des chemins de fer 
TGV  Train à grande vitesse 
TRI  Taux de rentabilité interne 
X  Ecole polytechnique 
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Other and bibliographical abbreviations 
 
 
 
AHCIF  Association pour l'histoire des chemins de fer en France 
BAM  British Archival Material 
CEMT  Community of European Ministers of Transport 
CGP  Commissariat général du Plan 
CUP  Cambridge University Press 
ECIS  European Centre for Infrastructure Studies 
EIU  The Economist Intelligence Unit 
ESRC  Economic and Social Research Council 
FAM  French Archival Material 
FNSP  Fondation nationale des sciences politiques 
FT  Financial Times 
HC  House of Commons 
HCSP  Haut Conseil du Secteur Public 
HMSO  Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
ICE  Institution of Civil Engineers 
IWPICT Interdepartmental working party on inter-city transport 
JO  Journal officiel de la République française 
OUP  Oxford University Press 
PTRC  Planning and Transport Research and Computation 
PUF  Presse universitaire de France 
RFSP  Revue française de sciences politiques 
RGCF  Revue générale des chemins de fer 
RGI  Railway Gazette International 
RHCF  Revue d'histoire des chemins de fer 
UIC  Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (International Union of Railways) 
WP  White Paper 
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